231 U.S. Syllabus. LURIA v. UNITED STATES. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. No. 27. Argued April 23, 1913.-Decided October 20, 1913. Where a point involving sufficiency of the complaint is not raised and defendant does not challenge the statement of the court that it supposes the point will not be raised, it is too late to raise it in this court. This court concurs in the conclusion reached by the District Court that the residence in a foreign country of one whose certificate of naturalization was attacked as fraudulent was intended to be and was of a permanent nature and justified the proceeding on the part of the United States to cancel the certificate under § 15 of the act of June 29, 1906. Unverified certificates of unofficial parties as to residence of a naturalized person in a foreign country held insufficient to overcome the presumption of permanent residence created under § 15 of the act of June 29, 1906. The provisions of the second paragraph of § 15 of the act of June 29, 1906, dealing with the evidential effect of taking up a permanent residence in a foreign country within five years after securing a certificate of naturalization applies not only to certificates issued under that law but also to those issued under prior laws. The words "provisions of this section" used in a statute naturally mean every part of the section, one paragraph as much as another. A paragraph in a statute which is plain and unambiguous, must be accepted as it reads even though inserted as an amendment by one branch of the legislature. The statutes, as they existed prior to June 29, 1906, conferred the right to naturalization upon such aliens only as contemplated the continuance of a residence already established in the United States. Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies the reciprocal obligations as compensation for each other of a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty of protection on the part of the society. Under the Constitution of the United States a naturalized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native citizen in all respects save that of eligibility to the Presidency. That which is contrary to the plain implication of a statute is unlaw Statement of the Case. 231 U.S. ful, for what is clearly implied is as much a part of a law as that which is expressed. The spirit of the naturalization laws of the United States has always been that an applicant if admitted to citizenship should be a citizen in fact as well as name and bear the obligations and duties of that status as well as enjoy its rights and privileges. The provisions of § 15 of the act of June 29, 1906, are not unconstitutional as making any act fraudulent or illegal that was honest and legal when done, or as imposing penalties, or doing more than providing for annulling letters of citizenship to which the possessors were never entitled. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227. The establishment of a presumption from certain facts prescribes a rule of evidence and not one of substantive right; and if the inference is reasonable and opportunity is given to controvert the presumption, it is not a denial of due process of law, Mobile &c. R. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, even if made applicable to existing causes of action. The right to have one's controversy determined by existing rules of evidence is not a vested right and a reasonable change of such rules does not deny due process of law. The taking up of a permanent residence in a foreign country shortly after naturalization has a bearing upon the purpose for which naturalization is sought, and it is reasonable to make it a presumption that such action indicates an absence of intention to reside permanently in the United States; and the provision in § 15 of the act of June 29, 1906, making such action a presumption, rebuttable by proof to the contrary, of intention not to reside permanently in the United States, is not unconstitutional as a denial of due process of law. A proceeding under § 15 of the act of June 29, 1906, to cancel a certificate of naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently issued is not a suit at common law but a suit in equity similar to a suit to cancel a patent for land or letters patent for an invention and the defendant is not entitled to a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment. United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315. 184 Fed. Rep. 643, affirmed. THE facts, which involve the construction of § 15 of the act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 596, 601, c. 3592, relating to citizenship and naturalization and the validity of a decree setting aside a certificate of naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently issued, are stated in the opinion. 231 U.S. Argument for Appellant. Mr. Louis Marshall, with whom Mr. A. M. Friedenberg was on the brief, for appellant: In so far as the act of 1906 assumes (though appellant claims that it does not), to deprive the appellant of the citizenship, lawfully and without fraud secured by him in 1894, by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, twelve years before the passage of that act, it is unconstitutional, in that it violates Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution of the United States, and § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment thereto. For purposes of citizenship, persons born and persons naturalized in the United States are placed on an exact equality by the Constitution. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 165; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583, 641, 642; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393; Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 162. The only distinction between citizenship by birth and citizenship by naturalization, is the provision of the Constitution making only natural born citizens eligible to the office of president. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94, 101. Citizenship by birth and by naturalization being thus, for all practical purposes, absolute equivalents, it would seem as though it were as much beyond the power of Congress to deprive one who has become a naturalized citizen, of his citizenship, as it would be to deprive a natural born citizen of that right. For limitations on the power of Congress to deal with the subject of naturalization, see Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 825; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 702, 703. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227, does not depart from the decisions cited or determine any of the questions which are now presented for consideration. The contention that the act merely enacts a rule of evidence cannot be sustained. It affects substantial rights. Argument for Appellant. 231 U.S. While it is true that it is within the province of a legislature to enact that proof of one fact shall be prima facie evidence of another, the inference must not be arbitrary, and there must be a rational relation between the two facts. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219; People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32, 43. The inference of a lack of bona fide intention to become a citizen from appellant's subsequent action, is purely arbitrary, and is unreasonable, unnatural and extraordinary. The cases cited in the opinion of the court below do not sustain this legislation. That portion of § 15 of the act of 1906 which is involved in this action, is confined in its operation to cases of naturalization under the act of 1906, and does not include persons naturalized under the prior act. See Johannessen Case, 225 U. S. 227; United States v. Mansour, 170 Fed. Rep. 671. Under the Naturalization Act as it existed at the time of the issuance to the appellant of his certificate of citizenship, there was no requirement that the applicant should intend to reside permanently within the United States. No oath to that effect was called for. On the other hand, the act of 1906 requires an oath from the applicant, that it is his intention to reside permanently within the United States. While it is true that most of the provisions of § 15 are remedial, and are, therefore, properly applicable to any case relating to naturalization which comes within their terms, irrespective of the time when the naturalization takes place, that paragraph constitutes an exception, not only by necessary implication, but by its express terms, to the general and remedial provisions contained in the section. Conclusive evidence of this statutory purpose is afforded by the history of the second paragraph of § 15, now under consideration. 231 U. S. Argument for Appellant. A court may refer to the public history of the times, and to legislative documents, to ascertain the reason of an enactment as well as the meaning of particular provisions therein, and to that end may consider the evil which it is designed to remedy, contemporaneous events, and the existing situation with regard to the subject-matter of the legislation as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body. United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S. 72, 79; Platt v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 99 U. S. 60; Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 463; The Delaware, 161 U. S. 472; Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U. S. 331; Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 495; Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 19; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 339; Wadsworth v. Boysen, 148 Fed. Rep. 771, 775; Tenement House Department v. Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 325; Musco v. United Surety Co., 196 N. Y. 459, 465. For the genesis and passage of the act of 1906, see Report of Commission of November 8, 1905, House Doc. No. 46, 59th Cong., 1st. Sess.; Cong. Rec., vol. 40, pt. 8, pp. 7869-7871, 7874. For its history in the Senate see Vol. 40, Cong. Rec., pp. 7913, 9009, 9359-9361, 9407, 9411, 9505, 9620, 9691. Even if § 15 were in terms applicable to the appellant and were as to him constitutional, he did not take up a permanent residence at Johannesburg, but continued to be a legal resident of the United States. Residence is always a matter of intention. His intention to remain a resident and citizen of the United States was manifested over and over again. Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556; Moorhouse v. Lord, 10 H. L. C. 272; Marchioness of Huntly v. Gaskell, 1906 App. Cas. 56 and Matter of Newcomb, 192 N. Y. 238. This legislation violates Art. I, § 9, of the Federal Constitution, because it is in effect a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts |