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the complaint, that the taxes were delinquent, and in connection with the statutory provisions augmenting the delinquency by designated penalties and costs. When this is done it is quite evident that the amount sought to be collected was not excessive.

The remaining objections advanced in the complaint are founded upon a failure to comply with local statutory provisions directing the making and preserving of proofs of the publication and posting of the notice of sale. The Supreme Court of the Territory held, in effect, that compliance with these statutory provisions was not essential in a constitutional sense to the validity of tax sales and therefore that the territorial legislature was free to declare that non-compliance should not render the sales invalid; and with this as a premise the court further held that the objections could not prevail, because the statute under which the sales were had contained a provision that "no bill of review or other action attacking the title to any property sold at tax sale in accordance with this act shall be entertained by any court, nor shall such sale or title be invalidated by any proceedings, except upon the ground that the taxes, penalties, interest and costs had been paid before the sale, or that the property was not subject to taxation." Laws New Mexico, 1899, c. 22, § 25.

The appellant assigns error upon this ruling and insists that the provision just quoted (a) is in terms restricted to sales made "in accordance with this act" and so cannot be applied to any sale wherein some requirements of the act were not followed, and (b) is repugnant to the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the Territory by the organic act.

The Supreme Court of the Territory construed the words "in accordance with this act" as meaning "under this act," and we think this was right. At least, we cannot say that it was manifestly wrong, as must be done

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to justify us in rejecting the local interpretation of a territorial statute. Fox v. Haarstick, 156 U. S. 674, 679; Treat v. Grand Canyon Railway Co., 222 U. S. 448, 452. Of course, the provision was intended to have some operation and effect, and it hardly could have any if restricted to sales made in accordance with the act, in the stricter sense, for such sales would be as valid without the provision as with it.

While statutes authorizing tax sales often provide for making and preserving some designated form of record evidence of compliance with the requirements respecting notice of the sale, the subject is one which rests in legislative discretion, being quite apart from those fundamental rights which are embraced in a right conception of due process of law. And if there be legislative provision upon the subject, it does not assume the dignity of an essential element of due process of law in the constitutional sense (Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674, 683), but belongs to that class of regulations of which it is said in Williams v. Supervisors of Albany, 122 U. S. 154, 164: "Where directions upon the subject might originally have been dispensed with, or executed at another time, irregularities arising from neglect to follow them may be remedied by the legislature, unless its action in this respect is restrained by constitutional provisions prohibiting retrospective legislation." We are not here concerned with retrospective legislation or with any prohibition of it, for, as before shown, the remedial or relieving provision was embodied in the act under which the sales were had.

It is contended, however, that the remedial or relieving provision is so broad in its terms as to give effect to a sale not founded upon a prior assessment or where no opportunity was afforded for a hearing in opposition to the tax, and therefore that it is violative of due process. To this it is a sufficient answer to repeat what was said in Castillo v. McConnico (p. 680), in disposing of a like contention:

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"But, as thus stated, the proposition presents a purely moot question. The plaintiff in error has no interest to assert that the statute is unconstitutional because it might be construed so as to cause it to violate the Constitution. His right is limited solely to the inquiry whether in the case which he presents the effect of applying the statute is to deprive him of his property without due process of law."

As none of the objections advanced in the complaint against the defendant's tax title appears to have been well taken, we think the demurrer was rightly sustained. Decree affirmed.

TORRES v. LOTHROP, LUCE & COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM AND IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF PORTO RICO.

No. 17. Argued October 31, 1913.-Decided December 1, 1913.

The due process clause of the Federal Constitution does not control mere forms of procedure provided only the fundamental requirements of notice and opportunity to defend are afforded. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230.

Where the appellate court is without authority to consider errors of the trial court, which were not there assigned, this court cannot reverse the appellate court for error in not deciding matters which it had no authority to pass on.

Although proceeds of a crop received by a mortgagee of the land may by law be imputed to payment of interest on the mortgage and not to other advances, they may, under a special contract with the mortgagor and by his subsequent acquiescence, be applied to payment of advances instead of interest.

In the absence of clear conviction of error, this court follows the conclusions of the court below in applying the local law.

One who has transferred his mortgaged premises by deed recorded prior to the foreclosure suit cannot set the foreclosure aside on the ground

Argument for Appellant and Plaintiff in Error. 231 U. S.

that the court excluded testimony offered to show that the transfer was fictitious and that he was still the owner and entitled to notice. 16 Porto Rico 172, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the validity of a sale of real estate in Porto Rico made in judicial proceedings for the foreclosure of a mortgage, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. C. M. Boerman for appellant and plaintiff in error: This court has jurisdiction on this appeal, as the property claimed and involved is far exceeding the value of $5,000. Royal Ins. Co. v. Martin, 192 U. S. 149.

The summary proceedings under the mortgage law of Porto Rico are contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.

There is really no defense to the proceedings on a mortgage under this law. The mortgagor cannot have his day in court. The court virtually does not act as a court, but simply as an executive officer would act. It deprives a man of his property without due process of law.

The general guarantees of life, liberty and property contained in the Constitution of the United States apply to Porto Rico. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 277.

All the laws in force in Porto Rico are so only through the act of Congress which declared them so to be after the change of sovereignty. Article 8, Organic Act of April 12, 1900.

For definitions given by this court to the words "due process of law" see Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U. S. 409; Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427. See also Health Department v. Trinity Church, 17 N. Y. 510, 512; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 189; Ieck v. Anderson, 57 California, 251, 253.

The rule of justice which forbids the taking of property except according to the law of the land, means that there shall be no taking, no condemnation, before hearing. First Nat. Bank v. Swan, 3 Wyoming, 356. See also

231 U. S.

Opinion of the Court.

People v. Essex County Supr's, 70 N. Y. 228, 234; Wright v. Cradlebaught, 3 Nevada, 341, 349; State v. Cutshall, 110 N. Car. 538; Lumbering Co. v. Wasco County, 35 Oregon, 498; Simmons v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 63 S. Car. 525; Bennet v. Davis, 90 Maine, 102; Babcock v. City of Buffalo, Sheld. 317, 340.

Judicial orders or judgments affecting the life or property of citizens in the absence of notice and opportunity to be heard to the party affected, are violative of the fundamental principles of our laws, and cannot be sustained. In re Rosser, 101 Fed. Rep. 562, 567; Holden v. Harvey, 167 U. S. 366; Jensen v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 6 Utah, 253; In re Jensen, 59 N. Y. 653, 655; San Mateo v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 722, 752.

The provisions of the mortgage law itself were not complied with in the proceedings to foreclose the mortgage and therefore those proceedings are null and void.

Mr. Malcolm Donald for appellees and defendants in

error.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error, Marcelino Torres Zayas, in January, 1908, brought this suit to set aside a sale of real estate, made in judicial proceedings, of a summary or executory character, for the foreclosure of a mortgage and to recover the property with fruits, revenues and damages. The right to the relief sought was based, broadly speaking, upon the following grounds: a, the prematurity of the suit to foreclose because there was nothing due when the proceedings were commenced; b, the absence of a necessary party; c, vices in the proceedings, of such a character as to cause them to be absolutely void. The trial court dismissed the suit.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Porto Rico

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