Statement showing rates on pine lumber, C. L., from points in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi to St. Louis, Mo., in force June 30, 1897, and June 30, 1904. Tariffs.-St. L. S. W. Rwy., I. C. C. Nos. 189, 1766; Illinois Central R. R., I. C. C. B-86, 1850. Statement showing rates on classes and commodities from Chicago, Ill., to St. Paul, Minn., also from St. Paul, Minn., to Chicago, Ill., in force June 30, 1897, and June 30, 1904. [Rates in cents per hundred pounds.] FROM CHICAGO, ILL., TO ST. PAUL, MINN. Tariffs.-Western Trunk Line Joint Tariff No. 9; Special Circular No. 21; I. C. C. Nos. 491, 431. FROM ST. PAUL, MINN., TO CHICAGO, ILL. Tariffs.-Western Trunk Line, Joint Tariff No. 9, Special Circular No. 21, I. C. C. Nos. 491, 431; C., M. and St. P. Rwy., I. C. C. A-6146. Statement showing rates on grain and flour, domestic and export, to Galveston, Tex., from Kansas City, Mo., and points in Kansas, Indian and Oklahoma Territories, in force June 30, 1897, and June 30, 1904. Tariffs.-A., T. and S. F. Rwy., I. C. C., Nos. 355, 2978, 2979; Southwestern Tariff Committee, I. C. C., Nos. 16, 33, 340. Statement showing rates on classes and commodities from Chicago, Ill., to points in New Mexico and Arizona, in force June 30, 1897, and June 30, 1904. Statement showing rates on classes and commodities from points in Indian and Oklahoma Territories to St. Louis, Mo., in force June 30, 1897, and June 30, 1904. [Rates in cents per hundred pounds.] 97 84 97 84 McAlester, Ind. T 110 90 75 58 45 47 130 109 97 82 Oklahoma City, Okla. 130 109 97 82 70 68 52 45 39 30 25 25 Guthrie, Okla Oklahoma City, Okla. 130 109 75 67 115 98 55 43 73 58 June 30, 1904: Wagoner, Ind. T 69 Purcell, Ind. T 84 June 30, 1897: Guthrie, Okla 70 40 48 53 45 37 29 25 25 20 53 45 37 30 41 49 43 33 25 30 26 23 25 39 49 20 22 33 412 20 31 41 42 34 42 50 a Combination of locals. Tariffs.-A., T. and S. F. Rwy., I. C. C. Nos. 12, 364, 2094; M., K. and T. Rwy., I. C. C. Nos. A-3, 227, 262, 325, 1915, 1974; Missouri Pacific Rwy., I. C. C. No. 1553. SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, Friday, February 10, 1905. STATEMENT OF JOSEPH NIMMO, JR., STATISTICIAN AND ECONOMIST, OF WASHINGTON, D. C. Mr. NIмMO. Mr. Chairman, I have been requested to present to your committee a petition from the New York Board of Trade and Transportation, which contains a recommendation in favor of "a special commission of Congress on interstate commerce, to thoroughly investigate all problems involved, and to report their conclusions and recommendations by bill at the opening of the next Congress. I make this recommendation the text of my present remarks, which relate especially to the constitutional and political aspects of the question now before you. And, first, I would invite your attention to A CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION OF THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE COMMERCE AMONG THE STATES. Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, in clause 6 of section 9, imposes the following constitutional limitation upon the exercise of the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States: "No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another." This pro vision stands for the defense of commercial liberty. Mr. Madison, chronicler of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, states the historic fact that the main purpose had in view in framing the Constitution of the United States was to abolish certain intolerable discriminations in the nature of regulations imposed by the States upon both the domestic and the foreign commerce of the country. Such regulations were fast driving the country to disunion. When the convention assembled on May 25, 1787, the opinion prevailed to a considerable extent that the power to regulate commerce should not only be withheld from the States but also be denied to the National Government. But the more statesmanlike members of the convention held that the power of regulation by Congress should be asserted in some form compatible with the supreme object of maintaining commercial liberty. The first proposition of this nature, submitted by Mr. Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, four days after the convention was organized, provided that "all laws regulating commerce shall require the assent of two-thirds of the members present in each House." On August 6 the "committee of detail" reported in favor of the proposition that Congress shall have power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, "but that "no navigation act shall be passed without the assent of twothirds of the members present in each House." This proposition was overruled on August 29. Finally, on September 14, three days before the signing of the Constitution, the following provision was added to section 9 of article 1, which section relates exclusively to limitations of the powers of Congress: No preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another. This fully satisfied all the States and probably saved the Constitution. Apparently this limitation came rather near to the original proposition to omit from the Constitution