wrong. There is a technical reason, which makes this course in all cases imperative. The losing party, if the jury were allowed to decide the law for him, would be deprived of his exception, and of his unquestionable right to have the law of his case pronounced upon by the Supreme Court. Ad questiones juris respondeant judices, ad questiones facti juratores. disregard by the jury of the law, as laid down by the judge, is always therefore followed by additional and unnecessary delay and expense, and it is never an advantage to a party in the long run to obtain a verdict in opposition to the direction of the court.' It is best for coun -- A 1 Court and juries have their respective spheres assigned to them, within which each is to act and move, without encroaching upon the jurisdiction or province of the other. In order, then, that jurors as well as others may know that the direction and decision of the court, on any question of law arising in the course of the trial of an issue of fact, is not to be disregarded, and that a verdict given against such direction, whatever it may be, can never avail anything, unless it be to occasion additional delay, trouble, and expense to the parties, as also to the public, the course of the court is to set the verdict aside, and to order a new trial. And a court, sel to say in such cases, where nothing is left by the charge to the jury, that they do not ask for a verdict. It has a fair, candid, and manly aspect towards court, jury, opposite party, and even client. Instances of counsel urging or endeavoring to persuade a jury to 66 from whose decisions on questions of law an appeal lies, by writ of error or otherwise, ought never to depart from this course; otherwise the party against whom the verdict is given loses the benefit of such appeal, and of having the question decided by the appellate court, which would be a most unjust and illegal deprivation of his right: Per Kennedy, J., in Flemming v. Marine Ins. Co., 4 Whart. 67. After two concurring verdicts against the direction of the court in point of law, a new trial will still be awarded: Commissioners of Berks County v. Ross, 3 Binn. 520. "Principles the most firmly established might be overturned, because a second jury were obstinate and rash enough to persevere in the errors of the first, in a matter confessed by all to be properly within the jurisdiction of the court; I mean the construction of the law arising from undisputed facts:" Per Tilghman, C. J., Ibid. 524. It is not necessary to refer to the numerous cases, both in English and American courts, which accord with these principles. A judicious selection of the leading ones is to be found in the note to 1 Wharton's Troubat & Haly 529. The text and the note are confined, of course, to civil cases. disregard the charge may sometimes occur, but they are exceedingly rare, when there is good feeling between the Bench and the Bar, and when the members of the profession have just and enlightened views of their duty as well as interest. It need hardly be added that a practitioner ought to be particularly cautious, in all his dealings with the court, to use no deceit, imposition, or evasion-to make no statements of facts which he does not know or believe to be true--to distinguish carefully what lies in his own knowledge from what he has merely derived from his instructions-to present no paper-books intentionally garbled. "Sir Mathew Hale abhorred," says his biographer, "those too common faults of misreciting witnesses, quoting precedents or books falsely, or asserting anything confidently; by which ignorant juries, and weak judges are too often wrought upon.' One such false step in a young lawyer wiil do him an injury in the opinion of the Bench and of his professional brethren, which 991 1 Burnet's Life of Sir Mathew Hale 72. it will take years to redeem, if, indeed, it ever can be entirely redeemed. A very great part of a man's comfort, as well as of his success at the Bar, depends upon his relations with his professional brethren. With them he is in daily necessary intercourse, and he must have their respect and confidence, if he wishes to sail along in smooth waters. He cannot be too particular in keeping faithfully and liberally every promise or engagement he may make with them. One whose perfect truthfulness is even suspected by his brethren at the Bar has always an uneasy time of it. He will be constantly mortified by observing precautions taken with him which are not used with others. It is not only morally wrong but dangerous to mislead an opponent, or put him on a wrong scent in regard to the case. It would be going too far to say that it is ever advisable to expose the weakness of a client's cause to an adversary, who may be unscrupulous in taking advantage of it; but it may be safely said, that he who sits down deliberately to plot a surprise upon his opponent, and which he knows can succeed only by its being a surprise, deserves to fall, and in all probability will fall, into the trap which his own hands have laid. "Whoso diggeth a pit," says the wise man, "shall fall therein, and he that rolleth a stone, it will return upon him." If he should succeed, he will have gained with his success not the admiration and esteem, but the distrust and dislike of one of his associates as long as he lives. He should never unnecessarily have a personal difficulty with a professional brother. He should neither give nor provoke insult. Nowhere more than at the Bar is that advice valuable : "Beware Of entrance to a quarrel; but, being in, There is one more caution to be given under this head. Let him shun most carefully the reputation of a sharp practitioner. Let him be liberal to the slips and oversights of his opponent wherever he can do so, and in plain cases not shelter himself behind the instructions of his client. The client has no right to require him to be illiberal-and he should throw up |