Eight-Hour Law. to the proper construction of the act of May 18, 1872, section. 2, (17 Stat., 134.) By the act of June 23, 1868, (15 Stat., 77,) it was enacted "that eight hours shall constitute a day's work for all laborers, workmen, and mechanics now employed or who may be hereafter employed by or on behalf of the Government of the United States." Under this act it was at first a question whether it was the intention of Congress that persons who worked only eight hours a day should receive the full compensation which had previously been given for a day's work; and at first full payment was not allowed them. Afterward, by proclamation of the President, full wages for a day's work were allowed to all persons, although under this act they only worked eight hours a day. It was to meet this case that the section to which you have called my attention was enacted, and that provides: "That the proper accounting officers be, and hereby are, authorized and required, in the settlement of all accounts for the services of laborers, workmen, and mechanics employed by or on behalf of the Government of the United States, between the 25th day of June, 1868, the date of the act constituting eight hours a day's work for all such laborers, workmen, and mechanics, and the 19th day of May, 1869, the date of the proclamation of the President concerning such pay, to settle and pay the same without reduction on account of reduction of hours of labor by said act, when it shall be made to appear that such was the sole cause of reduction of wages, and a sufficient sum for said purpose is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated." I am strongly inclined to the opinion, considering the history of congressional legislation upon this subject, and particularly in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Twenty-per cent. Cases," (13 Wall., 568,) that this statute is to have a broad and liberal construction, and that the above case is decisive against limiting its provisions to those who would fall in strict language within the terms "laborers, workmen, and mechanics." On the contrary, I think it was the intention of Congress to include within the provisions of this act, and of the previous act of 1868, all persons who are employed and paid by the day. It clearly does not extend to Duty on Silk and Cotton Ribbons. persons who are paid regular salaries, but is limited to employés who are paid a day's wages for a day's work; and its purpose was to fix the number of hours which thereafter was to be considered as a day's work and entitling the workman to a day's wages. If there is in the employment of the Government any class of persons so employed and paid, I think they are entitled to the benefit of this act, although in common parlance they might not come within the strict definition of laborers, workmen, and mechanics. I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant, Hon. Wм. W. BELKNAP, Secretary of War. Acting Attorney-General. DUTY ON SILK AND COTTON RIBBONS. Silk and cotton ribbons, of which silk is the component material of chief value, fall within the last paragraph of the 8th section of the act of June 30, 1864, chap. 171, and are subject to a duty of 50 per cent. ad valorem. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 8th instant, and the accompanying papers, in relation to the classification of "silk and cotton ribbons," of which silk is the component material of chief value, under the 8th section of the act of June 30, 1864. (13 Stat., 210.) It seems that prior to December 19, 1870, ribbons of the description mentioned, other than velvet ribbons, were regarded by your Department as falling under the last paragraph of that section, and subject to a duty of 50 per cent. ad valorem; that silk and cotton velvet ribbons, of which silk is the material of chief value, were classified as "velvets," under the second paragraph of the same section, and a duty of 60 per cent. ad valorem charged thereon; while linen and cotton ribbons were placed under those sections of the act which relate to manufactures of cotton, flax, etc. (Sections 6 and 7.) Duty on Silk and Cotton Ribbons. At the May term, 1870, of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, in the case of Lane vs. Russell, the precise question arose whether silk and cotton velvet ribbons, silk being the component material of chief value, are subject to a duty of 60 per cent. ad valorem, under the said 8th section; and the court decided that they are subject to that duty. This decision appears to have been based on the idea that such articles are "ribbons" within the meaning of that section. Thus the Department and the court, while they coincided as to the duty to which these articles are chargeable under the statute, differed in their views respecting the particular grounds of their liability. Acting upon the interpretation of the statute conceived by the Department to have been given it by the court, according to which "silk and cotton ribbons" were thought to be chargeable with the same duty as "silk and cotton velvet ribbons," the Department, on the 19th of December, 1870, abandoned its previous ruling as to the classification of the former articles, and thereafter subjected them to a duty of 60 per cent. ad valorem, under the designation of "ribbons." And the question now presented, as you