Hill v. Adams Exp. Co. 82 N. J. L. 373, 81, not have the effect of an agreement or repreAtl. 859; Wichern v. United States Exp. Co. sentation. Some actual assent is necessary. 83 N. J. L. 241, 83 Atl. 776. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344, 382, 383, 12 L. ed. 465, 482; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Mineral Springs Mfg. Co. 16 Wall. 318, 328, 329, 21 L. ed. 297, 302, 303; Judson v. Western R. Corp. 6 Allen, 491, 83 Am. Dec. 646; Buckland v. Adams Exp. Co. 97 Mass. 124. The ground upon which the validity of a limitation upon a recovery for loss or damage due to negligence depends is that of estoppel. Wells, F. & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co. 227 U. S. 469, 476, 57 L. ed. 600, 602, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 651, 57 L. ed. 683, 688, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391. The refinements of the law in different jurisdictions are only important in this case to indicate the scope of the recent decision of Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 57 L. ed. 314, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 257, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148, and the cases which follow it. These cases in effect hold that the Federal government has declared its purpose to exercise supervision over all interstate contracts of cafriage, and that therefore this court will pass upon their validity. In effect, therefore, this court will decide both whether a contract limiting liability is valid in law and whether such a contract was made in fact. These decisions must necessarily affect the law hereafter laid down in a number of states. Those states which have had a different rule from that of this court, regarding either what is necessary to prove the existence of a contract to limit liability, or the extent to which such a limitation is valid, must modify their rules so far as interstate shipments are concerned; but the law of Massachusetts will remain unchanged, for that law is precisely the same as that laid down in the Croninger Case, both with reference to the validity of agreements to limit liability and with reference to what constitutes such an agreement. In Massachusetts it has long been the law that the acceptance of a document binds one who receives it, though he may not choose to read it (Grace v. Adams, 100 Mass. 505, 97 Am. Dec. 117, 1 Am. Rep. 131; Grinnell v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 113 Mass. 299, 18 Am. Rep. 485; Hoadley v. Northern Transp. Co. 115 Mass. 304, 15 Am. Rep. 106; Clement v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 137 Mass. 463; Graves v. Adams Exp. Co. 176 Mass. 280, 57 N. E. 462). And such had indeed been the law laid down by this court prior to the decision of the Croninger Case (Cau v. Texas & P. R. Co. 194 U. S. 427, 431, 48 L. ed. 1053, 1056, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663, 16 Am. Neg. Rep. 659). But it should be observed that it has also been the law both of this court and of the Massachusetts court that a public notice of an asserted limitation by the carrier, even though the shipper was aware of it (which was not the fact in the case at bar), does And this is the generally accepted law of the United States. 1 Hutchinson, Carr. 3d ed. § 406. It is suggested in the opinion of the Massachusetts court in the present case that the English rule is slightly more favorable to the carrier, but it is hard to find any warrant for this statement. Henderson v. Stevenson, L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. App. Cas. 470, 32 L. T. N. S. 709; Richardson v. Rowntree [1894] A. C. 217, 63 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 283, 6 Reports, 95, 70 L. T. N. S. 817, 58 J. P. 493, 7 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 482; Parker v. South Eastern R. Co. L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 416. The Carl Case, Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 654, 57 L. ed. 683, 689, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391, is not to be understood as meaning that a limitation of liability, or the valuation on which such a limitation is based, is literally part of the rate itself. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 509, 57 L. ed. 314, 321, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 257, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148; Wells, F. & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co. 227 U. S. 469, 475, 57 L. ed. 600, 602, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267. The amendments to the interstate commerce act in 1906 did not change the law either as to what a rate is or what the effect is of a rate duly filed. Whatever is now binding as a rate upon a shipper was binding before 1906. The statements in The Majestic, 166 U. S. 375, 41 L. ed. 1039, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 597, 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 282; Cau v. Texas & P. R. Co. 194 U. S. 427, 431, 48 L. ed. 1053, 1056, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663, 16 Am. Neg. Rep. 659, and Saunders v. Southern R. Co. 62 C. C. A. 523, 128 Fed. 15, all made shortly before 1906, would all have been inaccurate as general statements in asserting that the assent of the shipper was necessary for the validity of a limitaChicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 tion of liability. Moreover, the decisions in U. S. 133, 42 L. ed. 688, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289, and