towards the clofe of the war; and foon after went out to the West Indies, where he confirmed his former good character as an officer, and returned home with increased rank, and increating reputa

tion.

When General Sir William Meadows went out to India, Colonel Harris accompanied him; and, on the fubfequent arrival of Lord Cornwallis as Governor General, he fo recommended himself to his L rdhip's notice by his active and fpirited behaviour, as well as his know. ledge in fortification and all the other branches of his profeffion, that, on his Lordship's quitting India, he left him with the rank of Lieutenant General, and Commander in Chief of the British Forces.

As we are now arriving to the point of time which gives the higheft luftre to his name (viz. the conquest of Seringapatam), it will be neceffary just to sketch the origin and refult of the Myfore War, by which the Public will be better enabled to judge of the high confidence which this able officer held in the opinion of the Governor General, Lord Mornington, as well as the very confiderable military talents which fo defervedly entitled him to obtain that opinion.

The triple alliance of 190, and the peace of Seringapatam, dictated after a glorious and decifive war by Lord Cornwallis in 1792, had given a confiftency to the fluctuating politics of India. They had generated and defined a fyftem of balanced power and mutual intereft calculated to conciliate and enforce the prefervation of public tranquillity :-they had diminished the power, removed the intereft, and confequently, it was prefumed, the inclination of Tippoo Sultaun to disturb the harmony of the EngJifh and their allies and they prefented to thofe al ies,, the Nizam and the Mharattas, fuch motives to peace, and fuch checks upon their mutual ambition, as it was hoped would, for a long feries of years, have made us the arbiters of the power and prosperity of India.

But Tippoo Sultaun, having found that the intrigues of the Mharatta Court played favourably for his purpose, and that the Nizam, though willing to fulfil the treaties of 1791 and 1792, could not, from the infirmities of extreme old age, and the predatory power of the Mharattas, availed himself of these circumftances to give a loose to that reftiefs and perfidious Ipirit which ever governed his politics. Hence he began to intrigue once more in French defigns to carry on his favourite project-the extermination of the English from India.

What rendered the point of time ftill more favourable to him was, that the Republican principles of Old France had, in a very early ftage of the Revolution, infected the colonies of Pondicherry and Chandernagore; and the capture of those places by the English had dispersed fore of the most zealous propagators of milchief amongst the courts and armies of the native princes of India. Tippoo faw all thefe circumftances favourable to his purpose; and, encouraged by the exaggerated statement of a French marine adventurer (Ripaud) of the number and condition of the French troops at the Mauritius, he immediately fent a dif guifed embaffy to that ifland, propofing a defenfive and offenfive alliance, but endeavoured to cover it by a falfe affertion,-that it meant nothing more than a private mercantile adventure.

The proclamations, however, of General Malartie, the Governor of the French ifland, avowing publicly the Sultaun's embaffy and defigns, foon reached the ears of Lord Mornington (now Marquis Wellesley), who had just landed at Bengal as Governor General, and who at firft could fcarcely believe it, till foon after convinced of it by official intelligence from Lord Macartney at the Cape.

On the preffure of this emergency, aggravated by great financial embarra ments, his Lordfhip iffued his orders for the immediate affembly of the army on the coaft of Coromandel and Malabar, determined to anticipate, if poffible, the

4

defigne

defigns of his enemies before the arrival of the French army, and other contingencies in their favour. But here his Lordship met with an unexpected check, by being told officially from Madras, "That the army of the Prefidency was fo difperfed and ill equipped for an offentive campaign, that it would require three, or, according to fome refpectable military opinions, fix months, to put it even in a state of efficient defence; that the danger of afflembling any confiderable part of it, and thus provoking the immediate hoftility of Tippoo, was, independent of the expence, fo great and alarming, that, without a strong previous reprefentation, the Members of the Madras Council could not think themfelves justified in obeying the orders they had

received."

Though the above may be an accurate ftatement of the fact relative to the state of the army in Madras, it did not appear to his Lordship that the inference was juft. The arguments, therefore, of the Madras Council only ferved to call up new energies in his Lordship's mind to encounter, or if practicable to prevent the danger; he therefore fent pofitive orders to the Madras Government (which the provident wisdom of the British Le. giflature had empowered him to do) not only to expedite the equipment of the army at Vellore, but to hold in readiness 4,000 men to march to Hyderabad, on the requifition of the refident at that court.

