was put upon him which can be called undue or unfair. Therefore he would not have obtained relief in a Court of Equity apart from the recent Statute. But it was contended that this Act has altered and extended the rule previously laid down by the Courts." Having dealt with the words of s. 1 (1), the learned Judge continued-" In the first place, in order to make the Act applicable, there must be evidence to satisfy the Court either that the interest or that the charges made are excessive; and there must, in the second place, be also evidence that the transaction is harsh and unconscionable, or is otherwise such that a Court of Equity would give relief. Excessive interest or charges will not of themselves suffice. There must be something besides harsh and unconscionable, or such circumstances as would give rise to a claim for relief from a Court of Equity."

Such being the view of the learned Judge, he gave judgment for the plaintiffs for the amount claimed, with costs, but he granted a stay of execution, as it was mentioned that the Irish Courts (see supra) had taken a different view of the Act.

ECHOES OF THE COURTS.

The Privy Council have disallowed the Order of the Local Government Board of February last as to nursing arrangements in unions.

The Benchers of King's Inns will, on the first day of next Trinity Sittings, proceed to the election of a Professor of the Law of Equity, Pleading and Practice, in the several Divisions of the High Court of Justice in Ireland.

Mr. Justice Meredith, on the 17th May, 1901, in the case of Jane Angus v. Executors of T. Brown, mentioned that it was unnecessary for him to decide the point, as a similar case had arisen before Kenny, J., at last Kilkenny Assizes (Clifford v. Clifford), which the Judge followed, and stated he was pleased with the rapidity with which these reports came into the IRISH LAW TIMES, and obviated the necessity of their considering the question themselves.

The principal provision of Lord Ashbourne's Lunacy (Ireland) Bill is clause 4, which provides that the Lord Chancellor's powers and duties under the Lunacy Act of 1871 shall and may be exercised by the Lord Chancellor "acting alone or jointly with one or more of such Judges of the Supreme Court as may from time to time be entrusted as aforesaid." The Bill provides further that the Lord Lieutenant may, in addition to his power of absolute discharge, discharge any criminal lunatic conditionally-that is to say, on such conditions as to the duration of such discharge and otherwise as he shall think fit.

NOTES OF CASES.

(Before HIS HONOR JUDGE FITZGERALD.)
HODGINS v. KIRWAN.

Abbeyleix, May 3, 1900.-Road contractors-Repair of roads-Negligence.

Action for damages due to defects in the road which the defendant had contracted to repair. The action was brought to recover £50 for loss and damage sustained by plaintiff by reason of a gullet on the road at Rushio breaking down.

Mr. P. J. Meehan, solicitor, for the plaintiff.

Mr. Bridge (Roe & Co.), for the defendant (the contractor.)

Mr. Meehan referred his Honor to the case of Rennick v. The Wexford County Council (35 Ir. L. T. R. 78). In that

case the County Court Judge gave a decree, but Lord Justice FitzGibbon reversed that decision, and held that the County Council would not be held liable. It had already been decided that the County Surveyor was not liable.

HIS HONOR-Was there ever a case in which a road contractor was made liable?

Mr. Meehan said in the case referred to the Lord Justice, in dismissing the case, did so without prejudice. The facts of the case were that on the evening of the 18th December Mrs. Hodgins and her son were driving home from Mountrath, and when they came to this gullet the horse fell. The shafts of the car were broken, and her son pitched out on the road; and Mrs. Hodgins held on to the car until it turned over.

Mrs. Eleanor Hodgins was then examined by Mr. Meehan, and said she left Mountrath on the day in question, about 8 p.m., and drove home. When they came to Rushin the horse was thrown on the road, and her son thrown out of the car. It was quite dark. She was not thrown out until the horse plunged and turned the car over. Her back and shoulders were injured, and she had not yet quite recovered from the shock. Her son had to drag her out, and he had only one hand, as the other was sprained. A man named Bennet came to their assistance; and we discovered a hole in the gullet. The car was badly injured, the shafts being broken and the springs badly strained.

On cross-examination by Mr. Bridge she said she never saw the hole there before, or she would not have driven into it.

Dan Daughen, in reply to Mr. Meehan, said he knew the road in question, and saw a hole in the same gullet three or four years ago.

Mr. Henry Mitchell, Assistant County Surveyor, in reply to Mr. Meehan, said he is in charge of that portion of the county, and knew the gullet, which is really an old dry bridge through which no water has passed for a number of years. Early last winter a portion of the arch sank a little bit, and he called the attention of the contractor to it, and very little was done to it. The bridge is very old, and he thought it is not very well repaired. Kirwan was bound by his contract to keep the masonry of the bridge in repair.

The defendant, Kirwan, was next called, and in reply to Mr. Bridge, said he passed over the road just before dusk on the evening in question and it was all right. There had been heavy traffic of timber on the road, and the gullet was not able for it.

On cross-examination by Mr. Meehan he boasted that he was the best contractor in the county.

Mr. Meehan-And why were you cut? Defendant-Why were many men cut as well? Go to the cut book and see all that is cut. There is more cut than you'd have at your funeral.

Mr. C. P. Hamilton, Roundwood, was next examined for the defence, and said he lives near the place, and never saw any holes in this gullet. He believed this hole was caused by the heavy traffic of timber, and he did not think it could be foreseen.

Mr. Mitchell was re-examined, and said there was not sufficient attention paid to this road by the contractor. He was 135 tons of material short last year, and the gullet was kept in a very bad way. When witness went there he saw the hole, and it was very badly repaired, and he had to employ men to fill in the whole arch with stones.

HIS HONOR reserved judgment, and on Saturday he drove to the place and inspected the road and gullet.

Subsequently at Maryborough, on the 6th inst., his Honor said that in the case of Hodgins v. Kirwan, which was heard at Abbeyleix, he had examined the place where the damage had occurred through the road contractor leaving an opening in the road, and had come to the conclusion that the accident was caused by neg. ligence. He would hear evidence as to extent of injuries.

Mr. Hodgins, complainant, swore that his car was broken, the pony injured, his son's arm and his wife also injured, and the harness broken.

HIS HONOR inquired to which of the injuries he attributed most loss-his wife, his son, the car, or the harness.

Mr. E. Travers was of opinion the car would cost £4 to make it right, and the harness £2.

HIS HONOR said he was satisfied that the damage was caused by the neglect of the contractor. The gullet is now stopped up, but he had sufficient evidence of its dangerous state. He therefore held the contractor liable. Having heard evidence as to damage he assessed the damages at £6, and gave a decree for the amount, with costs, and 15s. expenses.-Leinster Express.

PRACTICAL POINTS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW.

(From the Justice of the Peace.)

NOTE. Before relying on these English questions and answers great caution must be exercised, as sometimes the various statutes cited and relied on do not apply to Ireland. where no similar provision exists.-H. M. F., ED.

ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 1894.-District council -Chairman-Three candidates - Voting, how taken.

I shall be glad if you will give your opinion on the following case :

A., B., and C. are candidates for the chairmanship at the annual meeting of an urban district council. There are twelve members of the council, and each candidate receives four votes. What course should be taken by the chairman so as to get a majority of those present and voting on the question?

Answer.

The difficulty would be overcome by regarding the nominations of B. and C. as amendments to the nomination of A. The voting should be taken between B. and C. If C. is successful over B. or B. over C. then the voting will be taken between such successful candidate and A.

[Note up on pp. 265 and 266 of FitzGibbon and Johnston's Law of Local Government in Ireland.]

ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTS-Salary of district council clerk-Whether includes fee for acting as returning officer.

The advertisement issued by an urban district council for a person to fill the office of clerk to that body contained the following: "The clerk's duties shall be to carry out the duties of clerk to the council, including all bookkeeping and accounts, and all legal work, excepting Parliamentary work and actions in the High Court of Justice." A clerk was appointed, and out of his salary he has to pay the salaries of his two assistants. The clerk has lately acted as returning officer at the district council elections, and a member of the council objects to his charge of £12 for his fee as returning officer under the scale of fees sanctioned by the county council. Is the clerk entitled to charge such fee under the circumstances?

