amendment to article five." Those desiring to vote against the amendment shall have written or printed upon their tickets: " Against amendment to article five." Immediately after the election the officers of each precinct shall forward to the county judge of their county a duplicate return showing the number of votes cast for or against the amendment; and on the tenth day thereafter the county judge shall open and count said returns, and forthwith forward to the Secretary of State, in a sealed package, a tabulated statement thereof, showing the total number of votes cast in the county for or against the amendment; and on the fortieth day after said election the Secretary of State shall, in the presence of the Governor and Attorney-General, open and count said returns; and if it shall appear from the returns that a majority of the votes were cast for said amendment, it shall be the duty of the Governor, on the following day, to issue his proclamation setting forth the fact that said amendment has received a majority of the votes cast at said election, and shall proclaim that said amendment has become and is a part of the State Constitution, and this amendment shall take effect from and after said proclamation.

II.

That section twenty-four (24), of Article 3, of the Constitution of the State of Texas, be so amended as to hereafter read as follows (viz):

SEC. 24. The members of the Legislature shall receive from the public treasury such compensation for their services as may from time to time be provided by law, not exceeding five dollars per day. In addition to the per diem, the members of each house shall be entitled to mileage in going to and returning from the seat of government, which mileage shall not exceed five ($5.00) dollars for every twenty-five miles, the distance to be computed by the nearest and most direct route of travel by land, regardless of railways or water routes; and the Comptroller of the State shall prepare and preserve a table of distances to each county seat now or hereafter to be established, and by such table the mileage of each member shall be paid; but no member shall be entitled to mileage for any extra session that may be called within one day after the adjournment of a regular or called session: Provided, the regular session of the Legislature shall not continue longer than one hundred days.

And be it further resolved, That the Governor be requested to submit to the vote of the electors of the State the foregoing proposed amendment to the Constitution, at an election to be ordered on the first Tuesday in September, A. D. 1881, in accordance with the provisions of article 17 of the State Constitution.

total 30,913. Waco received 2,632 for the main University, and 7,167 for the entire University; total 9,799. Tyler, main University, 18,420; entire University, 544; total 18,974. Thorp Springs, main University, 2930; entire University, 287; total 3217. Lampasas, main University, 2622; entire University, 207; total 2829. Williams' Ranch, main University, 8; entire University, 13; total, 21. Albany, main University, 12; entire University, 7; total, 19. Graham, main University, 128; entire University, 80; total, 208. Matagorda, main University, 14; entire University, 3; total, 17. Caddo Grove and Peak, main University, 544; entire University, 26; total, 570. Scattering for main University, 62; entire University, 33; total, 95. Austin was declared as the selected location for the main University. The following votes were cast for the location of the Medical Department: Galveston, 29,741; Houston, 12,586; Austin, 994; Waco, 199; Tyler, 41; scattering, 110. Galveston having received the largest number of votes, which vote cast for said locality amounts to over one-third of the vote cast, was declared selected by the people as the location of the Medical Department of the university.

Virginia.

The following, in relation to the elective franchise and qualifications for office, will be submitted to the qualified voters in 1882:

Strike out Sect. I, Art. III, as follows:
ARTICLE THIRD.

Elective franchise and qualifications for office.

1. Every male citizen of the United States, twenty-one years old, who shall have been a resident of the state twelve months, and of the county, city or town in which he shall offer to vote three months next preceding any election, and shall have paid to the state, before the day of election, the capitation tax required by law for the preceding year, shall be entitled to vote for members of the general assembly and all officers elected by the people: provided, that no officer, soldier, seaman or marine of the United States army or navy shall be considered a resident of this state by reason of being stationed therein: and provided, also, that the following persons shall be excluded from voting:

First. Idiots and lunatics.

Second. Persons convicted of bribery in any election, embezzlement of public funds, treason, felony, or petit larceny.

Third. No person who, while a citizen of this state, has, since the adoption of this constitution, fought a duel with a deadly weapon, sent or accepted a challenge to fight a duel with a deadly weapon, either within or beyond the boundaries of this state, or knowingly conveyed a challenge, or aided or assisted in any manner in fighting a duel, shall be allowed to vote or hold any office of honor, profit or trust under this constitution— And in lieu thereof insert the following:

1. Every male citizen of the United States, twenty-one years old, who shall have been a resident of this state twelve months, and of the county, city or town in which he shall offer to vote three months next preceding any election,

shall be entitled to vote for members of the general assembly and all officers elected by the people provided, that no officer, soldier, seaman or marine of the United States army or navy shall be considered a resident of this state by reason of being stationed therein and provided, also, that the following persons shall be excluded from voting:

First. Idiots and lunatics.