The confequence of this quick movement, and its fubfequent operations, was, that a French corps, under the command of Monf. Perrou, were furrounded, difarined, and disbanded without bloodshed or tumult, and in their ftead were fubftituted a subsidiary British force of 6,000 men, which, operating as an immediate check on the army of Myfore, relieved us from part of the apprehenfions entertained of Tippoo's designs against the Carnatic, and restored to us that influence at the court of Hyderabad which experience has fhewn to be of fo much consequence to the fecurity of our poffeffions in the Decan, and fo neceffary to the general tranquillity of India. Lord Mornington, now thinking the force afiembled at Vellore, ftrengthened by the revived power of the Nizam, and the fure co-operation of the British detachment at Hyderabad fufficiently impofing, on the 8th Nov. 1798 firft warned Tippoo Sultaun of his having intelli. gence of his designs and hoftile connec

tions with the French; at the fame time propofing to fend an ambassador to treat of the means of reftoring a good underRanding between the two states, and, if poffible, remove the grounds of diftruit.

No notice was taken of this letter till the 18th December, when Tippoo contented himself with fimply and falfely denying the facts alleged against him, and declined the admiflion of an English ambassador.

It is not permitted us in the limits of this memoir to detail the various endeavours of the Governor General to bring Tippoo to a fair explanation of facts, and confequently to a renewal of that good faith which he fo repeatedly and folemnly pledged himself to maintain by several treaties, and particularly that of 1792.Tippco's antwers were all trifling and uniatisfactory, and evidently fhewed he waited nothing but the arrival of the French forces, and the benefits of the approaching season, to put all his defigns into execution. In one of his latest anfwers to Lord Mornington (upon the latter requesting him to permit an ambaffador to be fent to him to adjust all depending circumftances) he infultingly fays, in a letter without any date" that his lordship might send an ambassador if he thought proper, but that as he was go. ing on a hunting party, defires that he might be fent without any attendants."

Thefe repeated frivolous delays, with the additional private information which the Governor General had of Tippoo's daily expectation of 15,000 French troops of the line, befide a fufficient naval force, decided him to lofe no time of gaining that by force of arms, which he believed no treaties could effect-accordingly, he immediately assembled an army, the fineft perhaps that ever was assembled in India, commanded by an officer of known courage, abilities, and local experience, which, on the 3d of February 1799, was ordered directly to advance into the Myfore, for the exprefs purpofe (in cale of no negotiation taking place) of the capture of Seringapatam.

Why this prompt measure of attacking the capital of Tippoo was refolved on by the deliberation of the Governor General (and no doubt aided by the local knowledge and military talents of General Harris), is best fhewn by the following reafons, which are now aligned for it, and fhews what great credit is due to the vigilance, good fente, and vigour of mind of the British Council:

"From

"From the moment that the proclamation at the Mauritius was authenticated, it was allowed on all fides that an army must be immediately aflembled to cover the Carnatic. To cover a frontier of many hundred miles, in which there are no lefs than feventy or eighty paffes, practicable and eafy to light armed troops, from the deftructive predatory irruptions of Indian horfe, both reafon and experience fhew to be impoffible, on any other fyftem than that of obliging the enemy to concentre his force for the protection of Seringapatam. Seriously to alarm Tippoo for the lafety of his capital, and prevent his detaching his regular and irregular cavalry, to plunder and lay waste our provinces below the Gauts of Coromandel and Malabar, it was neceffary the army fhould be fully equipped, and that he fhould know it to be ready to move forward at a moment's warning. The fame expence of troops, carriage, and provifions, muft therefore be contracted as was contracted whether the amy remained encamped under the walls of Vellore, or at the gates of Seringapatam.

"Befide, on the principle of a defenfive war, we should have had an army of obfervation, at an immenfe and never-ending expence on the borders of Myfore; and if this had kept Tippoo at bay, how long could our finances have fupported it? What fecurity had we, that the French, whole alliance he had fought and obtain ed, would never land on his coat from France, from Egypt, or the Mauritius ? "We know, from what has lately pafled in Egypt and Ireland, that no fleets, however fuperior, can abiclutely remove the danger of defperate defcent, even on coafts which fleets are feldom obliged to quit, much leis that of Malabar, which, for a whole monioon, muft be left open and expofed; where, though the protection must be withdrawn, from the general danger of remaining on the ccaft during the South-west Monicon, there are many intervals of moderate weather, in which fhips might difembark their troops without darger or difficulty. -How fhould we then attack a country guarded by French ta@ics, and abounding in natural fortrefes, which, if defended with European skill, are abfolutely impregnable? What other armies could we furnifh to watch the French action at Hyderabad, or the licentious cops of Scindiah, at Poonah; to lay

nothing of the fupport of the army we had been already obliged to aflemble against Zeman Shah, in Oude ?-it is plain that the very means of defence would have been infallible ruin.

"We should have had months and years of defenfive apprehenfion, at nearly the expence of actual hoftility, instead of a few weeks of offenfive war. We fhould have had enemies, inftead of allies-danger inttead of tafety-contempt, decline of power, and bankruptcy, instead of increafing refources-ftrength and glory."