Answer.

We consider that he is so entitled. The duties referred to in the advertisement are duties which the clerk is bound to perform. He is not bound to act as returning officer. Article 1 (2) of the Election Order recognises the case of the clerk being unwilling to act, in which case the council must appoint another whom they would have to pay. It can make no difference that the clerk acts. If the council wished to include the fees, they ought to have expressly mentioned them, or used language to include this. Not having done so, they cannot call upon the clerk to forego his fee. [Note up on p. 123 of FitzGibbon and Johnston's Law of Local Government in Ireland.]

ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 1894.-District council - Candidate disqualified declared elected-Position of. A. on the 25th of February last carried out, after tendering, the repair of a parapet wall adjoining a high way for this rural district council, and on the 12th of March last repaired another wall, the total cost of which was under £6, the accounts were paid by the council on the 30th of March.

On the 6th of March the said A. was nominated a rural district councillor for a parish in this district, and on the 25th of March duly elected.

Kindly say, having regard to the Gloucester Election Petition, if A. is disqualified from taking his seat, and if he sits and votes is he liable for penalties. If so, what course, if any, can A. take to put himself in order, and what proceedings must be taken to unseat him?

Answer.

A. is disqualified, and if he sits and votes while disqualified, he is liable to penalties. A petition may be presented against him within 21 days of the election. If this is not done, A may abandon the seat. Or, if not, he should do nothing until the time for presenting the p tition has expired and he has been paid the amount of his account. The work having been completed and the account paid, it might be held that the disqualification had ceased, and as no petition had been presented against him, his right to sit could not be questioned. He could then safely act and vote at the council meetings. Section 46 (7) of the Local Government Act, 1894, does not appear to apply, as A. did not "become" disqualified; he was disqualified at the time of his election.

[Note up on pp. 231 and 233 of FitzGibbon and Johnston's Law of Local Government in Ireland.]

ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 1894, s. 20 (7)Guardians-Chairman, vice-chairman, and guardians elected from outside - Term of office.

I shall be much obliged if you will state whether the guardians of a poor law union (where the required number of guardians has been recently elected) can legally appoint either a chairman, vice-chairman, or two other persons from outside the board elected by the ratepayers and to act as guardians for the same period as the guardians elected?

Answer.

The guardians may lawfully elect a chairman and vice-chairman for one year and two guardians for three years. A chairman and vice-chairman are elected in what may be called their official capacity, and as these officers hold office for a year only, persons elected from outside to such offices are elected for a year only, while in the case of guardians they are elected for a term of three years. (See 60 J. P. 110; 63 J. P. 255.)

[Note up on p. 43 of FitzGibbon and Johnston's Law of Local Government in Ireland.]

THE LAW ON VACCINATION. The opponents of compulsory vaccination are 60 keen to take advantage of every possible means of evading the laws, made for the protection of the public against a dire disease with the approval of almost all persons of education, that attention may with advantage be drawn to the case of Langridge v. Hobbs, heard in a Divisional Court, recently. A bench of magistrates had convicted the appellant, under sections 16 and 29 of the Vaccination Act, 1867, as amended by section 1 of the Act of 1898, for not causing his child to be vaccinated within six months after the birth of such child. The defence was that the proceedings were out of time, as, under the provisions of section 11 of the Act of 1871, proceedings may be taken "at any time not exceeding twelve

