troversy can only be settled by determining | it be [368] arguendo conceded that such which of these two gives the better right power had theretofore been possessed by the to the demanded premises. Henshaw v. officials who exercised authority within Bissell, 18 Wall. 255, 266, 21 L. ed. 835, 839. the area which was made a territory by the In Miller v. Dale, 92 U. S. 473, 23 L. ed. Constitution." But this only in passing. 735, there was a conflict between a conces We are not called upon to consider the sion of the Mexican government, confirmed power of the territorial officers. The vaby the tribunals of the United States and lidity of the grants has been pronounced by a survey thereon, and a patent of the United | Congress, and we are only required to conStates issued upon a similar confirmed consider their relation to each other and the cession, and the question in the case was which gave the better right to the premises. This court said: "To answer this question, we must look into the character of the original concessions; and if they furnish no guide to the just conclusion, we must seek a [362] solution in the proceedings had before our tribunals and officers by which the claims of the parties were determined." This rule is the only just and practical one, and, besides, the act of Congress confirming the Beck and Perea grants saved to each rights against the other by § 4 of the act. It is urged, however, that this doctrine is opposed by Dent v. Emmeger, 14 Wall. 308, 20 L. ed. 838, Les Bois v. Bramell, 4 How. 449, 11 L. ed. 1051, and the cases cited by them. In Dent v. Emmeger, it was said of grants which were described as of "imperfect obligation, and affected only the conscience of the new sovereign," and received from it "a vitality and efficacy which they did not before possess," that "when confirmed by Congress they became American titles and took their legal validity wholly from the act of confirmation, and not from any French or Spanish element which entered into their previous existence. The doctrine of senior and junior equities and of relation back has no application in the jurisprudence of such cases.' Of the same character were the rights in the other cases. In some of them there were mere orders for surveys and promises of title which the new sovereign was under no obligation to yield to. In the case at bar we are dealing with rights which were recognized by the new sovereign because they were supposed to have legal validity under the old sovereign. It is true in the case at bar, such validity is contested, and the contest is certainly justified as to the Perea grant. It was decided in Hayes v. United States, 170 U. S. 637, 644, 42 L. ed. 1174, 1177, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735, that after it was decreed by the general constituent Congress July 6, 1824, that "the province of New Mexico remains a territory of the federation,” the adoption by the same Congress of a general colonization law, August 18, 1824, and a permanent Constitution October 24th of the same year, the officials of the territory had no "power to dispose of the public lands, even though public domain. We have seen that the Beck grant in all of its steps was prior to the Perea grant. Juridical possession was given of it before the Perea grant was applied for and the conveyance of the land embraced within its boundaries made complete. It was confirmed first by the surveyor general of the territory and surveyed first by the Interior Department, and a survey "was necessary to its accurate segregation and delimitation." Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 158 U. S. 250, 39 L. ed. 969, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 822. It follows from these views that the land in conflict is part of the Beck grant, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory is reversed, and the cause remanded to the Supreme Court of the state for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed. SUSAN J. TAYLOR, as Administratrix of the Goods, Chattels, and Credits which were of Howard E. Taylor, Deceased, Plff. in Err., V. SEXTUS E. TAYLOR. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 363-371.) Commerce - exclusiveness of Federal power employers' liability distribution of damages. Nothing in the state statute for the disthe right of the childless widow of an intribution of personal property can defeat terstate railway employee who was fatally injured while employed by the carrier in interstate commerce, to the entire net proceeds of a judgment for the resulting damages recovered by her as administratrix in an action against the carrier, whether of § 1 of the employers' liability act of April her action was based upon the provisions 22, 1908 (35 Stat. at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), making every such carrier liable in damages for the negligent death of such employee "to his or her personal representative for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband NOTE. On the constitutionality, application, and effect of the Federal employers' liability act-see note to Lamphere v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 38. and children of such employee; and if none, than of such employee's parents; and if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee," or upon the provision of § 9, added by the act of April 5, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 291, chap. 143, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1324), that "any right of action given by this act to a person suffering injury shall survive to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee, and, if none, then to such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, but in such cases there shall be only one recovery for the same injury," since such provisions govern the distribution of the damages to the exclusion of any applicable state legislation. [For other cases, see Commerce, I. c, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1913 Supp.) [No. 224.] Argued January 30, 1914. Decided February 24, 1914. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 703; St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 158, 162, 57 L. ed. 1129, 1133, 1135, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651,-the judgment of the state court herein complained of was wrong, and should be reversed, with instructions to reinstate the judgment of the special term of the supreme court of New York. The right of action given by the Federal employers' liability acts is wholly dependent upon the disposition of the Congress in such regard. It does not inhere in the comin the nature of a gratuity, as the Congress mon law, and may be extended or withheld may see fit. If capable of being extended or withheld in toto, it may be extended upon conditions, and in favor of those only whom the Congress may select, in the order and to the extent which the Congress may specify. Marvin v. Maysville Street R. & Transfer Co. 49 Fed. 436; McCarty v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 62 Fed. 437; Wilson v. Tootle, 55 Fed. 211; Stewart v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 168 U. S. 445, 42 L. ed. 537, 18 I Sup. Ct. Rep. 105; Florida C. & P. R. v. County in that state to review a judgment directing the distribution according to the state law of the proceeds of a judgment recovered under the Federal employers' liability act, entered pursuant to the mandate of the Court of Appeals of the state, which affirmed a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Second Department, which had reversed an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. See same case below in Appellate Division, 144 App. Div. 634, 128 N. Y. Supp. 378; in Court of Appeals, 204 N. Y. 135, 97 N. E. 502, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 276. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Frederic D. McKenney argued the cause, and, with Messrs. George F. Brownell, John Spalding Flannery, and William Hitz, filed a brief for plaintiff in error: Sullivan, 61 L.R.A. 410, 57 C. C. A. 167; 120 Fed. 799. It being conceded that the Federal government, when operating within its own proper sphere, is supreme, it is of the very essence of that supremacy that it should also possess the incidental power to remove all obstacles to its operation, and to that end so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments as to exempt its own operations from their influence. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579. No brief was filed for defendant in error. Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court: his death. The plaintiff in error and defendant in error are respectively the widow and father of one Howard Taylor, a resident of Orange county, state of New York, who, through Upon authority of the opinions and the negligence of the Erie Railroad Comjudgments of this court in Second Employ-pany, met with an accident which caused ers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 56 L. ed. 327, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 1 N. C. C. A. 875; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570, 576, 57 L. ed. 355, 362, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 135; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 Ü. S. 59, 67, 57 L. ed. 417, 420, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192; American R. Co. v. Didricksen, 227 U. S. 145, 149, 57 L. ed. 456, 457, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U. S. 173, 175, 57 L. ed. 785, 786, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426, 3 N. C. C. A. 806; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702, 57 L. ed. 1031, tratrix. Plaintiff in error was appointed the administratrix of his estate, with right to prosecute any right of action granted by special provision of law as such adminisShe brought suit, as such administratrix, against the railroad company for damages, alleging the employment of her husband in interstate commerce upon a train running from Port Jervis, New York, to Jersey City, New Jersey, the negligence of the railroad company as the cause of his death, and that the action was brought under the act of Congress of April 22, 1908 [35 Stat. at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. D, 276.] And considering that the conComp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322], entitled, | sequences of a contrary doctrine would give "An Act Relating to Liability of Common Congress power over the distribution of Carriers by Railroads to their Employees real estate which might happen to be purin Certain Cases," known as the employers' chased by the earnings of an employee in liability law. interstate commerce, the court declared that By permission of the surrogate of Orange the act of Congress, in so far as it attemptcounty, she compromised with the railroad,¦ed to distribute the funds in controversy, accepting a judgment for $5,000. Defendant in error filed a petition in the supreme court of Orange county for an order directing plaintiff in error to pay over to him one half of the net proceeds of the judgment in accordance with the statute of distribution of the state. The motion was denied and an order was entered determining that plaintiff in error, as widow of the deceased, was entitled to receive and retain for her own use all of the net proceeds of the judgment. The order was reversed by the appellate division of the supreme court, and the judgment of reversal, on appeal to the court of appeals, was affirmed and the record remitted [366] to the supreme court. This writ of error was then prosecuted. There was "invalid and unauthorized." We have had many occasions to declare the comprehensive and exclusive power which Congress possesses over interstate commerce. And starting with that power as a factor, we have only to consider the breadth and meaning of the act of Congress. Section 6, as amended April 5, 1910, provides that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several states, and if the action be brought in a state court it shall not be removed to a court of the United States. Section 1 provides that