the department directly it entered its doors; consequently the company failed to prove that the acceptance had been posted before 8.30 a.m., the hour at which the withdrawal had reached the secretary's hands.

(To be continued.)

NORTHERN LAW SOCIETY.

The solicitors of Belfast and neighbourhood held a social reunion on Thursday, the 9th inst., in Thompson's Restaurant, Donegall-place. Dinner was served at 7 30 p.m., the following being the menu :-Hors d'oeuvre various, clear turtle, salmon, parsley sauce, cucumber, cream of ptarmigan, fricandeau of veal, roast lamb, mint sauce, York ham and champagne, iced asparagus, spring chicken, Hungarian salad, compot, pears labazon, devilled mushrooms, iced pudding, dessert, coffee.

The company was very large, comprising the leading solicitors of Belfast, Lisburn, Lurgan, and Banbridge, and the local members of the North-East Bar. After the cloth was removed,

Dr. Peter Macaulay, as president, occupied the chair. The toast of "The King" having been duly honoured, The Chairman, in suitable terms, proposed "The Solicitors' Profession." In lucid terms he dilated on the advantages of such a reunion, and pointed out the great power and position of solicitors if they were united with each other, He suggested there should be a strong combination to abolish the annual licence duty of £5 on country and £9 on Dublin solicitors. It degraded the solicitors from the position of a profession to rank with dealers and pedlars. The money could be advantageously expended for the material and social advancement of the profession. He also suggested that public appointments, that naturally belonged to the solicitors, should be made secure to the profession.

Mr. Wellington Young responded in an able speech, indicating how solicitors could improve their position by being true to each other. He gave a very vivid description of the profession when he joined it, thirty-five years ago, and contrasted it with the present. The examinations had raised it higher, and the more difficult the examination it was the greater prize to those who succeeded in passing.

Mr. Andrew M Clelland (Banbridge) proposed "The Northern Law Society " in a very eloquent speech, and showed that the society had been watching the interests of the profession, and had protected them by warding off poachers on the preserves of the profession. The existence of such a society was therefore absolutely

necessary.

Mr. Daniel Murray responded in a speech full of detail of what had been done by the society, in which he himself had taken an humble part. Every suggestion made by the society received the careful attention and consideration of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, and legislation affecting the profession was frequently thereby modified.

Mr. D. F. Spiller also responded to the toast, and gave interesting particulars of the society's work on behalf of the profession.

The Chairman proposed "The Bar of Ireland," and in a spirited speech declared that the Bar is always admired when it shows its independence of the Bench, and referred to the stand recently made by Mr. Bodkin, K.C., in defence of counsels' rights.

The toast was acknowledged in graceful terms by Messrs. George Hill Smith and William M. M'Grath. The "Dinner Committee" was proposed by Mr. Robert Kelly, jun., and responded to by Messrs. James L. M'Donnell and Albert J. Lewis.

The health of the Chairman was proposed by Mr. J. B. M'Cutcheon, and acknowledged by the Chairman. During the evening at suitable intervals vocal and instrumental music was provided by Messrs. Hugh O'Neill, B.L.; W. H. Hancock, Joseph Donnelly, Joseph I. Donaghy, J. C. O'Reilly (Lurgan), James L. M'Donnell, and others. The Northern Quartette ren

dered several selections in admirable style, and a very happy evening was brought to a close by the company singing" Auld Lang Syne."

The reunion was the first ever held by the local members of the solicitors' profession, and the great success of the meeting will securely establish the reunion as an annual affair. The arrangements were most complete, and reflected much credit on Messrs. J. Donnelly, A. J. Lewis, and J. L. M'Donnell (Hon. Secretary), to whose exertions the success of the meeting was due.

NOTES OF ENGLISH CASES. (From the Law Journal.)

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE.
COURT OF APPEAL.

(Before RIGBY, WILLIAMS, and ROMER, L.JJ.)
GARDNER V. THE HODGSON'S KINGSTON BREWERY
COMPANY,

Dec. 14, 17, 18. March 25.--Easement-Right of wayParol licence-Claiming right-Uninterrupted enjoyment for forty years-Irescription Act, 1832 (2 & 3 Will. IV., c. 71), ss. 2, 4, 5.

