in his professional character, to speculate in lawsuits. The precedent would tend to corrupt the profession, and produce lasting mischief to the community. 91 "This is not the time nor place," says Chief Justice Gibson, "to discuss the legality of contingent fees; though it be clear that if the British statutes of champerty were in force here, such fees would be prohibited by them. But a contract

1 Arden v. Patterson, 5 Johns. Ch. Rep. 48. If an attorney in a suit purchase the subject thereof, the client may set aside the sale at his pleasure, unless the attorney show clearly and conclusively that no advantage was taken, that everything was explained to the client, and that the price was fair and reasonable: Valentine v. Stewart, 15 California 387; Gray v. Emmons, 7 Michigan 533; Mills v. Mills, 26 Conn. 213; Ford v. Harrington, 16 New York 285; Jennings v. McConnel, 17 Illinois 148; Lewis v. J. A., 4 Edwards Ch. Rep. 599; Evans v. Ellis, 5 Denio 640. The purchase by an attorney from his client, pending litigation, of the subject-matter of the litigation, is absolutely void: West v. Raymond, 21 Indiana 305. An agreement between an attorney and his client that the former shall pay the costs of an action he has brought for his client, if unsuccessful, is illegal and void, and cannot be enforced by the client: Low v. Hutchinson, 37 Maine 196.

of the sort is certainly not to be encouraged by implication, from a questionable usage, nor established by less than a positive stipulation:" Foster v. Jack, 4 Watts 338, 339. A contract to allow a compensation for services in procuring the passage of a private Act of Assembly, has been held to be unlawful and void, as against public policy. "The practice," said

1 Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S. 315; Marshall v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 16 Howard (S. C.) Rep. 336. That champerty is an offence at common law, and that contracts of that character, between client and counsel, are void on that ground, and as against public policy, will be found to have been maintained in Rust v. Larue, 4 Litt. 411; Caldwell's Administrators v. Shepherd's Heirs, 6 Monroe 391; Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. 415; Arden v. Patterson, 5 Johns. Ch. Rep. 48; Bleakley's Case, 5 Paige 311; Wallis v. Loubat, 2 Denio 607; Backus v. Byron, 4 Michigan 535; Elliott v. McClelland, 17 Alabama 206. The cases on the other side are: Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cowen 643; Ramsey's Devisees v. Trent, 10 B. Mon. 336; Bayard McLane, 3 Harrington 216; Lytle. v. State, 17 Arkansas 608; Newkirk v. Cone, 18 Illinois 449; Major v. Gibson, 1 Patton Jr. & Heath (Va.) 48; Wright v. Meek, 3 Greene (Ia.) 472. In New York, by the Revised Statutes, it was made an offence, punishable by fine or imprisonment,

Judge Rogers, in delivering the opinion of the court, “which has generally obtained in this state, to allow a contingent compensation for legal services, has been a subject of regret; nor am I aware of any direct decision by which the practice has received judicial sanction in our courts." The case of Ex parte Plitt, 2 Wallace Jr. Rep. 454, however, recognises fully the and removal from the Bar, for any attorney, counsellor, or solicitor, directly or indirectly to buy, or be in any manner interested in buying, or to advance or procure money to be advanced upon anything in action, with intent, or for the purpose of bringing any suit thereon: 2 Revised Stat. 386. The Code of Procedure appears to have changed the law in this respect, and to enable parties to make such bargains as they please with their attorneys: Code of Procedure, s. 258; Satterlee v. Frazer, 2 Sandf. S. C. Rep. 142; Benedict v. Stuart, 23 Barb. 420; Ogden v. Des Arts, 4 Duer (N. Y.) 275; Sedgwick v. Stanton, 4 Kernan 289. In Kentucky there appears to be a statute which provides that any one not a party receiving as compensation for services in prosecuting or defending a suit the whole or part of the subject-matter in suit, is guilty of champerty, and it has been held that this statute extends to attorneys: Davis v. Sharron, 15 B. Mon. 64. In England, contingent fees are held to be clearly within the statutes of champerty and maintenance: Penrice v. Parker, Rep. Temp. Finch 75.

lawfulness of contingent fees, though in his opinion Judge Kane says: "It is not a practice to be generally commended, exposing honorable men not unfrequently to misapprehension and illiberal remark, and giving the apparent sanction of their example to conduct which they would be among the foremost to reprehend. Such contracts may sometimes be necessary in a community such as that of Pennsylvania has been, and perhaps as it is yet; and when they have been made in abundant good faith-uberrima fide—without suppression or reserve of fact or exaggeration of apprehended difficulties, or under influence of any sort or degree; and when the compensa tion bargained for is absolutely just and fair, so that the transaction is characterized throughout by'all good fidelity to the client,' the court will hold such contracts to be valid. But it is unnecessary to say, that such contracts, as they can scarcely be excepted from the general rule, which denounces as suspicious the dealings of fiduciaries with those under their protection, must undergo the most exact and jealous scru

tiny before they can expect the judicial ratification." Finally, the question of law may be considered as at rest in Pennsylvania by the decision of the Supreme Court in Patten v. Wilson, 10 Casey 299, which recognised an agreement between counsel and client to pay him out of the verdict as an equitable assignment, and gave effect to it as against an attaching creditor.

It is not, however, with the lawfulness, but with the policy and morality of the practice, that we are now dealing. Admitting its legality, is it consistent with that high standard of moral excellence which the members of this profession should ever propose to themselves?

Let us look at what would be the results of such a practice if it became general. If these are bad, if its tendency is to corrupt and degrade the character of the however confident any man

profession, then,

may feel in his

moral power to ward off its evil influences from his own character and conduct, he should be careful not to encourage and give countenance to it by his example.