Page images
PDF
EPUB

tranquillity, that the controlling power in the State was on each side so wisely actuated; but, fortunately for the encouragement of those who hope for the coming of an age which shall know how to regulate the world without war, the great body of the people in both countries were plainly impatient of any disturbance of the peace of Christendom. This is evident from the congratulations so widely exchanged in both countriescongratulations arising not altogether from calculations of interest, but as well from a feeling every day more generally diffused, that a war which should have been avoided is crime. And this satisfaction is not entirely confined to the two nations more immediately concerned in the controversy. France also, volatile, ambitious, fond of glory and excitement-qualities of temper which render her the most dangerous of all the communities of Europe-has given unequivocal proofs of her gratification that the civilized world is not again to be convulsed with general hostilities. A few Parisian journals, which from opposition to a ministry disposed to maintain friendly relations toward the English Government, are accustomed to denounce all the movements of Great Britain, feel it of course their duty to be dissatisfied; but the French people, it is evident, are mainly in favor of peace among civilized nations. This community of sentiment is an important fact;-evidently, by a single reflection. There are four great nations, that virtually rule the affairs, not only of Christendom, but of the world. They are England, France, the United States and Russia. Unquestionably, any one of these great powers-of itself, unaided by any other-would dare to break up the present peace of nations, and would be able to carry on the war for a period, in the face of any combination. But it is nearly as certain that no other State, without the countenance of one of these, would dare to enter into a struggle of any moment. Austria would not: she has no vessels, nor even sea-board, to enable her to acquire power upon the ocean, and her position midway between France and Russia would "give her pause" before she would undertake a war without the assistance, or at least the guarantied forbearance, of either. Prussia would not having no ships, she is but the worse at present for her sea-coast; and, though a military state by education, she stands too much in awe of her powerful

neighbors from without, and, from within, of the more dangerous free opinions so rapidly growing up in the minds of the people. Sweden and Norway have neither fleets nor armies, nor a treasury by which they could be created; Italy and Spain, impoverished, oppressed, dispirited, are only able to lament and bleed; Turkey, broken in her pride and without resources, will hereafter see the crescent of Islam gleam only on the minarets of her mosques, no longer over the front of battle; Mexico and the South American States, are plainly unequal to any prolonged efforts of hostilities on a grand scale; and the nations of Asia, inert and inefficient, as they have been for 2,000 years, can never greatly disturb, with demonstrations of war, the affairs of more civilized powers. Thus the vast interests of general peace lie practically in the keeping of only four governments. Hostilities may be carried on by half barbarous nations among themselves; or some one of the great powers spoken of may wage a desultory war on the outskirts of civilized life; but, as power is now divided, no great struggle, breaking the repose of Christendom, and checking the progress of civilization, can be entered into, if France, Russia, England and America, should stand against it. We may go farther; for if the other three, especially France and England, should manifest strong and united opposition, Russia, without such an accession to her naval and military skill as cannot be looked for, will hardly feel disposed to disturb the peace of Europe. That those two governments, therefore, which can, together, practically hold the balance of power in the eastern hemisphere, should share with this republic, growing every day more powerful and important, so manifest a gratification that a warlike question has been peacefully settled, is a thing worthy of consideration among the signs of the times.

It is true, that this expression is not to be relied on as implying any determination, in the minds of these governments, to have no more to do with Christian warfare. They have by no means reached such a point. They are as yet content with desiring it, in a manner, without coming at all to any clear purpose, or even to any definite perception of what is attainable. They have hardly begun fairly to lay aside old animosities, and the remembrances of ancient battles; much less have they brought themselves