Second. Persons convicted of bribery in any election, embezzlement of public funds, treason, felony, or petit larceny.

Third. No person who, while a citizen of this state, has, since the adoption of this constitution, fought a duel with deadly weapon, sent or accepted a challenge to fight a duel with deadly weapon, either within or beyond the boundaries of this state, or knowingly conveyed a challenge, or aided or assisted in any manner in fighting a duel, shall be allowed to vote or hold any office of honor, profit or trust under this constitution.

West Virginia.

Two Constitutional Amendments were ratified at the general election in 1880.* That striking out Article VIII, and substituting a new system of Courts received 57,941 votes; against it, 34,270. That striking out Section 13 of Article III, and substituting a provision authorizing, in courts at common law where the claim exceeds $20 exclusive of interest and costs, trials by jury of six persons, if required by either party, received 56,482 votes; against it, 34,073.

Wisconsin.

The following amendment:

That section four of article four of the constiution of this state, be amended so as to read as follows: Section 4. The members of the assembly shall be chosen biennially by single districts on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday of November, after the adoption of this amendment, by the qualified electors of the several districts; such districts to be bounded by county, precinct, town or ward lines, to consist of contiguous territory and be in as compact form as practicable.

That section five of article four of the constitution of this state be amended so as to read as follows: Section 5. The senators shall be elected by single districts of convenient contiguous territory at the same time and in the same manner as members of the assembly are required to be chosen, and no assembly district shall be divided in the formation of a senate district. The senate districts shall be numbered in the regular series, and the senators shall be chosen alternately from the odd and even numbered districts. The senators elected, or holding over at the time of the adoption of this amendment, shall continue in office till their successors are duly elected and qualified. And after the adoption of this amendment, all senators shall be chosen for the term of four years.

That section eleven of article four of the constitution of this state, be amended so as to read

*For the full text of these Amendments, see McPherson's HAND BOOK OF POLITICS for 1880, pp. 91-94.

as follows: The legislature shall meet at the seat of government, at such times as shall be provided by law, once in two years and no oftener, unless convened by the governor in special session, and when so convened no business shall be transacted except as shall be necessary to accomplish the special purposes for which it was convened.

That section twenty-one of article four of the constitution of this state, be amended so as to read as follows: Section 21. Each member of the legislature shall receive for his services for and during a regular session the sum of five hundred dollars, and ten cents for every mile he shall travel in going to and returning from the place of meeting of the legislature, on the most usual route. In case of an extra session of the legislature, no additional compensation shall be allowed to any member thereof, either directly or indirectly, except for mileage, to be computed at the same rate as for a regular session. stationery, newspapers, postage, or other perquisites, except the salary and mileage above provided, shall be received from the state by any member of the legislature for his services, or in any other manner, as such member.

No

Was ratified at the November election of

1881: Yeas, 53,532; nays, 13,936.

The following proposed amendment was adopted by the legislatures of 1881 and 1882, and will be submitted to popular vote November 7, 1882:

That section four of article six be amended to read as follows: Sheriffs, coroners, registers of deeds, district attorneys, and all other county officers, except judicial officers, shall be chosen by the electors of the respective counties, once in every two years. Sheriffs shall hold no other office, and be ineligible for two years next succeeding the termination of their offices; they may be required by law to renew their security from time to time, and in default of giving such new security their office shall be deemed vacant; but the county shall never be made responsible for the acts of the sheriff. The Governor may remove any officer in this section mentioned, giving to such a copy of the charges against him, and an opportunity of being heard in his defense. All vacancies shall be filled by appointment, and the person appointed to fill a vacancy shall hold only for the unexpired portion of the term to which he shall be appointed, and until his successor shall be elected and qualified.

That section twelve, article seven, of said constitution, be so amended as to read as follows: Section 12. There shall be a clerk of the circuit court chosen in each county organized for judicial purposes, by the qualified electors thereof, who shall hold his office for two years, subject to removal as shall be provided by law. In case of a vacancy, the judge of the circuit court shall have power to appoint a clerk until the vacancy shall be filled by an election. The clerk thus elected or appointed, shall give such security as the legislature may require. The Supreme Court shall appoint its own clerk, and a clerk of the circuit court may be appointed a clerk of the Supreme Court."