Appeal from a decision of Cozens-Hardy, J. (reported 69 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 368; L. R. (1900) 1 Chanc. 592.) The plaintiff and.her predecessors in title had for upwards of sixty years occupied certain trade premises with a yard and stables at the back. The defendants were the owners of adjoining premises, with a yard and stables at the side and rear thereof. The only access to the plaintiff's yard had been through a gateway leading therefrom into the defendant's yard, and across that yard into the main street. This way had been openly used by the plaintiff and her predecessors during the whole sixty years, and a pump in the defendant's yard had been used by them for the same period. Since 1855 an annual rent of 15s. had been paid by the plaintiff and her predecessors for the right of way. The defendants, while admitting the plaintiff's right of access to the pump, denied her right of way over their yard to the street, and gave notice to determine it. The plaintiff claimed to be entitled to the way as of right. CozensHardy, J., was of opinion that a parol licence, whether gratuitous or for consideration, was of no moment unless applied for within the period of forty years; and the payment of the annual sum was attributable to a parol agreement giving permission to use the way which he inferred to have been made more than forty years ago, and was not evidence of a fresh application for a licence each year. He held that the plaintiff had acquired a right of way under section 2 of the Prescription Act, 1832; and further that, if necessary, a lost grant ought to be presumed. He gave judgment for the plaintiff. The defendants appealed.

Their LORDSHIPS allowed the appeal (dissentiente RIGBY, L.J.).

VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.J., and ROMER, L.J., were of opinion that the inference to be drawn from the annual payment of the 15s. was that each payment was for the permission to use the way for the preceding year, although such permission was not expressly demanded and given in each year; and that the plaintiff had not discharged the onus thus thrown upon her of showing that the user was of right.

RIGBY. L.J., was of opinion that it could not be assumed that each annual payment of 15s. had to do with the right of way for one year only, so as to involve successive permissions for one year at a time. In his opinion the conclusion arrived at by Cozens-Hardy, J., was correct.

March 5, 6, 11, 18.-Highway-Grass space between hedge and metalled strip-Presumption of dedication of grass space to the public.

Action for an injunction to restrain the defendant council from trespassing on a strip of grass by the side of the metalled highway, alleged to be the property of the plaintiff, the Countess of Belmore, as tenant-forlife in possession. The strip of grass measured about 300 yards in length, and was about 50 feet wide at its broadest point, tapering away to nothing at either end. It was situated between the metalled highway and the ancient hedge of the adjoining farm. The learned judge found as a fact on the evidence offered at the trial that, as far as living memory went, the plaintiff, the Countess of Belmore, and her co-plaintiff, the tenant of the adjoining farm, and their predecessors in title, had used and enjoyed this strip in such a manner and to such an extent as the nature of the strip permitted, and had exercised acts of ownership inconsistent with public rights. It was argued, however, as a point of law, on behalf of the defendant council, that in the case of an uninclosed strip between the boundary hedge and the metalled part of the highway, the presumption was that the uninclosed strip as well as the metalled highway had been dedicated to the public, and that there was nothing in the present case to rebut such presumption.

COZENS-HARDY, J., said that he had derived assistance from the judgments of Mr. Justice Channell and of the Court of Appeal in Neeld v. The Hendon Urban District Council, 81 L. T. Rep. 405. Applying the principles laid down in that case by Lord Russell of Killowen, C.J., at p. 409, he was of opinion that there was no presumption of dedication up to the ancient hedge; or that, if there was any such presumption, it was rebutted by the surrounding circumstances and by the evidence. The only difficulty he had felt was as to the immediate margin of the side of the metalled part of the highway, which had been used occasionally, and by a few people, for the purpose of walking on. He thought, however, that such use was inevitable by reason of the absence of any fence; and that it was too indefinite to form the foundation of a public right.

(Before FARWELL, J.)

WHITBREAD & Co. v. WATT.