to contemplate the possibility of three or four leading powers actually resolving that there shall be no more great wars in Christendom, and keeping their resolution. It is, indeed, wonderful, how rapidly an enlightened people, in this age even, come to accustom themselves to the idea of war. "Possible," "probable," "inevitable," is the development of appellatives in their minds. First, they indulge themselves in talking largely, and with no great clearness, of certain injuries received from a foreign nation, insulted claims, or some offensive position assumed by them: it is declared not unlikely, if things go on so, that hostilities may grow out of it. Next, the speechmaking leaders opportunely delegated to be rulers, patriotic men in power, and the unpurchasable press, take pains to show the country aggrieved, talk strongly as a government, and contrive by a bold front and skillful diplomacy to convert a previous measurably good understanding into uneasiness and rancor. Their warlike tone being naturally reechoed, the sober part of the community begin then to denounce the blundering government which has brought things to such a pass-they acknowledge the nation partly in the wrong, but what of right there is in the case must be defended! Diplomatic issues, oblique as usual, shoot past each other-negotiation confuses itself-friendly argument is thrust aside as not sufficiently independent military preparations begin to be madeand both nations, settling down into the feeling that there is "no help for it," philosophically" prepare their hearts for war." At length, after a long suspense, and a general checking of all prosperous business, the dominant parties in the respective States discover that no political capital can be manufactured by a war fever; a few mutual concessions are then made, a treaty summarily follows, and both countries congratulate themselves, each other and the world, that they did not invoke the aid of arms, when they ought only to be ashamed that war was ever dreamed of between them. This, it will not be denied, has been too much the history of the public mind in this country; and in England, the body of the people were gradually and coolly adopting the opinion that as the Americans "would have war," war it must be :-it seems never to have entered their minds that their own government might not have offered altogether so liberal, or just,

a concession as could have been conceived of. It offered to arbitrate-which was fair; but in the way of negotiation it had always been unreasonable.

Such was the matter-of-fact acquiescence of Christian communities in the alternative of blood! It shows their congratulations of peace to be based, as yet, somewhat less on principle than could be wished. A feeling, however, is evidently present, on which a received principle may finally be established as a line of conduct for Christendom. And in this point of view, the fact that another controversy between nations has been settled by honorable concession, is of large importance. For its inherent nature, the moral effect of such an occurrence is great, and tends to produce in the minds of men that state of sentiment which shall be the perennial well-spring of the peace of humanity. With nations, moreover, as with individuals, custom, habit, rules, everything;-each new example of a question so settled, will render it more easy and natural for another to follow, by one step more, towards that condition of the world when "the loudness of the trumpet and the shock of armies" shall be forgotten. And in this conviction we cannot but advert to the tone in which the first men of both countries have expressed themselves on this occasion. The language used by Mr. Webster, Mr. Mangum, Mr. Crittenden, and other eminent members of the American Senate, was unequivocal and exalted :-It deprecated

and for higher reasons than the burning of cities and the ruin of commercethat useless intervention of arms, which, at the end of a long struggle, would but leave both nations impoverished and demoralized, and the question still to be settled-by treaty! Similar terms had been uttered by the leaders of the British Parliament. Especially noble is the language used by Sir Robert Peel-a man of generous and enlarged views, whom the world is very justly coming to consider one of the most enlightened statesmen of the age. In that noble and elevated speech, in which he has just taken leave of official power, he bestows a lofty encomium upon Lord Aberdeen for "the exertions which he had made in the maintenance of peace." "He has dared to avow," says the British Minister, "that he thinks in a Christian country there is a moral obligation upon a Christian minister to exhaust every effort before incurring the risk of war." And afterwards, having

announced, amid the cheers of the House of Commons, that the last proposals of the English Government for the division of Oregon had been accepted by America, Sir Robert Peel added a few impressive words, which are worth remembering.

"Thus, sir, these two great nations, impelled, I believe, by the public opinion, which ought to guide and influence statesmen, have by moderation-by the spirit of mutual compromise-avoided the dreadful calamity of a war between two nations of kindred race and common language, the breaking out of which would have involved the civilized world in calamities to an extent which it is difficult to foresee."

We have thus spoken of the event itself. It is worthy of all the congratulations that the country can bestow upon it. Against its provisions very little can be said. But in the manner of its accomplishment we have not been so fortunate. As a party, indeed-if anything about the matter ever ought, as we have before mentioned, to have been looked at in a partisan light-the more sober portion of the community have nothing to regret in the transaction. The Whigs, with here and there a moderate mind from the opposite ranks, were always in favor of just the partition which has taken place. But what have the Democratic party to felicitate themselves upon in the whole affair, from first to last? The history of their entire conduct on the question throughout is sufficiently sickening, and the country has heard enough of it. It is necessary, however, to open up a page or two here, that our own position may be placed on record. But we will promise to be brief. That a clear view of the whole case may be had, we present a short statement of the proposals made, at different times, by our government, and those offered by England, in return, together with the provisions of the present treaty. It will then be seen, what we have gained or lost by this treaty over our own former proposition, and which party in the Republic stands on the most favorable ground in relation to this great national question.

