neral Anson. The last regiment suffered dreadfully in a brave but rash andill-judged attempt to break through a solid column of French infantry. Nor were the enemy more successful in their attack upon general Campbell: they were completely repulsed by that general, sup ported by a regiment of Spanish cavalry and two battalions of Spanish infantry, and lost their cannon. General Sherbrooke's division, which formed the left and centre of the first line of the army, was next attacked: they immediately charged with bayonets, and drove back the enemy with great slaughter. The brigade of guards, which formed part of this division, in their eagerness to pursue the enemy, advanced too far, and were thrown into temporary confusion, by having exposed their left flank to the fire of the enemy's battery: part of general Cotton's brigade of cavalry, upon observing this, pushed forward to assist them, and covered their retreat towards their original position. The enemy being thus completely foiled in all his attempts against the British, retreated across the Al berche, in the most regular order; having lost 20 pieces of cannon and a few prisoners. Their loss in killed and wounded was supposed to be nearly 10,000 men; among the former were generals Lapisse and Malot; and among the latter, general Sebastiani and Boulet.-The loss of the British was proportionally severe: the killed, wounded, and missing, amounting to nearly 6000 men; among the killed were major-general Mackenzie and brigadier-general Lang worth. As the Spanish troops were only partially engaged, their loss was comparatively small, not exceeding 1000 men in killed, wounded, and missing. 1809. Scarcely had our troops time to congratulate themselves on having achieved this brilliant victory, when the unexpected intelligence was received that Soult, Ney, and Mortier, having formed a junction, had advanced through Estremadura, and were already in the rear of the British. There was no time for delay or hesitation: the army could be saved only by promptly adopting the most active measures. The bridge of Almarez, by which one of the divisions of the army was to have crossed the Tagus, was destroyed, so that the whole troops were obliged to be conveyed over the bridge of Arcobispo. As no doubt could be entertained that the army of Victor, though defeated at the battle of Talavera, would again advance, as soon as he heard of the approach of the forces under Soult, Ney, and Mortier, it was necessary that part of the combined troops should remain at Talavera, as well for the purpose of checking Victor, as to take care of the wounded. General Cuesta giving sir Arthur Wellesley the choice either to remain or to march against Soult, he preferred the latter, hoping that when the French general knew that he was to be opposed by the British, he would retreat, and thus leave the road into Portugal again open and unmolested. General Cuesta was accordingly left at Talavera, where it was hoped he might be able to maintain his position: if he found himself compelled to quit it, he was desired by sir Arthur Wellesley to bring the wounded along with him. On the 3d of August the British left Talavera, and marched to Oropesa: on the evening of that day, sir Arthur Wellesley received information that Cuesta meant to leave Talavera immediately, and that he would be Z -- obliged obliged to let most of the wounded and sick fall into the hands of the French, from the want of means of conveyance. The reason alleged by the Spanish general for quitting Talavera, even before the French approached it, and deserting the sick and wounded of his allies, who had been confided to his care and protection, was, that he apprehended, without his assistance, sir Arthur Wellesley would not be able successfully to oppose the combined forces under Soult, Mortier, and Ney. By this movement not only did general Cuesta give up an important position, and abandon the British hospital, but he also exposed the combined armies to the imminent danger of an attack in front and rear at the same time. On one side were the corps of Soult and Ney 30,000 strong, in possession of the high road leading to the passage of the Tagus, at the bridge of Almarez: on the other side there were nearly 30,000 men, under Victor, to whose advance no obstacle existed, after the retreat of general Cuesta from Talavera. In this embarrassing situation the most rapid retreat was indispensably requisite; and to this the troops; having been without their allow ance of provisions for several days, were very unequal. After mature deliberation, sir Arthur Wellesley resolved to retire by the bridge of Arcobispo, and to take up a strong position at Deleytosa. Here he remained unmolested by the French, and was enabled to recruit his army but finding that the junta were by no means disposed to supply the wants which had prevented his pursuit of the French before the battle of Talavera, he judged it expedient to retreat to