in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 48 L. ed. 268, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132, which admitted the efficacy of state laws forbidding limitations of liability would have been wholly wrong. For, if the limitation of liability is literally part of the rate, not only must it be assumed that the schedules of the railroad showed the rate and the asserted limitation of liability, but the special contracts of limitation proved in the | sions applicable to shippers. It can hardly cases would have been clearly within exclu- be claimed that a shipper who ignorantly sive Federal control prior to the amendments violated a prohibition of the act which was of 1906. It has been decided that the Carmack qualified by one of these words is guilty of amendment gives full control to the Federal | a misdemeanor. Potter v. United States, 155 government of all contracts for interstate | U. S. 438, 39 L. ed. 214, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. carriage, but it does not change the definition of what is a rate, and, if a limitation of liability is now part of a rate, it was part of a rate when these cases were decided. A limitation of liability in any form except by contract or a representation by the shipper has never been permitted by the law. The attempt to escape from this rule of the common law is as ineffectual as the attempt to escape the statutory liability cast upon an initial carrier by the Carmack amendment, which was held futile in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 55 L. ed. 167, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 7, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 56 L. ed. 516, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Dixie Tobacco Co. 228 U. S. 593, 57 L. ed. 980, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609. A limitation of liability is not within the meaning of the words "rule, regulation, or practice." Curry v. Marvin, 2 Fla. 411; Re Leasing of State Lands, 18 Colo. 359, 32 Pac. 988; Martin v. Central R. Co. 121 App. Div. 552, 106 N. Y. Supp. 226. There is no provision for the filing of contracts with shippers, and no method of making them public defined in the statute. Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 81, 52 L. ed. 681, 694, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 428; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 479, 55 L. ed. 297, 302, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 671, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265. A law or a statute is binding, whether persons subject to the law are aware of it or not. A rate duly filed is unquestionably equally binding; but it is not, perhaps, a fortunate mode of expression, even in regard to the rate itself, to say that shippers are conclusively presumed to know it. It is submitted that the exact expression is that in Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 652, 57 L. ed. 683, 689, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391, "want of knowledge is no excuse," or that in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Min. Co. 230 U. S. 184, 197, 57 L. ed. 1446, 1451, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 893, "the tariff, so long as it was of force, was, in this respect, to be treated as though it had been a statute, binding as such upon railroad and shipper alike." That the law recognizes the fact that a shipper may or may not know the rate is obvious from the criminal sections of the act. The words "wilfully," "willingly," and "knowingly" recur in the criminal provi 144. Yet, if it were true that he was conclusively presumed to know the contents of schedules duly filed, he would be violating the act wilfully, willingly, and knowingly. Even in prosecutions under the Elkins act, which contains no express qualifying word such as "wilfully" or "knowingly," a shipper who ignorantly ships goods at a preferential rate is not criminally liable. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 90 C. C. A. 364, 164 Fed. 376; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 103 C. C. A. 172, 179 Fed. 614. There is no estoppel barring the defendant in error from showing the value of her baggage. Re Released Rates, 13 Inters. Com. Rep. 550. There is nothing in the decisions under the interstate commerce acts which is in conflict with the construction of the statute for which the defendant in error contends. It is, of course, well settled that a shipper has no redress because a rate is unreasonable, except by the direct proceedings allowed by the act (Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 204 U. S. 426, 51 L. ed. 553, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350, 9 Ann. Cas. 1075; Robinson v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 222 U. S. 506, 56 L. ed. 288, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Min. Co. 230 U. S. 184, 57 L. ed. 1446, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 893; Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 230 U. S. 247, 57 L. ed. 1472, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 916), and the unreasonableness of a rule, regulation, or practice of a carrier must be objected to in the same way. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, 215 U. S. 481, 54 L. ed. 292, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164; Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsyl vania R. Co. 230 U. S. 304, 57 L. ed. 1494, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 938. There is nothing in the decisions of this court at variance with these principles, nor does the case of Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 57 L. ed. 314, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 257, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148, and the cases which followed it (Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513, 57 L. ed. 323, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155; Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. v. Latta, 226 U. S. 519, 57 L. ed. 328, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155; Wells, F. & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co. 227 U. S. 469, 57 L. ed. 600, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 57 L. ed. 683, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman, | tract would permit the carrier to destroy 227 U. S. 657, 57 L. ed. 690, 33 Sup. Ct. negligently the baggage intrusted to it, and Rep. 397), limit the principle that there pay for the consequences of its negligence is no provision for the filing of contracts at its own valuation, is emphatically denied. with shippers, and no method of making It is not a special service or privilege which them public defined in the statute. the defendant seeks to enforce. Whether the agreement to carry baggage was valid or not, in any of its terms, is immaterial. The duty to restore the bailed goods without negligence is another matter. On the exact facts of Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, the Massachusetts court, shortly before it decided this case in favor of the shipper, had decided in favor of the carrier (Bernard v. Adams Exp. Co. 205 Mass. 254, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 293, 91 N. E. 325, 18 Ann. Cas. 351); and the court of appeals of New York had reached the same result (Greenwald v. Barrett, 199 N. Y. 170, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 971, 92 N. E. 218). Yet neither the New York court nor the Massachusetts court felt that such decisions in the least interfered with the general rule that a passenger, or, indeed, any shipper of goods, could recover their full value if lost by negligence of the carrier, in the absence of a special contract of valuation or of limitation of liability. In the cases where the liability of the carrier has been held to be limited, there was, in fact, a special contract to that effect or an agreed valuation. In Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger the shipper had accepted a receipt stating a valuation and limitation of liability as one of the terms of the contract contained in the receipt. This also was true in Wells, F. & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co. 227 U. S. 469, 57 L. ed. 600, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267. In other recent cases (Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513, 57 L. ed. 323, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657, 57 L. ed. 690, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397; and Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 57 L. ed. 683, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391), there was unquestionably assent in fact to the limitation of value. Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. A. 151 U. S. 368, 388, 38 L. ed. 195, 205, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 499, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367. Nor is the railroad, on the assumption that its contract of carriage was invalid, in the position of a gratuitous bailee. It received the baggage as part of a business transaction in which it had a beneficial interest, and, in addition to the price of the passenger's ticket, received a payment on account of the weight of the baggage. Judge v. Northern P. R. Co. 189 Fed. 1014. The schedules filed make the defendant in error liable for the excess charge for value, and the railroad liable for the full value of the baggage. Re Released Rates, 13 Inters. Com. Rep. 550; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 650, 57 L. ed. 683, 687, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391. There is no hardship on the carrier in the decision of the supreme court of Massachusetts. The obligation imposed by that decision is no greater than that which everywhere existed prior to the passage of the interstate commerce acts, and still exists as to intrastate shipments. To make inquiry from the passenger or shipper, or at least to give a receipt or bill of lading which states the terms upon which the carrier is willing to accept the goods, is all that is requisite. It is immaterial whether in Where a contract is made with a carrier any case the person presenting the goods which requires the court to choose between has any knowledge of their value or authorthe alternative of saying that the rate is ity to declare the same. The carrier may illegal or that the service contracted for nevertheless demand from the person preis illegal, it is settled that the former alter-senting the goods an acceptance or rejection native is the correct one. of its terms, and the action of this person will bind the owner. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, 50 L. ed. 1011, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 628; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 39 L. ed. 910, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 802. If it be assumed that the schedules do not permit the carrier to fulfil the contract which it made to carry goods at full liability because the value was not previously declared and the rate paid in advance, what is the consequence? Certainly, under the decision of Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155, 56 L. ed. 1033, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 501, the carrier would not be liable on its contract. But that the unenforceability of the con York Mfg. Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 3 Wall. 107, 113, 18 L. ed. 170, 172; Squire v. New York C. R. Co. 98 Mass. 239, 93 Am. Dec. 162; Hill v. Boston, H. T. & W. R. Co. 144 Mass. 284, 10 N. E. 836. Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court: Katharine Hooker brought an action in the superior court of Middlesex county, Massachusetts, to recover from the Boston & Maine Railroad as a common carrier on account of the loss of certain baggage belonging to her, which had been transported by the defendant in interstate commerce, defendant had placed with its agent in from Boston, Massachusetts, to Sunapee Boston all rate and fare schedules and the Lake station, New Hampshire, on Septem- terminal and other charges applicable to ber 15, 1908. The plaintiff recovered a judgment for the value of the baggage lost, with interest. The case was taken to the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts upon exceptions of the defendant, and upon its rescript, returned to the [107] superior court, overruling the exceptions (209 Mass. 508, 95 N. E. 945, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 669), judgment was there entered for the plaintiff for $2,253.77. "For excess value the rate will be one half of the current excess baggage rate per 100 pounds for each $100, or fraction thereof, of increased value declared. The minimum charge for excess value will be 15 cents. that station, and had enabled and required him to keep in accessible form a file of such schedules, and had instructed him to give information contained therein to all seeking it, and to afford to inquirers opportunity to examine the schedules, and that the defendant in the manner shown and in all other ways conformed to the acts of Congress and the orders and regulations of the commission with reference to such schedThe defendant insists that the recovery ules. The court also found that the of the plaintiff should have been limited to schedules contained provisions limiting the the sum of $100, in view of certain require-free transportation of baggage to a certain ments made by it concerning the transpor- weight, and the liability of the defendant tation of baggage, and filed with the Inter- to $100, followed by a table of charges for state Commerce Commission. From the excess weight, and also contained the folfindings of fact it appears that the baggage lowing provision: was checked upon a first-class ticket purchased for the plaintiff (although not used by her, she traveling upon another similar ticket purchased by herself); that at the time the baggage was checked the plaintiff had no notice of the regulations hereinafter referred to, limiting the liability of the defendant (further than such notice is to be presumed from the schedules filed and posted as hereinafter stated); that no inquiry was made by the defendant on receiving the plaintiff's baggage as to its value; that there was no evidence that any more expensive or different mode of transportation was adopted for baggage the value of which was declared to exceed $100 than for other baggage; that any reasonable person would infer from the outward appearance of the plaintiff's baggage when tendered to the defendant for transportation that the value largely exceeded $100, and that the loss of plaintiff's baggage was due to the negligence of defendant. The court further found that previous to and during September, 1908, the defendant had published and kept open for inspection and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, in accordance with the act of Congress relating to interstate commerce and amendments thereto and the orders and regulations of the Commission, schedules giving the rates, fares, and charges for transportation between different points, including Boston and Sunapee Lake station, all terminal, storage, and other charges re quired by the Commission, all privileges and facilities granted or allowed, and all rules or regulations [108] which in any way affected or determined such rates, fares, and charges or the value of the service rendered to passengers; that during the same time, in accordance with an order of the Commission of June. 2, 1908, making comprehensive regulations as to rate and fare schedules, the "Baggage liability is limited to personal baggage not to exceed $100 in value for a passenger presenting a full ticket and $50 in value for a half ticket, unless a greater value is declared and stipulated by the owner and excess charges thereon paid at time of checking the baggage;" that the excess charge for transporting baggage valued at $1,904.50, which was the value of the baggage lost, from Boston to Sunapee Lake station during September, 1908, according to the schedules, was $4.75; that notices were posted at or near the offices where passenger's tickets were sold in the Boston [109] station, stating that tariffs naming the rates on interstate traffic were on file with the agent, and would be furnished for inspection upon application, and that notices were posted in the baggage room of that station, in a conspicuous place, and in sight of persons using the room for checking baggage, reading that personal baggage not exceeding $100 in value would be