It will be remembered, that the first convention entered into between any two nations respecting the north-west coast, having any influence on our final claims, was that of Nootka Sound, in 1790. Spain, by early discoveries from the year 1513, by occupation of the coasts as high as the Californias, by farther explorations in 1774-5, as high up as latitude 58°, and

by two centuries and a half of "prescription" along the whole Pacific shore, considered herself as having exclusive right to that entire region. England, having made, after 1768, several explorations, in the high latitudes below the 58th, more accurate than the Spanish-landing, moreover, and trading with the natives-conceived that she also had claims on that coast. Difficulties arose, and were rapidly ripening into war, when the Treaty of the Escurial, called the Nootka Convention, was entered into, by which, saying nothing of the original claims asserted by either party, the north-west coast and seas were to be open to the subjects both of England and Spain, in a kind of common occupancy. So much was wrested, as we showed more fully in the February article, from Spanish weakness. Still, once obtained, it was, undoubtedly, in some sort, an English acquisition.

The first transaction entered into by our government affecting the Oregon question, was the purchase of Louisiana from the French, in 1803. This vast region, as originally held by Spain, and afterwards by France, seems never to have had any conceivable limits. Lying west of the Mississippi, and stretching north and north-west to an undefined extent, it gave us, as against England, some indefinite claims on the Pacific. The discovery of the Columbia river, and subsequent explorations of the branches, gave us, as against her, a still farther title to that region. Great Britain, meantime, following up the advantage she had won from Spain, had begun to occupy, with trading posts, and-what is the strongest point in her final claim-had discovered and explored the second great river and valley of Oregon, Frazer's river, running from above the 54th degree south nearly to the 49th parallel.

The first distinct proposition made by us to the English government, bearing upon this question, was that in a prospective treaty, drawn up with their Commissioners, soon after our acquisition of Louisiana, for the purpose of settling the northern boundary of that territory. It had been commonly believed-and the point is not yet wholly cleared up—that Commissioners, appointed according to the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, had already adopted the 49th parallel as the dividing line between the then French possession of Louisiana and Canada and the British Hudson's Bay territories; and in the treaty now proposed, it

was agreed, that the boundary between the United States and British possessions on the north should run from the Lake of the Woods to the 49th degree, and follow that parallel westward "as far as their said respective territories extend in tbat quarter: provided that nothing in the present article shall be construed to extend to the north-west coast of America, or to territories belonging to, or claimed by, either party, on the Continent of America, to the westward of the Stony (Rocky) Mountains." This article in the intended treaty was approved of by both governments. But President Jefferson wished the proviso respecting the north-west coast should be omitted, as it "could have little other effect than as an offensive intimation to Spain, that the claims of the United States extend to the Pacific ocean. However reasonable," continues Mr. Jefferson, "such claims may be compared with those of others, it is impolitic, especially at the present moment, to strengthen Spanish jealousies of the United States, which it is probably an object with Great Britain to excite, by the clause in question." We do not suppose that Jefferson's idea of England's wishing to "excite Spanish jealousies" of us, had any foundation whatever, or was excusable, except from the disturbed state of feelings, at that time, between the United States and Great Britain; but the passage shows how completely that statesman, sagacious in many things, was possessed of the true idea of the nature and condition of our claims on the Pacific coast-that, by our discoveries there, and by the indefinite extent of the Louisiana territories, our title was tenable, not wholly as against Spain, who had a prior title, but as against England. This was the proposed treaty of 1807-8; but the disturbed relations of the two countries, from other causes, prevented its ratification.

After the war, negotiation on the subject of north-west boundaries was renewed. The American Plenipotentiaries, Messrs. Rush and Gallatin, in 1818 proposed, in effect, the same dividing line as before-that it should run from the northwest extremity of the Lake of the Woods to latitude 49°, and thence with that parallel westward; but with this addition, that it should be continued to the Pacific ocean. The discussion was protracted-the British Commissioners,

Goulburn and Robinson, being anxious to secure to English subjects the free navigation of the Mississippi. This was steadily refused on our part, the more firmly that we had been denied access to the St. Lawrence, to which we had a far greater right. The proposed line was finally acceded to as far west as the Rocky Mountains. They then discussed, by itself, the subject of respective claims to territories on the Pacific. The several grounds of title, with which the public are now familiar, were set forth on each side. No distinct proposition for a boundary was made by the British Commissioners, but it was intimated that the river was the most proper, and that no articles would be agreed to that did not give them the harbor at the mouth in common with the United States. This was decided enough, and of course precluded further argument. The alternative agreed upon was the convention of joint-occupancy, which stipulated, in substance, that "all the territories and their waters, claimed by either power, should be free and open to the vessels, citizens and subjects of both, for ten years; provided, however, that no claim of either, or of any other nation to any part of these territories should be prejudiced by the arrangement."

