land, 227 U. S. 59, 57 L. ed. 417, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192; Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 229 U. S. 146, 57 L. ed. 1125, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648, 3 N. C. C. A. 779; St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 57 L. ed. 1129, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651.

The expression of the intention of Congress to bring the subject within its control is alone sufficient. Though there be no act of Congress operative, and no regulation in force, such expression, as soon as uttered in legislative form, at once supersedes and excludes all power of a state to legislate on or enforce legislation with reference to the subject.

Northern P. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370, 378, 379, 56 L. ed. 237, 239, 240, 32 | Sup. Ct. Rep. 160.

A service that interferes with interstate commerce cannot be imposed by a state. A statute imposing such service is void.

Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321, 327, 328, 50 L. ed. 772, 774, 775, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 491; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 7, 27, 37, 54 L. ed. 355, 357, 366, 370, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56, 65, 54 L. ed. | 378, 385, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232; Ludwig v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 216 U. S. 146, 162, 54 L. ed. 423, 429, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661, 31 L. ed. 205, 210, Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Henderson v. New York (Henderson v. Wickham) 92 U. S. 259, 268, 23 L. ed. 543, 547; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 319, 330, 34 L. ed. 455, 457, 461, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 185, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862.

The mere extension of a facility to the

public by a carrier which it is not required under the law to give will not prevent such I carrier from withdrawing that facility from the use of the public at any time it may see fit.

Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1, 26, 29 L. ed. 791, 802, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542, 628; Providence Coal Co. v. Providence & W. R. Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 368; Douglas & Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co. 21 Inters. Com. Rep. 102.

These statutes, by reason of the heavy fines provided for all violations thereof, with no opportunity given therein to test their validity as to the provisions complained of in these bills without incurring the risk of these penalties, are unconstitutional their face.

on

Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 148, 52 L. ed. 714, 724, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 932, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441, 14 Ann. Cas. 764.

Mr. Hal H. Smith argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees:

An interchange of traffic at a terminal midway on the line haul does not involve the use of a carrier's tracks and terminals.

Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 2 L.R.A. 289, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 381, 37 Fed. 630; Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 537, 59 Fed. 400.

Neither does an interchange of traffic after it had crossed the limits of a city, but was still several miles from its ultimate destination.

Cardiff Coal Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 13 Inters. Com. Rep. 460; St. Louis, S. & P. R. Co. v. Peoria & P. Union R. Co. 26 Inters. Com. Rep. 226.

A carrier can be compelled to perform the intra-city switching service.

Iowa v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 425, 33 Fed. 391.

The order is not in conflict with the doctrine of this court in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Central Stock Yards Co. 212 U. S. 132, 53 L. ed. 441, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 246.

(a) That case dealt with a constitutional provision providing for interchange of traffic, but making no provision for compensation.

(b) That case dealt with the delivery of live stock at stock yards,—a service distinguishable from that in question here.

North Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 123 U. S. 727, 31 L. ed. 287, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 266; Covington Stock-Yards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128, 35 L. ed. 73, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 461; Central Stock Yards Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 192 U. S. 568, 48 L. ed. 565, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 339; Chicago, 1. & L. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 175 Ind. 630, 95 N. E. 364.

The order is not void as imposing "intra

city switching" upon the appellant railroads. The appellants as railroads are incorporated to do switching and perform a terminal service.

Bridwell v. Gate City Terminal Co. 127 Ga. 520, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 909, 56 S. E. 624; State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Terminal R. Asso. 182 Mo. 284, 81 S. W. 395.

Neither the order complained of nor the statute of Michigan under which the order is made imposes any burdens upon interstate commerce, nor are they void by reason of any conflict with any provisions of the interstate commerce act.

Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 511, 46 L. ed. 303, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 95; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Com. 102 Va. 599, 49 S. E. 911; Iowa v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 425, 33 Fed. 391; Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729; New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U. S. 431, 39 L. ed. 1043, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 896.

The order was intended to facilitate commerce and to compel carriers to perform

transportation services for the benefit of the public which, as common carriers, they should perform. The statute and order are therefore in aid of commerce; they tend to promote the safe and prompt delivery of goods. The order should be sustained as an order to compel the performance of a duty by a common carrier, which, in the absence of the statute, it should perform.

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mazursky, 216 U. S. 122, 54 L. cd. 411, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 378: Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Crovo, 220 U. S. 364, 55 L. ed. 498, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep.

399.

W. 98; Jacobson v. Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. 71 Minn. 532, 40 L.R.A. 389, 70 Am. St. Rep. 358, 74 N. W. 893; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Smithson, 45 Mich. 221, 7 N. W. 795; Michigan R. Commission v. Michigan C. R. Co. 168 Mich. 230, 132 N. W. 1068; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hunt, 171 Ind. 189, 86 N. E. 328; Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 175 Ind. 630, 95 N. E. 364; State ex rel. Lamar v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. 41 Fla. 377, 27 So. 225; Inman v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. 14 Tex. Civ. App. 39, 37 S. W. 37; Peoria & P. Union R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 109 Ill. 139, 50 Am. Rep. 605; Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 296, 45 L. ed. 194, 199, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 263, 46 L. ed. 1156, 22 Sup. Ct.

use of the tracks or terminal facilities of one carrier by another. The service thus required of a carrier is essentially a transportation service; it is not a mere switching service, and therefore does not, as such, constitute the use of another carrier's terminal

facilities.

Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 203, 29 L. ed. 158, 161, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826; Dixon v. Central of Georgia R. Co. 110 Ga. 173, 35 S. E. 369; Akron Gravel & S. Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (June 2, 1911) Ohio R. Com.; Cardiff Coal Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 13 Inters. Com. Rep. 468; Michigan R. Commission v. Michigan C. R. Co. 168 Mich. 230, 132 N. W. 1068; Enterprise Fuel Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 16 Inters. Com. Rep. 219.

Complainant is a foreign corporation, and by coming into the state, it has submitted itself to the laws of the state, and has agreed to do the very things required by act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1909, as amended by act No. 139 of the Public Acts of 1911, and it cannot therefore attack such laws.

Home Ins. Co. v. Davis, 29 Mich. 239; 19 Cyc. 1251: Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 655, 39 L. ed. 297, 300, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 610. 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207.

Even if complainant had not subjected itself to the laws of Michigan requiring interchange of traffic, and could complain of such laws, such laws are valid and do not deprive a railroad company of its property without due process of law, in contravention of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Dey, 82 lowa, 336, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 436, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 584, 31 Am. St. Rep. 477, 48 N.

The Commission was constituted by the Public Acts of the state, and invested with quite full and detailed powers of regulation of the railroads of the state. Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of Michigan of 1909, as amended by act No. 139, 1911.

Section 7, as originally enacted and as amended, is alone specially relevant to the discussion, and is inserted in the margin, subdivision (d) being the amendment.†

[460] After the amendment took effect, and on July 29, 1912, the Grand Trunk System, which is constituted of a number of railroad lines, published a tariff of charges, to be effective September 1, 1911, which, among other things, set forth the rates for the designated services within the corpo

† (55) Sec. 7. (a) All railroads subject to the provisions of this act shall afford all reasonable and proper facilities by the tween one another and the establishment of depots and otherwise for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers and property to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith, and shall transfer and deliver without unreasonable delay or discrimina tion any freight or cars or passengers destined to any point on its own line or on

establishment of switch connections be

Haggerty filed a supplementary petition with the Commission, complaining that the new rates were unreasonable and exorbitant, and, on March 15, 1912, the Commission ordered the postponement of the same until April 29th to give the Commission an opportunity for investigation into "the reasonableness of such proposed rate and the matter set forth in the complaint." Thereupon the Grand Trunk System issued a supplement to its tariff, suspending the intrastate rates named in its tariff, and, on March 30th, published a new tariff, canceling all rates between industries having private sidings on the System, and hold or team tracks on that System, and all rates between junction points with other carriers within the corporate limits of Detroit and the team tracks of the System. The effect of this tariff was to withdraw all intrastate and interstate switching movements, except as to the Detroit & Toledo Shore Line, with which the Grand Trunk was under contract for terminal switching.

On April 10th the Commission suspended this supplemental tariff in order to give it opportunity to investigate, and two days afterward the bill in this case was filed. On April 27th an amended bill was filed, and, on the same day, the Detroit, Grand Haven, & Milwaukee Railway Company filed its bill.

We may observe that the order of the Commission of April 10th is the only one in controversy. The other orders of February 6th and March 15th, 1912, were directed against the Grand Trunk Western Railway, and when it came to the knowledge of the Commission that [463] that road did not enter the city, the orders were canceled.

The bills prayed that the acts referred to and the order of the Commission be declared null and void as to complainants, that injunctions interlocutory and perpetual be granted restraining appellees from executing the order, and from taking any steps or proceedings to enforce any of the penalties or remedies of the statute.

Answers were filed to the bills, and supporting and attacking affidavits. The district court, upon hearing, denied an injunction and vacated the restraining order, but

The two suits may be treated as one, the material points being identical, except as to the territory through which the roads run and the diversity of citizenship which exists only in the first suit filed. The foundation of both suits is the same, that the order of the Commission and the acts of the state under which it was made, in so far as the order and the acts require of complainants or their property any of the services above set forth or so threatened to be required, constitute the taking of their property without due process of law, in contravention of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and is also a violation of the commerce clause of that instrument. The specification under the latter is "that Congress has taken over the whole subjectmatter of terminals, team tracks, switching tracks, sidings, etc., of carriers engaged in interstate commerce, and has enacted that such carriers shall not be required to give the use of such terminal facilities to other carriers engaged in like business."

It is further objected against said order that the companies [464] were not incorporated for the purpose of local or intrastate switching or drayage business, but for the purpose of interstate and intrastate commerce; and, further, the penalties prescribed by the acts under which the Commission purported to have acted are SO drastic that a resort to court to test the validity thereof is at the risk of imprison. ment in the jails of the various counties where the lines of the companies run, and, therefore, the companies are denied the equal protection of the laws, and their property is taken without due process of law.

The question in the case is whether, under the statutes of the state of Michigan. appellants can be compelled to use the tracks it owns and operates in the city of Detroit for the interchange of intrastate traffic; or, stating the question more spe cifically, whether the companies shall receive cars from another carrier at a junction point or physical connection with such carrier within the corporate limits of Detroit for transportation to the team tracks of the companies; and whether the companies shall allow the use of their team tracks for cars to be hauled from their team tracks to a junction point or phys ical connection with another carrier within such limits, and be required to haul such