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FEBRUARY, 1847.]

Three Million Bill.

of conquest. What did the President say? He told them that he was going to prosecute the war until he had obtained an ample indemnity, not only for the claims of our citizens against Mexico for spoliations, but also for the expenses of the war. Now, in what attitude did this present itself? He supposed it would not be considered extravagant to assume that the expenses of the war up to this time would amount to fifty millions; and if the war were continued for another year, they would amount to one hundred millions. But suppose fifty millions to be the amount for which we were to be indemnified. Mexico had a few years ago shown herself either unable or unwilling to pay a very few millions of dollars by way of indemnity to our citizens. There was every reason to believe that she resorted to forced loans and contributions for the purpose of paying them, without succeeding in discharging the amount. How, then, was it to be expected that she could pay fifty millions of dollars for the expenses of this war? But the President was going to say to Mexico, You must either pay me the money or deliver a part of your territory; I must have satisfaction in money or in land. Was it not evident, then, that the plan of the Administration, that the end and object of the war, was conquest? He had shown, he thought conclusively, that the war had been commenced by the President, and afterwards sanctioned by Congress. Here, then, was a war, commenced by us, in which we have expended fifty millions of dollars; and we say to Mexico, We will now settle this dispute, if you will pay us in land for the expenses we have incurred in prosecuting a war which we have ourselves commenced.

Mr. B., in the course of his remarks, quoted from a Message of Mr. Jefferson, in 1805, to show how he understood the power to declare war to be in the Congress alone. Territory which we had acquired, and which was in our possession, was threatened with invasion; but Mr. Jefferson submitted the matter to Congress.

Mr. CHALMERS moved an adjournment; but gave way to—

[29TH CONG. the limits of Louisiana, in which Jefferson said that Congress alone being constitutionally invested with the power of changing our condition from peace to war, he thought it his duty to await their authority for using force in any degree which could be avoided. The Sentor from Arkansas here interrupted the Senator from North Carolina, and denying this proposi tion, undertook to oppose the authority of Mr. Madison to that of Mr. Jefferson. He referred to the course of Mr. Madison in relation to the occupation of what were then called, and still are frequently, the Florida parishes of Louisiana. I sent for the authority which I am about to submit to the Senate, but did not receive it till the Senator had passed to another point in his argument; and I did not think it proper then to interrupt him. Sir, the Senator from Arkansas is mistaken; Mr. Madison held no doctrine at variance with that of Mr. Jefferson. He did not assume that the Executive, of his sole authority, could take military possession of territory, even rightfully belonging to the United States, if in the actual occupancy of a foreign power. He, equally with Mr. Jefferson, recognized the constitutional power of Congress, and invoked their authority before taking possession of that part of Louisiana of which Spain then held the occupancy. It is true that the Spanish authorities at Baton Rouge were dispossessed by a body of armed indivduals, in the summer of 1810, who declared their independence, and established a government of their own; and that Mr. Madison, by his proclamation of October 16, 1810, took possession of this country in the name of the United States. But this proclamation recited that the territory in question "had always been claimed as being within the territory of Louisiana;" "that a crisis had at length arrived subversive of the order of things under the Spanish authority;" and "that, under the peculiar and imperative circumstances, forbearance on the part of the United States to occupy the territory in question, and thereby guard against the confusions and contingencies which threaten it, might be construed into a dereliction of their title," &c.; and " 'finally, that the acts of Congress, though contemplating a present possession by a foreign authority, have contemplated also an eventual possession of the said territory, and are accordingly so framed as in that to extend their operation to the same."

Mr. PEARCE, who said that he rose only for the purpose of strengthening a point made by the Senator from North Carolina, (Mr. BADGER,) which had been controverted by the Senator from Arkansas, (Mr. SEVIER.) The Senator from North Carolina had assumed, that if the Now, sir, this instance does not amount to a United States had a clear and indisputable title contradiction of Mr. Jefferson's authority, and to a territory which was in the actual occu- the position of the Senator from North Caropancy and possession of a foreign power, the lina, for the Spanish authority was at an end taking military possession of such territory by in this territory; it could not be said to be in the United States would be an act of war. In the occupancy of a foreign power. And Mr. the case supposed, it would be a rightful act of Madison so well knew this distinction, that war, but being such, the authority first must General Claiborne was especially instructed not be referred to the legislative and war-making to take possession of any post in which the power; that is to say, to Congress; and he Spaniards had a garrison; accordingly no atquoted, in support of this position, the Message tempt was made to take possession of Mobile, of Mr. Jefferson, in December, 1805, in relation or any part of the territory around it. Mr. to the posts and territory held by Spain within | Madison's proclamation was communicated to

