reader of their works, it is difficult to state, on account of the mingled feelings of admiration and dislike which they excite. Through the long line of English poets, we know of few, whose vices of head and heart deserve a sterner condemnation than theirs. After the strictest justice has been done to their excellencies, the score of vulgarity, licentiousness and a heavy balance stands against them on indifference to the moral consequences of slavishness. They wrote with a supreme their writings. Their works bear continual evidence of uncommon powers of mind given over to gild the most depraved excesses of passion and the most senseless pretensions of power. That they possessed hearts fitted to perceive what is noble in man and pure in woman, and minds to set forth that nobleness and purity in shapes of ideal beauty, only deepens their profligacy and the meanness of their servility. They stand forth from all the elder dramatists, the weakest in nerve and principle, the lowest in the scale of honor; and present the spectacle of English scholars and gentlemen, descending to play the part of panders, and eager to sell their souls for distinction or bread. No genius can shed lustre on such intrinsic baseness as this, and their fame as writers makes more painfully prominent their infamy as men. P.

of sound. Had the business of towncrier been hereditary in one family, since the first herald opened his mouth, the latest specimen would be, we think, the ideal of a slang-whanger. As for his mind, let that pass: as little might be said of his heart. His fiddle-built body, if it encase one at all, contains it as a child's rattle holds its contents. He has neither sensitiveness nor sense. To him the word sacred bears no meaning, and no seal of decency can teach him to respect the sanctities of public or private character. In fact, we do not love slangwhangers and if we do not declare war with them, it is that we do not fancy tilting with crocodiles. Knowing that argument or expostulation, or even satire, may as well be addressed to a windmill as to these iron-throated gentlemen, we propose, simply, to take the abused pub

lic by the arm, and once for all advise it against giving audience to these modern Eumenides.

There are slang-whangers everywhere; but perhaps a portion of our Democratic Congress, with certain stumporators who are Congressmen in training-bear off the palm in this country, probably in the world. On many subjects these orators provided by law are restless, raving and ridiculous enough to excite about equal degrees of compassion and contempt; but it is particularly in assailing our little army and navy, and their nurseries the U. S. Military Academy and Naval School, that they have shown the quality of their souls." If any one argues against all military organizations, as prolonging the spirit and dominion of war in the world, it is a very different thing. We can even go a part of the way with them, and are only brought up at the rock of necessity, or at least of national caution. But when persons, who are forever noisy about fighting for national honor, feed daily on martial epithets and belligerent denunciations, wax sanguinary in the face against great nations desirous of being at peace with us, and have finally succeeded in plunging us into a war of sheer aggression, in which all the little military science we possess is in vital demand-when such persons froth at the mouth with abuse of the system and single institution, from which alone that necessary science is derived, it becomes a matter despicable beyond endurance. If they would but conduct their operations in the spirit, or even under the semblance, of fair controversy, we would by no means quarrel with them. But they have, of their own accord, stepped without the pale of common courtesy. For several years a mean and libelous system of attack has been indulged in by Members of Congress, stump-orators and editors of the slang-whanger school, characterized by an entire want of can dor, and a total disregard of the public and private character of the class so foolishly assailed. Whatever objections any person may entertain against the Army and Military Academy, as institutions of the country, he has no right publicly to deal in wholesale denunciations of officers and cadets; as if, in giving their official services to the country, they had also thrown in their private characters for the public amusement. No one need be informed that such gen

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eralized anathemas offend alike against the laws of veracity and gentility. When Members of Congress deliberately characterize cadets as " wasp-waisted vampyres," and officers of the army as epauletted loafers," it would appear hopeless to argue points of propriety in that quarter. There are but few who so entirely violate decorum; and, in most cases, even those are evidently and confessedly offering sacrifice to the newly installed deity of Buncombe. The devo tees of Juggernaut can plead superstition in extenuation of their practices; these worshipers of Buncombe add hypocrisy to their other pleasant qualities. We do not propose a formal vindication of the character of the Army and Academy: the species of attack against which we protest is too mean-spirited to deserve refutation. With those who know it, the private character of officers and cadets will sufficiently plead their own cause; and their official character has been vindicated by a voice from the fields of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, to which a nation has listened, and which we hope will long silence the clamor of detraction.

