situation improved, speculation suppressed, land division will cause trouble. Soldiers desire peace but without concession; socialist propaganda carried into German Army. REINSCH File No. 861.00/829 The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] TOKYO, December 16, 1917, 10 p. m. [Received December 17, 6.20 a. m.] Russian Ambassador called to-day to express his suspicion that the persistent press reports of Japanese intervention in Vladivostok may be semiofficial feelers. He asked me to report to the Department his belief that action of that character by Japan would provoke feeling of resentment in Russia and thus antagonize Russian people without in any way serving the cause of the Allies. He expressed the hope that American Government would not give Japanese Government the impression that such action would be approved. MORRIS File No. 861.00/826 The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] VLADIVOSTOK, December 16, 1917, 12 p. m. [Received December 16, 3.45 p. m.] Japanese troops have not arrived here and none dispatched as far as I can learn although many seem expect and some now even hope for their coming. CALDWELL File No. 861.00/822 The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch) [Telegram] WASHINGTON, December 18, 1917, 5 p. m. Your telegram December 15, 8 p. m. Ambassador and Consuls in Russia advised that President desires all American representatives to withhold direct communication with Bolshevik government. LANSING File No. 861.00/854 The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] PETROGRAD, December 21, 1917. 2127. Japanese Embassy in statement published Petrograd gazette yesterday denies report Japanese landing at Vladivostok and in connection says: 1. All know that the capture of Vladivostok by Japanese could not present the slightest difficulty for them. 2. That Japan has not shown any aggressive tendencies toward Russia, notwithstanding attacks on Japanese for plunder and other cases of the trampling of alien rights judging in Japan the present war is hardly viewed as the final chord of world militarism and the naval forces of Japan are gradually being increased [sic]. Concerning secret treaty cabled in my 21181 after saying that heading thereof is unauthorized ends: With regard to this convention the Japanese Embassy declares that there is being attributed to this treaty a character that is entirely foreign to it and that it is in no wise ambiguous as regards England. The unauthorized heading merely shows that the person who composed it had not penetrated the meaning of the fourth article of the said treaty. The purpose of all this is apparently to call forth among the Allies if only a shadow of confusion. FRANCIS File No. 861.00/861 The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] VLADIVOSTOK, December 22, 1917, 6 p. m. [Received December 23, 1.35 p. m.] Still quiet here. Bolsheviks have not yet forced their control upon Government institutions but may do so soon. This will cause strike employees, paralyzing port. Since 16th no telegraphic communication west of Chita. The newspapers report all stations west of Irkutsk in hands of Bolsheviks, Irkutsk telegraph and postal clerks having struck in protest. Returns Priamur district not quite complete but indicate five peasant, one Cossack and one Bolshevik delegates Constituent 1Dated Dec. 18, 1917, 11 p. m.; Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, p. 709. Assembly. Irkutsk, Bolsheviks have 11,000 out of total 30,000 votes, but in Krasnoyarsk they have 12,000 out of total 17,000. Many prisoners of war reported escaping particularly from Krasnoyarsk. In case of separate treaty of peace believe their acts would necessitate Allied control Vladivostok and Priamur district to protect shipping China and Japan routes. Meantime we should have properly organized military passport controls at five points, Asia[tic Russia ?], Vladivostok particularly, as British look for their chief control of much [omission?] and local counter-spy organization about to collapse for lack of funds. Latter requests foreign financial assistance, would require about five hundred American dollars monthly. Maintenance this organization is very important to Allied interests as without it or large force of our own agencies we cannot hope to extend proper passport control. CALDWELL File No. 861.00/863 The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] TOKYO, December 24, 1917, 11 p. m. [Received December 24, 2.20 p. m.] Stevens1 arrived here to-day having left in Nagasaki the Russian railway unit. He considers it imperative that they be kept available for immediate usefulness in the event of conditions in Russia making possible the resumption of their work on Trans-Siberian system. He anxiously awaits the arrangements of the necessary credits. At the request of Viscount Motono, I took Stevens to see him. This appears to explain his own views of the Russian situation. He expressed firm conviction that limitations on [duration of] particular coterie now exercising power in Russia is doubtless ephemeral, yet it is the fact that power has passed permanently and inalienably to the Maximalist constituency which for the time being they represent and that it would be fatal mistake for the Allied powers to attempt to support or countenance any counter-revolution or any movement by the Cadets, for instance, to obtain control in favor of less radical elements. He also dwells upon the futility and danger of antagonizing what must ultimately be the decisive influence in 'John F. Stevens, chairman of the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts to Russia. 