state it, is whether your Department should "return to its former ruling, assessing duty on silk and cotton ribbons, silk chief value, at 50 per cent. ad valorem." I have carefully examined the papers submitted by you touching this subject, among which is a communication from the Solicitor of the Treasury on the same subject, in whose views I in the main concur. In that paper the Solicitor says: "My own opinion is, after much consideration, that Congress never intended that any ribbons but silk ribbons should be charged with the highest rate of duty. "It will be observed that the different portions of the act are quite carefully subdivided. There is a cotton section, a linen section, and a silk section. The presumption is, in my judgment, that the silk section of the act referred to means purely silk or silk goods, unless there are express words limiting or qualifying this general intent. In this view, as I understand, the Department has held only dress and piece Duty on Silk and Cotton Ribbons. silks, wholly of silk, to be subject to the 60 per cent. rate, while dress and piece silks of silk and cotton are subject to the 50 per cent. rate. Silk velvets or velvets are accompanied by qualifying words, evidently intending and actually making an exception to the general plan and intent of the section, those goods being charged with a duty of 60 per cent. if only their component material of chief value is composed of silk. "Nor does the grammatical construction of the sentence allow the description and qualifying words applicable to silk velvets, and velvets, to be applied to ribbons. Or, if they should be or have been applied to ribbons, with exactly the same reason they should be applied to dress and piece silks. "To my mind the plain intent of the 8th section is that the various forms of pure silk first enumerated are subject to their respective rates of duty, and then dress and piece silks, silk ribbons, (that is, goods wholly of silk,) and, finally, silk velvets, or velvets of which silk is the component material of chief value, are subject to 60 per cent., and that dress and piece silks and ribbons not wholly of silk, but of which silk is the component material of chief value, come under the last clause of the section, and are subject to 50 per cent. duty. "But one single class of ribbons was involved in that case, (Lane vs. Russell,) whereas it is well known there are many other classes. No presentation was, therefore, made of a case involving all the various forms of ribbons, nor was the court called upon to consider carefully the application of all the various provisions of the act to all the various forms of ribbons. * "A return by the Department to its former rule would recognize a graded system of duties, which would apparently correspond with the relative value of the several classes of goods to which reference has been made, and would at once strike the mercantile sense as entirely just and proper, as well as in accordance with a correct construction of the law." I have to add as to this decision of the court in the case of Lane vs. Russell, that the question submitted and decided was as to the duty to be imposed upon silk and cotton velvet ribbons, silk being the component material of chief value, Members of Congress Elect. and that the application of this decision to linen and cotton or silk and cotton ribbons not velvet, is an inference from the argument of the court, which inference is manifestly in conflict with the legislative intent of the tariff act of June 30, 1864. Compliance with that decision did not, therefore, in my judgment, necessitate a departure by the Department from its first ruling upon the subject of ribbons, and my opinion is that the law requires a return by the Department to that ruling. Very respectfully, Hon. WM. A. RICHARDSON, GEO. H. WILLIAMS. Acting Secretary of the Treasury. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ELECT. By the act of July 11, 1864, chap. 119, a member of Congress elect is, previous to as well as after taking the oath of office, debarred from acting as counsel for parties, and from prosecuting claims against the Government, before any Department, court-martial, bureau, officer, or any civil, naval, or military commission, if he has received or has agreed to receive any compensation whatever, directly or indirectly, therefor. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, November 2, 1872. SIR: Your letter of the 31st ultimo refers to a communication addressed to you, under date of the 28th ultimo, by Hon. William M. Lawrence, member of Congress elect, in which he states that he has been asked to appear before the War Department or the Judge-Advocate General in behalf of a United States officer recently convicted by a court-martial, and asks whether in view of the acts of July 11, 1864, (13 Stat., 123,) and July 16, 1862, (12 Stat., 577,) a member of Congress elect is, previous to his taking the oath of office, debarred from acting as counsel for parties arraigned before United States tribunals, or from prosecuting claims for private individuals against the United States; which question, at the instance of Mr. Lawrence, you refer for my opinion. I have the honor to reply as follows: The first clause of the act of July 16, 1862, prohibits members of Congress from taking or receiving, directly or indi |