nity of the responsibility, which every man virtually incurs when he enters upon the practice

ever, be found upon examination somewhat at variancenot the decision itself, but the views expressed by Chancellor Watres in his opinion. The case simply decided what would seem unquestionable, that the legislature had a right to prohibit any public officer, judicial or otherwise, from practising as an attorney or solicitor. The Chancellor said, "He (a solicitor) can be considered in no other light than that of a private agent for the citizens of the country, who may employ him to do their legal business in the courts; and although the law requires of him certain qualifications, and he receives a license from the judges, yet his office is no more a public one than would be any other profession or trade, which the legislature might choose to subject to similar regulations, and which is the practice in many other countries. It cannot be doubted, that a man's trade or profession is his property; and if a law should be passed avowedly for the purpose of restraining any member of this bar, who was not a public officer, from exercising his profession, I should declare such law void." This is to assume high ground; but the idea that a man's profession or trade cannot be constitutionally interfered with by legislative enactments, seems scarcely tenable, and especially so far as the profession of the law is concerned, in view of the absolute power with which every court is clothed, both as to the admission of their attorneys, and forejudging or striking them from the roll: Act of 14th April

of his profession, the higher and more impressive sanction of an appeal to the Searcher of all Hearts.

Fidelity to the court requires outward respect in words and actions. The oath, as it has been said, undoubtedly looks to nothing like allegiance to the person of the judge; unless in those cases where his person is so insep

1834, s. 73 (Pamphlet Laws 354). Courts of record and of general jurisdiction are vested with exclusive power to regulate the conduct of their own officers, and in this respect their decisions are put on the same footing with that numerous class of cases, which is wisely confided to the legal discretion and judgment of the court, having jurisdiction over the subject-matter: Commonwealth v. The Judges, 5 W. & S. 272; Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 531; Ex parte Brown, 1 Howard (Miss.) Rep. 306; Perry v. State, 3 Greene (Ia.) 550; In the matter of Mills, 1 Mich. 392. "The power is one which ought to be exercised with great caution, but which is, we think, inciden tal to all courts, and necessary for the preservation of decorum and for the respectability of the profession :" Marshall, C. J., 9 Wheat. 531; Perry v. State, 3 Greene (Ia.) 550; In the matter of Mills, 1 Mich. 392. An attorney may be dismissed for a false oath or professional misstatement without a conviction for perjury: Perry v. State, 3 Greene (Ia.) 550.

arable from his office, that an insult to the one is an indignity to the other. In matters collateral to official duty, the judge is on a level with the members of the bar, as he is with his fellowcitizens; his title to distinction and respect resting on no other foundation than his virtues and qualities as a man: Per Gibson, C. J., in Austin's case, 5 Rawle 204. There are occasions, no doubt, when duty to the interests confided to the charge of the advocate demands firm and decided opposition to the views expressed or the course pursued by the court, nay, even manly and open remonstrance; but this duty may be faithfully performed, and yet that outward respect be preserved, which is here inculcated. Counsel should ever remember how necessary it is for the dignified and honorable administration of justice, upon which the dignity and honor of their profession entirely depend, that the courts and the members of the courts, should be regarded with respect by the suitors and people; that on all occasions of difficulty or danger to that department of government, they should have the good opinion

and confidence of the public on their side. Good men of all parties prefer to live in a country, in which justice according to law is impartially administered. Counsel should bear in mind also the wearisomeness of a judge's office; how much he sees and hears in the course of a long session, to try his temper and patience. Lord Campbell has remarked that it is rather difficult for a judge altogether to escape the imputation of discourtesy if he properly values the public time; for one of his duties is to "render it disagreeable to counsel to talk nonsense." Respectful submission, nay, most frequently, even cheerful acquiescence in a decision, when, as is most generally the case, no good result can grow to his cause from any other course, is the part of true wisdom as well as civility. An exception may be noted to the opinion of the Bench, as easily in an agreeable and polite as in a contemptuous and insulting manner. The excitement of the trial of a cause caused by the conflict of testimony, making often the probabilities of success to vibrate backwards and forwards with as much

apparent uncertainty as the chances in a game of hazard, is no doubt often the reason and apology for apparent disrespect in manner and language; but let it be observed, that petulance in conflicts with the Bench, which renders the trial of causes disagreeable to all concerned, has most generally an injurious effect upon the interest of clients.

Indeed it is highly important that the temper of an advocate should be always equal. He should most carefully aim to repress everything like excitability or irritability. When passion is allowed to prevail, the judgment is dethroned. Words are spoken, or things done, which the parties afterwards wish could be unsaid or undone. Equanimity and self-possession are qualities of unspeakable value. An anecdote may serve to illustrate this remark. There was a gentleman of the Bar of Philadelphia, many years ago, who possessed these qualities in a very remarkable degree. He allowed nothing that occurred in a cause to disturb or surprise him. On an occasion in one of the neighboring counties, the circuit of which it was his