Council of the peace conference. The plan was approved by the Supreme Council on July 28 and ordered into being by the Supreme Council by means of its resolution of December 13.

The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on January 21, 1920 decided to call the committee set up by that resolution the "Conference of Ambassadors" and to invest their Ambassadors at Paris with the "full powers" held by the Supreme Council, except that the body was given no jurisdiction over questions arising out of the treaty of peace with Turkey. As finally determined, the functions of the Conference of Ambassadors embraced questions concerning the interpretation and execution of the treaties of peace, "with the exception of those entrusted by them to the League of Nations, or to the Reparation Commission, those for military, naval and air control and for the left bank of the Rhine or other permanent organs of the same character". The conference held its first meeting on January 26, 1920 and took 2,957 resolutions at 327 regular sessions up till March 30, 1931. It sat at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. Belgium was admitted for Belgian questions after March 1920. The French representative presided, and the Ambassadors of Great Britain, Italy, and Japan sat as members, with the Ambassador of the United States as an intermittent "observer".

Collaborating with the conference was the Allied Military Committee "of Versailles", which dealt with military questions of the treaty's execution, in virtue of a decision of the Heads of Governments on December 13, 1919, until its dissolution from March 16, 1931. The conference had other aids. It called on naval counselors of the four principal powers for advice and reports, and set up the Technical Geographical Committee to assist it with reference to delimitation and territorial questions. A Technical Committee on Railroads, a Financial Committee, and an Editing Committee served the conference in their respective fields.

The action of the Conference of Ambassadors was taken in four forms: (1) Resolutions, effective decisions without appeal which could be questioned only by the Governments represented on the conference; (2) declarations, more solemn acts which engaged the general policy of the ex-allied states; (3) protocols, signed by the Ambassadors and plenipotentiaries of states, with which questions of application of the treaties were regulated; (4) procès-verbaux (minutes) of their meetings.

The United States and the Settlement

The primary relationship of the United States to the treaties was determined by its participation as a belligerent in the war of 1914-18. The President, in whose name the action would be taken, determined to attend the peace conference in person as head of the American Commission To Negotiate Peace. The President arrived in Paris on December 13, 1918 and ceased to head the commission immediately after the signing of the treaty of peace with Germany. The commission itself continued its activities through the conclusion of the treaties of peace with Austria and Bulgaria and did not take ship to return to the United States until December 10, 1919.

The commissioners of the United States signed the treaties of peace with Germany, Austria, and Hungary as a consequence of having been in a state of war with each.

The American commissioners signed the treaty of peace with Bulgaria without having been at war with that country. "We took part in the negotiations" (with Bulgaria), wrote the Secretary of State to the President on November 21, 1919, "on the theory that under Article 10 [of the Covenant] we were bound to guarantee the settlements and therefore should have a voice in reaching them and should also be a party to the treaty." On November 24 the President's secretary transmitted a memorandum from Mrs. Wilson which stated from the President that the commissioners "could sign but [he] does not advise their remaining for that purpose" (file 763.72119/812612 A and /81272). The commissioners, still being at Paris, did sign the treaty of peace with Bulgaria on November 27.

Uncertainty of the extent of participation of the United States in the deliberations of the Supreme Council increased in October 1919 and thereafter. The American Commission To Negotiate Peace left Paris on December 9, and the treaty of peace with Germany was brought into force on January 10, 1920 without the eventual participation of the United States having been clarified.

In Washington attention was concentrated on the treaty of peace with Germany on which a highly publicized debate had been going on since the convening of the Senate of the 66th Congress on May 19, 1919. The debate increased in critical content after the formal submission of the treaty to the Senate on July 10 and again after the submission of the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on September 10. The Senate failed to give its advice and consent to ratification on November 19.

The Department of State on August 28, 1919 concluded that the "United States should not participate in the work of setting up commissions, etc., until the treaty is ratified by the United States". but there seemed "to be no reason why United States representatives can not discuss with representatives of the other powers what may be done if and when the treaty comes into force". Vacancies were not filled by the United States as they occurred, a situation which caused the Council to provide that commissions could take valid decisions if all eligible states were not represented.

The Secretary of State on October 22 wrote his opinion that "our representatives may sit as unofficial observers at the meetings of certain commissions in cases where such express authority is given by the Department". On November 27, in view of the failure of the Senate to advise and consent to ratification of the treaty of peace with Germany, the Secretary of State informed the American Commission To Negotiate Peace, "the President feels that you should withdraw immediately the American representatives on all commissions growing out of or dependent on either the Peace Conference or the treaty except those dealing with Reparations Commission which are being further considered by the President. The Department feels that this Government has an interest apart from the treaty in keeping in touch with economic and financial questions." As to the Austrian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian treaties, "the position of the United States . . . is the same as outlined above with reference to the German treaty".

