attack, they would doubtless be appropriately and advantageously applied. We believe, however, that the minds of our people are so firmly impressed with the idea that Canada will ultimately become ours, that a proposition to prepare for any other issue, in case of hostilities, would meet with no favor!

The character of our western frontier is altogether peculiar. Civilized and savage life so blend into each other, that it is impossible exactly to define its position. The presence of numerous tribes of Indians beyond it, renders a frequent show of force necessary, not so much to conduct, as to prevent hostilities. Its distribution into garrisons must be regulated by the rapidly shifting circumstances of the case. Our western works of defence, therefore, must all be of a temporary character. As they can never be subject to a formal siege with artillery, it would be a useless excess of precaution to give them a greater degree of strength than is possessed by the stockade forts and blockhouses now in use.

The general character of our maritime and Gulf frontier is such as to direct to them our principal positive means of permanent defence. Its immense extent, the great importance to our nation of securing the wealthy and flourishing towns springing up at many points along it, the military and naval resources concentrated within them; these are peculiar features, inviting peculiar consideration. These sections, too, constitute the frontier over which must cross any serious invasion of our soil which might be attempted. Along the Gulf frontier, the towns are few, and, with one great exception, comparatively unimportant. Yet they stand in special need of defence, as the country from which they draw their support has not in itself the means of promptly sustaining them in their attempts to repel an attack, and especially as the hope, so confidently and cruelly entertained across the Atlantic, of deriving assistance from servile insurrections, would greatly tend to attract invasion towards this portion of our Union. But it is the commerce of the west, collected into the Mississippi, which gives peculiar importance to Gulf defence. The establishment of secure harbors of refuge, at Key West, Tortugas and Pensacola, will give to this commerce a degree of security which nothing else but a naval supremacy could afford.

The eastern section is that which presents the strongest temptations to an ene

my. Containing, especially on its northern portion, many excellent harbors, most of which are inlets to important towns, and within which is concentrated the main commerce of the second maritime power on the earth, they furnish to the immense navies of the old world every incentive to organize overwhelming attacks.

Expeditions destined to act against our shores are quite within the range of probabilities. The overwhelming navy of Great Britain could dispatch, almost without perceptible reduction, a fleet superior in force to our entire navy. Were such a squadron allowed to enter our harbors without obstruction, it might successively visit our ports, capturing or destroying our mercantile marine, bombarding our cities or laying them under contribution, destroying our naval materials, shipyards and docks; all this, too, without making a landing or exposing itself to the action of land troops. Historical proofs of the probability of such enterprises might be adduced in abundancce, but we shall content ourselves with alluding to the action of the British government in fortifying the coast of England against such attempts. Hitherto its reliance for home defence has been placed mainly on a channel fleet, which it has been enabled to maintain without elsewhere losing the naval supremacy. It has thus always succeeded in transferring hostilities to the country of its enemy. The immense expedition which Napoleon had contemplated for invading England with 150,000 veterans, not having been executed, has generally been considered as a chimerical project, but whatever may have been its character then, the English government is now evidently convinced that steam has brought down the sea-girt isle from her position of fancied security. Their channel fleet cannot by its flutterings frighten away the " dogs of war," which can almost blow their breath over so narrow a line of water, and are able to cross it in a single hour. If, then, England, so long the acknowledged mistress of the seas, with a limited, densely peopled shore, is obliged to confess by her present heavy expenditures that her wooden walls are no longer a sufficient security against invasion, how unlikely is she to doubt her own ability to invade our immense and sparsely-settled coast, if it be left undefended? We have a positive expression of her opinion on this point in the establishment of an extensive coal depot

at the Bermudas. The ability of England, or even of France, to direct an expedition of twenty or thirty thousand men against our coast to execute a coup-de-main can only be doubted by blind or prejudiced students of past history; and still less can such a sceptic comprehend the effect of steam navigation in annihilating distance. The question of the success of such enterprises, after reaching our shores, is quite another thing, and its answer will depend on the state of our preparations for their reception. This brings us to the question as to what preparation we must make to frustrate, as far as possible, such an attempt.

