his brief sooner than do what revolts against his own sense of what is demanded by honor and propriety.

Nothing is more certain than that the practitioner will find, in the long run, the good opinion of his professional brethren of more importance than that of what is commonly called the public. The foundations of the reputation of every truly great lawyer will be discovered to have been laid here. Sooner or later, the real public-the business men of the community, who have important lawsuits, and are valuable clients-endorse the estimate of a man entertained by his associates of the Bar, unless indeed there be some glaring defect of popular qualities. The community know that they are better qualified to judge of legal attainments, that they have the best opportunity of judging, and that they are slow in forming a judgment. The good opinion and confidence of the members of the same profession, like the King's name on the field of battle, is "a tower of strength;" it is the title of legitimacy. The

ambition to please the people, to captivate jurors, spectators and loungers about the court-room, may mislead a young man into pertness, flippancy and impudence, things which often pass current for eloquence and ability with the masses; but the ambition to please the Bar can never mislead him. Their good graces are only to be gained by real learning, by the strictest integrity and honor, by a courteous demeanor, and by attention, accuracy and punctuality in the transaction of business.

The topic of fidelity to the client involves the most difficult questions in the consideration of the duty of a lawyer.

He is legally responsible to his client only for the want of ordinary care and ordinary skill. That constitutes gross negligence. It is extremely difficult to fix upon any rule which shall define what is negligence in a given case. The habits and practice of men are widely dif ferent in this regard. It has been laid down that if the ordinary and average degree of diligence and skill could be determined, it would

furnish the true rule.' Though such be the extent of legal liability, that of moral responsi

1 An attorney is not answerable for every error or mistake; he ought not to be liable, in cases of reasonable doubt: Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060. "That part of the profession which is carried on by attorneys," said Lord Mansfield, "is liberal and reputable as well as useful to the public, when they conduct themselves with honor and integrity; and they ought to be protected, when they act to the best of their skill and knowledge. But every man is liable to error; and I should be very sorry that it should be taken for granted that an attorney is answerable for every error or mistake, and to be punished for it by being charged with the debt which he was employed to recover for his client from the person who stands indebted to him. A counsel may mistake as well as an attorney. Yet no one will say that a counsel who has been mistaken shall be charged with the debt. The counsel indeed is honorary in his advice and does not demand a fee; the attorney may demand compensation. But neither of them ought to be charged with the debt for a mistake. Not only counsel, but judges may differ or doubt or take time to consider. Therefore an attorney ought not to be liable in cases of reasonable doubt:" Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2061. "No attorney," said C. J. Abbott, afterwards Lord Tenterden, " is bound to know all the law. God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law; or that an attorney is to lose his fair

bility is wider. Entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance

recompense on account of an error, being such an error as a cautious man might fall into :" Montriou v. Jefferys, 2 C. & P. 113 (12 E. C. L. R. 50). "It would be extremely difficult," said C. J. Tindal, "to define the exact limit by which the skill and diligence which an attorney undertakes to furnish in the conduct of a cause is bounded; or to trace precisely the dividing line between that reasonable skill and diligence which appears to satisfy his undertaking, and that crassa negligentia or lata culpa mentioned in some of the cases, for which he is undoubtedly responsible. The cases, however, which have been cited and commented on at the Bar, appear to establish, in general, that he is liable for the consequences of ignorance or non-observance of the rules of practice of this court; for the want of care in the preparation of the cause for trial; or of attendance thereon with his witnesses; and for the mismanagement of so much of the conduct of a cause as is usually and ordinarily allotted to his department of the profession. Whilst, on the other hand, he is not answerable for error in judgment upon points of new occurrence or of nice or doubtful construction, or of such as are usually intrusted to men in the higher branch of the profession of the law." Godefroy v. Dalton, 6 Bingh. 460 (19 E. C. L. R. 136). He shall be protected, when he acts with good faith, and to the best of his skill and knowledge: Gilbert v. Williams, 8 Mass. 57. The want of ordinary care and skill in such a person is gross negli

and defence of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,-these are the

gence: Holmes v. Peck, 1 Rhode Island Rep. 245; Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Georgia 144; Pennington v. Yell, 6 English 212. As between the client and the attorney, the responsibility of the latter is as great and as strict here as in any country when want of good faith or attention to the cause is alleged; but in the exercise of the discretionary power usually confided in this country, and especially when the client resides at a great distance, an attorney ought not to be held liable where he has acted honestly and in a way he thought was for the interest of his client : Lynch v. The Commonwealth, 16 S. & R. 368; Stokely v. Robinson, 10 Casey 317. When, however, an attorney disobeys the lawful instructions of his client and a loss ensues, for that loss the attorney is responsible: Gilbert v. Williams, 8 Mass. 57. If the holder of a note place it in the hands of an attorney-at-law, with instructions to bring suit upon it, and the attorney, acting under the honest impression that he would best promote the interests of his client by not bringing suit immediately, omits to do so, and the money is afterwards lost by the insolvency of the maker, the attorney is liable in an action against him; and the measure of damages is what might have been recovered from the maker of the note, if suit had been brought when the note was placed in the hands of the attorney for collection: Cox v. Livingston, 2 W. & S. 103; Wilcox v. Plummer, 4 Peters 172. But a client has no right to control his attorney in the due and