TAREE-POWER CONFERENCE AT GENEVA FOR THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMA
MENT, JUNE 20-AUGUST 4, 1927—Continued
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To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Approval of suggested private conversation should Conference fail; suggestion that a short adjournment might be of value if agreement seems impossible; additional considerations to be included in American delegation's statement to the public meeting if Conference breaks up. From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)
Substance of conversation with Chamberlain, in which he appeared to be impressed by Ambassador's statement that U. S. public opinion had reacted unfavorably to British proposals. Ambassador's opinion that, should total tonnage be kept under 400,000 tons, it will be a material concession to American views. From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)
Note from Chamberlain (text printed), reporting discussion with the Prime Minister and colleagues of substance of con- versation with American Ambassador, July 8, and stating likeli- hood that British may ask for short adjournment at Geneva in order to study the points raised in that conversation. From the British Embassy
Explanation of attitude of British Government at Geneva, in order to dispel apparent misunderstanding of its policy. To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Telegram from President Coolidge (text printed) directing Secretary to instruct chairman that a clear, strong statement of American position is needed, regardless of where blame falls, and approving suggestions in Secretary's telegram No. 30, July 8, to the chairman. From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Summary of a private conversation of the three delegations, held at instance of British, in which it appeared that a pos- sible way out of the cruiser impasse might be reached; chair- man's opinion that a solution may yet be found. From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Indefinite postponement of plenary session scheduled for July 11, as a mark of respect to death of Irish Foreign Minister, who recently participated in the Conference's work. To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Protest of British Ambassador concerning Wythe Williams' article in New York Times (excerpts printed), which predicts release by American experts, if Conference fails, of documen- tary proof that Great Britain has violated Washington treaty terms by overtonnage of battleships. From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)
Foreign Minister's request that his earnest desire for U. S. assistance to Japanese in bringing about an agreement which will not call for material increases in naval armaments be con- veyed to Washington. From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Belief that delegation should concentrate on need to find common ground for agreement between Japanese and British on tonnage levels, and should emphasize U. S. preference for Japanese levels.
THREE-POWER CONFERENCE AT GENEVA FOR THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMA
MENT, JUNE 20-AUGUST 4, 1927—Continued
From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Opinion that the Wythe Williams, article was founded on pure conjecture; information that American delegates have been scrupulous in not revealing confidential information to the press. To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Inquiry as to truth of press reports from English sources (excerpt printed) that representatives of steel plants or manu- facturing concerns are in Geneva or are interfering with delib- erations by propagandizing American experts. From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)
British suggestion (text printed) that agreement should be sought on basis of total tonnage in each class beyond which each party would not go up to 1936. Chamberlain's intention to ask short adjournment and order Bridgeman to London for consultation if agreement cannot be reached along this line; his willingness to meet the Secretary in Geneva if necessary, and if Secretary so requests.
(Repeated to Geneva.) From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
American suggestion to mixed committee exploring cruiser problem that the real difficulty lies in British effort to force other navies to accept same type of cruisers as themselves, regardless of individual requirements; reiteration by British of unacceptability of tonnage figures of Japanese. From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Unacceptability to Americans and Japanese of British draft plan (text printed) providing for tonnage limitation of 550,000 tons under certain ages, retention of over-age ships in the amount of 20 percent of this figure, and a limitation of 10,000- ton cruisers to 12-12-8, all other cruisers to be limited to 6,000 tons, mounted with no larger than 6-inch guns. To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)
Permission to inform Chamberlain of Secretary's concur- rence in British suggestion outlined in Ambassador's telegram No. 162, July 12; assumption that by "each class" is meant cruisers, destroyers, and submarines; assertion that while the United States requires 10,000-ton cruisers, it does not object to the smaller-type cruisers preferred by British, provided they do not exceed the total tonnage limitation; opinion that a short adjournment of Conference might serve a useful purpose.
(Repeated to Geneva.) To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Reluctance of Ambassador in Great Britain, expressed in a telegram of July 13 (text printed), to inform Chamberlain as directed by Secretary's telegram No. 159, July 12, for fear of consequences unfavorable to the American position at Geneva. Instructions to advise Ambassador of any suggestions chair- man plans to make concerning Secretary's telegram and possible adjournment.
(Footnote: Information that the Ambassador in Great Britain was informed of the contents of this telegram by Department telegram No. 160, July 13, 5 p. m.)
THREE-POWER CONFERENCE AT GENEVA FOR THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMA
MENT, JUNE 20-AUGUST 4, 1927—Continued
1927 July 13 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (86) Opinion that British delegation is aware that the largest
size of cruiser is most suited to U. S. needs; belief that restric- tion of number of maximum-size cruisers cannot be decided until the total tonnage figure is agreed upon, that short ad- journment might cause loss of ground gained by American delegation, and that probably Secretary's influence would continue to be most effective if he remained in Washington.
(Copy to London.) July 13 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (87) Japanese proposal for a 30 percent cut in tonnage of auxiliary
surface craft now built, building, or authorized, which would result in approximate figure for Great Britain of 484,000 tons, for the United States of 454,000 tons, and for Japan of 310,000 tons.