So far, the American Commissioners had conducted the negotiation without reference at all to the Spanish title. This has been made by the English press and diplomatists the ground of the accusation, that we had no real belief in the validity of that title. Nothing could well be more unfounded. The relation of Spain and the United States to each other and to England, was at that time precisely analogous to that of England and the United States to each other and to Russia, in the negotiation that took place_five years afterwards with that power. Russia had arrogated extensive rights on the north-west coast farther south than either England or the United States, who had then acquired the Spanish title, was disposed to allow. Our government was desirous of settling the matter by a triple convention, which should confine each power within certain latitudes. Both England and Russia, however, taking offence at President Monroe's declaration against European intervention or colonization on this continent, refused the pro

* Greenhow's Oregon and California.

† President Jefferson's Message to Congress, March 22, 1808.

posal. But instead, Russia treated with each power separately-agreeing with each that as to her own claims, they should be conceded to her as far south as 54° 40′, leaving any conflicting claims which England and the United States might assert below that latitude, to be settled between themselves. But if it was competent to England to negotiate for certain claims, as against Russia, knowing the necessity of afterwards settling with us about the same claims, manifestly it was equally competent for the United States to negotiate with England abont similar claims held by us, as against her, though aware that the same must subsequently be treated about with Spain, as holding a title prior to that of both. And there are, besides, two other considerations bearing upon this case. It had long been evident to American Statesmen, that the ancient vast dominion of Spain on this continent was rapidly breaking up. A few years longer of indolent efforts and misguided counsels would see it in fragments. It was but the part of common foresight so to interpose contingent grounds of title, that such parts of her immense territories as were greatly more valuable to us than to any foreign power should not fail of falling to our share. A second important fact is that, while our negotiations with England were pending, in 1818, we had already been treating with Spain two or three years for all her rights in the Oregon region. That treaty was all the while expected to be first consummated, but it was not till four months later; and this we think matter of regret; for had we, negotiating with Great Britain, definitely possessed the Spanish title, we might at that time have attained some settlement of the question, and saved all further altercation.

Having strengthened our claim by the acquisition of the rights of Spain, we opened the negotiation again in 1824. Mr. Rush, on our part, proposed that any part of the territory claimed by either power, should be open to both nations for ten years: Provided, that in that time the British were to make no settlements north of the 55th or south of the 51st parallel. For the 51st, Mr. Rush afterwards substituted the 49th. The British Commissioners, Huskisson and Canning, proposed, on the other hand, that the boundary-line should pass

from the Rocky Mountains along the 49th parallel, till it struck the great northern branch of the Columbia, thence down the middle of the river to the ocean-both nations being at liberty, for ten years, to pass by land or water through the territories on both sides of the boundary. This proposal was, of course, rejected. Great Britain, it was declared, would make no other, and the negotiation was stopped.

The original period of joint occupation, however, was drawing to a close, and our government again, in 1826, pressed for a settlement of the question. During this period, the "joint occupancy" had been all on one side. We had neglected the country. Scarcely an American was seen in the whole region, while throug h the vast extent of wilderness, from Labrador to the Pacific, the Hudson's Bay Company had established trading-posts, and extended the laws, usages and interests of Great Britain. This strengthened for England that kind of secondary claim recognized in law as created by occupa tion, use -but it did not at all affect the original title. The American right, by the Spanish title and by our own discoveries, was still, on the whole, paramount. In this negotiation, the British Commissioners made, in effect, the same proposal as before. Mr. Gallatin, in return, repeated the offer made in 1818viz.: the 49th parallel, from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific, but with this important addition, that " if the said line should cross any of the branches of the Columbia at points from which they are navigable to the main stream, the navigation of said branches of the main stream should be perpetually free to the citizens of both nations."* England refused to give up the territory on the north bank of the Columbia; she offered, however, to give up "a detached territory, extending on the Pacific and the Straits of Fuca, from Bulfinch's Harbor to Hood's Canal," and that "no works should be erected by either power at the mouth or on the banks of the Columbia, calculated to impede free navigation." But the United States very justly resolved to yield no part of the country south of the 49th parallel. They had offered, uniformly and consistently, a line of compromise quite below the claims of their abstract title, and they were resolved to abide by it. The provisions for joint occupancy, there

* Greenhow, p. 346.

« ՆախորդըՇարունակել »