First of all, we must, if it can be done, cut off all facilities for a hostile entrance into our harbors to attack our cities from on shipboard. A great point will be gained if we can force an enemy to land at a distance: for we are thus enabled to dispute his landing, which being necessarily made on an open beach, is, at best, a matter of great difficulty and hazard. Then his approach to the city may be contested foot by foot, and the city itself may be vigorously defended, especially as he can hardly put on shore any artillery to accompany his advancing column. Meantime the alarm is spread; volunteers come pouring in from the surrounding country; a retreat becomes necessary, if the field is well contested, even before reaching the town; the fleet, lying off an open coast, may have been driven by rising winds out to sea, or on shore, either of which disasters may render surrender or destruction the sole alternative of the invading army. Besides, we by this means deprive him of the power of using his immense naval batteries against our cities, and render bombardment, the means of attack most of all to be dreaded, quite impossible, except at infinite expense and hazard. By obliging him to put his mortars on shore, and to transport them some distance overland, we so delay his attack that our troops may be concentrated in great force to oppose his onset. Again, inasmuch as a landing on an open beach is only possible under favoring circumstances of the weather, we may, by closing our harbors aginst him, constrain him to lie off at sea, exposed to storms and the danger of being driven on shore, waiting a favorable occasion for debarkation. His approach being thus made known some time before he can attempt a landing, we are enabled to

organize a vigorous resistance to that difficult operation. From these considerations, it seems evident that if we can seal our harbors against invasion, we make the hazards of attempts on our towns so great as to throw them quite beyond the range of probabilities, and thus procure, as far as may be done, perfect security to our decisive points of defence.

To effect this great object, is the proposed end of the system of permanent defences, which has, for the past thirty or forty years, been in slow process of execution. The problem of closing the harbors on our maritime frontier, has been addressed in all its generality; and careful examinations of our whole extent of coast, have been made by officers of the Corps of Engineers, with special reference to the practical solution of this great question. The result of their deliberations and investigations has been the projection of a system of permanent works, which, when completed, will positively preclude an enemy from entrance to any of our good harbors. The erection of the individual works composing this system, has been undertaken, as far as practicable, in the order of their importance. The constant study, in their construction, has been to effect the proposed object in the most economical manner consistent with a due regard for those military principles, which must regulate the relation of parts, in order to render the works secure from an assault, or coup-de-main.

The necessity of a

strict observance of flanking arrangements, which alone can secure a fort from escalade, requires the preservation of a considerable interior space, and positively forbids that reduction in their capacity which some of the uninitiated have thought practicable. We have but one fort which would be considered in Europe as more than of the third magnitude. The old assertion, that everything degenerates in this hemisphere, is true enough of the magnitude of our forts, though decidedly false in regard to their other good qualities.

The system to which we have alluded will require a long time for its completion, yet this event is quite within the range of calculation. The small appropri ations annually made for this purpose are gradually effecting it, and Congress may, at pleasure, accelerate within certain limits its rate of progress. When once completed in the manner contem

lated, the entire system may be kept in repair, by a very small annual expenditure. Its total cost cannot be determined at present with any great accuracy, as many of the works are not yet planned. But the conjectural estimates of the Engineer Department, made with all the care which circumstances would permit, give the aggregate cost of the whole proposed system, exclusive of those parts constructed up to 1836, about thirty-one and a half millions of dollars. This expenditure dwindles into nothingness, when compared with the additional loss which might be inflicted on the nation without it, even in one war. But its duration will be measured in centuries, if proper attention be paid to its repair, instead of the twelve years cycle, deduced from French naval statistics, as the lifetime of a man-of-war. Hence it is a fair inference that a true economy would dictate the gradual completion of this system, as fast as the means of the general government will permit. It can hardly be doubted, that when this great national work shall be finished, it will constitute a pacific argument fully competent to refute the "ultima ratio regum," thereby powerfully tending to subvert the present bloody system of international dialectics. The unity of opinion among those who have made a special study of the subject, should silence the doubts of those who question the ability of forts, to close the entrances of our harbors. Obstructions placed in the channels will detain, under their fire, any vessel attempting to pass, sufficiently long to secure her inevitable destruction, whether propelled by wind or steam. Our sea-coast batteries being all furnished with hot-shot furnaces, can, with the utmost certainty, if properly served, set fire to any wooden ship venturing within their range. If floating defences, specially adapted to harbor operations, be employed as auxiliaries, nothing but our neglect or treachery can enable a fleet to run this gauntlet with safety. Such is the decided opinion of those whom careful examination of this subject has best qualified to decide, and as this is mainly a question of facts, all vague,