That section one, article thirteen, of said constitution, be so amended as to read as follows: Section I. The political year for the State of Wisconsin shall commence on the first Monday in January in each year, and the general elections hall be holden on the Tuesday next succeeding the first Monday in November. The first general election for all state and county officers, except judicial officers, after the adoption of this

amendment, shall be holden in the year A. D. 1884, and thereafter the general election shall be held biennially. All state, county, or other officers, elected at the general election in the year 1881, and whose term of office would otherwise expire on the first Monday of January in the year 1884, shall hold and continue in such offices respectively, until the first Monday in January in the year 1885.

VS.

Jason N. Bruffy, Administrator of George Bruffy, deceased.

Petition of the plaintiffs in error that the court take proceedings to to render its judgment

effectual.

Mr. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Court of Appeals of Virginia declines to enforce the mandate of this court issued in this case, and the petition of the plaintiffs in error is that this court will take such proceedings as will render its judgment effectual.

The plaintiffs in error are citizens of the State of Pennsylvania, and in 1866 they instituted an action in the Circuit Court of Rockingham County, Virginia, against the administrator of the estate of one George Bruffy, deceased, who, at the time of his death, was a citizen of Virginia, for the value of certain goods sold by them to him in March, 1861.

The administrator appeared to the action and pleaded the general issue and certain special pleas, the substance of which was that Pennsylvania was one of the United States, and that Virginia was one of the states which had formed a confederation known as the Confederate States; that from some time in 1861 until some time in 1865, the government of the United States was at war with the government of the Confederate States; and that by law of the Confederate States, debts to alien enemies were sequestered; that the intestate had paid over the amount claimed in this action to a receiver in those states appointed under that law, and was thus discharged from the debt to the plaintiffs.

To these pleas the plaintiffs demurred, but the demurrers were overruled. The case was then submitted to the court upon certain depositions and an agreed statement of facts. They established the sale and delivery of the goods for which the action was brought, the residence of the plaintiffs in Pennsylvania and of the deceased in Virginia during the war, the payment by the latter of the debt claimed to the seques

trator of the Confederate government under a judgment of a Confederate court. The Circuit Court of Rockingham county, therefore, gave judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiffs applied to the supreme court of appeals of the state for a writ of supersedeas to bring the case before it for review.

In the courts of other states, a supersedeas is merely an auxiliary process designed to supersede the enforcement of the judgment of the court below brought up by writ of error for review. But in Virginia, it serves a different purpose. "There," says Robinson, in his treatise on the practice in the courts of that state, "the writ of error is never used as a means of removing the judgment of an inferior court before a superior tribunal, except in those cases in which security is dispened with. In practice, the supersedeas is a substitute for the writ of error in all cases in which it is designed that the judgment of the court below shall be superseded."—(Vol. I., p. 660; White vs. Jones, I Wash., 118; Burwell vs. Anderson, 2 Ibid., 194; Wingfield vs. Crenshaw, 3 Henning & Mumford, 251.)

By the law of that state, when application is made to the supreme court of appeals for a writ of supersedeas, the court looks into the record of the case, and only allows the writ when of opinion that the decision complained of ought to be reviewed. Its action upon the record is in effect a determination whether or not it presents a sufficient question for the consideration of the court. If it deem the judgment of the court below "plainly right," and reject the application on that ground, and its order of rejection so state, no further application for the writ can be presented; the judgment of the court below is thenceforth irreversible. So, in effect, its refusal of the writ on that ground is equivalent to an affirmance of the judgment, for the reason that the record discloses no error.

In the present case the supreme court of appeals denied the writ, stating in its order that it was of opinion that the judgment of the court of Rockingham county was "plainly right." To review this action of the court of appeals-this determination as to the character of the judgment rendered in the circuit court-a writ of error was prosecuted from this court. It was issued in the court of appeals, and was returned with a

transcript of the record on file in the office of its clerk, properly certified, and the case was elaborately argued here by counsel. We came to the conclusion unanimously that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Rockingham county was erroneous, that the demurrers to the special pleas should have been sustained, and that the plaintiffs should have had judgment upon the agreed statement of facts for the amount of their claim, with interest from its maturity, deducting in the computation of time the period during which the war continued. We accordingly directed that the action of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, in refusing a supersedeas of the judgment of the circuit court, should be reversed, and that the cause should be remanded to it for further proceedings in accordance with our opinion. The judgment of this court was accordingly certified to that court, and presented to it in April, 1879. In April of the present year that court declined to take action upon our mandate, for reasons embodied in its opinion, at the time entered in its records. That opinion is as follows:

"This court, having maturely considered the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States, is of opinion that, according to the true intent and meaning of said mandate, this court is required to grant a writ of error or supersedeas to the judgment of the Circuit Court of Rockingham County.