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In January, 1813, the President sent to Congress a confidential communication, which led to the passage of the secret act of February 12, 1813, which authorized the President "to occupy and hold all that tract of country called West Florida, which lies west of the river Perdido, not now in the possession of the United States; " and it also authorized the President to employ the military and naval force of the United States in maintaining the authority of the United States in such territory. Under the sanction of this act, the President sent orders to General Wilkinson, who drove the Spaniards out of Fort Charlotte, established a fortification at Mobile Point, and occupied the country west of the Perdido in the name of the United States.

Mr. SEVIER then briefly noticed some historical circumstances in connection with the act of General Thomas, which had been referred to by Mr. PEARCE, to show that Congress had afterwards sanctioned and approved his conduct, by making him a donation of sections of land.

While he was up, he would take occasion to say, that the removal of our army from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande was known to Congress; for the Secretary of War had given all necessary information on that subject in his report which accompanied the President's annual Message; and gentlemen could have read the documents with but little attention, who complained that no notification had been given of that movement. It was made known to Congress sufficiently early for steps to have been taken to prevent it, if prevention were deemed necessary.

Mr. CHALMERS then obtained the floor, as was afterwards understood for Mr. COLQUITT, who was absent, and the Senate went into Executive session. After a short time spent therein,

The Senate adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, February 17.

Three Million Bill.

The Senate proceeded to the consideration of the special order, being the bill making an appropriation of three millions of dollars for the purpose of bringing the existing war with Mexico to a conclusion, with the amendments proposed by the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Michigan.

[FEBRUARY, 1847.

Mr. COLQUITT, of Georgia, then rose and addressed the Senate as follows:

I will now make some remarks upon the war itself, the fruitful theme for abuse of the Administration. It has been said, and has been reiterated again and again, that the President made this war. The question is, how did he make it? How do you establish the charge? It should be remembered, that if this charge fails-if the proof does not establish it, our Whig friends will have no excuse for their course upon the subject of the war, and must expect the stern rebuke of an insulted and indignant people. How did the President make this war? It is positively certain that he sought very earnestly to make a treaty with Mexico! After the Mexican Minister had left the country, breathing hostility against the United States; after our Minister had been dismissed from his official station by the authorities of Mexico, the President still sought negotiation. This did not exhibit any anxiety for war with that republic. After the threatening tone and attitude of Mexico made it necessary for our vessels of war to hang upon her coast, and be ready for the exigency that was threatened, they were withdrawn by the suggestion of Mexico, that their contiguity was a barrier to any overtures of peace. This, surely, indicated no hostile wish on the part of the President to have a war with Mexico. If he sought only a pretext for hostility, he had enough to justify him in the eyes of the civillized world. He still sued for peace, and by means which would have been humiliating, if we had been in contest with a mightier power; he flattered himself that success would attend the effort. According to agreement, he sent a Minister, with full powers to make a permanent treaty. This certainly bears no mark of a desire upon the part of the President to rush into a war. Herrera, the then President of Mexico, soon heard the murmurings of discontent, and saw the undoubted signs of a revolution, in consequence of his consent to make a treaty of boundary. He endeavored to prolong the existence of his rickety Government, by refusing our Minister, and excusing himself for the refusal by denying the agreement. He agreed to receive a commissioner only, and not a Minister, he said. I do not propose to examine this quibble, although politicians here agreed with Mexico and blamed the President. The revolution in Mexico was not consummated because Herrera agreed to receive a Minister; but because he was friendly to a treaty of boundary. If the quibble to which he resorted had been the cause of complaint, the resolution would have been arrested when he rejected our Minister. Having shown a disposition to treat upon the subject of boundary, the army would not trust him in power. They placed at the head of the Government the masterspirit of the revolution, Paredes, who put the army in motion by his hostility to the United States, and his opposition to any treaty with

FEBRUARY, 1847.]

Three Million Bill.

[29TH CONG.

