have enumerated, how is it possible that a population of nearly twenty millions could remain subject to a power that does not possess in Europe eight millions of subjects, and which could not grant the least useful protection, in compensation for the exorbitaut privileges which she arrogated to herself? witness the uncontested occupation of the Floridas, which the United States seized upon, under the convenient pretext that the feeble and abandoned condition of these possessions, joined to the consideration of their proximity to the United States, were sufficient motives to authorize the occupation of a position, which, like Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, or England itself, is cal culated to command the navigation of the world.

It is, therefore, evident, that if no foreign force intervene, South America is irrevocably freed from her bonds. It remains now to ascertain whether it be the interest or policy of those powers who have no possessions in America, to enter into a contest in which their interposition would be, in fact, announcing to the world a system of unlimited invasion of rights; for it is plain, that not one of the motives recently alleged against Spain and Italy are at all applicable to South America.

Nothing seems to forebode that such will be the conduct of the cabinets of continental Europe. But let us anticipate the most fatal suppositions, and let us admit the hypothesis whereby a more than imprudent policy would lead them into an alliance, tending to constrain America, by force of arms, to return under the yoke of the mother country, or to adopt a prescribed form of government: is it not probable, or rather, is it not certain, that such a step would meet with an in

surmountable barrier in the counter interposition of the United States and of Great Britain-a barrier which, according to all probability, would become a source of fatal re-action for the aggressors themselves. The wishes of the United States, and the objects of their policy are manifest. Every one knows that, after the acquisition of their own independence, their greatest interest is that of the liberation of South America; for, independently of the grand question of its political existence, of which the liberty of the south ought to serve as a corollary, and which, for instance, would be immediately threatened by the submission of Mexico to the poltical system of the holy alliance, it is evident that the same liberty which will open the southern ports to every flag, will considerably add to the possession of the Floridas, whence the United States will be able to watch all foreign navigation, which constantly tends towards the Gulf of Mexico. But perhaps, it will be said, if such be the interest of the United States, why have they observed that strict neutrality between Spain and her colonies? By entering as a party in the contest, they would have accelerated so desirable an event. To this we will answer, that this neutrality is, in our opinion, one of the wisest calculations of the Washington cabinet. The North Americans perceived that the insurrection of South America was one of those events that could not be prevented by feeble efforts; they, therefore, waited till facts had sufficiently attested the inability of Spain to regain her authority: by this prudent conduct, they prevented the issue of the contest being attributed to accidental force or to a violation of public rights, which, in the eyes of Europe,

might have weakened the legitimacy of American independence; and this was the grand and essential point, since on this depended the accordance of general principles with the exigency of those particular circumstances in which the Spanish colonies were placed. But, as soon as the government of one of the insurgent states had acquired, by its own energy, some appearance of stability, the United States immediately recognized its independence, and thus openly displayed their ultimate policy and power. Besides, if there remained the least doubt with respect to the determination of this country, in case of an attack on America, by any European power, acting in the name of the mother country, the speech of the president in congress, pronounced in 1823, must tend to dissipate all such expectation: the following are a few extracts:

"The Ministers who were appointed to the republics of Colombia and Buenos-Ayres, during the last session of Congress, proceeded afterwards to their destinations. Of their arrival there, official intelligence has not yet been received. The minister appointed to the republic of Chili will sail in a few days. An early appointment will also be made to Mexico. A minister has been received from Colombia, and the other Governments have been informed that ministers, or diplomatic agents of inferior grade, would be received from each, according as they might prefer the one or the other:"

The president, after having spoken on the internal affairs of the republic, which he pronounces to be highly satisfactory, alludes carefully to the failure

of the president's former hopes in regard to the great efforts made in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries; and he says:

"In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded, or seriously menaced, that we resent injuries, or make preparation for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere, we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different, in this respect, from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defence of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of our most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candour, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But, with the governments who have declared their independence and main→ tained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration, and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner

their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States!"

The president next speaks of the obviously unsettled state of Europe, of which no greater proof could be given than the aggression upon Spain:

"To what extent such interpositions may be carried on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers, whose governments differ from theirs, are interested; even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy, in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early age of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same; which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy; meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power-submitting to injuries from none. But, in regard to those continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent, without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain, and those new governments, and their dis