"This court, at a former term, held at Staunton, Virginia, had refused such writ in the same case, being of opinion that the 'said judgment is plainly right.' By such refusal the said judgment of the Circuit Court of Rockingham had become irreversible and placed beyond the control and jurisdiction of this court. It was at one time a pending cause in this court. There is no mode by which the decision of an inferior court can be reversed here, except upon an appeal allowed or writ of error granted and duly perfected in conformity with the statutes made and provided. If, therefore, the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States shall be entered on the records of this court, it must be inoperative and of no effect, unless this court shall now grant a writ of error, or writ of error and supersedeas, to the said judgment of the Circuit Court of Rockingham County. judgment was rendered on the 18th of April, 1871. The seventeenth section of chaper 178, Code of 1873, provides that no process shall issue upon an appeal, writ of error, or supersedeas to or from a final judgment or decree, if, when the record is delivered to the clerk of the appellate court, there shall have elapsed two years since the date of such final judgment, decree, or order; but the appeal, writ of error, or

That

supersedeas shall be dismissed whenever it appears that two years have elapsed since the said date before the record is delivered to such clerk. So that, if the court should now grant the writ of error and supersedeas, no process could issue thereon: and if such process should issue, the writ of error or supersedeas must hereafter be dismissed by the express mandate of the statute. It is further provided, except in certain enumerated cases, that a writ of error or supersedeas shall not take effect until bond is given by the petitioner in a penalty, and with certain conditions prescribed; and if two years elapse from the date of such final judgment or decree before such bond is given, the appeal, writ of error, or supersedeas shall be dismissed. (See sections 13 and 17, chapter 178, Code of 1873.) In the present case the record has not been delivered to the clerk of this court, nor has any such bond been given as is required of the petitioner, nor indeed can be. These considerations are sufficient to show that no writ of error or supersedeas can now be granted, or, if granted, it must be dismissed, unless this court is authorized to disregard the plain letter of the statute under which it exercises its appellate jurisdiction. It may be further added, that when this court deems the decision of the inferior court plainly right and rejects the application for appeal on that ground, no other appeal, writ of error or supersedeas can afterwards be granted by this court in the said case. (See section 10, chapter 178, Code of 1873.)

"For these reasons, this court, with the highest respect and consideration for the Supreme Court of the United States, must decline to take any further action with respect to the mandate of said court.

"This entry is made on the record book of this court in conformity with the request and at the suggestion of the counsel for the petitioners. "A copy.-Teste:

'GEO. K. TAYLOR, C. C." The petitioners accordingly pray that this court will take such action as may be proper and needful in the premises to give efficacy to its judgment.

We do not understand that the court of appeals intends by its refusal to deny or question the appellate power of this tribunal in cases arising in the state court where the validity of a statute of, or of an authority exercised under, the state is drawn in question, on the ground of its repugnancy to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity. Its appellate jurisdiction over the judgments of the state courts in such cases, and other cases mentioned in the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act of 1789, (re-enacted in the Revised Statutes,) passed beyond the region of discussion in this court more than half a century ago. As early as 1816, in the celebrated case of Martin vs. Hunter's lessee, this court, in an opinion of unanswerable reasoning from the general language of the Constitution, asserted its appellate jurisdiction over the state courts in the cases mentioned in the act. It also showed that the jurisdiction had been sustained in a great variety of cases, and that the doctrine had been

acquiesced in by enlightened state courts without a judicial doubt being breathed until that case arose. No doctrine of this court rests upon more solid foundations or is more fully valued and cherished than that which sustains its appellate power over state courts where the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States are drawn in question and their authority is denied or evaded, or where any right is asserted under a state law or authority in conflict with them. And in no class of cases could that jurisdiction be more properly invoked thân when, by enactments of a revolutionary organization against the government of the United States, the property or the rights of citizens of the loyal states are attempted to be destroyed or impaired because of their loyalty to the Union.

