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summation for any open demonstration of her belligerent designs. Of course we accomplished the measure with every reasonable dispatch. The joint resolution of Annexation was passed by Congress, and approved March 1, 1845.

Now it is to this fact to which we wish to call the attention of our readers; namely, that Mexico chose to take offence at this measure of Annexationchose to regard it as an act which placed the two countries necessarily in a state of hostility, and as calling on her, as she regarded her rights, her honor and her dignity, to make it cause of war against us; and that the necessary consequence was, whether she attempted to prosecute actual hostilities against us or not, or made an actual declaration of war or not, that, as at least all friendly relations and all diplomatic intercourse were suspended, she should deem herself free, for the time being, from all obligations toward us, by treaty or otherwise; the question, therefore, of her right temporarily to disregard these obligations-the question whether she has any and how much excuse for her neglect and delay to pay her acknowledged indebtedness and to provide for other undoubted claims upon her, depends altogether, in our judgment, on another question; and that is, whether she can justify herself before the law of nations, the law of God, and the civilized world, in resorting to war, or carrying her resentment so far as to assume an attitude of hostility towards us, on account of the Annexation of Texas to the United States.

Into this question we have no intention now to enter. We should not care to be obliged to defend the act of Annexation, at all points, in the face of the world; though we think that on strict grounds of legal right, as against other nations, including Mexico, it is defensible-certainly not on any ground of wisdom, generosity or fairness. And this we will freely say of the matter, that no generous or liberal-minded man can wonder that Mexico should have indulged just that feeling of wounded pride, and all that disposition to resent this act as an injury and an outrage, which she has manifested. She felt as George III. did when his American colonies were about to be wrested from him by force of arms. He is said to have been the last man in his kingdom to be convinced of the impossibility of reconquering them, and the necessity of giving them up.

Mexico was never ready to believe, or rather to confess, that she could not yet reconquer Texas, and impose her arbitrary laws on an unwilling people. This was her error-her weakness, if we will have it so. And it was an error and a weakness that we could very well have afforded to respect, and which we ought to have respected. We did not choose to do so. We took Texas; with how much profit or honor we shall know by and by. The strict legal right to do so we think may be maintained and defended-just as an individual may defend his legal right to the profits of a bargain, though taking a very unfair or ungenerous advantage of other persons' necessities in securing that bargain to himself. Having taken Texas by strict legal right, it seems to follow that, technically at least, Mexico is wrong in setting up that acquisition by us, either as cause of war, or as a reason or excuse for her failure to fulfill her treaty and other obligations towards us. She should have swallowed her resentment; and we, the American people, tell her so, who would probably be the last on earth, in the like case, to follow this teaching. She should have kept down her pride; she should have submitted to an inexorable necessity. She might have appealed to the world against us, and got what sympathy she could; but she should not have talked or thought of war, and she should have proceeded, as if nothing had happened, to do us ample justice, by satisfying all the claims of our citizens upon her. We sometimes call the Mexican nation half civilized; here was a chance for that Power to show us that, at least, she understood the moral law almost as well as we do.

We hold, then, that strictly Mexico cannot defend herself, on the ground of the measure of Annexation, for her failures to give us complete redress for the injuries and losses which our citizens have sustained at her hands in times past; and if we had chosen to do so, we might have regarded her failures to make reparation, at least if continued after a proper demand according to old treaty stipulations, as cause of war. But have we done so, or have we had any real occasion to do so? Neither the one nor the other. We have not made war on Mexico for this cause, though we have set up this grievance as a pretence for hostilities. We have not declared war against her at all. The President called on Congress “to re

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cognize the existence of the war;" Congress recited in the preamble of a Supply Bill, that war existed; and the President issued a proclamation, to the effect that Congress had so recognized the existence of the war. Neither has Mexico declared war against us.

"I solemnly announce," says the Provincial President, Paredes, in a formal proclamation," that I do not declare war against the United States of America, because the august Congress of the nation, and not the Executive, must decide definitively upon that reparation which so many insults call for. But the defence of the Mexican territory which is invaded by troops of the United States, is of paramount necessity, and my responsibility would become great if I did not command that the enemy's forces should be repelled. I have done so."