Badajoz.Here during the remainder of the year his army remained not only inactive, but exposed from the un healthiness of the situation to the ravages of a very fatal disorder. An attentive, cool, and impartial consideration of all the movements, operations and events of this campaign of sir Arthur Wellesley, will probably dispose us rather to admire his bravery, than to commend his foresight and circumspection. The victory gained at Talavera may undoubtedly be ranked amongst the most splendid that British va lour ever achieved: nor is there any necessity, in order to gain it its due applause, to represent it as having been won over an enemy of more than double our force, thus forgetting and despising our allies the Spaniards, of whom the official account drawn up by the British general records, not merely that they covered the right wing, but that several regiments assisted in repelling the attacks of the French. But it may be questioned, whether a consummate generala general whose object is not merely to gain a battle, but to reap and secure all the advantages of victory, and who is more anxious to benefit his country than to raise his own fame by his exploits, would have advanced so far into Spain, doubtful as sir A. Wellesley was of the hearty and effectual cooperation of the Spaniards; destitute of the means of following up a victory or of securing a retreat; and ignorant of the movements and strength of the enemy in his rear. Such a general as sir Arthur Wellesley will undoubtedly afford to the world many proofs of what British valour can effect; but he is not exactly the man most likely or best calculated to conduct that valour to the success which it deserves. CHAP. CHAPTER XIII. Affairs of Spain concluded-The War grows languid-French Power in Spain very limited and precarious-Siege of Gerona rivals Saragossa in the Bravery of its Defence-The French attack and take the Casile of Mountjoi-Blake throws Supplies and Reinforcements into Gerona in a most masterly and successful Manner-Assault of the 19th SeptemberFrench repulsed - Augereau assumes the Command of the besieging Army -gets between Blake und Gerona-defeats the Spanish General and takes the City-State and Position of the Spanish Armies in the Beginning of November-Armies of the Centre, the Right, and the Left-Battle of Zamames-The Spaniards victorious--Consequences of the Victory The Spaniards. gain Possession of Salamanca - The Battle of Alba del Tormes-Operations of the Army of the Centre resolve to advance to Madrid-Joseph Bonaparte leaves Madrid to oppose them-Battle of Ocana-The Spanish Army completely defeated-Remarks on the Causes of the Disasters of the Spaniards-The Duty and actual Behaviour of the Supreme Junta contrasted-Character of their Proclamations- The Marquis of Wellesley sent to them-persuades them to assemble the Cortes-Proclamation for this Purpose. A Frp tad by successful at FTER the unsuccessful at surprise or force a passage across the Sierra Morena, and of the combined British armies to fight their way to Madrid, the war resumed for some time its former character. The British army had met with so little cooperation from the Spaniards, and the respective generals agreed so ill about either the general plan of the campaign or the particular mode of proceeding, that the common cause was not likely to be much benefited by their fu ture union. The Spanish armies, again left to themselves, directed their attention to too many objects, and possessed among them too slight a principle of union, to strike a decisive stroke against the power of the enemy. The French also, foiled in their attempt to cross the Sierra Morena, seemed to have contented themselves for some time with desultory warfare, and to have abandoned the plan of advancing into the south of Spain. At this period the power of Joseph Bonaparte in Spain was very limited in its extent, and very precarious and unstable in its foundation, so that the exercise of a common share of vigour and activity on the part of the Spanish generals, aided by the regular supply of arms, ammunition, and provisions, on the part of the supreme junta, Z2 would would in all probability have ob- The provinces nearest the Pyrenees evinced, perhaps, the most determined and persevering spirit of resistance to the French. In Biscay, notwithstanding it was open to continual incursions from the enemy, no diminution of patriotism, no dread of danger or difficulty in defence of their independence were manifest. The immortal defence of Saragossa is alone worthy of placing the people of Arragon in the same distinguished and exalted rank of patriotism with the people of Biscay. Nor were the Catalans, a race of men honourably known in Spanish history for their active industry, and their ardent love of liberty and independence, inferior either to the Arragonese or the Biscayans. We have already had occasion to advert to the siege of Gerona. The capture of this place was as