March 21, 22.- Vendor and purchaser-Deposit-Lien. The plaintiff had agreed to purchase a plot of land forming part of an estate in course of development as a building estate under a written contract which proIvided that if a certain number of houses were not built upon the remainder of the estate within a limited time (which event happened) the purchaser should be at liberty to rescind. The defendant claimed under the original vendor, but could not raise the defence of a purchase for value without notice. The purchaser elected to rescind, and sought to recover the deposit as against the defendant by originating summons, praying a declaration of lien and enforcing the same by foreclosure or sale and delivery of possession.

FARWELL, J., held that according to Rose v. Watson (1864), 33 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 385; 10 H. L. Cas. 672, a purchaser acquires a lien upon the property which he agrees to buy for the amount of the deposit paid by him. That this lien may be enforced by a purchaser, unless he is in default; but that a purchaser is not in default by rescinding under the terms of a condition contained in the contract respecting the property sold to him. In his lordship's opinion the dictum of Lord Justice Kay, in Rodger v. Harrison (1892), 62 Law J

Rep. Q. B. 213, 220; L. R. (1893) 1 Q. B. 161, 174, was inconsistent with Rose v. Watson, which was not cited to the Court of Appeal, and his lordship declined to follow it.

CORRESPONDENCE.

We throw open the columns of this journal most willingly for the discussion of subjects of interest to the profession; but it must be understood that we do not necessarily agree with all the opinions expressed by our correspondents.

Letters and communications intended for publication, and addressed to THE EDITOR, 53 Upper Sackville-street, Dublin. must be authenticated by the name of the writer, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee of good faith.

VOLUNTARY PREFERENCES IN BANKRUPTCY.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE IRISH LAW TIMES.

SIR,-The decision of the English Court of Appeal in the recent case of In re Lake, ex parte Dyer, following on others of a similar kind, will, I think, suffice to show that if the existing law has been rightly interpreted its provisions are inadequate to prevent the evil which they were intended to remedy. That evil is, I apprehend, that a man on the eve of bankruptcy sometimes makes a purely voluntary disposition of a part of his assets which gives to a particular creditor an undue advantage over the other creditors. The object of the statutes was to render such preferences void as against the trustees or assignees in bankruptcy, and to deprive the particular creditor of the advantage which he had obtained. not through his own activity or vigilance, but through the voluntary act of an insolvent debtor whose bankruptcy speedily followed. These voluntary preferences are rendered fraudulent by the statutes, but they need not be fraudulent in any other sense than that. Indeed the word "void" without the addition of "fraudulent" would have answered the purpose as

well.

The preference, according to my view, need not proceed from any fraudulent motive, and in fact the motive is not the point at issue. If the debtor does something which gives one creditor an advantage over another creditor, knowing and intending that it shall have this effect, he seems to me to be acting with a view to giving a preference to this creditor. He always has some motive for this preference distinct from the preference itself. That motive may be a desire to repair an injury. It may be gratitude for favours received from the creditor. It may be love and affection, as when the creditor is a near relative or intimate friend. It may be dislike to some other creditor whom he wishes to deprive of his proper share of the assets. It may be a desire to save a friend who has guaranteed the debt, and there may be other motives still. But there is in all cases an intention of giving the particular creditor an advantage-a preference-over other creditors, from whatever motive this intention arises; and it seems to me that wherever the act is done with the intention of giving the particular creditor an advantage over others, it is done with a view of preferring that creditor to others, and falls within the scope of the statute, subject to the two provisions that the act is voluntary, and that it takes place within the statutory time limit. An inquiry as to the debtor's "dominant motive seems to me irrelevant. Whatever a man's motive may be, he must be taken to have intended the natural consequences of his action, and if he intended these consequences he acted with a view to them. It is therefore to be regretted that the Court of Appeal while reversing Mr. Justice Wright in this case refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords-and that on the ground that the question was one of fact, though it in reality involved the legal meaning of two very important words, "prefer " and "creditor." But if the question is to be reduced to one of motive and the act

is to be held good unless the motive is fraudulent (or otherwise objectionable), the evil will plainly continue until the statute is amended.

