was then filed, admitted the incorporation of the complainant in Missouri, and the citizenship in Oklahoma of the defendants, as well as the jurisdictional amount. The allegations of the complaint as to interference with the authority of the courts of the United States as to the commerce and contract clauses of the Constitution and the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment were sought to be traversed by copious averments concerning the subject. Finally it was asserted, 1, that the Missouri corporation was never authorized to acquire any railroad in either the Indian or Oklahoma territory, and it therefore had no standing to assert as a Missouri corporation, its ownership and control of such roads as a basis for removal; 2, that in forming the line or lines of railway which constituted its system, the complainant had consolidated parallel and competing roads, in violation of the anti-trust laws of the territory and of the state of Oklahoma, as well as the law of the United States, and therefore the corporation was not in a position to assert its Missouri citizenship; and 3, that the acquisition by the complainant of various [323] roads forming parts of its system, which were covered by charters granted by Congress or by Oklahoma territory, was in conflict with such charters, and for this reason, moreover, the corporation could not be heard to assert its Missouri citizenship. An exception of the complainant to the relevancy of the three grounds just stated was maintained, and they were stricken from the answer. By agreement between the parties, the present appellant, the successor in office as secretary of state, was substituted as defendant. Thereupon, the case having been submitted to the court on bill and answer, a decree was entered perpetually enjoining the secretary of state from giving effect to the order of revocation, or interfering with or disturbing the complainant in the transaction of its business in the state. It was expressly decreed that the act of the legislature of Oklahoma upon which the action of the secretary of state was taken was void and unenforceable because of its repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States. This appeal was then taken. Mr. Charles West, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Mr. Ben F. Harrison, submitted the cause for appellant: The best reason for believing the act did not intend to hinder the Federal courts is because it must necessarily fail to accomplish that purpose. Southern R. Co. v. Allison, 190 U. S. 330, 47 L. ed. 1080, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 713. It will be claimed that the Oklahoma act is within the reasoning of Herndon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 218 U. S. 135, 54 L. ed. 970, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56, 54 L. ed. 378, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232; Ludwig v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 216 U. S. 146, 54 L. ed. 423, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287, 19 Ann. Cas. 1247; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 355, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190. In all of those cases the statute was held to be either a direct interference with interstate commerce, or else to discriminate against companies doing interstate commerce, and in each instance was held to violate the obligation of a contract. It will be noticed that the other acts operated upon foreign corporations differently than upon the domestic corporations, and thus caused a discrimination against the foreign corporations engaged in interstate commerce. The Oklahoma act works no such discrimination, and therefore is to be decided under the authority of Security Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 248, 50 L. ed. 1014, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 619, 6 Ann. Cas. 317; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. 94 U. S. 535, 24 L. ed. 148; National Council v. State Council, 203 U. S. 163, 51 L. ed. 137, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 46. As far as jurisdiction in the Federal courts is concerned, there is an indisputable presumption of law that the citizenship of corporations is in the state which originally created them. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545, 40 L. ed. 802, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621. But this does not in any way interfere with the requirement that corporations be domiciled in the state, or the prohibition against such corporations having two domicils, one in and one out of the state, and the requirement that residence should not be subject to change, and the provision that the effect of an attempt to migrate might be the forfeiture of the rights in this state. Thomp. Corp. 493-495; Martine v. International L. Ins. Co. 53 N. Y. 339, 13 Am. Rep. 529; State ex rel. Safford v. Topeka Water Co. 59 Kan. 151, 52 Pac. 422; Aspinwall v. Ohio & M. R. Co. 20 Ind. 492, 83 Am. Dec. 329; State ex rel. Childs v. Park & N. Lumber Co. 58 Minn. 330, 49 Am. St. Rep. 516, 59 N. W. 1048; Simmons v. Norfolk & B. S. B. Co. 113 N. C. 147, 22 L.R.A. 677, 37 Am. St. Rep. 614, 18 S. E. 117; State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. R. Co. 45 Wis. 579; Com. ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Pittsburg & C. R. Co. 58 Pa. 26; North & South Rolling Stock Co. v. People, | 147 Ill. 234, 24 L.R.A. 462, 35 N. E. 608; State v. Southern P. R. Co. 24 Tex. 80; People ex rel. Platt v. Oakland County Mr. Chief Justice White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court: We have stated the case only to the ex The statute is not an interference with tent necessary to make clear the questions interstate commerce. essential to be decided. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 45; 44 L. ed. 664, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 512, 518, 46 L. ed. 304, 306, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 95. Messrs. W. F. Evans and E. T. Miller submitted the cause for appellee: The evident purpose of the Oklahoma act of 1908 is to prevent foreign corporations doing business in Oklahoma from invoking jurisdiction of the Federal courts in that state. If such be the purpose of the act, it is ineffectual to that end. Buck Stove & Range Co. v. Vickers, 226 U. S. 205, 57 L. ed. 189, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 41; Herndon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 218 U. S. 135, 54 L. ed. 970, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633; Ludwig v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 216 U. S. 146, 54 L. ed. 423, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56, 54 L. ed. 378, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545, 40 L. ed. 802, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287, 19 Ann. Cas. 1247; Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 36 L. ed. 943, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44; Southern R. Co. v. Allison, 190 U. S. 326, 47 L. ed. 1078, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 713; International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 54 L. ed. 678, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 493, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 481, 18 Ann. Cas. 1103; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 355, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190. The statute in question is void because it is an indirect interference with, and imposes a direct burden upon, interstate com merce. The assignments of error in general terms assail the overruling of the demurrer, the striking of matter from the answer, and the final decree. The propositions, however, which are urged at bar to sustain these general assignments, are numerous and we think in some aspects redundant. To consider them in the order in which they are urged would, besides giving rise to repetition, tend to produce confusion. We hence disregard the mere order in which they are stated in the argument, and come to consider the fundamental propositions necessary to be taken [328] into view in order right in holding that the law under which the secretary of state acted, as well as the action of that officer, was void because inconsistent with the judicial power of the United States, reserving until that is done such separate consideration of the propositions relied on as we may deem it neces to determine whether the court below was sary to make. It may not be doubted that the judicial power of the United States as created by the Constitution and provided for by Congress pursuant to its constitutional authority is a power wholly independent of state action, and which therefore the several states may not by any exertion of authority in any form, directly or indirectly, destroy, abridge, limit, or render inefficacious. The doctrine is so elementary as to require no citation of authority to sustain it. Indeeed, it stands out so plainly as one of the essential and fundamental conour constitutional ceptions upon which system rests, and the lines which define it are so broad and so obvious, that, unlike some of the other powers delegated by the Constitution, where the lines of distinction are less clearly defined, the attempts to transgress or forget them have been so in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 52 L. ed. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121; Buck Stove & Range Co. v. Vickers, 226 U. S. 205, 57 L. ed. 189, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 41; I. M. Darnell & Son Co. v. Mem-frequent as to call for few occasions for phis, 208 U. S. 113, 52 L. ed. 413, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23; Heyman v. Southern R. Co. 203 U. S. 270, 51 L. ed. 178, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 104, 7 Ann. Cas. 1130; Ludwig v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 216 U. S. 146, 54 L. ed: 423, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280; Pensacola Teleg. Co. v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 96 U. S. 1, 24 L. ed. 708; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56, 54 L. ed. 378, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 51 L. ed. 295, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep.. 159; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 355, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190. their statement and application. However, though infrequent, occasions have not been wanting, especially on the subject of the removal of causes with which we are now dealing, where the general principle has been expounded and applied so as to cause the subject, even from the mere point of view of authority, to be beyond the domain of all possible controversy. See for general question, Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 52 L. ed. 714, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 932, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441, 14 Ann. Cas. 764; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 302, 391, 38 L. ed. 1014, 1021, 232 U. S. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. agent, through an office, or otherwise trans1047; Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73, 77, acting business within said state of Okla28 L. ed. 927, 928, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 377; homa, who shall claim or declare in writMadisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard ing before any court of law or equity within Min. Co. 196 U. S. 239, 252, 49 L. ed. 462, said state of Oklahoma, domicil within an467, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251, and on subject other state or foreign count.." [Okla. of removal, Southern P. Co. v. Denton, 146 Laws of May 26, 1908.] The 3d section U. S. 202, 36 L. ed. 942, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. makes it the duty of the judge of any court 44; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. James, 161 | before which any claim of foreign domicil U. S. 545, 40 L. ed. 802, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. is made within the contemplation of the 621; [329] Southern R. Co. v. Allison, 190 | 2d section to at once make report of the U. S. 326, 47 L. ed. 1078, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 713; Herndon v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. 