careless scepticism should yield to their matured judgments.*

We have thought that the important functions of fortifications and their relations to sea-coast protection, could not better be illustrated than by a brief exposition of their application in the defence of the city and harbor of New York. The importance of placing beyond ques tion the security of this great commercial emporium, would appear to be self-evident; nor can we suppose that any person would seriously regard this object as too unimportant to justify a great expen diture. Yet, conscious as we are that the city is actually open to the approach of an invading force, which may be put on shore within seven miles of Brooklyn without disturbance from forts or storms, we confess a degree of surprise at the general apathy on this subject which has prevailed among those most concerned, during the recent agitating state of our foreign relations. It hardly seems to have been thought possible that, in the event of hostilities with England, New York should be in danger of insult. Now, we would not be alarmists, nor are we ambitious to create a sensation, but as we have bestowed a careful examination and some reflection on the facts of the case, we feel justified in stating our deliberate conviction that, in case of war with any great maritime power, New York is in greater danger of being laid under contribution and otherwise insulted, than any other city on our coast, unless its fortifications are considerably extended. This opinion is based on the fact that an enemy's inducements for such an operation against this city is so much greater than it would be for a similar enterprise elsewhere. Could he destroy the Navy-yard, with its three millions of public property, its ships on the stocks, ship materials and dry-docks, this alone would be equivalent to several victories at sea, in its effects on the progress of the war. If he were to add our mercantile marine, collected at the docks, the docks themselves, exactions of heavy contributions, or pillage of private property, he would have done us a greater injury than he could possibly have effected in any other way.

This would be Vandalism doubtless, but did the fear of that reproach stay the hand of the spoiler at Washington? Yet, great as his inducement for such a course would unquestionably be, its practicability will doubtless he denied. Prudence forbids a detailed statement of the facts which have confirmed us in the opinion that 40,000 or 50,000 men may suddenly be precipitated on the rear of Brooklyn, almost bearing the tidings of their own approach. To check such an enterprise before the apprehended mischief should be completed, would require the full force of our city troops, who could, it is to be feared, only be brought into the field in time to annoy the enemy's retreat. Certainly, full success could not be promised to such an attempt, but the injury which even its partial success might inflict on us, would be of such magnitude that all chance of such a stroke should absolutely be prevented, by availing ourselves of the facilities which, in the present case, nature has so lavishly bestowed.

There are two great water approaches to New York harbor, which must be closed against the entrance of a hostile squadron. There is an obvious advantage in closing them as far as possible from the city, as by this means we force an army attempting a bold stroke to make a longer land march, thus giving time to oppose his advance and to concentrate in force on his rear. The first position on the East River, in approaching from the Sound, capable of being occupied for this purpose, is Throg's Point, on which Fort Schuyler is now being erected. This is admirably situated on a sandy spur of the mainland, and when completed, (which will probably be in about two years,) will be almost impregnable. This, in connection with a work on Wilkin's Point, situated just opposite, would render any attempt to force this pass foolhardy in the extreme. The entrance through the Narrows is, in every sense, the most important passage on our coast. It consists of an inner and an outer har bor, connected by the Narrows, a channel of about a mile wide. The inner harbor contains Governor's, Bedlow's and Ellis' Islands, on all of which batteries are now constructed. But the strong point is at the Narrows, which is capable of being made absolutely impassable by an enemy. On the Long Island shore the present defences are in good condition and possess no inconsiderable strength. On the Sta

ten Island shore, though considerable has already been done, much more remains to be accomplished. As this is the key to the defence of New York, delay in completing its efficient occupation with permanent works, is attended with no small danger to our metropolis. The outer harbor is separated from the ocean by Sandy Hook, which is a spur of sand shooting out about five miles from the Jersey shore, across its entrance, and by a bar, with an interior line of shoals and channels, stretching thence to the Long Island shore. It contains a spacious anchorage, by the occupancy of which all ingress or egress of vessels might be prevented and a strict blockade enforced. But by occuping the point of Sandy Hook with a respectable fort, and by the erection of at most three castellated batteries on the intermediate shoals, this harbor may also be closed against an enemy, thus rendering the enforcement of a strict blockade impossible; as a hostile squadron could only maintain a blockading position when favored with calms or western or northern winds. Supposing the water approaches closed as has been indicated, a land descent can only be made by a disembarkation on the Jersey shore, on Long Island or on the northern shore of the Sound. The intersected and marshy nature of the country on the Jersey shore makes an approach to the city from that quarter quite impracticable. To effect a landing on the southern shore of Long Island would, for a similar reason, be impracticable, or at least extremely hazardous, at any point nearer than twenty miles from the city. Disembarkation on the northern shore would also be removed to about the same distance by the action of Fort Schuyler. But the western section of the island is diversified with hills and villages, which might be most efficiently employed to check the advance of an army; while the militia from the eastern portion and from the mainland, crossing at Throg's Point, might concentrate on its rear in such strength as to cut off its retreat, unless it be commenced before reaching Brooklyn. A disembarkation on the northern shore of the Sound might be made at about the same distance from the city, and would present even greater difficulties. Westchester Creek, the Bronx, Harlaem river and Harlaem heights would constitute a series of obstacles quite too great to be overcome without enormous force. From this examination it would appear to be within the power of fortifi