any declaration in favor of conferring upon Congress the power to regulate commerce among the States. But it voiced the dominant sentiment of the people in favor of a government which should secure the ends of commercial liberty and meddle as little as possible with the competitive struggles of business. The practical question arises: What does that limitation imply to-day? I shall endeavor to answer that question. * * * Besides the ports of the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts, Congress has from time to time created "ports" at interior points on rivers, on the Great Lakes, and on railroads, all of which ports now afford all necessary_facilities for the conduct of both internal and foreign commerce. But this constitutional limitation has a much wider application. The significance of the word "port" in the Constitution was undoubtedly that which it had and still has in Great Britain. The exact meaning of the word "port," according to Lord Esher, M. R., in 15 Q. B. D., 580-a case decided in the year 1885--is "not usually the legal port as defined by acts of Parliament, but any place at which the loading and landing takes place." Accordingly, in the case at bar, it was ruled that "the word 'port' in a charter party is to be understood in its popular, business, or commercial sense, and not the port as defined for revenue or pilotage purposes." This is the meaning given to the word "port" by Lord Chief Justice Hale in "De Portibus Maris," chapter 2, page 46, and it is regarded by Bouvier, an accepted American authority on legal definitions, as defining the meaning of the word "port" in the United States. It applies to all places or markets where goods are shipped or received by rail or by water. Thus the constitutional limitation that "no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another," involves stringent restraints upon the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States. These served at the beginning to avert the danger of disunion, and to-day they stand as a defense of commercial liberty throughout all our borders. The question arises-did the constitutional limitation referred to practically eliminate the power vested in Congress in the eighth section of article one-namely, the power to "regulate commerce among the States?" I answer, No! In many ways not affected by the constitutional limitation the National Government has effectually and beneficially regulated commerce and transportation. There is no business in this country which is more completely the subject of legal restraint than is that of railroad transportation. The railroads are regulated not only by the National Government, but also by States, by cities, counties, towns, village boards of trustees, school districts, and by almost every other political subdivision of the State. The decisions of the courts involving the law of the common carrier and of public highways embrace volumes of judicial regulation applicable to the conduct of railroad transportation. The act to regulate commerce amplifies, extends, and particularizes the regulative principles of the common law in its application to the railroads. In view of these facts it has been asserted by an eminent lawyer that "the railroad is held to a more rigid responsibility in the courts than any other litigant." The judicial records of the country afford abundant proof of the correctness of that assertion. I But the question arises, What would be the effect of the constitutional limitation, "No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another" upon an act of Congress which would confer upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to determine the relative rates which shall be charged on railroads engaged in interstate commerce? Experience clearly proves that it is unwise for lawyer or layman, or even legislator, to predict the judicial determination of the meaning of an act of Congress vitally affecting the commercial interaction of the people, or the question as to the constitutionality of such an act. shall not attempt it; it is sufficient here to point to a dilemma which confronts Congress in any attempt to confer the power of rate making upon an administrative board. In case the Supreme Court should hold that an act conferring the rate-making power upon the Interstate Commerce Commission is subject to the constitutional limitation, "No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another,” it appears probable that such a statute would in practice be nugatory for the reason that any regulation of relative rates to or from the ports or markets of any two States by the Commission might be alleged to violate the contitutional inhibition against preference to the ports of one State over those of another. This, of course, would give rise to tedious and interminable litigation. If, however, the Supreme Court should rule that a rate-making statute would not be subject to the constitutional inhibition mentioned, it seems evident that the multip.icity of cases arising under such a statute would overwhelm the Commission just as the assumption indulged for a while at the beginning, that the interstate commerce |