War exists, then, between these two nations in the actual collision and conflict of their armies in the field, and not by the formal declaration of war on either side. We marched an army into a territory which Mexico claimed as her own, the possession of which she held, and had always held, by her people, her municipal authorities, and her military posts; she called this a hostile invasion of her soil, and forthwith undertook to repel it by force. This made the war. And what, we ask now, has this war, in its inception, to do with our unsatisfied claims on Mexico for wrongs and injuries done to American citizens? Manifestly nothing. Our army was not sent into the field to make a military demonstration in behalf of these claims. That movement had a distinct and a very different object. It was territory and not money that the President intended to secure by it-new and further acquisitions of territory, above and beyond what was strictly acquired by the Annexation of Texas. Hence the war. We will not suffer ourselves, and, if we can help it, we will not allow the people of this country, to be cheated into the belief that our Government has gone to war with Mexico on account of a debt of three, four or six millions, which she has neglected to pay. The Administration know well enough that this cause has not produced or led to the war. We do not hesitate to affirm, as a matter admitting of no doubt or disputation, that, had every dollar of this debt been paid to us two years ago, this war would have been just as inevitable, and would have taken place just as

certainly as it has, if the Administration had entertained the same designs in regard to the extension of our territorial limits, and had adopted the same measures to secure that object. How we wish Mexico had been both just and wise enough✓ to have satisfied our claims upon her promptly, at any sacrifice, when she saw this difficulty approaching, and so left this modest and peace-loving Administration of ours to pursue its designs of aggression upon her, if it dared, stripped naked of every rag of defence or apology! She did not do this; and her failure has complicated the relations between the two countries. War has come on while this notable delinquency is chargeable on her; and, though certainly brought on with little real regard to this cause, still it gives this advantage to this Government, that it marches upon her under cover of a fire from this battery. She should have spiked this artillery beforehand. As it is, she goes into the war-a war for other and distinct objects-with this admitted cause of complaint against her, on our part, and with the necessity fastened upon her of making due reparation for this injury before she can expect to come out of it. The war cannot now be relinquished by us till this satisfaction be made or secured. Would to God she understood her interest well enough to make this advance at once, and without any further delay. Public opinion in this country would soon settle the rest of the business, by compelling our Government to make peace with her, without robbery, or any further attempt at robbery.

But not only was this war begun, with no other than a pretended regard to our unsatisfied claims as a distinct object to be secured by it; but there was no necessary occasion for making this a cause of war—at least, at the time and in the manner in which warlike demonstrations were commenced on our part. At a former period, when Mexico was suffering under "the irritating effects of her struggle with Texas," and General Jackson took that occasion to break out in paroxysms of impatience and passion for the delay of that Government in providing for these claims, even he did not recommend war, but reprisals-and that only after another demand from on board one of our vessels of war. Congress refused to sanction even this measure of redress, and recommended a compliance with treaty stipulations, before resorting either to reprisals or war-which required a friendly de

mand first to be made for redress of injuries, accompanied with proper proofs to verify the complaints. If the two countries were not at war until blows were struck on the Rio Grande, then the Treaty of 1831 was as much in force as ever, and a proper demand was to be made before a resort to war or reprisals. And if it be said that Mexico refused to receive our Minister, sent to her for this and other objects, still we say, the mode of redress formerly proposed by General Jackson was open to the Government; a demand might have been made from on board one of our vessels of war, followed by reprisals in case of refusal, or unreasonable delay.

If it be said that Mexico

had first violated her treaty obligations to us by neglecting to pay her liquidated debt, and therefore we were no longer bound by any treaty stipulations with her, still we say, that with or without treaty, demand and reprisals were better than war, and should have been first resorted to, if coercive measures of any kind were necessary, and the real object had been to obtain satisfaction from Mexico for her debt and dues to us. But who does not see that the matter of these claims was the last and the least object which the Administration had in view in its military demonstrations towards Mexico? It was not for this that one fleet was gathering, at an early day, before Vera Cruz, and another was hovering around her ports on the Pacific, while an army was directed to take up a position on and over the farther boundary of Texas proper, preparatory to a march to its " point of ultimate destination" on the Rio Grande. The Administration cannot say, with truth, that it was the object of these movements originally, to compel Mexico to settle these claims, or that anything of the sort was deemed necessary for that purpose though the President and his echoes are continually ringing changes on these wrongs and injuries," as if they had really led to the war. They knew very well that these claims would be voluntarily settled the moment that Mexico could be reconciled to the loss of Texas, or could be made to submit to that loss. Mexico has never, at any period, refused to recognize and settle these claims, though she has often proscrastinated and neglected their settlement. It is only just to her to say this much. Before friendly relations were interrupted by this Texan business, and from the time of the Convention of 1839, we cannot charge