60806-32- -7 Russia by attempting any sort of armed intervention even in eastern Siberia. He considers, while there is throughout the people of Russia an earnest desire for peace, yet it may not be too late to bring about some such reconstitution of governmental authority as would defeat the intrigues for a separate peace with Germany. There are strong elements in Russia who perceive that the country must continue faithful to the alliance if it is to escape ultimate commercial and financial domination by Germany and have the opportunity to realize its own political destiny, but these elements are now disorganized and discouraged by the prevailing anarchy. They would give strong support to any administration capable of maintaining order and national unity in the pursuit of the United States ideals but there is urgent danger that the continuance of present chaotic conditions may so discourage them as to destroy their effectiveness. In reply to Motono's request for his suggestions as to the possibility of constructive action Stevens urged his belief that the only hope lies in sending immediately to Petrograd a large commission jointly representing the Allied powers and composed of men of wellknown administrative capacity who would be at least sympathetic with the progressive spirit which in Russia, [spite of] transient personalities, is destined to control the future of Russia; this commission bearing no formal credentials but going prepared to ascertain for itself where the real power lies in Russia and to affiliate itself with those politicians who give most promise of leadership and to seek opportunities to cooperate with them in the actual reorganization and acclimate [to counsel] the government for the period of the war. Stevens considers that although this suggestion is a hazard which might not prove in the event [successful], nevertheless presents the only chance to avoid complete disintegration which would work powerfully in favor of Germany and which could be only partially nullified by treating Russia as an actual enemy. Minister of Foreign Affairs incidentally stated that the Japanese Government is opposed to using military force even in Siberia lest such action should crystallize Russian feeling against the Allied powers. Although he made no statement to that effect, his inquiries suggested the impression that he had been inclined to consider favorably supporting Cadet Party as against the Maximalist; he appeared much impressed by Stevens's course of action [consideration] that no change of administration can deprive of permanent power the radical masses who are now effectively represented by the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. He proposes to have Stevens in the near future present his views to the Prime Minister. File No. 861.00/8772 Memorandum of the Secretary of State of an interview with the Japanese Ambassador (Sato), December 27, 1917 The Ambassador called and introduced Baron Megata. After a brief conversation the Baron left and the Ambassador remained. He first asked in regard to the situation in Russia and I told him that our purpose was to remain quiescent and await developments. He said that that was the view of his Government. I then spoke to him about the situation at Vladivostok and told him that the view of this Government was that it would be unwise for either the United States or Japan to send troops to Vladivostok as it would undoubtedly result in the unifying of the Russians under the Bolsheviks against foreign interference. He said to me that that was the exact view of his Government and that they have no intention of sending troops to Vladivostok for the same reason that we opposed it. He said that both Great Britain and France had made the suggestion but that the Japanese Government did not consider it wise to adopt the suggestion. The Ambassador also told me that he had been called home and that he was leaving about January 10. I asked him if it was a recall and he said he did not know except that his Government stated it desired to confer with him. He then asked me whether there was any prospect of our sending a mission to Japan at this time. I replied that he must realize that it would only do for us to send distinguished men to Japan, and that they must be representative of the Government; that at the present time every man who was suitable for such a mission was pressed into the service in connection. with the war, and that to let any one of them go would be to weaken our war machine; and that of course our supreme object to-day was to win the war and we must devote all our energies to that end. I therefore thought that it was quite out of the question at present to think of sending a mission and I was sure he would understand the situation and could explain it fully to his Government. File No. 861.00/867 The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] VLADIVOSTOK, December 27, 1917, 8 p. m. [Received December 27, 7.25 p. m.] General commissioner appointed by Provisional Government in the place of governor general maritime region was arrested yester |