checked free for each passenger on presentation of a first-class ticket, and containing information with reference to excess weight. And the court further found that the plaintiff did not declare at the time her baggage was checked that it exceeded $100 in value, and did not pay any charges for valuation in excess of that amount. It is to be borne in mind that the action as tried and decided in the state court was not for negligence of the railroad company as a warehouseman for the loss of the baggage after its delivery at Sunapee Lake station, but was solely upon the contract of was declared to be valid and effectual to carriage in interstate commerce. relieve the carrier from a greater liability The supreme judicial court of Massachu- than that therein expressed. But the court setts, in deciding the case, held that the did not stop there: In Adams Exp. Co. v. interstate commerce act did not in any | Croninger, 226 U. S. 509, 57 L. ed. 321, wise change the common-law rule, applicable ¦ 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 257, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148, in Massachusetts, that regulations of this it said: "The knowledge of the shipper character, limiting the amount of recovery that the rate was based upon the value is for baggage lost, must be brought home to to be presumed from the terms of the bill the knowledge of the shipper and assented of lading and of the published schedules to, or circumstances shown from which as- filed with the Commission." In Kansas sent might be implied. In reaching this City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. conclusion that learned court relied upon 652, 57 L. ed. 688, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391, the case of Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, this court said: "The valuation the ship191 U. S. 477, 48 L. ed. 268, 24 Sup. Ct. per declares determines the legal rate Rep. 132, in which case it was held that a where there are two rates based upon state might apply its local law and policy valuation. He must take notice of the rate to recovery for the loss of a horse shipped applicable, [111] and actual want of knowlin interstate commerce from Albany, New edge is no excuse. The rate, when made out York, to Cynwyd, in the state of Pennsyl- and filed, is notice, and its effect is not lost, vania, and injured by the negligence of a although it is not actually posted in the stacarrier in the latter state, notwithstanding tion. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. the bill of lading contained an express con- S. 242, 50 L. ed. 1011, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. dition that the carrier assumed liability 628; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 to the extent only of the agreed valuation | U. S. 155, 56 L. ed. 1033, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. in event of loss. [110] It was further held in the Hughes Case that the interstate commerce act, in the respect then under consideration, had not enacted an exclusive rule upon which recovery might be had governing responsibility for loss, and that as the law then stood the state might enforce its own regulations authorized by statute or judicial | decision as to responsibility for such neg ligence. Since the decision in the Hughes Case the Hepburn act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 584, chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1288), has been passed, and this court has held that by virtue of that act (particularly § 7, the Carmack amendment) the subject of interstate transportation of property has been regulated by Federal law to the exclusion of the power of the states to control in such respect by their own policy or legislation. In this connection we may refer to the cases of Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 57 L. ed. 314, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 257, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148; Wells, F. & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co. 227 U. S. 469, 57 L. ed. 600, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 57 L. ed. 683, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman Bros. 227 U. S. 657, 57 L. ed. 690, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397. The cases in 226 and 227 U. S., it is true, involved liability for express or freight shipments made upon express receipts, bills of lading, or separate contracts, showing on their face or by reference to tariffs the opportunity for valuation for the purpose of fixing the rate and liability, and the limitation appearing in such form of contract 648. It would open a wide door to fraud and destroy the uniform operation of the published tariff rate sheets. When there are two published rates, based upon difference in value, the legal rate automatically attaches itself to the declared or agreed value. Neither the intentional nor accidental misstatement of the applicable published rate will bind the carrier or shipper. The lawful rate is that which the carrier must exact and that which the shipper must pay. To the extent that such limitations When the car of liability are not forbidden by law, they "That rule of liability [the uniform rule established by the Hepburn act] is to be enforced in the light of the fact that the provisions of the tariff enter into and form a part of the contract of shipment, and if a regularly filed tariff offers two rates, based on value, and the goods are forwarded at the low value in order to secure the low |