The trustees in bankruptcy in Lake's case seem to me to have had another very strong ground for claiming a decision, but it does not appear to have been urged at the hearing-viz., that the transfer of the property was really subsequent to the act of bankruptcy. Placing the debenture scrip with a letter in a box containing the trust papers was not, I think, a real equitable assignment so long as the box remained in the possession and control of Lake and the fact of the transfer was not communicated to anyone. Lake could at any moment have put an end to the whole thing by simply taking the scrip out of the box and tearing up the letter; and this he would probably have done if he had been able to tide over the crisis. It was not until the act of bankruptcy was completed that he revealed the existence of the transfer and handed over the scrip and the letter to his co-trustee. The transfer being incomplete, the transferees came in to obtain an order that the trustee in bankruptcy should execute a legal transfer so as to perfect their title. In order to entitle themselves to this order, I think they should have shown that there was a genuine equitable deposit before the act of bankruptcy, instead of a mere removing of the scrip from one part of his house to another, and writing a letter which he was careful to keep in his own possession and not to show or communicate to anyone. How can a letter bind the writer until it is posted or deliveredas long as it is unknown to every one except the writer, who can cancel it whenever he chooses to do so? If the bankrupt carefully retained the power of revocation until the act of bankruptcy was completed, why should not the trustee in bankruptcy whose title relates back to that act possess the power of revocation also ?

It seems strange, moreover, that if the right of the trustee in bankruptcy depends on the dominant motive" of the debtor at the time of the transaction, the Court did not require the bankrupt to be examined and cross-examined as to what his dominant motive really was. The bankrupt was in fact the only person who could tell what that dominant motive was. He may have been unworthy of credit, but the Court could form a better judgment on that subject after hearing his evidence; and if his sworn testimony was untrustworthy, what reliance could be placed on the unsworn statements in his letter? If motive is to be the guiding principle, no available evidence as to what the motive actually was should be omitted. But I submit that the true principle applicable to the subject is that every sane man intends the natural consequences of his acts, and must be taken to have acted with a view to these consequences-at least unless the act is done under pressure or compulsion.

It is true the language of the statutes is merely enabling, but it has long since been settled that when a statute confers an authority to do a judicial act in a certain case, it is imperative on those so authorised to exercise the authority when the case arises, and its exercise is duly applied for by a party interested, and having the right to make the application:" per Jervis, C.J., in MacDougall v. Paterson, 11 C. B. 755; Julius v. Bishop of Oxford, L. R. 5 App. Cases 225; Owen's Trustees' Estate, App. [1897], 1 I. R. 200. And this principle has been applied to the Licensing Acts in a great number of cases: Reg. v. Walsall JJ., 3 C. L. R. 100, Q. B.; Reg. (Dempsey) v. Antrim JJ., 9 Ir. L. T. R. 156; Reg.

(Lambe) v. Armagh JJ. [1897], 2 Ir. R. 57. Again the statutes specify certain disqualifications both of persons and premises, and the usual rule of expressio unius, exclusio alterius, operates to render these objections the only ones, and so the Acts must be read, "the Justices shall grant certificates for licences and renewals and transfers unless, &c." Reg. (Morley) v. King, 20 Q. B. D. 430; Reg. (Marshall) v. Tyrone JJ. [1896], 2 Ir. R. 15; Reg. (Donohue) v. Armagh J.J. [1898], 2 Ir. R. 126; Reg (Callaghan) v. Donegal JJ. [1898], 2 Ir. R. 652. Cf. per Palles, C.B., in M'Donnell v. Blake, 28 L. R. Ir., at pp. 401-2.

It seems to me therefore that when a landlord comes before magistrates for a transfer under 18 & 19 Vict., c. 114, he has to prove :

(1.) The existence of a licence.

(2.) The removal of the licencee from licensed premises. (3.) That he is a person having an interest in the exercise of the magistrates' authority to transfer licence.

(4.) That he is "in possession " and capable of carrying on the trade.

Having proved these, then, if no objection be made, the magistrates must transfer the licence. If an objection be made it must be grounded on some of the statutable disqualifications of the applicant, since the statute enables, i.e., compels, transfer to any person not disqualified by law. Of course any objection of this kind must be met, but subject to a judicial adjudication upon such objection, I submit the applicant is entitled to get the transfer.