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Mexico with any disposition or design to escape from the settlement of her just dues to us. Witness the conventions negotiated by Mr. Thompson. One, by which she gave up her right by former treaty to pay in depreciated paper, and agreed to pay in coin; and another, by which the remaining cases, not disposed of under the former commission, were promptly provided for. And this was not all. Mr. Thompson says: "I was anxious before I left the legation that the docket should be cleared, and as there were five cases remaining, some of them of long standing, I asked an interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to discuss and settle them. The re

sult was, that all 1 asked was conceded to me, in all of them." All this did not look as if Mexico, at that time, if she had been unjust, was resolved to be unjust still. There were not wanting many other occasions, while Mr. Thompson was in Mexico, when the dispositions of that Government, whether to oblige or disoblige and injure us, were put to the test. She had in her possession prisoners of the Santa Fé expedition, prisoners of the expedition to Mier, and prisoners taken at San Antonio, in behalf of all of whom, in one way and another, our Minister had occasion to interpose with his remonstrances, or his good offices and solicitations. It was never done without success. So an order had been issued stopping the inland trade to Santa Fé, and another affecting seriously the goods and interests of American merchants in that country, both of which were rescinded, at the instance of the American Minister. So also the Government of Mexico, fearing another Texan operation, and not without good reason, had made an order for expelling all natives of the United States from California, and three adjoining Departments of Mexico; this order, too, was rescinded, at the peremptory demand of the Minister, who says that he did not take the high ground he had assumed in regard to it without "some compunctious visitings," for he had already been informed, and indeed consulted, in regard to a plot for the formation of an Independent Republic in that quarter, of which California should constitute a part.

Mr. Thompson's Mission in Mexico terminated, be it remembered, in March, 1844, just one month before Mr. Tyler's Treaty for the Annexation of Texas was concluded; and up to that moment, as he declared in his address on taking leave,

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"the bonds of friendship between the two nations had been strengthened, instead of being weakened." He added, in that same address, this fact-as creditable to him as to the Mexican Government -having first adverted to one exception only I have not made a single official demand, or even a simple request, which was not granted." All this did not look, certainly, as though in two short years from that time, we must needs be thundering with our cannon around her cities, to wake her up to a sense of "the wrongs and injuries we had so long borne," and of the justice she was wantonly withholding from us. No, no. It only needed that Mexico should have been conciliated in regard to Texas, to make the settlement of our claims certain and secure; and this the Administration knew perfectly well. There was not a well-informed man in the country who did not perfectly understand, that, on the event of Annex ation, if nothing worse happened, at least our friendly relations with Mexico, and with them the payment of our claims, must be suspended for a while, and until, by counsels of conciliation, moderation and wisdom, on our part, in dealing with her and the whole subject, she could be brought to look on Annexation with composure. We all knew, that if we escaped war in this business, yet the restoration of friendly relations must necessarily be the work of time, and would demand of us great circumspection, delicacy of treatment, and forbearance towards that excitable and sensitive people, whom, however innocently as we may think, we had deeply wounded.

And now we are prepared to say, and we do say, with emphasis and solemnity, that, with such a line of conduct on our part towards Mexico as was due from us in reference to the case and the occasion, war might have been and would have been avoided, without the sacrifice of one just claim or one substantial and fair interest of the United States, or of any American citizen. All the facts and disclosures in the case testify to this conclusion, and warrant us in taking this ground boldly, and without the slightest misgiving or doubt. Let those beware who have brought this needless war upon us, for covert objects which they have not dared to disclose or avow, and yet with pretences which are hypocritical and false !

The position which we here take in the first place, is this; that Mexico would

never have declared war against us, or gone to war with us, merely on account of the Annexation of Texas to the United States, with an undefined boundary between her territory and ours. It is true, she threatened war, and assumed a warlike attitude, and if her ability had been equal to her will, perhaps she would have taken the field--and perhaps not. There was at first some danger of war, merely because there was some danger that her authorities might not be able to satisfy the boastful feelings and pride of her people and her army short of it. But it is a good while since this danger passed away. It is perfectly manifest that her successive military chiefs-Santa Aña -Herrera-Paredes-none of them intended to make war on account of Annexation, unless forced into it by a noisy popular opinion which could clamor about war, without having really any stomach for the fight; and it is a good while since it became apparent that such a war, so far as Mexico was concerned, might and would be avoided. General Thompson satisfied himself of this before he left Mexico. "They are not going to declare war against us-1 have never doubted for a moment about that.”