months from the time when the matter of such complaint or information arose and not subsequently. It was proved that the child in question was born on the 30th of December, 1898, and that the appellant refused to allow the public vaccinator to operate. Accordingly, on the 7th of July, 1899, a notice was served upon the appellant in the form prescribed by the Vaccination Order, 1898, requiring him to have the child vaccinated within fourteen days from that date. This notice was disregarded and an information was laid on the 12th of July, 1900. The magistrates were of opinion that the information was laid in time, as it was laid within twelve months of the 21st of July, 1899, the date of the expiration of the time mentioned in the notice, and under the rules for the guidance of vaccination officers contained in the Vaccination Order, 1898, officers are only to take proceedings for the enforcement of the law after the expiration of that time. This reasoning did not commend itself to the High Court, and the conviction was quashed. It is clear that the justices put a wrong interpretation upon these rules. They do not, and cannot, in any way alter the law as contained in the statutes, but one of their objects is to ensure that proceedings should not be taken against parents until less harsh methods have been tried in vain. The offence is not causing the child to be vaccinated within six months of its birth. In this case, therefore, the offence was complete on the 30th of June, 1899, and it seems clear that no proceedings could be taken after the 30th of June, 1900, therefore the information was out of time. In fact, the disregard of the notice was no offence under the sections upon which the prosecution was founded. It must be remembered, however, that there is another offence under section 31 of the Act of 1867, and that parents who are protected by the lapse of time from proceedings under section 29 may be reached under this section. This applies to any child under fourteen who is unvaccinated, and provides for the making of an order by justices directing the parent to cause the child to be vaccinated within a certain time, where the parent disregards a notice from the vaccination officer requiring him to have the child vaccinated. Here the offence is constituted by disregarding the notice, and the twelve months run from the expiration of the time named in the notice: Knight v. Halliwell (22 W. R. 689, L. R. 9 Q. B. 412). In the recent case there seems to have been some confusion between the two offences and between the two notices.-Solicitors' Journal.

AN EXECUTOR'S RIGHT OF RETAINER.

It mght have been supposed that the law on the subject of the right of a creditor who is appointed an executor to retain the amount of his debt out of the assets (except as against creditors of a higher degree) was so simple as to have been long ago well settled. That it is not so, however, is abundantly proved by the frequency with which cases on the subject crop up in the Courts and occur in the reports. There have been several important instances of this in the course of the last year or two; and the decision of the Court of Appeal in In re Rhoades, 68 Law J. Rep. Q. B. 804, is not the least important of them. It is well settled that without possession there can be no retainer. The gist of the executor's right lies in the fact that he is the possessor of the assets; and therefore it is futile for him to bring an action against himself to recover the amount of his debt. In accordance with this it has been held that the right to retain is lost if a receiver is appointed who gets in the assets without their passing through the hands of the executor, or to whom the executor paid them before actually incurring the debt, as in the case of a contingent liability which ripens after the testator's death. But the right is not lost by the making of an administration order or hy payment into Court. Nor is it affected by section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875, which incorporates the

rules of administrazion in bankruptcy into the administration of insolvent estates. And now it appears from

In re Rhoades that, where an order has been made in bankruptcy for the administration of the estate of an insolvent testator, an executor who is a creditor is not deprived of his right of retainer over the assets even though he has parted with the possession of them by paying them over, in ignorance of the right under which he can claim, to the official receiver under the administration order. And even if before he discovers his rights he has proved for the debt in the bankruptcy proceedings, he can by withdrawing his proof become entitled to be repaid the amount which he would have been entitled to retain if the assets had remained in his possession. The principle appears to be that which is laid down in "Williams on Executors," to the effect that if the executor has assets of the debtor, the debt is extinguished, inasmuch as the person who is to receive the money is the person who ought to pay it. And Blackstone says: So much as is sufficient to answer his own demand is by operation of law applied to that particular purpose."-Law Journal.

SOME NOTEWORTHY DECISIONS OF THE
JUDICIAL YEAR.

(From the Law Times.)
(Continued from page 235, ante).