Fair and able expositions of the condition and importance of the Army and Academy have so often come from official sources, as to require no reiteration from us. But it is a fair ground of complaint, that some of those to whom these reports are addressed should allow their preconceived opinions, formed without either opportunity or desire for candid examination, entirely to close their eyes to official testimony, given with a full knowledge of facts. There are some Members of Congress who, with the most wretchedly crude notions of our military organization, indulge themselves in periodical outpourings of bile on our establishment and all connected with it, doling out stale denunciations and gross misstatements, already often refuted. When Members thus volunteer to inform the world, it surely is but fair to hold them responsible for the veracity of their facts, when these are open for investigation. Yet some have doggedly persevered, for years, in stating as such, what a glance at statistics have shown to be misconceptions. What does this mean? This simply these patriots, amid their statistical oratory, are casting sweet sideglances at their dear constituency. They are laboring to demonstrate their pure democracy.

There is another species of army attack

which, coming from a different and higher source, threatens consequences of a more formidable character both to the army and the country. The President, in the exercise of his appointing power, has chosen to do violence to the cherished feelings of all military men, and to crush the just hopes of those whose distinguished services should have recommended them to his favorable notice. Little as the officers in our service had to hope in the way of promotion, he has made that little less by showing them that no services, however brilliant, can secure to them this, the only real and appropriate reward in his gift.

We have seen the country plunged into a war of Executive origin; our little army we have seen brought into a situation which made even the most sanguine tremble for its safety; by the most conspicuous gallantry and good conduct on the part of all concerned, we have seen it, not only saving itself, but signally overthrowing its enemies. Suppose the result what it surely must have been with officers unlike what ours showed themselves, brave and accomplished in their profession; suppose that army sacrificed to the Mexican arms through Ex. ecutive mismanagement: with what a voice of universal indignation would the country have resounded, and what bitter reproaches would have been coupled with the names of those who had brought this deep, abiding stain upon us! If ever an administration was saved from irretrievable disgrace, it was that of James K. Polk by the battles of the 8th and 9th of May. From him, then, we might fairly suppose, a sense of gratitude would call forth every just acknowledgment of those services which saved him.

What has he done? Close upon the heels of the dispatches announcing the triumph of our arms, comes a law authorizing the formation of a new reigment, as if purposely to furnish him the means of rewarding the merit which had won a nation's applause. With a total contempt of both justice and gratitude, he coolly passed by all the gallant spirits of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, to appoint a crowd of hungry aspirants whose courage and ability has only been shown in political campaigning. He prefers those who made him to those who saved him. Amongst these beautiful appointments are several deficient cadets, to whom he has at once given a rank above that of their former classmates who have

graduated and continued in service: a piece of indelicacy and injustice too gross to require comment.

But are we told that the President intends to reward with brevet rank, the distinguished officers of the Rio Grande ? He might better reward them with a blue ribbon or a sugar plum, as the more valuable of the two. Brevet rank gives neither pay nor (according to his own decision) command, except in certain unusual circumstances. Besides, this is so cheap a present that it has long since lost the attraction of being a distinction. The President could not now, if he would, bestow a substantial reward. Or perhaps it will be said that he has rewarded them by speaking in the highest terms of their merits in his communications to Congress. The approbation of a Washington or a Jackson might be esteemed a reward worth seeking; but what imbecility, what downright lunacy, what a specimen of reasoning from great to small, to argue thence that any praise from James K. Polk is a sufficient recompense, is glory enough!

