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ship on such ground. For the purposes of this appeal a number of grounds of error were asserted, but we content ourselves with the mere statement that we think they are without merit because in the argument at bar for the appellant only the rulings of the court below concerning the three propositions to which we have referred are discussed and insisted upon as a basis for reversal. We come then briefly to consider those propositions.

At the outset it is to be observed that the questions are inherently and in the strictest sense local in character, depending as they do upon the right to have the benefit in the Territory of the statutes of limitation concerning real estate and the application of such statutes to the case as made by the defendant, the United Globe Mines. But as to questions of such character the settled rule is that this court "accepts the construction which the territorial court has placed upon a local statute"; in other words, will not disregard or reverse the same unless constrained to do so by the clearest conviction of serious error. (Phoenix Railway Co. v. Landis, ante, p. 578, where a full list of the applicable cases is collected, decided December 23 last.) With our duty thus defined the case is readily disposed of. As to the first question, the court below expressly found that during the whole of the statutory time the United Globe Mines, although a non-resident in the sense that it was a corporation of foreign organization, had complied with the laws of Arizona, was in possession of the property, paying taxes thereon and conducting business by means of its use, and was subject there to be sued, having under the law of the Territory, an agency for that purpose. It is manifest under these conditions, if there be any ground for a different conclusion, which we do not intimate, there is no possible room for holding that such serious error was committed as to constrain us to reverse. As to the second proposition,—the five years' statutethe only contention is that the court erred in holding that

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a reference in the deed which was relied upon as to the origin of title did not operate to render the deed relied on, insufficient for the purposes of the statute, although it was in every other respect adequate. That is to say, the contention is that the sufficiency of the deed should have been tested not by its own adequacy but by the insufficiency of another deed, not involved in the case simply because such other deed by way of mere recital was referred to in the deed which was relied on and upon which deed the application of the bar of the statute solely depended. We do not test the accuracy of the reasoning upon which the contention must rest, nor comprehensively review the authorities since in our opinion it cannot be said, either from the point of view of reason, or from a consideration of the decided cases 1 that there is ground for holding that there was such manifest error committed as to justify reversal. In saying this we intimate no doubt as to the correctness of the ruling below made our sole purpose is to abstain from deciding a purely local question in the absence of those conditions which render it necessary for us to do so that is the existence of plain error of so serious a nature as to require correction at our hands.

1

Affirmed.

1 Bradstreet v. Huntington, 5 Pet. 402, 447; Clarke v. Courtney, 5 Pet. 319, 354; Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. 472; Wright v. Mattison, 18 How. 50; Cameron v. United States, 148 U. S. 301.

231 U. S.

Opinion of the Court.

VAN SYCKEL v. ARSUAGA.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PORTO RICO.

No. 69. Argued November 13, 1913.—Decided January 5, 1914. Where appellant with ground challenges the adequacy of the findings of the court below to sustain the legal conclusions based on them, it is the duty of this court to consider and decide that question. Under the local law of Porto Rico, if there is intrinsic ambiguity in a written instrument the right obtains to dispel such ambiguity by extraneous proof showing the circumstances under which the instrument was executed.

In this case there was such ambiguity in the contract involved as justified proof beyond the terms of the instrument to clear up the situation, and findings of the trial court based upon such proof are not void because of want of power to consider it.

The mere fact that parties seek in a lawful mode to protect legal rights by keeping alive an instrument under which possession to the property could be maintained in case of adverse decision in suits under another instrument does not indicate fraud in the transaction. On the record in this case, held, that a partner who had kept alive a lease on property which his firm had acquired from him through another source of title so as to protect the interest of the firm against attacks from outside parties could not subsequently recover the property under the lease to the detriment of the other partners. There is evident lack of merit in the contention of a partner to recover property which he sold to the partnership and was paid for, without returning the price.

THE facts, which involve the validity of a judgment liquidating and distributing the assets of a copartnership in Porto Rico, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. N. B. K. Pettingill, with whom Mr. George H. Lamar was on the brief, for appellants.

Mr. Charles F. Carusi for appellees.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

When the court below delivered its opinion and made

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a statement of facts it did not enter a final decree, but directed a re-statement of certain accounts to be made and ordered a survey and report as to the condition of certain real estate to the end that thereafter the case might be finally disposed of. Fixing their attention upon the controlling force of the reasons which the court had stated in its opinion and the decisive character of the findings embodied in the statement of facts, the parties who believed themselves aggrieved at once appealed, but their appeal was dismissed for want of a final judgment. 200 U. S. 624. The case is now here on an appeal from a final judgment and the contentions previously relied upon to secure a reversal are applicable and now require to be decided.

This suit was begun by the widow and heirs of Paul Van Syckel to liquidate and distribute the assets of two partnerships of which he was a member, viz., P. Van Syckel & Co. and the Santa Cruz Sugar Co. The defendants were the other members of the firms. From the petition and the documents annexed, from the answer, and a cross-petition filed by the defendants to construe and limit a document referred to as an agreement for "postponement of rights," as also from the issues taken on the cross-petition and from the opinion of the court and the statement of facts which it made it is beyond question that the only controversy between the partners arose from an assertion by the widow and heirs of Van Syckel that they were the holders of a subsisting lease covering an important piece of partnership real estate.

The solution of this controversy depended upon the answers proper to be made to the following questions: 1st, Did the lease which was owned by Van Syckel prior to the formation of the partnership of P. Van Syckel and Company pass to that firm as the result of its organization and the stipulations contained in the articles of partnership? 2nd, If the firm became the owner of the lease, was such lease extinguished by confusion (Civil Code, § 1192)

231 U.S.

Opinion of the Court.

as the result of the purchase by the firm of the leased property under a foreclosure sale, and 3rd, even although as a general rule, the lease was extinguished under the conditions stated, could the surviving members of the firm be heard to deny the existence of the lease as against the widow and heirs of Van Syckel in view of the public record concerning the lease, of the stipulations of the agreement styled postponement of rights of the foreclosure proceedings, and of other declarations made in other notarial acts to which the partnership and the partners were parties?

Concluding that these questions required an affirmative answer the court below rejected the claim based upon the existence of the alleged lease. The reasons which led to this conclusion were stated in an elaborate opinion and the facts which were deemed controlling were enumerated in a statement of facts. While conceding that there is no power to review the facts, and while further conceding that if effect be given to the facts found, the judgment is clearly right, it is yet insisted by the appellants that there should be a reversal upon the following grounds: a, Because the ultimate findings made by the court as to the non-existence of the lease were on the face of the record manifestly alone based upon inferences drawn from parol proof conflicting with the declarations of the parties contained in notarial acts and which under the local law were not lawfully susceptible of being overthrown by parol proof; and, b, because moreover error is manifest on the face of the findings as well as in the legal conclusions based on the findings because it was impossible to conclude that the lease had no existence without permitting the defendants to repudiate their declarations made in notarial acts, to base a claim of right upon their deceit and fraud. and to discharge themselves and their property from an obligation by giving efficacy to their wrongdoing. As these propositions in their final analysis challenge the adequacy of the findings made to sustain the legal conclusions

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