The main reason assigned by the court of appeals for declining to act upon our mandate, as seen by its opinion, is the lapse of over two years from the date of the rendition of the judgment of the Circuit Court of Rockingham County and the delivery of the record of that court. The judgment was rendered on the 18th day of April, 1871, and the petition for tho supersedeas with the record was not presented to the court and delivered to its clerk until the 12th of September, 1874. The court of appeals, it is true, in its opinion states that the record has not been delivered to its clerk, but this is evidently an inadvertence, as the transcript before us shows that such record was filed with him on the day mentioned. The court also adds, as further reasons for its action, that a bond with a certain penalty and prescribed conditions was required to be given within like period before a supersedeas could take effect. and that no such bond was given in the case; and also, that when the court of appeals deems a decision of the inferior court plainly right, and rejects an application for an appeal on that ground, no other appeal or supersedeas can afterwards be granted.

These last two grounds do not impress us as having force, for a bond could not be required until the writ is allowed. And the ground of refusing the writ, that the decision in the inferior court was plainly right, being itself held to be untenable, there could be no reason why the order of denial should not be reversed, and an order granting the writ entered in its place, as in the case of reversals of other orders.

As to the lapse of more than two years between the date of the judgment and the delivery of the record to the clerk of the appellate court, it is sufficient to observe, that the court of appeals gave no effect to that circumstance; and we could not say it had no authority after that time to look into the record of the inferior court. We could not say what facts may have existed which prevented the operation of the statute, or what proceedings may have been necessary, according to the practice of the court, to enable parties to avail themselves of the lapse of time. The court did not refuse to receive the petition of the plaintiffs in error on the ground that it was presented too late, nor did it afterwards dismiss the petition for that reason. It took jurisdiction of it so far as to examine the record of the judg

ment of the court below, and to pass upon its character. In its judgment, entered in its records, it states that the petition, "having been maturely considered and the transcript of the said judgment seen and inspected, the court being of opinion that said judgment is plainly right, doth deny the said supersedeas." That judgment, thus entered, is a final determination of the character of the judgment of the inferior court. Although in the form of denying the supersedeas, it is not essentially different in its character and effect from a judgment dismissing such writ after it had been once granted and the merits of the case heard. So long as it remains unreversed, it will be authority to all the inferior courts of Virginia that the confiscation of debts due to loyal citizens, under an act of the Confederate government, enforced as a law of the state, was a valid proceeding. It is, therefore, the subject of review in this court.—(The Richmond, &c., Railroad Co. vs. The Louisiana Railroad Co., 13 How., 80.) It is enough for our jurisdiction over the case that there was a final judgment of the court of appeals, and our jurisdiction cannot be now ousted, after we have acted upon the case and passed upon its merits, by any suggestion that that court never took jurisdiction to look into the record of the inferior court and determine the character of its judgment; nor can we listen to any such suggestion in contradiction of the record of the case. In the elaborate argument of counsel of the case before us, though several objections were urged to our jurisdiction, no intimation was made of the want of jurisdiction by the court of appeals.

(Skillern's Executors vs. May's Executors, 6 Cranch, 267; Ex-parte Story, 12 Peters, 339; and Washington Bridge Co. vs. Stewart, 3 How., 413.)

Whenever the highest court of a state by any form of decision affirms or denies the validity of a judgment of an inferior court, over which it by law can exercise appellate authority, the jurisdiction of this court to review such decision, if it involve a federal question, will It cannot upon a proper proceeding attach. make any difference whether, after an examination of the record of the court below, such decision be expressed by refusing a writ of error or supersedeas, or by dismissing a writ previously allowed. And when this court has once acquired jurisdiction, it may send its process, in the enforcement of its judgment, to the appellate court of the state, or to the inferior court whose judgment is reversed. Had the court of appeals, after assuming jurisdiction so far as to examine the record of the inferior court and pass upon its action, granted the supersedeas and rendered in the case the judgment which, in our opinion, should have been rendered, the judgment of the inferior court would have been reversed, and judgment ordered in favor of the plaintiffs in error. Having jurisdiction of the case, we can now direct that such reversal be made, and such judgment be entered.

But inasmuch as the court of appeals finds itself embarrassed in its action upon our mandate by reason of the statute, to which no reference was made in its original decision, we will direct