Here is the declaration of war! Here are the circulars calling for soldiers to prosecute the war! This was all done some twelve months before our army left Corpus Christi. Will gentlemen still insist that the removal of the army was the cause of the war? In obedience to these orders from the Department of War in Mexico, troops were collected, and an invading army, with orders to retake Texas, of which she insisted she had been perfidiously despoiled. This army had its headquarters at Matamoras, waiting more troops and additional preparation. Thus, with war declared, an army collected, all chance for negotiation closed, we are still gravely assured that nothing but the removal of the army caused the war! I am willing that this assertion-no matter by whom made, wholly unsupported by facts, and contradicted by so many circumstances shall go before the world for what it is worth.

us upon the subject of boundary. I suppose | Union to the other, how can you now change that the most bitter enemy of the President your position, and charge the war upon the will not deny but he did all that could be done President, because he ordered the army to the to make a treaty of peace. He failed. All Rio Grande? But, sir, not only did the Mexithis I am told is true; but that the war was can Minister return home, our Minister there made by the President, by ordering the army dismissed, and a revolution favorable to Parefrom Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande! If he des, all showing that Mexico intended war, but had suffered the army to remain at Corpus I desire to submit two or three circulars, which Christi, say they, we should have had no war. issued from the War Department in Mexico, This is a supposition, unsupported by a solitary that there may be no mistake, no doubt about fact; it is a mere conjecture, contradicted by how and by whom the war was commenced. every act and every declaration upon the part [Here the honorable Senator submitted the of Mexico. Why do you say that we should well-known official declaration of the Mexican have had no war, if the army had remained at Government, denouncing annexation as an act Corpus Christi? Your only reply must be, of war, and directing the generals in command that such is your opinion-you think so! You of the army to collect troops.] may have high character for wisdom and sagacity, but I prefer to have some data upon which I may examine the correctness of that opinion. That such is your opinion, and so you think, that may be answer sufficient for yourself; but I very much doubt whether your naked assertion, unsupported by a single well-founded reason, and contradicted by repeated acts and declarations upon the part of Mexico, will be considered conclusive by the thinking public. At any rate, I must be excused for my incredulity and unbelief. When the resolutions favorable to the admission of Texas into the Union passed the Congress of the United States, the Mexican Minister demanded his passports, and declared that act a cause of war. During the campaign of 1844, almost every Whig press and Whig orator in the Union opposed the annexation of Texas, assigning, as a prominent reason, the injustice of the act, and that it necessarily involved us in a war with Mexico. I stop but a moment to inquire of gentlemen upon the other side of the chamber how they hope to reconcile the people of this country to their own glaring inconsistency? They made an issue before the people in the Presidential canvass, and received the support of no small number of voters, by proclaiming the act of annexation as a just and certain cause of war. You now throw yourselves before the same people, and tell them, Oh, no; that was no cause of war. Annexation did not produce it; but the war has been made by the President! Will not the people ask an explanation of this inconsistency? Will you not have to acknowledge that your predictions were insincere in 1844, or that your declarations now are unfounded? This clamor about a war with Mexico, and the injustice of annexing Texas to the Union, did not cease with the election. I will call your attention to an extract or two from the New York Tribune, which will more definitely exhibit the position of the Whig party, even after the election of President.

[The honorable gentleman here read several extracts from the New York "Tribune," containing denunciations of the Democratic party on account of annexation.]

With such declarations as these, made prior to the election of President from one end of the

Again: it is urged that the President ought not to have ordered the army on disputed ground. The President might have been very delicately situated, in deciding what was disputed ground. The Mexicans claimed all Texas; and by her the whole ground was disputed, until our army crossed the Sabine. I suppose gentlemen do not mean to insist that it was the duty of the President to abandon Texas, in order to place the army on undisputed territory. At what point do you say the ground was undisputed? Congress has fixed no boundary. The best informed statesmen here may complain, but they cannot define what they themselves call undisputed ground. How was the President to ascertain this boundary? Texas claimed to the Rio Grande. She had never claimed any other boundary. No other was established by either Mexico or Texas. No other boundary was known to the United States or to the world. What was the President to do? By his official oath, he was bound to protect Texas. He had no power to define limits, unless Mexico had entered into treaty, which she refused. I leave this question for those wise statesmen to solve, who could not be satisfied with any act which the President could do. If the ground between the Nueces and the Rio Grande is what gentlemen call

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disputed ground, and if that were truly the case, I would say that, after every effort to settle the dispute, and every overture of peace had been rejected by Mexico, it was the duty of the President to take possession of the disputed ground; and if it had to be settled by war, let that be the place of settlement.