Only a few decisions of any moment have been delivered during the past judicial year on the subject of bills of sale. A somewhat important one sanctioned a deviation from the cast-iron statutory form in regard to the stipulated time for payment. In De Braam v. Ford (81 L. T. Rep. 568; (1900)) 1 Ch. 142) the Court of Appeal held that an agreement to pay the principal lent" on or before the 1st Nov. " amounted to an undertaking to pay on the 1st Nov., with a further arrangement that the security should be abrogatest payment could be made at some earlier date. Mr. Justice North had held the reverse, deeming the provision one which departed from the form of the statute in a manner such as the courts could not recognise. This view, however, is now to be deemed too illiberal, since the Court of Appeal has held the meaning of a "stipu lated" time to be a fixed time at which payment is to become obligatory. In useful contrast to this case, compare Davies v. Jenkins (81 L. T. Rep. 788; (1900) 1 Q. B. 133), where a deviation from the statutory form was held by a divisional court to be fatal. Here the bill of sale contained no acknowledgment of the receipt of the morey lent-an omission which the court declined to overlook. It was also held that a description of the chattels affected as "Stock: two horses, four cows," although no evidence was forthcoming that the grantor of the bill had any other horses or cows, was insufficiently precise, because where, as here, the chattels are likely to be replaced by others of a similar character it is necessary to describe them more specifically than in the case of furniture or such other articles as are not so frequently substituted. Finally, another question of form was settled by a divisional court ruling in Kemble v. Addison (82 L. T. Rep. 91; (1900) 1 Q. B. 430) that a married woman living apart from her husband simply describing herself as a "married woman " without stating her vocation, although here she was maintaining herself in a dressmaking business, had insufficiently described her occupation, and the registration of the bill was therefore invalid.

Very few partnership cases have been of sufficient note to secure a place in the law reports. The only one which seems to call for any detailed comment at all in a general review such as this is Gillingham v. Beddow (82 L. T. Rep. 791; (1900) 2 Ch. 242), where two partners had dissolved their relationship under a provision in their deed arranging for one buying out the other, nothing therein being, according to the tenor of the deed, contained which would prevent either

partner from starting a similar business in the neighbourhood after the expiration of the partnership. The defendant having started a similar business, and having circularised the customers of the late firm for orders, the plaintiff moved to restrain such advertisements. Mr. Justice Cozens-Hardy held that the provision in the deed simply expressed in words what would have been implied by law without them, and did not authorise the defendant in soliciting old customers. Again, for the sake of completion, we refer our readers to Burchell v. Wilde (ubi sup.), more especially commented upon when discussing cases intimately affecting solicitors.

From commercial partnerships to those of a marital nature is not an extreme mental transition. In the law regarding husband and wife some few important deci sions have been pronounced. Thus in Earle v. Kingscote (noted L. T. p. 269; (1900) W. N. 162) the Court of Appeal have affirmed Mr. Justice Byrne, who had held a husband liable for his wife's tort where she had requested the plaintiff to join her in buying some shares with a promise to repay the plaintiff out of the proceeds of the investment, a debt then owed to her. The plaintiff, relying on the defendant's statements, signed two promissory notes, which were discounted and the proceeds paid to the defendant. The defendant never purchased the shares, and the plaintiff brought her action against the defendant and her husband for damages with success. In Re Turnbull; Turnbull v. Nicholas (1900) 1 Ch. 180) a married woman was administratrix of an intestate. Mr. Justice Stirling held that where such an one is ordered to pay into court a sum of money belonging to the estate and in her possession, and where there is no evidence of any devastavit; the order should be in common form and not restricted to the separate estate. On non. compliance the court can attach her. On the other hand, if the object of the order be to make good a loss occasioned by devastavit, then the order would follow the form of Scott v. Morley (57 L. T. Rep. 919; 20 Q. B. Div. 120), and no liability to attachment would ensue upon the non-compliance. One of the most

unusual cases of the whole year was that of Cowley v. Cowley (noted L. T., p. 365; (1900) W. N. 180), where the Court of Appeal (reversing Mr. Justice Barnes) held that the divorced wife of Earl Cowley was entitled to retain the title of Countess Cowley notwithstanding her divorce and her subsequent remarriage. After a considered judgment it was ruled that, though the title and dignity of an earl were incorporeal hereditaments, yet the acts complained of did not constitute a trespass, but a mere assertion; that the earl had suffered no legal wrong; and that a man could not enjoin a woman from using his name and from saying she was his wife in the absence of malice.