necessary to the fur ther movements and operations of the French on the side of the eastern Pyrenees, as its defence and retention were desirable to the Spaniards, both for the purpose of checking and retarding the progress of the enemy, and for holding cut an animating and influencing example of what they were capable and determined to effect, where, from local circumstances, the superior force and skill of the French could be of little avail. After it had been twice invested, and had twice driven back the assailants, the French again advanced to besiege it with more formidable means, and in a more regular and cautious manner. As being the key to Catalonia, they appeared resolutely bent on not relaxing in their efforts this time till they had accomplished its capture, and thus secured themselves in the possession of that province. For its defence the inhabitants had little but their own valour to trust to. Almost the only strong part of it was the castle of Montjoi: against this the French directed repeated and dreadful attacks, which were met and opposed by the most heroic bravery. In order to bring the assistance of religious feeling to patriotism, a crusade was established within the walls; ail those who assumed the cross, and who continued in the service during the whole of the war with France, were promised exemption from the personal tax for ever; and each repulse of the enemy's attacks was crowned and followed by solemn procession to the cathedral. It would far exceed our limits to enter into a detail of all the events that occurred during the siege of this place, or to record the numerous instances of bravery which the inhabitants of all ages and condi tions, and of both sexes, uniformly exhibited. But the attack of the French on the castle of Mountjoi in the beginning of July, and the more interesting and prominent circumstances connected with the siege of Gerona, are well worthy our notice. On the 7th of July the French, to the number of 6000, having effected three breaches in the walls of the castle of Mountjoi, proceeded to the assault. The garrison, though comparatively few, and enfeebled by hard and unremitted duty, as well as by an inadequate supply of provisions, immediately made the necessary preparations to repel the assault. Five times the French advanced to the breaches; and as often were they driven back with considerable slaughter. From the time of this attack till the middle of August, the French contented themselves with bombarding the fortress and the city of Gerona, and with inter.cepting all supplies that were attempted to be introduced into the former. The ill success they met with on the memorable 7th of July determined them to proceed with more caution, and to carry on the siege in a more regular and scientific manner. They therefore began to raise the necessary works: but in this they met with great obstacles and difficulties, partly from the nature of the ground, and partly from the incessant bombardment and sallies of the besieged. They were obliged to raise their works on a rock, and to form their intrenchments in the presence and under the fire of the garrison. On the 12th of August the besieged, finding themselves unable any longer to defend the citadel of Mountjoi, retired unmolested, unto the city of Gerona, leaving the enemy only a heap of ruins, and a few pieces of nearly useless cannon. The French having thus gained possession of the fortress, were enabled to carry on the siege of the city to greater advantage, while the inhabitants of the latter, become more numerous by the addition of the garrison of Mountjoi, were reduced to greater extremities for provisions, and even for the most necessary articles for the sick and wounded. As it was closely invested, and cut off from all regular or certain communication with the rest of the province, it was extremely difficult and hazardous to concert with the garrison any measures for its relief or supply. The enemy indeed presented a line not very strong or formidable, from the extent to which it was drawn out; but on the least alarm or apprehension of attack, he had it completely in his power to concentrate this line, and thus present a formidable obstacle to the relief of the garrison. Nevertheless Blake, who commanded the Spanish army in Catalonia, determined to throw in not merely a supply of provisions, but also a reinforcement of troops. This he was more likely to effect by stratagem than by open attack: he therefore formed his plan accordingly, and made such movements and arrangements as seemed to indicate his intention of attacking the enemy in a quarter directly opposite to that by which the convoy was sent into the city. A body of 1200 infantry supported by some cavalry marched against the enemy's troops that were sta tioned in Brunolas, and commenced an attack upon them with so much impetuosity and vigour, that they were induced to think, that the convoy for the supply of Gerona Z 3 was |