of these two substances to dry rapidly, and which compound constitutes a new material, and possesses new properties different from those of either of the original substances. The new substance was less sensible to heat and cold than India rubber in its original condition.

This discovery of the petitioner, and the results attained by it, were the utmost advance ever made in the manufacture of India rubber, except the invention of what is familiarly called "the vulcanizing process," which seems conceded to have been the invention of Charles Goodyear.

All the evidence submitted to the committee, as well as the evidence upon the application to the Commissioner, conclusively proved that Hayward was the first and original inventor of this combination of sulphur and India rubber, as described in the specifications of the patent granted upon his application. That the invention was useful, and the inventor has used due diligence in introducing it into public use, is shown from the fact that this combination of sulphur and India rubber is used in almost all articles in the India rubber manufacture. This fact also shows the value and importance to the public of this invention. All these questions were determined in favor of the petitioner upon the application for an extension under the law. The only open question before the Commissioner and before the committee was that of compensation: had the inventor been adequately remunerated for his time, ingenuity, and expense in originating his invention and introducing it into use. The Commissioner determined that Mr. Hayward had received adequate remuneration in the sense of the patent law, but he arrived at this result from the facts and reasoning of which the following is the substance:

Hayward sold his invention to Goodyear for the sum of $3,000, which was conceded to have been but a very small fraction of its actual value, and no remuneration in the proper sense of the patent laws. But after Mr. Goodyear had made the discovery of the vulcanizing process by the application of heat to the combination of sulphur and rubber, discovered by Hayward, the company of which the latter was a member, in connexion with the other companies, obtained a license to use both his own invention (which Goodyear then owned by purchase) and Goodyear's in the manufacture of India rubber shoes. This license was at a rate or tariff which enabled Hayward's company to make shoes at a profit, and thereby Hayward acquired some property; that is, the inventor had been forced by his impoverished circumstances to sell his invention for a nominal sum entirely disproportionate to its actual value, and which afforded no adequate remuneration in the sense of the patent laws; but his subsequent good fortune in purchasing a license under another patent, as well as under that for the invertion he had thus parted with, at a rate which permitted him to make money, should be taken into account against him when he seeks to obtain the reward of his own ingenuity by an extension of his patent. Hayward was merely a stockholder in the Hayward Rubber Company, which purchased this license from Goodyear, and all the property he has acquired has been saved by economy from his share in the profits of their business, which havebeen obtained in great part by his unremitted attention and labor. But the Commissioner decided that because Mr. Hayward had thus acquired some property, he was not

entitled to the privilege which the law secures to a meritorious inventor, although his poverty had compelled him to part with his invention for a mere trifle.

This argument, and the result to which it leads, seems to be an entire mistake and perversion of the object of the patent laws. It would seem to be clear that if Mr. Hayward had received but $1,174 25 from the forced sale of an invention which had proved of immense value to the public, that his right to an extension of his patent would have been regarded as incontestible; yet he was met and defeated by an argument as strange as this: "Your invention is novel, valuable; the public have been benefitted by its use, and you are compelled by poverty to sell it for a paltry sum; but you saw the value of Goodyear's invention; you purchased a license under that, and have made money by it; because you have succeeded in that business, you shall not have the benefit of your own invention during the extended time which the law permits."

The committee do not see any justice or propriety in this argument, or the decision based upon it.

Besides, it was conclusively proved to the committee that not only has the inventor failed to receive any just reward for his invention, but that the public have never paid anything for the use of it. Goodyear was the owner of the patent during the whole of the criginal term. He testifies that he never made any charge for the use of the sulpur patent, and that his tariffs have charged for the use of his vulcanizing patent alone.

Here is a most valuable invention, therefore, for which the patentee has received nothing, or next to nothing, and for the use of which the public have paid nothing. As the object of the patent laws is to afford remuneration, and as the inventor has failed to receive it from his invention without any fault of his own, unless poverty be a fault, it seems to be a case which demands the interference of Congress to correct the mistake of the officer to whom its power of protecting inventors in the useful arts have been delegated. Without such interference a meritorious inventor must submit to the loss of his invention without remuneration, or the hope of it. The public gets the benefit of the discovery without keeping its part of the contract with the inventor, which is to be carried out through the patent laws, by affording him protection for a limited period. Common justice demands that he should have the relief which these laws were intended to afford.

The petitioner has been guilty of no negligence in this matter. As soon as his application to the Commissioner was rejected, he applied to Congress for relief. A bill was passed by the Senate during the last Congress, after an elaborate report by the Committee on Patents, for the extension of his patent, and was favorably reported upon after a laborious investigation by the Committee on Patents in the House of Representatives, but the bill was not reached for action in that body.