On December 8 the Ambassador in France was informed of the President's agreement to his "sitting on the Supreme Council in behalf of the United States as an observer and not as a participant". He was later cautioned to make it clear that "the United States is not to be considered as party to any resolution, declaration or action of or by the Council unless through special act of the Department this Government expressly adheres thereto".

On December 30 he was instructed to request the Council "to delay all actions, resolutions, or decisions which concern this Government until Department sends you instructions for each matter involved", and that "Principal Allied and Associated Powers' should only be used when you have agreed to its use in any particular instance" (Foreign Relations, 1919, 1, 31.)

Throughout November and December the Supreme Council devoted considerable thought to making the adjustments necessitated by the withdrawal of the United States and to organizing the work which remained. On December 13 the Supreme Council agreed that

"the present session" of the peace conference should end at latest within a fortnight of the entry into force of the treaty with Germany. "Large questions" of policy would thereafter be dealt with by direct communication between the Governments and questions of detail would go to the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris.

The contemplated transition took place on January 21, 1920 when the Council of Heads of Government and of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in a last joint session provided for the future. The Conference of Ambassadors began its work on January 26, and shortly after there began a series of conferences extending over two years which were attended by the heads of government, the ministers of foreign affairs, or other delegates sitting as direct representatives of their governments. At this juncture it was incumbent upon the United States to decide upon the character and extent of its participation in the two series of meetings.

As to the Conference of Ambassadors, the Ambassador in France was instructed (ibid., p. 32): "The Department does not object to your attending unofficially and as an observer, provided your colleagues should request or offer no objection to your attending the meetings in such capacity."

The Conference of Ambassadors solved the difficulty of the abstention of the United States from its decisions on behalf of the "Principal Allied and Associated Powers" by employing this formula: “The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, signatories with the United States of America, as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, to the Treaty of Peace." The phrase was first used in the treaty transferring Slesvig to Denmark, May 22, 1920.

As to the series of conferences, no general instruction was issued. The first two of these were regarded as continuations of the peace conference for concluding the treaty of peace with Turkey. At the London conference, February 12-April 10, 1920, the President did not wish the Ambassador to attend "in any capacity even if you should be invited" (ibid., 1920, 1, 1). At San Remo, April 18-26, 1920, the Ambassador in Italy was present as an "observer". Until January 1923 there were subsequently held 15 conferences that can be regarded as related to the peace conference, of which 3 dealt only with Turkey and the Near East. Nine of the series dealt wholly or in part with reparation questions, in which the United States participated only at the informational level through its unofficial observer with the Reparation Commission. At Paris, August 8-13, 1921, there was an observer for the Upper Silesian question only (ibid., 1921, 1, 15), and there was an observer at Cannes, January

6-13, 1922. An invitation to Genoa, April 10-May 19, 1922, was declined since the conclusion was reached that it would be “a conference of a political character in which the Government of the United States could not helpfully participate" (ibid., 1922, 1, 393). However, the Ambassador in Italy was sent to Genoa for the duration of the conference.

The function of an observer was described in the instruction of April 20, 1920 to the Ambassador in Italy for attendance at the San Remo conference (ibid., 1920, 1, 2): "You are not to participate but will act solely as an observer. You are to express no opinion and take no action on any subjects [considered] by the Supreme Council but you are to report the proceedings to the Department and await instructions on any question on which an expression of the views of this Government is desired." The policy of the representative of the United States admitted to the Conference of Ambassadors to be an observer, as described by the first Ambassador in France to fill the position, was that "in every case where it seems that United States in the event of ratifying treaties concerned might even possibly desire to adopt different attitude from that decided upon by Conference a reservation has been made" (ibid., p. 3).

The Acting Secretary of State reported in a circular telegram of January 18, 1921 that it had been decided to discontinue representa tion on the Conference of Ambassadors "since this country has not accepted the Treaty of Versailles and as the most important questions raised by the armistice have been disposed of". By January 28 the Ambassador in France was asked to get copies of the minutes of meetings of the Conference of Ambassadors "informally"; they "would be of great value to the Department".

The Secretary of State of the new administration was equally cautious when he took office in March 1921, while the Principal Allied Powers were sitting in London to decide on the reparation program. From their president on May 6 came this request (ibid., 1921, 1, 12):

"As President of the Allied Conference which is just completing its sittings in London, I am authorised with the unanimous concurrence of all the Powers here represented to express to the United States Government our feeling that the settlement of the international difficulties in which the world is still involved would be materially assisted by the co-operation of the United States; and I am therefore to enquire whether that Government is disposed to be represented in the future, as it was at an earlier date, at Allied Confer