There is another view of this affair. The President seems evidently to be shaping his measures to make the army a part of the great Executive machine for political corruption which so powerfully contributed to make him what he is. Let this be done, and we too will join in the belief that a standing army, however small, is dangerous to the political liberty of this country. We cannot too soon disband our little army existing, when time-serving politicians shall discover that officers in it are to be won by stump rather than field services or military attainments. The Executive patronage is already so great as to be more dangerous to a free expression of popular opinion than any other cause: what then might we expect should it be double?

This system of army attack, of which we have had so recent and ungracious a foreshadowing, is directed against its most vital point, its hope of distinction and love of honor. If continued, it will soon break the spirit of its brightest ornaments, or drive them from the service in disgust. Its present high character for military science and efficiency will not long survive the system which created it.

Entering our most decided protest, in the names of gentility, gratitude, and justice, against the slang-whanger and stilletto systems of army attack, we proceed to the more welcome subject of na

tional defence. We will first briefly give our creed on the subject of war, whence arises the necessity of national defence. We believe, as our pages have heretofore testified, that war in itself is an immense evil, and that we are morally bound to strive against its occurrence by all means in our power, consistent with the rights and character of a free and Christian nation. We have often felt, moreover, that no sight could be more sublime, than that of a great people, like ourselves, quietly disbanding all armaments and means of war, and calmly resting for security upon the broad level of human gentleness and forbearance. We do not, however, believe that mankind has yet so far progressed in cultivating the principles of gospel kindness, that nations in their dealings with each other will be always controlled by sense of justice, and never allow interest to lead to violations of right. Most of all, we are too sadly persuaded that we cannot trust the action of our own Government-could this be otherwise, we might come to a different conclusion. We think, therefore, that war or quiet submission to foreign dictation and injustice, may become our sole alternative. When this case arises, we believe war to be not only justifiable but obligatory upon the nation, if there be a chance of success. As all past history and present indications show both the possibility and probability of future resorts to this last argument becoming necessary, we esteem it a first duty of Government to provide for its own security when such an emergency arises. We believe that a state of thorough preparation for such emergencies constitutes one of the strongest possible securities against their occurrence, and thus redoubles the obligation of Government to provide the most efficient means of NATIONAL DEFENCE.

It is not our present purpose to examine in detail the various systems which have been or may be proposed. We, as a nation, have already adopted our system, and it is this which we would now examine. The elements entering into its composition may be classed under four general heads, viz.: the navy, the militia, the army and fortifications. The militia is the grand park of material from which the mass of our armies must be drawn. The army is the school of practice in which the treasures of military science are kept. Its office is that of the Roman vestal, nourishing ever a sacred flame

which was thence extended to every hearth at Rome. Fortifications exert a controlling influence over other arms, and are the grand auxiliary of the defensive. The navy represents our power to foreign nations, protects our commerce, acts against their navies, and cöoperates in sea-coast defence. In the latter capacity, only, would we now consider it.

The physical circumstances under which we are placed, are such as to expose an immense sea-coast frontier to hostile attempts. But this very weakness of our position affords, to a certain extent, its own cure; since the intervention of the Atlantic creates an obstacle not easily overcome by a force of suffcient strength to effect, by landing on our shores, its proposed object. Here we must call distinctly before the mind the fundamental principle of war, which is, that in every movement-the object should be to effect a concentration of superior forces on decisive points. Our main sea-port towns containing, as they do, the grand depots of materials useful in war-being almost the sole repositories of our naval stores and supplies, and concentrating in themselves vast amounts of wealth which might be exacted by laying them under contribution-are all, strategically speaking, decisive points, as their occupancy, even though temporary, would seriously affect the issue of a war. Thus the most important positions in our country are, naturally, entirely open to the attacks of our enemy. Now unless means be adopted effectually to prevent his succeeding in attempts on those points, he will soon deprive us of our main resources, and draw from ourselves the means of protracting hostilities. The navy has, by some, been regarded as the most efficient means of preventing or resisting these attempts.

