minister, dated at Madrid on the 10th February, 1818: "The king has lately made large grants of land in East Florida to several of his favorites, and I am credibly informed that within these few days he has, by a sweeping grant, given all the remainder to the Duke of Alagon, captain of his guards, and the Count of Punon Rostro, one of his chamberlains. This is, perhaps, his mode of preparing for a cheap cession of the territory to the United States."-(3 For. Rel., 509.)

On the 26th April, 1818, he again writes, that in reference to a cession of Florida, in compensation of American claims, he had told the Spanish minister that these claims would have to be paid out of the sale of the lands. "Now the king had lately given all those lands away, (as I had duly informed my government;) to complete the transaction it would, therefore, be absolutely necessary that the whole of those grants should be cancelled." And on 14th May, 1818, he announces, "the council sent orders to the Duke of Alagon and the Count of Punon Rostro, directing them not to make sales of the lands granted to them."-(3 For. Rel., pp. 511-'12.)

On the 18th July, 1818, Mr. Ewing says to Mr. Pizarro, the Spanish secretary of state, "that it is quite certain that the United States cannot receive Florida as indemnity for its reclamations, if all the cessions to individuals since the date of the convention (1802) are not annulled."-(3 For. Rel., 516.)

Finally, the following were the propositions of the negotiators who concluded the treaty in Washington. The Chevalier Onis proposed, on 24th October, 1818, this clause:

.*

*

"His Catholic Majesty * * * * to put an end to the differences which now exist between the two governments, cedes to them, (the United States,) in full property and sovereignty, the provinces of East and West Florida, with all their towns and forts. * The donations or sales of lands, made by the government of his Majesty, or by legal authorities, until this time, are nevertheless to be recognized as valid."-(3 For. Rel., 530.)

* *

Mr. Adams answers, 31st October, 1818: "Neither can the United States recognize as valid all the grants of land until this time. It is well known to you, sir, that notice has been given by the minister of the United States in Spain to your government that all the grants of land lately alleged to have been made by your government within those territories must be cancelled, unless your government should provide some other adequate fund, from which the claims above referred to of the United States and their citizens may be satisfied."

Mr. Adams then proposes, "that all grants of land in any part of the territories to be ceded by Spain to the United States subsequent to the year 1802 are to be held null and void."-(Page 531.)

Don Onis replies, 16th November, 1818: "To this modification, in its absolute sense, I cannot assent, inasmuch as it is offensive to the dignity and imprescriptible rights of the crown of Spain, which, as the legitimate owner of both the Floridas, had a right to dispose of those lands as it pleased; and further, as the said modification would be productive of incalculable injury to the bona fide possessors who have acquired, settled, and improved those tracts of land.

"The extent of what I can agree to is, that the late grants made by his Majesty in the Floridas, since the 24th January last, the date of my first note announcing his Majesty's willingness to cede them to the United States, shall be declared null and void." * ** (Page 532.)

Mr. Onis then submitted a draught of an article, and Mr. Adams a counter-draught, the article being No. 9 in the projét of a treaty by Mr. Onis, and No. 8 in the counter-projét of Mr. Adams.

Mr. Onis-Article 9. All the grants of lands made by his Catholic Majesty, or by his legitimate authority, in the aforesaid two territories of Florida, and others which his Majesty cedes to the United States, shall be confirmed and acknowledged as valid, excepting those grants which may have been made after the 24th January of last year, the date that the first proposals were made for the cession of these provinces, which shall be held null, in consideration of the grantees not having complied with the conditions of the cession.

Mr. Adams- Article 8.

All grants of land made by or in the name of his Catholic Majesty in the aforesaid territories, after the 24th January, 1818, shall be null, the conditions of the said grants not having been performed by the grantees. All grants made before that date by his Catholic Majesty, or by his legitimate authorities in the said territories, the conditions of which shall have been performed by the grantees, according to the tenor of the respective grants, and none other, shall be confirmed and acknowledged as valid.

When Mr. Adams's counter-projèt appeared, the Chevalier Onis said on this article that it couldnot be varied from what was contained in his projét, as the object of the last clause therein is merely to save the honor and dignity of the sovereignty of his Catholic Majesty ; and on this objection, Mr. Adams agreed to the Chevalier's proposal, with the following explanation, "that all grants of land which shall not be annulled by this convention are valid to the same extent as they are binding on his Catholic Majesty."-(3 For. Rel., 619-20-21.)

By comparing these different projets, the words in italics in the counter-projét of Mr. Adams, and finally the words just quoted, the whole purpose of the clause is apparent. The United States were guarding themselves from any admission of the validity of such enormous colonization grants as were usually made by Spain, on condition of settlement and cultivation, of which they had recently been warned in the examples of the grants to the Duke of Alagon and Count of Punon Rostro. There was no danger as regarded bona fide sales or grants to settlers. Hence the requirement of Mr. Adams to insert words authorizing the United States to avail themselves of a noncompliance with conditions by grantees; hence his insertion of the provision that the titles should have the same validity against the United States as against Spain.