Now the production of licence is not necessary to prove its existence, the Licensing Act, 1874, having provided other evidence (secs. 35, 36), neither is it necessary to produce the licence to have transfer endorsed, this direction in the statute being merely directory and not mandatory. Per Lord Ashbourne, C., Kelly v. Montagu, 26 Ir. L. T. R. 123. As to removal the evidence would be the ejectment decree or habere with sheriff's return. The licensing code itself distinctly recognises the interest of landlord, as pointed out in my first letter, and he is noted in the official register of licences.

If English cases might be relied on, the question would be free from doubt. Reg. v. Market Bosworth JJ., 57 L. T. 56; Thornton v. Clegg, 24 Q. B. D. 132. Yours truly,

M. J. B.

CURIOUS CASE OF PERJURY.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE IRISH LAW TIMES.

SIR,-May I call attention to a very curious case occurring at the recent Assizes in Manchester, wherein a person was accused of perjury when giving evidence before the County Court. The defence set up now was, not sworn. The Judge at the trial put to the jury as one of the issues, "was the prisoner sworn." I submit that this showed enough to entitle the accused to an acquittal by direction, and that the conviction (for the jury found him guilty) could now be quashed.

REVIEWS.

The Law of Capital and Income as between Life-tenant and Remainderman. By WM. H. GOWER, LL.B. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 1901.

THIS work is more in the nature of a collection of notes of cases than of a regular legal treatise. It is practical and concise, dealing with a subject which frequently causes much difficulty to the practising lawyer-namely, the rights of tenants for life and remaindermen in respect of the proceeds of settled property and their liabilities in respect of outgoings, outlay, and losses. In the small compass of 113 pages it is, of course, impossible to deal with the subject comprehensively, but so far as it goes the book is accurate and clear. On the subject of Apportionment, it gives the effect of the Act of 1870 and the decisions under it very neatly. The chapter, also, on residuary personal estate, an important subject, seems to us well done, the rights of the parties in the case of wasting property, such as leaseholds for short terms or terminable annuities, being well explained. We regret, however, to notice that the Irish cases do not appear to have had much attention paid to them by the author. We have failed to find any we looked for cited. This, of course, is a serious defect in the work for Irish practitioners.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

The Housing of the Working Classes Acts, 1890-1900. By CHARLES E. ALLEN, M.A., LL.B., Barrister-atLaw, and FRANCIS J. ALLEN, M.D., D.P.H. Second edition. London: Butterworth and Co.; Shaw and Sons. 1901.

Agricultural Statistics, Ireland, 1900. Dublin: Thom and Co. 1901.

The South African Law Journal. Feb. 15, 1901. Part I., Vol. 18. Grahamstown, Cape of Good Hope: J. Slater. 1901.

The Secretary's Manual on the Law and Practice of Joint Stock Companies. By JAMES FITZPATRICK and V. DE S. FOWKE, Barrister-at-Law. Seventh edition. London: Jordan and Sons. 1901.

COURT PAPERS.

ADJUDICATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY.

[The dates of Adjudications are first given, the Sittings follow in italics.]

DUBLIN.

Herron, John, of Ardara, in the County of Donegal, grocer and vintner. May 3; Tuesday, May 28, and Tuesday, June 11. Thomas Gerrard and Co., solrs.

M'Ginity, Mary, of Linen Hall-street, Church-street, and Park-street, Dundalk, in the County of Louth, widow, miller and flour merchant, trading as "M'Ginity and Co." May 11; Tuesday, May 28, and Tuesday, June 11. Sheridan and Henry, solrs.

CORK.

Horgan, Daniel J., of 74 George's street, in the City of Cork, and of Glenbrook, in the County of Cork, trading as Cussen and Company," wine and spirit merchant. May 2; Tuesday, May 28, and Tuesday, June 11. Hanrahan and Company, solr s.

OBITUARY.

MR. ASHLEY MAGINNISS.