The committee have, therefore, arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to relief, and herewith report a bill, not for the specific relief prayed for, but allowing him an opportunity for a rehearing before the Commissioner of Patents, without prejudice on account of the former decision or of the expiration of the term of the original letters patent.

anything to the claimant on account of the freight which he contracted with McCoy, Smith & Waldo to transport. The claimant is not shown to have made any preparation to transport this freight, and of course it cannot be said that he has been damnified by any failure to furnish it.

But it is shown that he did fully prepare himself, at a heavy cost, to transport the 60,000 pounds to Taos and 150,000 pounds to El Paso, and was ready and willing to do so in accordance with the advertisement and contract aforesaid. And they think that justice requires that the claimant should be put into the same condition he would have been in if the freight had been transported and paid for according to the contract rates. This will be arrived at, in their opinion, by calculating the amount the transportation would come to at the contract rates, and adding thereto the amount realized by the claimant by the sale of his outfit, and then by deducting therefrom all the expenses of transportation, including value of oxen and,wagons, hire of hands, provisions, &c. The amount of transportation. would be as

follows:

One hundred and fifty thousand pounds to El Paso, at

$12 84 per hundred

$19,260 00

Thirty tons, or 60,000 pounds to Taos, at $8 83 per hundred....

5,298 00

Making an aggregate of

24,558 00

When the freighting for 1852 was broken up by the government failing to furnish anything to be transported, the claimant had his outfit of wagons, oxen, mules, horses, provisions, and all other necessaries, in the country beyond the Missouri border, and was compelled to make sale of them there, and under such circumstances as must, of necessity, have entailed a heavy sacrifice. They were sold to the best possible advantage, and yielded only the sum of $5,437, which, added to the amount of transportation, gives the sum of $29,995.

Nathan H. McKinney, whose testimony was taken in the case, testifies that he had the charge of claimant's trains during the summer and fall of 1851, and had the general control of the trip to El Paso and Doña Ana; and also had like charge and control in 1852 until the business of that season was broken up by the United States failing to furnish the freight to be transported. He was, therefore, in a condition to know accurately the expense of transporting the freight. He fixes this amount at $14,325, which, deducted from the last named sum, leaves a balance of $15,670; and this balance your committee set down as the amount necessary to make good to the claimant the loss sustained by him by reason of the failure by the government to furnish freight to him in 1852. They think, therefore, that that amount ought to be refunded to the claimant, and report a bill accordingly.

tioned in the advertisement. And while thus fully prepared, he was notified by Major Ogden, assistant quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth, on the 6th of April, 1852, that no stores would be furnished him for transportation, under his contract, during the then coming season. The petitioner immediately informed the quartermaster that he had prepared a train of 30 wagons, and 192 yoke of oxen, and all other things necessary to enable him promptly and fully to transport the freight according to the contract, and that he would be subjected to a heavy loss in consequence of the freight not being furnished him for transportation; and that he would look to the government for indemnity. Accordingly, in due time, and so soon as practicable, the claim of petitioner was presented to the Court of Claims, which held that, upon the law of the case, the advertisement did not constitute a part of the contract entered into between the claimant and the United States, and consequently that the relief asked by the petitioner could not be reported in favor of by the court. Yet the court present the facts of the case as constituting an appeal to the equity and sense of justice of Congress. A majority of the committee think that that clause of the fifth article of the contract which requires that due notice should be previously given to claimant by the United States of the amount of stores to be transported, has direct reference to the portion of the advertisement which says: "it is distinctly understood that the quantities therein before named, to wit to Fernando de Taos, 30 tons and upwards; to Doña Ana, 30 tons and upwards; and to Paso del Norte, 170 tons and upwards, are the minimum, and every contractor should be prepared to carry larger quantities, of which due notice will be given;" and if so, then the notice to be given would only refer to the excess of freight to be transported, over and above the minimums named in the advertisement. Indeed, it is evident that if the United States by the contract were under no obligation to furnish any amount of freight to be transported by the claimant in the summer of 1852, then the clause of the contract quoted above is entirely superfluous.

But it is submitted that whatever may be the hard law of the case, there can scarcely be a doubt but that the claimant understood that the government was bound to furnish him at least the minimums of freight mentioned in the advertisement on the one hand, and that he was also bound to carry the same between the points therein named on the other. And the claimant accordingly prepared himself fully to meet this obligation. And having made such preparation, and being ready and willing to transport the freight, of course he was subjected to damage and loss by the failure of the United States to furnish it. Against such loss actually sustained by the claimant while faithfully discharging his duty, and without any fault on his part, the committee think he ought to be indemnified, especially when such damage has seriously injured, if not broken him up.

The claimant made a contract with Smith, McCoy & Waldo, by which he granted to them the transporting of the thirty tons to Doña Ana, and of 190,000 pounds of the 170 tons to Paso del Norte, and he claims damages for the failure of the government to furnish this amount of freight. Your committee report against allowing