Much has been said as to the manner in which the war has been conducted, and what should be the course of future operations. The complaints made against the President I could take up, and I think, successfully defend. He has from the first shown great anxiety to prosecute with vigor the war. I doubt not that he has used all the means placed at his disposal as judiciously as the time and circumstances would permit. Many of us are wiser after the happening of events than before they transpired, and not a few delight in showing our wisdom by criticizing actions after their performance, which we could not very well have directed before. It is, however, soothing to our vanity to wind up our criticisms by insisting that it was all plain to our sagacious intellects before. The army has not advanced so rapidly as the President had wished, and a controversy has sprung up as to who is to blame. I think if the American people were polled, and they would all answer truly, that four-fifths of them would say that they believed there would have been no more fighting after the battles of the 8th and 9th of May. Taking into calculation the impoverished and distracted condition of Mexico, the supposition was reasonable. General Taylor thought so, or he would not have complained at the number of soldiers sent to his assistance. The army moved slowly, and I doubt not that the commander confidently expected propositions for peace. He did not desire to shed any more blood than was absolutely necessary to secure an honorable peace. This same expectation prevailed when the army was marched to Monterey. No battle was expected; and the best excuse offered for the capitulation was the belief that even then the Governments might be making terms of peace.

[FEBRUARY, 1847.

the designated line, but such as preferred to be a citizen of our Government. Within the country there would be, by that time, citizens enough to protect themselves without an army. I have full confidence that we can, with our arms, pass through every part of Mexico; but I doubt whether the country would be subdued, and a permanent peace secured. Whatever course may be supposed most efficient, that course will have my hearty co-operation. I shall vote for the bill placing the three millions of dollars at the disposal of the President. If he can use it for the benefit of the country, very well; if not, it will not be lost to the treasury. I regret the amendment proposed by my colleague, and shall vote against it. It appears to me to be nothing but a little display of party tactics, which will defeat the end it is proposed to serve. We are in a war; and can any one point out the propriety of informing Mexico and the world, that when the war is ended we intend to surrender all the advantages which have resulted from the conflict? Will it alarm Mexico and make her sue for peace? Will she be less disposed to continue the struggle when we inform her in advance that she shall lose nothing by its continuance?

I will not suffer myself to believe that we shall ever want men or money to prosecute successfully this war. Without money and without clothes, the sons of revolutionary fathers will march at the bidding of their country, to battle for her honor and defend her rights. Nor will I shrink back at the frightful spectre of fanaticism, nor yield a right, to escape its foulest machinations. No, sir; the God that guided and shielded the country in its fearful struggle for independence, is still our God. Many a paltry, time-serving politician, who estimates his selfish purposes higher than the constitution of his country, will be dead, and many others will be driven from the councils of the nation, shrouded with that black and bloody mantle with which they threatened to obscure the bright prospects of their country. I shall oppose every proposition by which the progress of the war may be checked by unnecessary or mischievous anticipation.

I am in favor of adopting the most effectual course for obtaining peace, and securing the rights of the country. The plan suggested by But I must say to those gentlemen who flatter the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. CALHOUN) themselves that now or hereafter the South it seems to me is the most certain and practi- will suffer herself to be degraded to preserve cable; and I shall not repeat it. His argu-friendly relations with the North, that they ments are strong, if not conclusive. We prosecute the war to procure a peace. It seems to me that a common interest will unite the people of Mexico, as your army advances. If you pause on some safe and convenient line, her dissensions will be more likely to operate in favor of a treaty, than continual invasion. If no treaty shall be made for five years, the additional expense over the ordinary expenses of the Government would not exceed five millions annually in maintaining a sufficient force to maintain our position. At the end of that time there would not be a Mexican on this side

make a sad miscalculation. I know the South, and the feelings of her generous people. They will lay no burdens upon other sections of the Union. They will require no sacrifices-make no exactions. They love the Union, and will labor to preserve it, so long as it can be preserved consistently with honor. But with all their devotion to the Union, there is not a man, woman, or child among them, but would sooner see the bright, sunny South, riven by an earthquake from the continent, and floating like an iceberg upon the ocean, than see her sons submit to outrage and degradation.

FEBRUARY, 1847.]

Three Million Bill.