Ir is with feelings of deep personal regret that we announce the death of Mr. Ashley Maginniss, which took place at his residence on Tuesday last. The deceased was for many years past very intimately connected with this Journal, of which he ably supervised the printing and production. In this capacity he was frequently brought into contact with various members of the Legal Profession. The following resolution was passed at a meeting of Falconer's Printing Companionship, held on the 15th inst:

"That we, the members of Falconer's Chapel, deeply deplore the death of our late and greatly esteemed overseer, Mr. Ashley Maginniss, and that we offer Mrs. Maginniss and family our most sincere and heartfelt sympathy in their grievous affliction, and that copies of this resolution be sent to Mrs. Maginniss and the Press.-Jas. M'Donnell, Father; E. Cummins, Clerk."

APPOINTMENTS AND PROMOTIONS.

Mr. Allan Nixon, Petty Sessions Clerk, Drumkeeran, Co. Leitrim, has been appointed a Commissioner for Oaths for that town.

LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY. The weekly meeting was held last Monday evening. Subject for discussion: "That trial by jury is unsuited to the conditions of the country."

SOLICITORS' FEES ON MINING LEASES

An interesting point for solicitors was raised in Re Gray (90 L. T. N., p. 184). It was a summons by the lessee of mines to review the taxation of a bill of costs brought in by the lessor's solicitor. Certain items had been allowed by the taxing master for negotiations and fees to the mining engineer before the granting of the lease. It was admitted that the scale fee did not apply in the present case, though, if it had applied, the lessee would have been bound to pay it, and such fee would have included the negotiation fee. Upon the authorities at common law, the lessor, if he had paid his solicitor's bill and then sued the lessee, could not have recovered anything incurred in the way of costs before the instructions for lease; but it was argued that because the lessee had obtained the usual third party order to tax his lessor's bill, he had admitted his liability to pay these costs. Mr. Justice Cozens-Hardy, however, was of a contrary opinion, holding that the fact of obtaining this order could not enlarge the liability upon the existence of which the order was based. In Re Negus (71 L. T. Rep. 716; (1895) 1 Ch. 73) the court held that apart from the order the court must look at the items and see whether there was any liability to pay them. In Holliday and Godlee (58 L. T. Rep. 801) it was laid down that purchasers who, under sect. 38 of the Solicitors Act, 1843, stood in the position of the vendors, by taking the usual third party order for taxation precluded themselves from taking any objection to the bill of costs which could not have been taken by the vendors. The proper course to have taken would have been to refuse to pay, and leave the vendors to bring an action. Re Negus (sup.) was a case where the scale fee applied, and so now it must be taken that the same rule applies whether or no the taxation is in respect of a bill based upon the scale or, as in the case under comment, where it is otherwise.-Law Times,

THE NEW COUNTY COURTS (IRELAND) BILL. [AS AMENDED IN COMMITTEE.]

Service of process.

1.-(1.) Service of process of the county court shall be effected in the manner directed or permitted by law unless otherwise ordered by the judge who may order service to be substituted or that service alrealy had shall be deemed good service as the case may be.

(3.) The plaintiff or party levying an execution may be served in the prescribed manner with an interpleader procss under section one hundred and fifty of the Civil Bill Courts (Ireland) Act 1851, in case he resides anywhere within the United Kingdom.

Proceedings for recovery of costs and balance of sum claimed.

2. Where a defendant in any action at any time after service of the civil bill upon him, pays to the plaintiff the entire amount sued for but without costs, the plaintiff may obtain a decree for the costs of such action; and where a defendant pays a part only of the sum sued for, the plaintiff may continue the proceedings for the balance, and if he obtains a decree for the same or any part thereof he shall be entitled to the costs of the action, to be taxed as if the decree were for the aggregate of the sum paid on account and the sum for which such decree was actually given.

Forging summons, &c., of the county

court.

3. Every person who forges any summons, process. decree, or order of the county court, or who serves or enforces any such forged summons, process, decree or order, knowing the same to be forged, or delivers or causes to be delivered to any person any paper purporting to be a copy of any summons, process, decree or order of the county court, knowing the same to be false, or who acts or professes to act under any false colour or pretence of the process or authority of the county court, shall be guilty of a felony.

Jurisdiction of judge within or without his districts.

