fective deed, and the grantees thereunder were thus enabled to recover the land which A. and his wife intended to convey to them. The law thus applied was held valid. Mercer v. Watson, 1 Watts, 356; affirmed, 8 Pet. 110, 8 L. 884; and see also, to the same effect, Randall v. Kreiger, 23 Wall. 149, 23 L. 126; again, B. and his wife attempted to convey a parcel of land to C. by a deed defectively acknowledged; by a later valid deed the property was conveyed to D., who was ignorant of the prior deed. A subsequent statute gave validity to the defective deed to C., but this was held inapplicable to divest D., an innocent purchaser for value, of his vested right in the property. Brinton v. Seevers, 12 Iowa, 389. Nor can it be said that retrospective laws whose operation is beneficial and in furtherance of justice, violate any vested rights, for as said by Parker, C. J., "There is no such thing as a vested right to do wrong." Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245, 273. Advantages acquired through a mere slip of form and contrary to natural justice are not vested rights to be protected by the courts. Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 420, 33 L. 199, 9 S. Ct. 768. But in remedial legislation of this character, it must appear that the legislature had power to dispense with the necessity for such a formality, or whatever it may be, by prior statute, ere it be declared capable of remedying it by subsequent law. To illustrate: Certain ministers of the gospel, having been in the habit of performing marriage ceremonies, in Connecticut, who were not empowered by the State law to perform the marriage ceremony, it came about that many parties who had been regarded as properly married were not so in fact; the legislature accordingly passed a law declaring that previous marriages, so performed, were to be considered as valid. This law was upheld by the court as a valid exercise of power. Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 224, 226, 10 Am. Dec. 128, 130. See also State v. Adams, 65 N. C. 537. Again, a board of public works in the District of Columbia, having entered into contracts for the improvement of streets, and levied taxes therefor without specific authority, congress subsequently passed an act ratifying such action. Held, valid. Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687, 24 L. 1098. This rule is recognized, in a number of cases, among which may be mentioned, Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. R., 15 Conn. 496, 497; Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 297; Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 224-226, 10 Am. Dec. 128-130; Brunswick v. Litchfield, 2 Greenl. (Me.) 33; Trustees v. McCaughy, 2 Ohio St. 152; McMillen v. County Judge, 6 Iowa, 394. In some jurisdictions, however, the courts have gone further in sanctioning retrospective legislation; and in a Georgia case a judgment was vacated in order to admit certain evidence on a subsequent trial. Bonner v. Martin, 40 Ga. 501, 505. See also Ex parte Bibb, 44 Ala. 152; Ex parte Norton & Shields, 44 Ala. 185. In Foster v. Forster, 129 Mass. 566, Gray, J., collects and classifies cases upholding retrospective legislation.

But where the defect in the transaction sought to be validated is something more than mere matter of form the rule is otherwise. The proposition is illustrated by Shonk v. Brown, 61 Pa. St. 320. In that case a married woman who held property as beneficiary under a will and under express restraints upon her power to convey, sought to give deed for the same; an attempt was made to validate this deed by a subsequent statute, in defraud of the rights of her heirs in whom the property had vested upon her death. This statute was held inoperative. And see Mitchell v. Campbell, 19 Or. 208, 24 Pac. 458.

Remedial statutes, what are.- Remedial laws have been defined as those "made from time to time to supply defects in the existing law, whether arising from the inevitable imperfection of human legislation, from change of circumstances, from mistake, or any other cause." Sedgwick Stat. & Const. Law (2d ed.), p. 32. And see Gillespie v. Allison, 115 N. C. 548, 20 S. E. 629. Of such a nature are statutes confirming proceedings of a court void for want of jurisdiction. Simmons v. Hanover, 23 Pick. 193. Similarly laws altering certain matters of procedure are remedial. A statute requiring a defendant in pleading usury as a defense against a note, to tender payment of the legal rate of interest, Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299, 305, 307, 52 Am. Dec. 698, 699; and a statute saving a certain period from the time within which an appeal from a lower to a higher court must be had, as applied to cases already commenced. Davis v. Ballard, 1 J. J. Marsh. 577, 579. Laws confirming marriages illegally celebrated are remedial, Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 224-226, 10 Am. Dec. 128-13; Brunswick v. Litchfield, 2 Greenl. 26, 33; so also are laws validating conveyances of land, Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110, 8 L. 884; and void sales of land by an executor, Leland v. Wilkinson, 10 Pet. 294, 9 L. 430. See also Aldridge v. Tuscumbia, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Stew. & Port. 207, 23 Am. Dec. 312; Elliott v. Mayfield, 4 Ala. 423; Scott v. Smart, 1 Mich. 302, 307; Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245; McMillen v. County Judge, 6 Iowa, 394. A statute giving to remaindermen the right to have partition of lands held in remainder vested before the passage of the act, is remedial and valid. Gillespie v. Allison, 115 N. C. 548, 20 S. E. 629.