(Copy to London.) July 14 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (91) Doubt that any truth exists in press reports of activities of
steel and other interests at Geneva, and opinion that such
assertions are British-inspired. July 14 To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.) (163) Instructions, in view of possible misunderstanding of term
"class” in British plan, to advise Chamberlain of American interpretation; information that as delegation believes prog- ress is being made, no immediate necessity for adjournment
exists. July 15 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (99) Belief that as a last resort Secretary might accept Chamber-
lain's suggestion to meet in Geneva, but that suggestion may be merely part of British effort to postpone decision; informa- tion that as a result of Japanese refusal to discuss a figure exceeding 315,000 tons for their combined cruiser-destroyer tonnage, the British will have to decide either to reduce their figures to approximately 500,000 tons or to accept whatever
consequences result. July 16 To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.) (166) Advice that the British proposal is rendered valueless by
British Ambassador's explanation that Chamberlain meant by “class" of ships, the different sizes of cruisers rather than the categories of naval craft.
(Sent also to Geneva.) July To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
(text printed) instructing him to advise Chamberlain that the Secretary foresees no circumstances which would require him to go to Geneva, and advising that the only real question is whether the British can reduce their figures on total cruiser tonnage to meet views of the American and Japanese delega-
tions. July 16 | From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (100) Request for comments on chairman's statement to second
THREE-POWER CONFERENCE AT GENEVA FOR THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMA
MENT, JUNE 20-AUGUST 4, 1927—Continued
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1927 July 18 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (105) Japanese memorandum (text printed) summarizing the
specific propositions set forth by each power in British-Japa- nese informal conversations.
To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) ) Approval of statement to plenary session of July 14; sug-
gestion that if another plenary session becomes necessary, the specific facts to justify American conclusions be stated; instructions as to the nature of statement to be made with
regard to American position should Conference break up. July 18 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (106) Request for instructions as to certain points of Japanese
memorandum: (1) Advance in ratio for Japan from 3 to 3.25, (2) question of 8-inch guns, and (3) maximum size of smaller-
type cruiser. July 18 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (107) Suggestion that the Secretary discuss with the British
Ambassador the two conflicting issues which now prevent agreement: (1) British insistence on small-type cruisers and restriction of 8-inch gun, and (2) American insistence on
liberty of armament. July 19 | From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.) (168) Chamberlain's concurrence in the Secretary's opinion that
nothing would be accomplished by a meeting at Geneva
between them. July 19 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (55) Opinion that the 5-5-3 ratio must be adhered to, with slight
concessions should exact ratio be impractical, and that after reaching agreement on total cruiser tonnage, the United States must retain right to construct within such limits the number and type of cruisers up to 10,000 tons, with such armament up to 8-inch guns as may be necessary. Instruc- tions to cable further data on suggestion in Japanese memo- randum that 25 percent of the tonnage totals be retained in
over-age vessels. July 19 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (108) Declaration, at meeting for further discussion of Japanese
memorandum, of willingness to discuss retention of over-age ships after agreement is reached on the other issues, and of
reasons for insistence on liberty of armanent within the tonnage limitations; reiteration of suggestion that treaty might con- 'tain a political clause providing for reexamination of the cruiser question in case either of the other powers should be- come apprehensive in the future as to the quantity of U. S.
construction of 8-inch-gun vessels. July 19 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (110) Suggestion that, in view of British delegation's recall to
London for consultations, a full statement of U. S. position as to tonnage level and liberty of armament within that figure be presented to the British Government either through its Em- bassy in Washington or through the American Ambassador in London.
119
THREE-POWER CONFERENCE AT GENEVA FOR THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMA
MENT, JUNE 20-AUGUST 4, 1927—Continued
To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) again with the British Government, considering instructions to the American Ambassador quoted in telegram No. 50, July 16, but that he will do everything possible to assist in bringing about an agreement. Fear that emphasis on 8-inch guns will lead British to assume U. S. willingness to build cruisers below 10,000 tons armed with 8-inch guns. From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Belief that it would be advisable not to insist on retaining the power to allocate all tonnage to 10,000-ton cruisers, but to indicate willingness to consider possibility of a smaller-size cruiser to be armed with 8-inch guns. To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Advice that it was not intention to direct delegation to insist on the construction of the entire tonnage in 10,000-ton vessels, and instructions to adhere to right to arm all new cruisers with 8-inch guns. To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Conversation with the British Ambassador, in which the Secretary emphasized that the American delegation had made extensive concessions, but that the British must agree to a total tonnage limitation and mounting of 8-inch guns if any treaty is to be made. From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)
Foreign Office information that Japanese still hope to bring tonnage figure down to 450,000 tons, that they have not ap- proved British 6-inch gun proposal, and that they recognize the difficulties presented by the obsolete cruiser tonnage clause. To President Coolidge
Doubt that Geneva Conference will have any practical re- sults, in view of grave difficulties encountered with regard to the British demands. From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Further explanation of proposal for retention of over-age ships as contained in Japanese memorandum; unacceptability to American delegation of proposal as it now stands, but possibility that modifications might be worked out which would make it a basis for discussion. From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Inquiry as to authorization to accede to Japanese wish for discussion of 5-3 ratio, and possibility of seeking compromise which would satisfy both U. S. demand for maintenance of the Washington treaty ratio and Japanese need to meet domestic political objections regarding its minority ratio. From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Request for opinion on two drafts of a political clause providing for reexamination of cruiser question (texts printed). To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)
Preference for the more specific form of political clause, should necessity for it arise.
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