Its entire inadequacy to effect this result becomes evident, if we reflect that it has not the power of omnipresence. Unless we suppose the chivalric courtesy of our enemy to extend so far as that he will favor us with a seat in his council of war, we cannot know beforehand whether he contemplates a blow at any of our towns, or, if he does, whether he will select Boston, New York, or New Orleans for a first effort. But till this be known, what can our navy do to prevent his design? Supposing it (what we may safely take for granted it long will be, in reference to the chief maritime powers of Europe) inferior in available force to

that of our enemy, it would be altogether absurd to expect it to secure our coast from insult, by moving out to sea to engage its antagonist. If it remains in port, It can only assist the defence of that harbor in which it may lie, while all the rest are entirely exposed. Next, suppose it of force equal to that of our enemy. Now, if it be kept together, it may try the result of an engagement, provided it can find an antagonist; but the chance of meeting him, by cruising after him on the broad ocean, is but as our chance of meeting Daniel Webster by taking a turn around the Capitol. But while our fleet is engaged in searching for its enemy, he may be successively laying our towns under contribution. Thus an equal fleet, united, would only succeed in defending our coast in the one fortunate case of its meeting and conquering its adversary. If, now, we suppose our equal fleet subdivided, no part would be able to cope with its enemy; as, in naval warfare, the inferior cannot maintain position before the superior. Wherever the descent be made, the enemy will find his prize increased by a fraction of our fleet. Thus our navy, considered as a means of seacoast defence, has but one chance, out of a great number, of effecting its object, so long as it is no more than equal to that of our antagonist.

A navy alone can only secure our defence when we are able to station before every town worth an enemy's attack, a fleet superior to his entire disposable naval force. If, with this idea, we think of the great number of our important seacoast towns, and of the immense navies of the maritime powers of Europe, we can form some conception of what an enormous marine we must create in order thereby to be secured. The whole nation would hardly furnish it crews. We regard those, then, entirely at fault, who look upon the navy as the principal in our defence against invasion, since we cannot, by it, secure an efficient and certain protection by any efforts within our power. But, as an auxiliary, it is of great value, as there are some important positions, naturally incapacitated for an unaided land defence, when ships of war or other floating batteries-acting under cover of fortifications-may seriously affect the the operations of an enemy, even though greatly inferior in force. Their province here is to act against the weak points of his line and his sources of supply, by improving favorable conjunc

tures for slipping out from their secure coverts, and not to endeavor to bear the whole brunt of his force. Thus, as an auxiliary, its necessity arises not from its excellence, but from the fact that nothing better can be substituted. The true sphere for the action of the navy is on the ocean-its own grand element-against the commerce and wooden walls of our enemies. Here its utility all must feel and acknowledge, and here our brilliant experience has shown how much we might yet hope from it in the event of another war. It still seems to us quite too small to effect this great object, and for this reason, together with the neces sity of our being honorably represented to other nations, we would advocate its increase.

The great peculiarity which characterizes our organization for national defence, is that, with us, the great reliance is placed, not as with other nations, on a standing army, but on the citizens of the country, embodied as militia. Practically dissenting from the conclusion on which the nations of Europe have grounded, and still ground, their organizations, that reliance can only be placed on troops formed by long and rigid discipline; we must be presumed to regard our circumstances as justifying us in excepting ourselves from a principle which is verified by so vast a body of experience. When a rule of national conduct has been universally concurred in, to depart without its pale is a dangerous experiment, requiring cogent reasons for its justification. Such we believe to be the character of those arguments which caused our national secession from the creed of the civilized world on this point. With us there does not exist the necessity for maintaining a large standing army, in order that we may be prepared for hostilities. With an efficient militia system, and with a small standing army sufficient to perpetuate the higher branches of military science among us, we can pass to a state of active hostilities with every requisite for success. The great body of troops required in war is composed of infantry, whose duties require but a slight degree of intelligence. These duties militia, under skilful direction, can efficiently perform, if they can be induced to use the abilities of which they are, in fact, possessed. The effect of discipline is not to make a man's skin shot-proof; its virtue lies in this, that it teaches all to act together as parts of a whole, to