Company case law has received some considerable attention during the sittings of the courts during the past year. An important addition to the chain of authorities dealing with misleading prospectuses is that of the Court of Appeal in Greenwood v. Leather Shod Wheel Company (81 L. T. Rep. 595; (1900) 1 Ch. 421), where it was held that sect. of the Directors' Liability Act, 1890, imposes liability whether or no the statement impeached is untrue in the sense in which it is used so long as it is, in point of fact, untrue. The same case shows also that tricky waiver clauses will not be operative; it is essential that subscribers should know the rights they are purporting to waive. Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Limited (82 L. T. Rep. 211; (1900) 1 Ch. 656), besides giving a strong instance of a company altering its articles so as to prejudice an individual shareholder, shows that where notices are to be given to members it is unnecessary to send an intimation to a deceased person or to direct it to his legal personal representatives unless they have become members by registration. In Re Trench Tubeless Tyre Company; Bethell v. Trench, &c., Tyre Company (82 L.T. Rep. 247; (1900) 1 Ch. 408) a point of some practical value was settled to the effect that where a confirmatory

A.

meeting is being held in respect to a vlountary winding-up, a notice of a resolution for the appointment of as liquidator may be dropped, and in substitution therefor a resolution for the appointment of B. may be proposed and carried without any further notice. Gluckstein v. Barnes (82 L. T. Rep. 393; (1900) A. C. 240) was an instance of a sordid and secret profit by company promoters who purchased a property for resale. They bought up at a cheap rate some of the charges upon it, and made a profit of £20,000; when the prospectus was issued this profit was carefully concealed, but it was held in an ensuing liquidation that a full disclosure should have been made. This is not a bad example of the sort of thing which is nowadays so frequent, and which has rendered it imperative to deal with by further legislation. The elementary duties of honesty in directors were brought home to certain of these people by the Court of Appeal in Alexander v. Automatic Telephone Company .82 L. T. Rep. 400; (1900) 2 Ch. 56), where it was held that shareholders must not be mulcted for the benefit of directors, but that the latter must count for such benefits to the company, so that all may share in them. Here some curious juggling with the making of calls had been detected. Such cases as these again illustrate the urgent need of legislation; it will be interesting to observe in, say, about two years' time how the new Companies Act of 1900, with its provision as to prospectuses and their contents, will serve the purpose for which it was intended.

(To be continued.)

JUSTICES' OATHS.

We are indebted to a correspondent for the following valuable memorandum:

The following oaths are required to be taken by justices of the peace, viz:

(1) The oath of allegiance.

(2) The oath of office or judicial oath.
(3) The oath of property qualification.

I have not yet been able to trace what were the forms of oaths Nos. (1) and (2) in olden time, but the point, perhaps, is not of any importance as the Promissory Oats Act, 1868, presently referred to, prescribes the present form.

The first statute necessary to refer to in this con-. nection is 1 Anne, c. 2, which declares that, on the demise of any king or queen, any commission of the peace shall not be determined, but that every commission shall continue in foll force for the space of six calendar months next ensuing unless superseded and determined by her Majesty, her heirs, or successors.

The Act does not contain any provision as to any oaths of the justices.

The 6 Anne, c. 41, s. 8, enacts that the Privy Council shall not be determined or dissolved by the demise of the Crown, but shall continue as such for six months thereafter, unless sooner determined by her successor to the Crown, nor shall the offices of Lord Chancellor, nor any of the other great offices specially mentioned, nor any office, place, or employment, civil or military, within Great Britain become void by the demise of the Crown, but that the persons in any offices, places, or employment, shall continue in them for six months after such demise unless sooner removed or discharged by the next in succession.

The 18 Geo. II., c. 20, prescribes the property quali fication to be held by justices, and the form of oath (still in force) to be taken at quarter sessions in that respect before acting.

The 1 Geo. III., c. 13, passed for clearing doubts as to the taking of the 44 'said oath " (of qualification) by justices appointed in that reign declares that all persons who were justices at the demise of Geo. II., or who shall be justices at the demise of his Majesty or his successors, or shall thereafter be appointed justices, and who shall take the oaths of office before the clerk of the peace, and shall have subscribed the "said oath " (ie., oath of

qualification) at quarter sessions may act without being obliged to take the "said oath " again.