every common carrier by railroad, while engaged in interstate commerce, "shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while The appellate division was of opinion he is employed by such carrier in such comthat the law of the state gave the right merce, or, in case of the death of such emof action and determined the distribution ployee, to his or her personal representaof the proceeds of the judgment. Consid- tive, for the benefit of the surviving widow ering the act of Congress and its provisions, or husband and children of such employee; the court was of the view that the act of and, if none, then of such employee's parCongress "should be construed as one grant- ents; and, if none, then of the next of ing a new remedy under certain circum- kin, dependent upon such employee, for stances, where none, or a less adequate one, such injury or death resulting in whole or existed under the state laws, and as not in part from the negligence of any of the intended to supplant or abrogate a right officers, agents, or employees of such carof action of practically equal extent exist-rier," or by reason of any defect in its ing under the laws of this state." [144 instrumentalities. App. Div. 641, 129 N. Y. Supp. 378.] The court further said: “It is only on the theory that this act of Congress constitutes the exclusive rule applicable to the facts of the case before us that the order of the special term [the order under review] can be upheld. If the remedy afforded by our laws be concurrent with that provided by Congress, then we think that our public policy "That any right of action given by this will not permit an administratrix appoint- act to a person suffering injury shall sured by our courts under our laws, to use vive to his or her personal representative, the Federal statute simply for the purpose for the benefit of the surviving widow or of defeating our statute of distribution of husband and children of such employee, and, personal property." The court of appeals if none, then of such employee's parents; expressed the opinion that the case pre- and, if none, then of the next of kin desented a case of conflict between the Fed-pendent upon such employee; but in such eral and state statutes, and determined that the state statutes must prevail. It was said that the power of Congress "to regulate interstate commerce must end somewhere, and so far as employees of common carriers engaged in interstate commerce are concerned, it appears to us that it must end with the death of the employee." [204 N. Y. 140, 97 N. E. 502, Ann. Cas. 1913 Section 9, as amended, is as follows: cases there shall be only one recovery for the same injury." [36 Stat. at L. 291, chap. 143, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1324.] [368] The act has come up for consideration in a number of cases. In Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 58 L. ed. 327, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 1 N. C. C. A. 875, it and its amendments were declared to be constitutional; that having been enacted in pursuance of a power reserved to Congress, state laws must give away to them. They established the policy for all, it was decided, and the courts of a state cannot refuse to enforce them on the ground that they are not in harmony with the policy of the state. Congress having acted, it was said, "the laws of the states, in so far as they cover the same field, are superseded; for necessarily that which is not supreme must yield to that which is." In Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570, 57 L. ed. 355, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 135, the Mondou Case was applied. The action was brought by the mother of a deceased employee in interstate commerce, under the state statute. The petition was subsequently amended to embrace a right of action by her under the Federal law as the personal representative of the decedent. The amendment was held not to be the commencement of a new action. It was said that notwithstanding the original petition asserted a cause of action under the state statute without making reference to the act of Congress, the court was presumed to be cognizant of the Federal enactment, and "to know that, with respect to the responsibility of interstate carriers by railroad to their employees injured in such commerce after its enactment, it had the effect of superseding state laws upon the subject." new and distinct right of action for the benefit of the dependent relatives named in the statute" for the damages which result to them because they have been deprived of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits on account of his wrongful death. In Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U. S. 173, 57 L. ed. 785, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426, 3 N. C. C. A. 806, the statute was again considered as giving a cause of action to the personal representative of the deceased employee for the benefit of the persons designated because of the pecuniary loss resulting to them. In St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702, 57 L. ed. 1031, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 703, the same principles were applied. In St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 57 L. ed. 1129, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651, the action was by the widow and parent of an interstate commerce employee. The petition stated case under the state statute. The railroad company contended that the Federal statute was the applicable one. There was a conflict between the statutes. The state statute gave the right of action to the surviving husband, wife, children, and parents; the Federal statute vested the right of action in the personal representative of the deceased for certain named beneficiaries, the parents of the deceased having no rights if there be a widow, husband, or children. The railroad company, therefore, interposed the objection [370] grounded on the Federal statute that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover on the case proved. The state court overruled the objection and we de of the plaintiffs, the father and mother, in whose favor there was a separate recovery, are not even beneficiaries under the Federal statute, there being a surviving widow; and she was not entitled to recover in her own name, but only through the deceased's personal representative, as is shown by the terms of the statute and the decisions before cited." In Michigan C. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 57 L. ed. 417, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192, it is again said that the act of Con-clared the ruling to be error. We said: "Two gress has undertaken to cover the subject of the liability of railroad companies to their employees injured while engaged in interstate commerce, and that state legis lation was superseded by it. "The obvious purpose of Congress," it was said, "was to save a right of action to certain relatives dependent upon an employee wrongfully injured, for the loss and [369] damage resulting to them financially by reason of the wrongful death." And again, "It is one beyond that which the decedent had,-one proceeding upon altogether different principles." The same view was expressed in American R. Co. v. Didricksen, 227 U. S. 145, 57 L. ed. 456, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224. The action was by surviving parents, they being the sole beneficiaries under the statute. A distinction was expressed between cause of action to an injured employee, and in case of his death, a cause of action to dependent relatives; and of the first it was said that it does not survive his death, but that in such case the act "creates a These cases were all brought under the statute as originally enacted and before the amendments of 1910. Section 1, however, was not amended, and in St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Hesterly, supra, it was said that the amendment of April 5, 1910, which added § 9, quoted above, "in like manner allows but one recovery, although it provides for survival of the right of the injured person." It is clear from these decisions that the source of the right of plaintiff in error was the Federal statute; and this whether the cause of action is based on the 1st section of the act or on § 9, added in 1910. From plaintiff in error's complaint against the Appeal from Porto Rico courts following decision below - res judi cata. railroad company it is not clear whether 3. The Federal Supreme Court will ordinarily not disturb on appeal the ruling of the Porto Rico supreme court upon the question whether there was a final judgment in a suit which could be set up as a bar to a later suit. [371] If the action included a right under § 9, the recovery was for her benefit exclusively as the widow of the decedent. The language of the section is that the right of action given to the employee survives to his personal representatives for the benefit of his parents only when there is no widow. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, VIII. m, 1; Courts, VII. d, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.j A [No. 199.] ary 24, 1914. Decided Febru PPEAL from the Supreme Court of Porto Rico to review a decree, which, reversing a decree of the District Court of Arecibo, dismissed the complaint in a suit to nullify a will instituting a universal heir. Affirmed. See same case below, 17 P. R. R. 185. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Manuel Rodriguez-Serra argued the cause, and, with Mr. Charles Hartzell, filed a brief for appellants: Under the law 11 of Toro, it is not required, in order to exercise the rights of a natural recognized son, that the fact of the ROSA MARIA CALAF Y FUGURUL et al., recognition by the natural father be proved Appts., 1. The recognition of a natural son, ig. nored in his father's will, can be proved in the Porto Rico courts in a suit to nullify the institution of a universal heir by such will only by a judgment, or by an act in solemn and authentic form. in a manner which is solemn, self-evident, and authentic. Decisions of Supreme Court of Spain: 1853, October 8; 1864, April 16; 1865, January 26; 1865, February 20; 1865, March 2; 1865, April 4; 1865, June 30; 1865, October 9; 1870, June 11; 1871, January 5; 1872, March 23; 1873, January 10; 1874, January 10; 1875, October 14; 1876, December 27; 1877, May 21; 1881, May 6; 1882, October 18; 1886, November 16; 1889, March 29; 1890, March 18; 1888, January 19, 20; 1899, November 29; 1909, April 2; Legisla [For other cases. see Evidence, XII. f, in Di-tive Collection 1861, p. 293; 1865, vol. 2, p. gest Sup. Ct. 1908.1 Appeal from Porto Rico courts following decision below - res judi cata. 2. A ruling of the Porto Rico supreme court that the dismissal of a suit to establish filiation by judgment is a bar to a subsequent suit between the same parties to nullify a will which ignored the child whose filiation was sought to be established in the earlier suit will not be disturbed by the Federal Supreme Court on appeal, unless shown by the clearest authority to be erro neous. [For other cases, see Appeal and Error. VIII. m. 1; Courts, VII. d, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] NOTE. On the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court over Porto Rican courts-see note to Garrozi v. Pastas, 51 L. ed. U. S. 369. 642 50; 1869, vol. 2, p. 518; 1871, vol. 1, p. 582; 1873, vol. 1, p. 377; 1881, vol. 3, p. 868; Aviles v. Sucesion Lange, 1 D. P. R. 350; Rivera v. Borrero, 3 P. R. R. 439. The certified copy of such a decision or opinion, which was introduced at the trial by defendant, is insufficient to base a plea of res judicata, because from it it does not appear that the case had been terminated, which condition is essential in order to produce the effects of res judicata. Decisions of Supreme Court of Spain: 1864, June 14; 1868, May 6; 1897, April 8; 1897, September 28; Re Weber, 28 L.R.A. 637, note; Callanan v. Votruba, 104 Iowa, 672, 40 L.R.A. 376, 63 Am. St. Rep. 538, 74 N. W. 13; 23 Cyc. 836, 1124, 1155; Los Angeles v. Mellus, 59 Cal. 444; 1 Freeman, |