by controlling their pay, and the limitation as to service.

The states were afraid of each other, especially were the small states distrustful of the large ones. This is evidenced in the provision that each state should have one vote. By this arrangement the states had equal power in the congress.

The people were afraid of the general government. A central government was a necessity, but the people gave it only very limited powers. They would not have an executive officer, because they feared anything resembling kingly rule. They did not dare to establish a national judiciary having jurisdiction over persons and property, because their experience with "trials beyond the sea” had made them wary of outside tribunals.

It is to be observed, however, that with all their distrust, in spite of the fact that their colonial or state jealousies and habits had returned upon them, notwithstanding their specific statement in the instrument itself that "each state retains its sovereignty," the instinct of nationality was yet strong enough to cause them to continue in the general government the actual sovereign powers. Thus the "United States" alone could treat with foreign nations, declare war and make peace. Another great sovereign power, that of coining money, was unfortunately shared by the states.

Their defects.-The great defect in the articles of confederation was that they left too little power in the hands of the general government. Although congress possessed the right to declare war, it could only apportion the quota of men to each state. The states raised the troops. And so on with the other powers. The government of the United States during the confed

eration period was "a name without a body, a shadow without a substance." An eminent statesman of the time remarked that "by this political compact the continental congress have exclusive power for the following purposes without being able to execute one of them: They may make and conclude treaties; but they can only recommend the observance of them. They may appoint ambassadors; but they cannot defray even the expenses of their tables. They may borrow money on the faith of the Union; but they cannot pay a dollar. They may coin money; but they cannot buy an ounce of bullion. They may make war and determine what troops are necessary; but they cannot raise a single soldier. In short, they may declare everything, but they can do nothing."

The consequences.-"The history of the confederation during the twelve years beyond which it was not able to maintain itself, is the history of the utter prostration, throughout the whole country, of every public and private interest,-of that which was, beyond all comparison, the most trying period of our national and social life. For it was the extreme weakness of the confederate government, if such it could be called, which caused the war of independence to drag its slow length along through seven dreary years, and which, but for a providential concurrence of circumstances in Europe, must have prevented it from reaching any other than a disastrous conclusion. When, at last, peace was proclaimed, the confederate congress had dwindled down to a feeble junto of about twenty persons, and was so degraded and demoralized, that its decisions were hardly more respected than those of any voluntary and irresponsible association. The treaties which the confederation had made with foreign powers,

t

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it was forced to see violated, and treated with contempt by its own members; which brought upon it distrust from its friends, and scorn from its enemies. It had no standing among the nations of the world, because it had no power to secure the faith of its national obligations. For want of an uniform system of duties and imposts, and by conflicing commercial regulations in the different states, the commerce of the whole country was prostrated and well-nigh ruined. *** Bankruptcy and distress were the rule rather than the exception. *The currency of the country had hardly a nominal value. The states themselves were the objects of jealous hostility to each other. In some of the states rebellion was already raising its horrid front, threatening the overthrow of all regular government and the inauguration of universal anarchy,"

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CHAPTER XIX.

THE ORIGIN OF THE CONSTITUTION.

"For several years efforts were made by some of our wisest and best patriots to procure an enlargement of the powers of the continental congress, but from the predominance of state jealousies, and the supposed incompatibility of state interests with each other, they all failed. At length, however, it became apparent, that the confederation, being left without resources and without powers, must soon expire of its own debility.

Each state regulated its own commerce.

Dr. J. H. McIlvaine in Princeton Review for October, 1861, quoted in Pomeroy's Constitutional Law

.

It had not only lost all vigor, but it had ceased even to be respected. It had approached the last stages of its decline; and the only question which remained was whether it should be left to a silent dissolution, or an attempt should be made to form a more efficient government before the great interests of the Union were buried beneath its ruins.'

Preliminary movements.-In 1785 a resolution was passed by the legislature of Massachusetts declaring the articles of confederation inadequate, and suggesting a convention of delegates from all the states to amend them. No action, however, was taken. In the same year commissioners from Virginia and Maryland met at Alexandria, Va., to arrange differences relative to the navigation of the Potomac, the Roanoke, and Chesapeake Bay. The deliberations showed the necessity of having other states participate in the arrangement of a compact. In 1786, the legislature of Virginia appointed commissioners "to meet such as might be appointed by the other states of the Union, to take into consideration the trade of the United States." Only four states accepted the invitation. Commissioners

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from the five states met at Annapolis, and framed a report advising that the states appoint commissioners "to meet at Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next, to take into consideration the situation of the United States, to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union." In accordance with this suggestion, congress passed a resolution, February 21, 1787, recommending that a convention of delegates who shall have

* Story.

+ Elliott's Debates.

been appointed by the several states, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the articles of confederation. "*

The Constitutional Convention. In response to the call of congress, delegates from all the states except Rhode Island met in Philadelphia. By May 25, a quorum had assembled, the convention organized, with George Washington as chairman, and began its morientous work.

It was soon discovered that it would be useless to attempt to amend the articles of confederation. They were radically defective, and a new plan of government was seen to be necessary. The national idea must be re-established as the basis of the political organization.

"It was objected by some members that they had no power, no authority, to construct a new government. They certainly had no authority, if their decisions were to be final; and no authority whatever, under the articles of confederation, to adopt the course they did. But they knew that their labors were only to be suggestions; and that they as well as any private individuals, and any private individuals as well as they, had a right to propose a plan of government to the people for their adoption. The people, by their expressed will, transformed this suggestion, this proposal, into an organic law, and the people might have done the same with a constitution submitted to them by a single citizen."

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The labors of the convention lasted four months. The constitution was agreed to September 15, 1787. Some of the difficulties encountered.-Of these, perhaps the most formidable was the adjustment of power

Elliott's Debates.

Pomeroy's Constitutional Law, p. 55.