Before the ratification of the treaty, the United States, however, required of Spain a special acknowledgment of the nullity of the three principal grants made subsequent to the date indicated in the treaty, and it was accordingly ratified on the 24th October, 1820, with a

special declaration that the three grants made in favor of Alagon, Punon Rostro, and Vargas were not ratified by the treaty. Now, the grant to Vargas was of land west of the Perdido river, in the disputed territory, and the inference is irresistible that, in the opinion of the government, the title of Vargas would have been ratified by the treaty, unless excepted by special provision.

The question again recurs, how happens it that the memorialists require any action on the part of Congress to impart validity to grants thus recognized as perfect by the most solemn of all the public acts of a nation-a treaty duly ratified? The answer is to be found in the adjudications of the Supreme Court of the United States.

In the case of Foster and Elam vs. Neilson, 2 Peters, 396, which involved the title to a tract of land within this disputed territory, the Supreme Court held the following propositions to be sound in law, viz:

1st. That Congress having, by the act of 1804 and other acts, asserted title to this disputed territory under the treaty of cession of Louisiana, "it is the province of the court to conform its decisions to the will of the legislature;" the question being one of disputed boundary between nations, in which it is scarcely possible that the court of either country should refuse to abide by the measures adopted by its own government."

2d. That as, by the treaty of 1819, the King of Spain had ceded to the United States "all the territories which belong to him to the eastward of the Mississippi, known by the name of East and West Florida,” the court was without power to consider the disputed territory as included in this cession, because the United States had always claimed that this disputed territory did not "belong to him," and that the court was not authorized to question this claim, which was a political one, and did not present a judicial question.

3d. That the eighth article of the treaty did not proprio vigore confirm the titles embraced within its terms, but merely pledged the faith of the nation that Congress would confirm them.

In the case of the United States vs. Arredondo, 6 Peters, 691, the second of the above propositions was again affirmed, the court stating "that the settlement of boundaries was not a judicial but a political question; that it was not its duty to lead but to follow the action of the other departments of the government;" "that, however individual judges might construe the treaty of St. Ildefonso, it is the province of the court to conform its decisions to the will of the legislature."

But, in the same case, the court also held that, under the treaty of 1819, the cession to the United States was only of land not previously granted by the crown, (page 738,) and that private titles were confirmed by the words of the treaty itself, which excepted them from the general grant to the United States, in all other parts of Florida.

The third proposition of the court, in Foster & Elam vs. Neilson, was (after being shaken in Arredondo's case) deliberately overruled in Percheman's case, 7 Peters, 58. Finally, in the year 1850, an attempt was again made, in the case of the United States vs. Reynes, 9 Howard, 127, to induce the Supreme Court to take judicial cognizance of the titles of the unfortunate proprietors who had, half a century before, bought and paid for their lands within this disputed

country, from the sovereign who held it and claimed it as owner, and in whose possession the United States had avowedly acquiesced for political reasons The court again said: "Whether, by the treaties of St. Ildefenso and of Paris, the territory south of the 31st degree of north latitude was ceded to the United States, is a question into which this court will not now inquire. The legislative and executive departments of the government have determined that the entire territory was so ceded. This court have solemnly and repeatedly declared that this was a matter peculiarly belonging to the cognizance of those departments, and that the propriety of their determination it was not within the province of the judiciary to contravene or ques

tion."

It thus appears that the memorialists by the action of the government are left without even a chance of trying their title. Congress passes acts referring them to the judiciary. The judiciary decides that it cannot examine the merits of their claim, because those merits depend on a political not a judicial question. Bandied backwards and forwards from one department of the government to the other, their rights have actually been sported with for fifty years. The violated faith of treaties calls aloud for redress. It is a scandal upon public justice that this state of things should endure a day longer. The whole case may be stated in a word. The United States, after years of dispute about a boundary with Spain, make a treaty by which Spain cedes her rights on the express condition that her grants shall be respected. And because she says she cedes the territory which belongs to her, the court holds that it is not at liberty to carry out the treaty until Congress will be pleased to say that the disputed territory did belong to her.

It is plain, from the language of the court in the cases cited, that the judges really thought Spain was right in the controversy. If they had thought our government right, it was very simple and easy to say so. The very excuse given for not deciding the merits shows whence the embarrassment of the court arose.

The committee will not assume to say that the court was wrong in declining to decide the cases submitted to it, according to the very plain meaning of the treaty, as expressed on its face and in the correspondence of the diplomatists who negotiated it; but they feel bound to say that there is no possible excuse for any further refusal by Congress to redeem the plighted faith of the nation.

The objects and purposes contemplated by the eminent statesmen who conducted our negotiations with France and Spain have long since been accomplished. The acquisitions which their sagacious foresight deemed so indispensable to the safety, progress, and prosperity of our country, have long since been secured. It is not for us to question the policy which urged so vigorously pretensions that, to say the least, were exceedingly doubtful.

If these great national purposes were still in jeopardy, if all their momentous consequences were still at hazard, a stern political necessity might excuse, if it could not justify, a pitiless sacrifice of individual rights. But that day has happily passed. Neither France nor Spain now hold a foot of soil on the North American continent. The battle

has been fought and won, and not even political expediency can now be pleaded in excuse for the confiscation of private rights.

Your committee report a bill for the relief of the memorialists, and include in it certain other claims referred to them which rest on the same principles as those involved in the claim of the memorialists.