218 U. S. 135, 54 L. ed. 970, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633. fact to the secretary of state, and to transmit to that officer a copy of the claim; and the 4th section imposes on the secretary of state the duty immediately, on the receipt of such report, and copy of the declaration, to "declare the license or charter of any person, firm, or corporation so filing said claim or declaration forfeited and revoked;" and the 5th causes it to be a misdemeanor subjecting to a penalty of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand dollars each day or part of day, for any person whose license or charter is revoked, to do business in Oklahoma in conflict with the prohibitions of the statute. With this general principle in hand let us come to fix one or more of the essentials of the right to remove as a prelude to testing the assailed statute and the action taken under it. In the first place, the right, unrestrained and unpenalized by state action, on compliance with the forms required by the law of the United States, to ask the removal of a cause pending in a state to a United States court, is obviously of the very essence of the right to remove conferred by the law of the United States. While the provisions of the statute are In the second place, as the right given to dependent one upon the other, and are uniremove by the United States law is para-fied in the sense that they all are commount, it results that it is also of the essence of the right to remove, that when an issue of whether a prayer for removal was rightfully asked arises, a Federal question results which is determinable by the courts of the United States free from limitation or interference arising from an exertion of state power. In the third place, as the right freely exists to seek removal unchecked or unburdened by state authority, and the duty to determine the adequacy of a prayed removal is a Federal, and not a state, question, it follows that the states are, in the nature of things, without authority to penalize or punish one who has sought to avail himself of the Federal right of removal on the ground that the removal asked was unauthorized or illegal. Let us come, then, to the text of the statute, with the object of determining its constitutionality. Its 1st section provides "that the domicil of every person, firm, or corporation conducting a business in person, by agent, through an office, or otherwise transacting business within the state of Oklahoma, and which has complied with or may comply with the Constitution and laws of the state of Oklahoma, shall be for all purposes deemed and held to be the state of Oklahoma." The 2d section provides for the immediate revocation of "the license or charter to do business within the state of [330] Oklahoma of every person, firm, or corporation conducting a business in person, by ponents of a common purpose, that is, tend to the realization of one and the same legislative intent, its provisions, nevertheless, for the purpose of analysis, are plainly twofold in character; that is, one, the compulsory citizenship and domicil within the state which the 1st section imposes, and the other, the prohibition which the statute pronounces against any assertion in a court of the existence of any other citizenship and domicil than that which the statute ordains, and the means and penalties provided for sanctioning such prohibition. Although theoretically, the first would seem to be the more primary and fundamental of the two, since the second. after all, consists but of methods provided for making the first [331] operative, the second, from the point of view we are examining, is the primal consideration, since it directly deals with the assertion in a state court of a right to remove, and provides the mechanism which was deemed to be effectual to render the assertion of such right impossible. In other words, the difference be tween its two provisions is that which exists between an attempt on the one hand to render the enjoyment of a Federal right impossible by arbitrarily creating a ficti tious legal status incompatible with the existence of the right, and on the other hand the formulation of such prohibitions and the establishment of such penalties against the attempt to avail of the Federal right as to cause it to be impossible to assert it. Coming, then, to consider the statute from the second or latter point of view, we think it is clear that it plainly and obviously forbids a resort to the Federal courts on the ground of diversity of citizenship in the contingency contemplated, punishes by extraordinary penalties any assertion of a right to remove under the laws of the United States, and attempts to divest the Federal courts of their power to determine, if issue arises on the subject, whether there is a right to remove. Indeed, the statute goes much further, since, when an application to remove is made, in order to prevent a judicial consideration of its merits even by the state court, it in effect commands the judge of such court, on the making of the application, to refuse the game, and to certify the fact that it was made to a state executive officer to the end that such officer should, without judicial action, strip the petitioning corporation of its right to do business, besides subjecting it to penal ties of the most destructive character as a means of compelling acquiescence. When the nature of the statute is thus properly appreciated, nothing need be further said to manifest its obvious repugnancy to the Constitution, or to demonstrate the correctness of the decree of the court below. The conclusion just stated leaves us only the duty of [332] separately and briefly referring to some of the propositions pressed in argument; (a) the contention that because the object of the suit was to enjoin state officers from violating the constitutional rights of the complainant, it was therefore a suit against the state, and not maintainable, is so plainly in conflict with the settled doctrine to the contrary that we do not further notice it. (b) The contention so much insisted upon, that the act should not be deciared unconstitutional because it does not discriminate, we assume refers to the provision of the statute creating an arbitrary standard of state citizenship and domicil; but, as we see no possibility of separating that provision from the unconstitutional attempt to prevent access to the courts of the United States, there is no occasion to further deal with the subject of discrimination. If, however, we were to separat consider it, at once (c) it is to be observed that the contention proceeds upon a self-evident misconception. which is this: that if only wrong be indiscriminately done, it becomes rightful. The proposition that the constitutionality of the statute and the action taken under it is supported by the decisions in Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. 94 U. S. 535, 24 L. ed. 148, and Security Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 248, 50 L. ed. 1014, 28 | Sup. Ct. Rep. 619, 6 Ann. Cas. 317, is, we think plainly unfounded. Those cases involved state legislation as to a subject over which there was complete state authority; that is, the exclusion from the state of a corporation which was so organized that it had no authority to do anything but a purely intrastate business, and the decisions rested upon the want of power to deprive a state of its right to deal with a subject which was in its complete control, even though an unlawful motive might have impelled the state to exert its lawful power. But that the application of those cases to a situation where complete power in a state over the subject dealt with does not exist has since been so repeatedly passed upon as to cause the question not to be open. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Kansas, 216 [333] U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 355, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56, 51 L. ed. 378, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232; International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 54 L. ed. 678, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 493, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 481, 18 Ann. Cas. 1103; Buck Stove & Range Co. v. Vickers, 226 U. S. 205, 57 L. ed. 189, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 41; and Herndon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 218 U. S. 135, 54 L. ed. 970, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633. The grounds of the decision in the last case show the extremely narrow scope of the rulings in the Doyle and Prewitt Cases, and render their inapplicability to this case certain. Indeed, the ruling in the Herndon Case and in those subsequent to the Doyle and Prewitt Cases, nost of which were reviewed in the Herndon Case, demonstrates that no authority is af forded by those two cases for the conception that it is within the power of a state in any form, directly or indirectly, to destroy or deprive of a right conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States. (d) The matters which the court below ordered stricken from the answer were irrelevant to the issue for decision, even if it be cor.ceded hypothetically that they had merit; because, under that assumption, they would have only been properly cognizable if presented in an appropriate manner and at the proper time to the Federal tribunal which had a right to pass upon them when considering the propriety of the removal which was prayed. (e) We consider that the plain text of the statute, the meaning affixed to it by the state court when the application to remove was made, the subsequent action taken by the state officers, the character of the pleadings, the concession as stated by the court below, which was made in the argument, all leave no room for the contention that, at all events, the statute should be construed not as an attempt on the part of the state to prevent the removal of causes, but simply as an effort on the part of the J. C. BACCUS, Plff. in Err., V. STATE OF LOUISIANA. trict court of the state of Louisiana, as that court had jurisdiction, in last resort, over the conviction sought to be reviewed. The information upon which the conviction was based charged that the accused had, in violation of § 12 of act 49 of the Laws of Louisiana for 1894, illegally, as an itinerant vender or peddler, "sold drugs, ointments, nostrums, and applications intended for the treatment of diseases and deformity." A motion was made to quash on the following [335] grounds: First, because the statute upon which the charge was based provided for no offense; second, because if it did, the acts charged were not, generally speaking, within the statute, and especially were not embraced by its provisions because the sale of drugs or proprietary preparations put up in sealed packages with directions for use did not constitute the practice of medicine; third, because if the statute embraced, as asserted, the acts charged, it was in conflict with the state Constitution, since it permitted all persons to sell drugs, ointments, etc., except itinerant venders; fourth, because if the statute operated as contended for, it was repugnant to the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States "(a) because it prevents a citizen from pursuing a lawful vocation; (b) it denies to other citizens rights enjoyed by all others in the state, and is class legislation in its effect, as it gives to the local dealer a monopoly in the sale of such drugs, etc., and deprives the itinerant vender or dealer of the privilege to sell such articles .." The motion to quash having been overruled, the case was submitted to the court without a jury, upon an agreed statement of facts to the following 1914. effect: 1st, "that the defendant was an itinerant vender of drugs, nostrums," etc., and as such had sold the articles "intended for the treatment of diseases, as alleged in 2d, "that the drugs so (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 334-335.) Constitutional law — equal protection of - sales by itinerant vend the laws ers. Prohibiting the sale by itinerant venders of "any drug, nostrum, ointment, or application of any kind intended for the treatment of disease or injury," as is done by La. Laws 1894, act No. 49, § 12, does not violate the equal protection or due process of law clauses of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, although the sale of such articles by other persons is permitted. [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, IV, a, 5, d; IV. b, 4, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 170.] Argued and submitted January 19, N ERROR to the Third Judicial District IN ERROR to Third for the treatment of Louisiana, to review a conviction of an itinerant vender for selling drugs or medicinal compounds. Affirmed. Statement by Mr. Chief Justice White: This writ of error was directed to a disNOTE.-On the right to discriminate between harmless articles, in legislation regulating peddlers-see notes to State v. Wright, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 349 and People ex rel. Moskowitz v. Jenkins, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1079. As to validity of ordinance regulating conduct of licensed street hucksters or peddlers-see note to Shreveport v. Dantes, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 304. On the validity of license tax on peddlers, so high as to be prohibitory in effect-see note to People use of State Bd. of Health v. Wilson, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1074. sold by the defendant as an itinerant vender were compounded and prepared by the Rawleigh Medical Company of the state of Illinois, and that said remedies, drugs, nostrums, ointments, and applications were put up in sealed packages or bottles ready On the validity of license or occupation tax on hawkers and peddlers and persons engaged in soliciting orders by sample or otherwise, as an exercise of the police power-see notes to State v. Bayer, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 301, and Dozier v. State, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 265. On discrimination against nonresidents by statute or municipal ordinance imposing li cense or occupation tax-see note to State v. Williams, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 286. |