Changes in rules of procedure applicable in the trial of preexisting causes.- The general rule is that a party must submit to have his cause tried by the rules of procedure in force at the time his cause is being adjudicated. This is true even in those States in which retrospective laws are specifically prohibited. Willard v. Harvey, 24 N. H. 344; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 313, 321, 349, 376, 380, 381, 387. Unless such change in procedure affect the rights of either party injuriously, oppressively or unjustly. Simpson v. City Savings Bank, 56 N. H. 469, 22 Am. Rep. 493.

Express prohibitions against.- The twenty-third article of the Bill of Rights of New Hampshire provides: "Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust. No such laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of civil causes or the punishment of offenses." Woart v. Winnick, 3 N. H. 475, 476, 14 Am. Dec. 385, 387; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304; Simpson v. City Sav. Bank, 56 N. H. 466, 469, 22 Am. Rep. 493. In Missouri the Constitution declares that "no law retrospective in its operations can be passed." State v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120. The Constitution of 1865 of Georgia provides, ex post facto laws impairing the obligation of contracts, the retrospective laws injuriously affecting any right of the citizen are prohibited. Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 124. Section 16 of the Declaration of Rights of Texas declares that: "No retrospective or ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be made." De Cordova v. City of Galveston, 4 Tex. 473. The provision of the Louisiana Constitution of 1868, that "No ex post facto or retroactive law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed, nor vested rights be divested, unless for purposes of public utility and for adequate compensation made," has, however, been held to be simply a prohibition against "retroactive laws which impair the obligation of contracts or which divest vested rights, unless for purposes of public utility and for adequate compensation made." City of New Orleans v. New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co., 35 La. Ann. 682. The Constitution of Colorado provides in section 11 of the Bill of Rights, "that no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation * shall be passed." Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 162. Section 20 of article 1 of the Constitution of Tennessee is: "That no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be made." Hope v. Johnson, 2 Yerg. 123. The Constitution of Ohio thus provides against the passage of retrospective laws: "The general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing the obligation of contracts, provided, however, that the general assembly may, by general laws, authorize courts to carry into effect the manifest intention of parties and officers, by curing omissions, defects and errors in instruments and proceedings, arising out of their want of conformity with the laws of this State, and upon such terms as shall be just and equitable." Art. 2, § 28; State v. Richland Tp., 20 Ohio St. 369.

Jurisdictions where no express prohibition against retrospective laws impairing vested rights.- Aside from these few States wherein retrospective laws are prohibited, eo nomine, there are elsewhere recognized certain limitations upon the power of the legislature to affect past acts and transactions by retroactive statute. The prohibition against laws impairing the obligation of contracts effectually prohibits one very large species of retroactive