The 7 Geo. III., c. 9, after reciting that doubts have! arisen as to the taking of oaths under the 1 Geo. III., | c. 13, enacts that all persons appointed justices by his present Majesty, and who have taken and subscribed the oaths mentioned in the said Act-i.e., oaths of office and of property qualification, and all persons appointed justices by any commission of his Majesty or his successors, and who shall have taken and subscribed the said oaths, shall not be obliged to take and subscribe the same oaths by reason of being appointed by any subsequent commission.

The Promissory Oaths Act (31 & 32 Vict., c. 72, s. 1) prescribes the form of (a) the oath of allegiance, which is to her late Majesty and her successors; (b) the judicial oath (or oath of office), which is to her late Majesty personally.

Section 6 declares that these oaths shall be taken by (inter alios) justices, as soon as may be after taking office, in the same manner in which the oaths would have been taken "previously to the passing of this Act "-i.e., before the High Court or quarter sessions.

Section 7 declares that no person shall be compelled in respect of the same appointment to the same office to take the oath "more times than one."

Section 10 declares that where in any oath "under this Act the name of her present Majesty is expressed the name of the sovereign of this Kingdom, for the time being, shall be substituted from time to time."

The result of these enactments, therefore, appears to be this:-That justices need not now take the oaths afresh albeit, as I think, it would have been necessary for them to take the oath of office anew but for section 10 of the Act of 1868 just referred to, seeing that that oath, as prescribed by the Act, is personal to her late Majesty.

It is to be regretted that the law officers have not seen their way to deal with this question in an authoritative manner. So far as it is possible to gather any reason for the official announcement that it is desirable that justices should take the oaths again, it would seem to rest on the declaration in section 7 of the Promissory Oaths Act, above quoted, that no person shall be compelled to take the oath more than once in respect of the same appointment to the same office.

One thing, however, is sufficiently clear- namely, that justices, on being named in any new commission of the King, must take oaths Nos. (1) and (2) afresh.— Justice of the Peace.

COURT PAPERS.

ADJUDICATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY.

[The dates of Adjudications are first given, the Sittings follow in italics.]

DUBLIN.

Carlin, Denis, of Greencastle and Tybane, in the County o Tyrone, grocer and draper. May 21; Friday, June 7 and Tuesday, June 25. Hayes and Sons, solrs. M'Lynn, Denis of Bridge-street, Sligo, in the County of Sligo, builder and contractor. May 17; Friday, June 7, and Tuesday, June 25. Wm. Smyth, solr.

APPOINTMENTS AND PROMOTIONS.

Mr. Nixon, Petty Sessions Clerk of Drumkeeran, Co. Leitrim, has been appointed a Commissioner for Qaths.

Mr. Albert E. Machin, Solicitor, of the firm of Ennis, Son, and Machin, of Dublin, has been appointed a Commissioner to Administer Oaths for His Majesty's High Court of Justice in Ireland.

Mr. Robert A. Wilson, Clerk of the Crown for Co. Donegal, has been appointed Clerk of the Peace for that County in room of the late Mr. John Cochrane, J.P.

BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS.

BIRTHS.

DONAGHY-May 16, at Eileen Gardens, Windsor Park, Belfast, the wife of Joseph J. Donaghy, solicitor, of a daughter. MARRIAGES.

BARBER and BROWN-May 18, at St. John's Church, St. Leonard's-on-Sea, by the Rev. J. H. Molesworth, Vicar of St. John's, Leicester, assisted by the Rev. B. de Malpas. Egerton, Vicar of St. Martin's, Peterborough, and the Rev. Canon Jones, Rector of the Parish, Alfred Taylor Barber, second son of the late Augustine Shottowe Barber, solicitor, Dublin, to Ellen Sophia Brown, daughter of the late Matthew Brown, of Peterborough.