This fair land of ours should be the peaceful patrimony of a band of brothers. The South earnestly and honestly desires to preserve and strengthen the golden chain that binds us together; and when its links shall be severed by the ruthless folly of fanaticism, the blow will not be given by a Southern arm, while she will receive its infliction with unflinching firmness and unfeigned regret.

THURSDAY, February 18.

Three Million Bill.

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the bill making an appropriation of three millions of dollars, for the purpose of bringing the war with Mexico to a conclusion.

Mr. BUTLER, of South Carolina, said: We are in a war; and now to examine into its origin is unwise, impolitic, and I cannot see any good that is to be attained by it. I am not disposed to go beyond its declaration, for declaration it is. This Government, in the most solemn manner, put at the disposal of the President ten millions of dollars and fifty thousand troops. They put the sword in his hand, and demanded him to use it. After this, what are we to do? That brings up the plain and practical question which seems to be involved in the bill on your table. What does that bill propose? I intend to speak directly to that before I pass to the other topics of greater importance, though, perhaps, not ultimately affecting the decision of the question. What, then, is it? It is a measure purporting to be for the purpose of obtaining a speedy, honorable, and, I hope, a safe peace. Well, so I regard the subject in one aspect. Looking at it only as it concerns our relations with a hostile Government, I would have very little difficulty on the subject. It is only in the other aspect, as it respects its bearing on our own domestic institutions, that it really becomes most formidable. But if this be a measure for peace, to take the alternative presented by my honorable friend from Maryland, (Mr. JOHNSON,) I would much prefer to "buy "if you choose to use the word-an honorable peace, made voluntarily by the people of Mexico, rather than have any peace extorted from them at the duress of the cannon or the point of the bayonet. I do not know that it would be a subject of reproach, but it would be an event very much to be deplored if our army were to penetrate into the heart of Mexico, and there undertake to dictate terms to the people, by making them pass under the yoke. It would be unfortunate, so far as regards the peace itself. You might have hands to sign it. You might find those who under the dictation of your armies, would, perhaps, put their hands to the paper. But what people on earth, pretending to be identified with their soil-who had mingled the sweat of their brow with the very

[29TH CONG. soil on which they lived-could keep such a peace with any other than Punic hearts? It would be no peace. It would be a peace only so long as the people could not break it with impunity. I am far, therefore, from desiring such a result.

And another thing I would say on this occasion: let the young adventurers of this nation -active, restless, and enterprising as they are -once look upon the fair fields of Mexico, and it will be as vain to attempt to restrain them as to restrain the young eagles from returning to the carnage of willing and submissive victims. If you ever dictate such a peace as that, with arms in your hands, within the palaces of Mexico, you are sowing the seeds of eternal strife between the two republics. It is impossible, sir, to relieve a people compelled to submit to such a peace from the abiding mortification, from which they would be continually attempting to relieve themselves. I desire no such result. I have always regarded patriotism as being somehow mystically associated with the love of soil, as well as the institutions of a people. I have always regarded that as one of the most beautiful passages in history, in which Bernadotte, whilst he felt it his duty as a sovereign to oppose Napoleon, and for that purpose exerted all his powers in conjunction with others, yet when they approached the frontiers of France, he paused and refused to invade his native soil! You cannot separate that feeling from any people. I would not wish, sir, to see any people on earth divested of that feeling. Least of all should I desire to see any act of a republic like ours tending to eradicate from the hearts of any people such a sacred national sentiment. In this point of view, therefore, I should regard it as a great misfortune, if it should become necessary to carry on our offensive operations so far that we could, by humiliation-by mere terror of our arms-force and extort from Mexico such a peace as the hearts of her people could not willingly observe.

But there is the other alternative, and I take that of my honorable friend from Maryland. Suppose a peace were presented to Mexico directly, in such terms as these: "We are engaged in war. You owe our citizens money. They have just claims against you. Thus far you have been unable to pay them. Having appealed to the arbitrament of the sword, we insist upon their adjustment." Mexico replies that she has no resources; that exhausted by this protracted war, she is unable to respond to the demand. "Very well!" we might reply; "if you cannot do that, we have this simple proposition to make: We will not only assume the debts due to our own citizens, but more than that, we are willing to give, in advance, three millions of dollars, in consideration that you will cede such territory as you can honestly and fairly-in looking at your own policy-spare, without interfering with the integrity of your country." Now, sir, it is

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