*

*

legislation, although the citations of Calder v. Bull do not require a consideration of them here. But when legislation of this sort seeks to divest rights which have vested under the existing law, otherwise than by contract, it has been considered a grave question whether any constitutional limitation is or is not infringed. The reprehensible character of such legislation has often led the courts, as has been seen, to refuse to give a retrospective construction to a statute unless its language imperatively so requires. As to provisions in the Constitution of the United States, it is well settled that prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, legislation of this sort was not thereby prohibited. In Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405, 33 L. 193, 9 S. Ct. 763, Justice Miller observed that "prior to the fourteenth amendment the power to provide such remedies, although they may have interfered with vested rights, seems to have been fully conceded." p. 420, 33 L. 199, 9 S. Ct. 768. Other cases in which such legislation has been declared not repugnant to any Federal limitation are, Proprietors, etc. v. Laboree, 2 Greenl. 289, 11 Am. Dec. 90; Burch v. Newbury, 10 N. Y. 390, 391, 394; Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 167; New Orleans v. New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co., 35 La Ann. 682; Grim v. Weissenberg School Dist., 57 Pa. St. 435, 98 Am. Dec. 239; Henderson, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dickerson, 17 B. Mon. 173, 177, 66 Am. Dec. 149, 150; Bender v. Crawford, 33 Tex. 745, 751, 7 Am. Rep. 272; Coles v. Madison Co., Breese, 156, 12 Am. Dec. 163; Drehman v. Stifel, 41 Mo. 204, 97 Am. Dec. 273. In one case the fifth amendment securing property against deprivation by congress, has been relied upon in holding void an act of congress validating certain payments to a provost marshal during the war. Clark v. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 574; reversed, Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U. S. 633, 28 L. 279, 4 S. Ct. 170, on other grounds. But since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment this proposition no longer holds true. Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 420, 33 L. 199, 9 S. Ct. 768. This amendment prohibits a deprivation of property without due process of law, a constitutional limitation which is to be found in the organic law of all the States. And this limitation has been invoked against the validity of retrospective laws divesting vested rights; and the weight of authority declares such legislation repugnant upon this ground. Proprietors, etc. v. Laboree, 2 Greeul. 289, 11 Am. Dec. 90; Andrews v. Russell, 7 Blackf. 475; Caperton v. Martin, 4 W. Va. 150, 6 Am. Rep. 279; Dockery v. McDowell, 40 Ala. 481; Wilder v. Lumpkin, 4 Ga. 214, 215, 218; Forster v. Forster, 129 Mass. 566; Aldridge v. Tuscumbia, etc., R. R., 2 Stew. & P. 207, 23 Am. Dec. 312; Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202; Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill, 305, 307, 52 Am. Dec. 698, 699; Davis v. Ballard, 1 J. J. Marsh. 577, 579. But see Wilson v. Hardesty, 1 Md. Ch. 66, 68; Henderson, etc., R. R. v. Dickinson, 17 B. Mon. 177, 66 Am. Dec. 150; Holman v. Bank of Norfolk, 12 Ala. 417; Gillespie v. Allison, 115

N. C. 548, 20 S. E. 629. Laws of this sort have also been declared to be invalid by the fundamental principles of the social compact, Wilder v. Lumpkin, 4 Ga. 214, 215, 218; or, because an exercise of judicial power, as they may sometimes be, Forster v. Forster, 129 Mass. 566; or, simply ipso facto, without an attempt to assign constitutional objections. Brinton v. Seevers, 12 Iowa, 389, 393. In some of the courts views directly conflicting have been advanced, and laws impairing vested rights declared void at one time and valid at another. For instance, the Supreme Court of Alabama declared such legislation prohibited by the Bill of Rights of that State, Aldridge v. Tuscumbia, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Stew. & P. 199, 207, 23 Am. Dec. 312; another view of the same court was that retrospective laws 66 although they operate on vested civil rights, provided they do not impair the obligation of contracts," are not prohibited, Holman v. Bank of Norfolk, 12 Ala. 417; but it was declared that if operating to divest rights of a particular person and not of others of the same class generally, that such legislation is invalid. A later case declared laws divesting a citizen of a lawfully acquired right or title to property to be void by the common law. Dockery v. McDowell, 40 Ala. 481. Compare Davis v. Ballard, 1 J. J. Marsh. 577, 579, with Henderson, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dickerson, 17 B. Mon. 177, 66 Am. Dec. 149, 150; Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill, 305, 307, 52 Am. Dec. 698, 699, with Wilson v. Hardesty, 1 Md. Ch. 68. An early Maine case illustrates this limitation upon the power to enact retrospective laws. By a rule of the common law long recognized in that State, one having an adverse possession of land for thirty years disseised the true owner of the entire tract, if his deed were on record; but only so much as he had in visible possession, if o deed were recorded. This rule was changed by a statute declaring that the same legal consequences against a demandant were to be attached to a possession without deed recorded, as to a possession under deed registered in the public register, i. e., the true owner might be disseised of the entire tract by a visible possession without deed on record of even part of it. The tenants in this case had had in possession for thirty years one-half of the premises in question; but claimed the entire tract by virtue of this statute, then recently passed. This act, by its terms intended to apply retrospectively, was declared void in its retroactive effect because operating to divest vested rights of property, which was prohibited by the State Constitution. Proprietors, etc. v. Laboree, 2 Greenl. 275, 288, 11 Am. Dec. 89.

Vested right means the power to do certain actions or possess certain things according to the law of the land.

The case has been cited to this point in several instances. De Cordova v. Galveston, 4 Tex. 480; Hamilton v. Flynn, 21 Tex. 716;