4. A judge shall, whether within the district of any of his courts or not, have jurisdiction to make any order or exercise on an ex parte application any authority or jurisdiction in any action, suit, matter or proceeding, pending in any of the courts of which he is judge, which, if the same related to an action, suit, matter, or proceeding, pending in the High Court, might be given, made, or exercised by a judge of the High Court in chambers, and with the consent of both parties to an action, suit, matter, or proceeding, to hear or decide any action, suit, matter, or proceeding, at any place either within or without any such district.

Attachment of debts.

5. Upon the application of any person having obtained a decree or order of a county court for the recovery by or payment to him of any sum of money, whether by way of debt or damages, not exceeding in the case of a judgment the sum of fifty pounds, a judge may, where the execution debtor resides within the jurisdiction of his court, make an order for the attachment of any debt owing or accruing to such execution debtor from any person residing within the same jurisdiction in like manner, subject to rules and orders under this Act, as orders for the attachment of debts are made by the High Court.

When documents produced from proper custody may be read without further proof.

6.-(1.) Where any documents which would, if duly proved, be admissible in evidence are produced to the court from the proper custody, they shall be read without further proof, if in the opinion of the judge they appear genuine, and if no objection is taken thereto.

(2.) If the admission of any documents so produced is objected to the judge may adjourn the hearing for proof of the documents, and the party objecting shall pay the costs caused by such objection in case the documents are afterwards proved, unless the judge otherwise orders.

Renewal of decree or dismiss.

7.-1.) Subject to.rules and orders under this Act, every decree and dismiss of a county court in any action and every affirmance or reversal of such decree or dismiss, whether made before or after the commencement of this Act, save a decree for the possession of lands or tenements or an affirmance of such last-mentioned decree, shall be in full force and effect for six years from the date of the decree or dismiss, or affirmance, or reversal thereof, as the case may be, and it shall not be necessary to renew such first-mentioned decree or dismiss, or affirmance or reversal thereof, within the said period of six years unless there is some change in the party entitled to execution or liable thereto, and in such other cases as may be prescribed.

(2.) Every renewal shall be made in the manner and upon the affidavit of such person as may be prescribed. Liability to debt or costs under decree or dismiss, or any reversal or affirmance thereof, to be extinguished in six years unless new security be given.

8.-1.) The liability to the payment of any debt, damages, and costs respectively which may be imposed by any decree or dismiss of a county court, or by any reversal or affirmance of any such decree or dismiss, shall be absolutely extinguished upon the expiration of the period of six years from the date of the decree or dismiss, affirmance or reversal, and shall not be capable of being enforced by any proceeding whatsoever.

(2.) Such decree, dismiss, reversal, or affirmance shall not be revived or kept in force by any parol evidence, cr promise to pay the said debt damages or costs or any part thereof, or by any evidence of a part payment thereof; provided that if the defendant executes any new security in writing for such debt or costs such new security shall be of full force and effect

in law.

Prosecution of appeal after abatement by death, marriage, or bankruptcy.

9. If any person dissatisfied with any decree, dismiss, or order, whether adverse to him or in his favour, pronounced by any judge in the exercise of any jurisdiction conferred whether before or after the passing of this Act upon him by any statute relating to county courts gives notice of appeal in the manner provided by law, and if after such notice is given the appeal is abated by the death, marriage, or bankruptcy of any of the parties before the hearing thereof, then, subject to rules and orders of the High Court, the appeal may be prosecuted within such time, upon such terms and conditions, and in such manner, may be prescribed by such rules and orders as aforesaid: provided that unless and until such rules and orders are made no such decree, dismiss, or order as last aforesaid shall be affected by the provisions of this section.

Amendment of proceedings.

as

10.-(1.) The judge, the Lord Chancellor, the Judge of Assize on Appeal, or any court or judge having cognizance of the matter, may at all times amend all defects and errors in any proceeding in the county court. whether there is anything in writing to amend by or not, and whether the defect or error is that of the party applying to amend or not.

(2.) All such amendments may be made with or without costs and upon such terms as to the judge, the Lord Chancellor, the Judge of Assize, or such court or judge as aforesaid, as the case may be, may seem just.

(3.) All such amendments as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties shall be made if duly applied for.