Such were the reafons, no doubt, which influenced Lord Mornington, to order the army directly to Seringapatam; but as there was still a hope left, that before the attack on this capital would be made, Tippco might enter into fome negotiation, his Lordship, with a magnanimous confidence, equally honourable to himself and ferviceable to the tate, intrusted a large portion of his own authority to the temporary difcretion of the Commander in Chief; and thus were the advantages, which had been formerly derived from an union of the civil and military power in the perfon of Lord Cornwallis, again fecured to the state.

How well this confidence was placed, and with what prudence and magnanimity the Commander in Chief (after every endeavour to prevent the effusion of human blood) obtained the conqueft of Seringapatam, is too recently and univerfally authenticated to need a repetition here. France fees this conqueft as the finishing blow to all her future expectations in India, and comes in as a bitter fuccedaneum to her merited difafters in Egypt— whilft Great Britain has the happiness of feeing a kingdom, equal in extent to two thirds of the ancient monarchy of France, and yielding an annual revenue of more than one million fterling, transferred in full fovereignty to the Company and their allies

and all this obtained in the short space of two months, and without any injury to its fubjects, or devaftation of the country, beyond what the Sultan himself had directed for the purpose of haraffing the march, and preventing the fupplies of the allied army.

The General who achieved this important conqueft is but about forty five years of age, a time of life which promiles to give him the enjoyment of his well deferved fortune and honours, in the bofom of his family and friends.

CHARAC

him from transportation; but his election was annulled.

Reitored to liberty and his family, he hattened back to his rural retreat where, with a tranquil confcience, he died on the 30th of December laft, at the age of 69 years; a good father, an affectionate husband, and a Chriftian.

Here let me remove one of thofe flanders engendered by the prejudices of le&t and party, which from the French papers has found its way to thofe of other countries. They acculed Marmontel of hypocrify, for defending the interests of religion in the Legislative Body, after having, they fay, attacked it in his works. Nothing is more abfurd and false than this affertion. But fuppofing that a writer in the effervefcence of youth, and hurried away by example, or the pallions, had taken unwarrantable liberties with religious principles, would it follow, that when matured by age and reason, when taught by dreadful experience the effects of incredulity, he should not acknowledge the danger of it, and oppofe it without being guilty of hypocrify? It was the cale of another academician, whofe converfion made ftill more noife than his errors.

But as for Marmontel, he never had grounds to lament his publications. He never sheltered himself by writing anonymoufly; and in which of his acknowledged works fhall we find a proof to fupport the imputation I am refuting? Will any one venture to adduce the cenfure of Bellifarius by the Doctor of the Sorbonne, who with a rage and abfurdity worthy of the tenth century, anathematized the maxims of toleration difplayed by the author of it, and which were adopted by all enlightened Chriftians awake to the spirit of the Gospel ?

FIG

To listen to the crowd of declaimers and ignorant fellows who pretend to explain the caules of the revolution, we fhould believe it to be the refult of a univerfal confpiracy of men of learning and fcience against the Throne and the Altar. They are, no doubt, right, according to their meaning; for, in their eyes, whoever requires that the power of the laws fhould be fuperior to that of a Minifter, or of a Lieutenant de Police, is a rebel and a Jacobin; just as they, with equal fagacity, pronounce him an Atheist who wrote against the Jefuits, or laughed at the legend.

Fact is the aniwer to thefe enormous fooleries. In fpite of the interested declamations and invectives of the Linguets, Merciers, and Chamforts, it is certain that the French Academy was compofed of men the moft diftinguished by their literary talents. Mark then: of 37 members, the number of that body in 1790, only eight embraced and ferved the Revolution*. Most of the members of the Academy of Inferiptions and Belles Lettres were clear of all participation in it. The Academy of Sciences alone merited that reproach which was fo unjustly thrown upon men of letters worthy of the title: and to it everlating fhame it produced three of Robespierre's minif ters, namely, Monge, Meunier, and Fourcroy.

As for the crowd of compofers of ballads and romances, college tutors, private teachers, club-philofophers, rhetoricians, and inspired jurifts, who have devoted their genius to the improvement of fociety, it is carrying the indulgence of language too far to call them men of letters.

IGURE 1. reprefents a houfe fituated in London Wall, curious from the antique figures on the front, of which no authentic account can be traced.

Figure 2. is an Old House the corner of Cloth-Fair and King-ftreet, Weft Smithfield, in the occupation of Mellrs. Campions, butchers, and fuppofed to be as ancient as part of the Monaftry of St. Bartholomew the Great; there are remaining four grotefque figures fupporting in part the covings on the corners of

the houfe, and before the front was alter, ed there were more emblematical figures.

Figure 3. is the Arch Way from Leadenhall treet, the entrance to Duke's Place, and generally believed to be part of the original gate-way of the palace of the Dukes of Norfolk, from which Duke's Place takes its name.

Figure 4. is an Ancient Entrance, fituated in St. Helen's, Bifhopigate ftrest.