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They talk as they have done for years about invading Texas. No such thing was attempted before the Annexation of Texas to this country; and an invasion now only excites a smile whenever it is spoken of. Not one man of sense in Mexico either desires or anticipates such a thing."

The attitude assumed by Mexico immediately after our Resolution of Annexation, made it necessary, in the opinion of the President, "as a precautionary measure, to order a strong squadron to the coasts of Mexico, and to concentrate an efficient military force on the Western Frontier of Texas." Where the "Western Frontier" of Texas was, or might be

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a settlement of boundaries, was an important question, which it was not competent to the President to decide. But our army took up a position at Corpus Christi on or near the right bank of the Nueces-a river which marked the wellknown boundary of the old province or department of Texas on the West. This was early in August of last year, and the avowed object of the movement was "to repel any invasion of the Texan territory which might be attempted by the Mexican forces." The President considered the Texan territory even then,

which was long before Annnexation was consummated, and while Texas was still as much an independent republic as she ever was, as a part of the territory of the United States, and to be defended accordingly. On this assumption, absurd, and mischievous as we deem it to be, he was right in taking proper precautions for its defence against a threatened invasion, if he believed the danger to be real, as we suppose he did. Admitting that it was, even at that period, the duty of the Executive to be prepared to repel any invasion of Texas by the Mexican forces, and to place the army near where it would be needed if Mexico should declare war against us; and admitting also that, with this object in view, it was proper that the army should have been directed to take up a position in the Texan territory, where, we ask, was the necessity that the very first position of our forces should have been taken on the farther side of the Nueces? Did not the President know that every inch of ground beyond the Nueces was disputed territory between Mexico and Texas? Did he not know that the Resolution of Annexation expressly reserved the question of boundary between us possessing the Texan territory, and Mexico, to be settled by friendly negotiation, and that it was this very country, between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, and the whole of it, which formed the subject of dispute? Certainly he knew all this, and he knew, too, that, if any thing could at that time, the taking military possession of this disputed territory would bring on a war. It was not enough for him to take possession of the undisputed soil of Texas, at that early day, to hold it against the day when Annexation should be consummated. Events have shown that he might have done this with impunity. But this could not satisfy him. Long before any attempt was made, or thought of, to open negotiations with Mexico for the peaceable settlement of the question of boundary, he orders General Taylor, as soon as the Convention of Texas should have passed on the proposition of Annexation, to march into Texas, and he instructs him that the point of his "ultimate destination" was "the Western Frontier" of Texas, where he would select and occupy a position with his army, on or near the Rio Grande-the extremest limit to which the nominal paper title of Texas had ever gone. General Taylor is told in another dispatch, " You will approach

as near the boundary line-the Rio Grande-as prudence will dictate." "The President desires that your position, for a part of your forces at least, should be west of the River Nueces." These letters invited General Taylor to push at once for the extremest limits→ the Rio Grande-they instructed him to pass "west of the River Nueces." He was too old a soldier to be caught in any trap set for him at Washington; he obeyed the orders, and gave the invita tion the go-by. He took his position at Corpus Christi, which was "west of the Nueces" because on the right bank of that river; and there he remained for six months, a hundred and fifty miles from the Rio del Norte, and until, having finally received positive orders, he moved to the latter river.

We affirm that Mexico would not have made war on the United States on account of Annexation, nor would she have invaded Texas, or crossed the Rio Grande with an army, if the President had kept his forces wholly out of Texas, or had contented himself with the military occupation of Texas alone within the well-known limits of the ancient state or province of that name. No man of sense can have any doubt on this point who understands what the position of Mexico has been, and what has actually transpired since the measure of Annexation was begun. If she made no attempt to reconquer Texas for long years, when Texas stood alone, she was not likely to begin such an enterprise after that country had come into our possession. Long before Annexation, she had become satisfied that her hold on Texas was gone→ the only difficulty was in making the acknowledgment. She was even ready, and offered to do this, in the prospect of Annexation, if Texas would pledge herself to remain independent. Indeed, it is known that Mexico had for some time cared for nothing else in regard to Texas, but to save the point of honor. She was willing to let her escape and be quit of her, on this condition. A nominal reunion, resulting, and designed to result, in complete separation, would have satisfied her at any time. It is true, that until some arrangement of the sort could be effected, her military chiefs deemed it politic to talk of re-conquest and invasion

but it was talk only. They became a little more vociferous on the event of Annexation-still, it was talk only. The Government of Herrera was well under

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