Co. v. Norfolk, 220 U. S. 472, 477. Duncklee v. Webber, 151 Massachusetts, 408, 411, and cases cited in 24 Cyc. 1057; 18 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 2d ed. 650. It has come back to what it started as being, a construction of the law; and since, notwithstanding its age, the special effect of demisi has not entered into speech so far as to reach popular understanding, the rule still may be construed as extending no further than reason dictates. Indeed warranties in law always have been dealt with on this principle. See e. g. Brett v. Cumberland, Cro. Jac. 521, 523. Therefore we may consider the question before us on the footing upon which it was discussed by the Supreme Court of the State.

The question is, then, whether our duty requires us to overthrow a decision that the policy of the state law excludes a constructive obligation to indemnify against the exercise of the sovereign power of taxation from leases by the State. Put in this form, it is not hard to answer. When the law creates an obligation outside of the expressed intent of the parties, it must consider all the circumstances, and the effect with reference to them. In ordinary cases the whole property is taxed and which party shall bear the burden is not a matter of public concern. But when the State makes the lease, the supposed obligation would be an obligation not to tax-a restriction of public import not lightly to be imposed. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 561. Wells v. Savannah, 181 U. S. 531, 539, 540. St. Louis v. United Railways Co., 210 U. S. 266, 273, 274. J. W. Perry Co. v. Norfolk, 220 U. S. 472, 480. It is urged that to deny the State's obligation discriminates unconstitutionally against this class of lessees, since all others are free from the burden. But that is not true. Whether landlord or tenant shall pay a tax is a matter of private arrangement, and the practice one way or the other has no bearing on the matter. The argument from inequality really works the other way. If these leaseholds are not VOL. CCXXXI-44

taxable, they are a favored class of property; for ordinarily leaseholds are taxed even if they are lumped and included in the value of the fee. When an interest in land, whether freehold or for years is severed from the public domain and put into private hands, the natural implication is that it goes there with the ordinary incidents of private property and therefore is subject to being taxed. See New York ex rel. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co. v. New York State Board of Tax Commissioners, 199 U. S. 1, 38.

The plaintiffs in error think that thus far there has been a failure to understand their contention that these assessments are against the land, and therefore are met by the supposed contract of the State, that the lessees should have the land free of all charges. The court below appears to us to have decided in direct response to that argument that the contract of the State did not go so far, and we are of opinion that we ought not to pronounce the decision wrong. There was some subsidiary discussion of the meaning and operation of the Statutes, but upon those matters we do not go behind the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State.

Judgment affirmed.

PIZA HERMANOS v. CALDENTEY.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PORTO RICO.

No. 134. Submitted December 15, 1913.-Decided January 5, 1914.

Where the principle on which the amount recovered is based is admitted, this court will not go behind well warranted findings of fact in regard to the question of amount.

Where it appears that there may have been an error in computing the

amount of the recovery, this court can affirm the judgment without prejudice to reopening the account for the single purpose of correcting such error if the lower court so permits.

THE facts, which involve the construction of a contract of employment, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Frederic R. Coudert, Mr. Paul Fuller and Mr. Charles B. Samuels for appellants.

Mr. Charles F. Carusi and Mr. A. Sarmiento for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a suit by the appellee to recover the sum alleged by him to be due upon a correct account between the defendants and himself. The facts as found are that the appellee was employed by the defendants, copartners, at a monthly salary and ten per cent. of the net profits, to be credited in his private account; that after about seven years and a half he left the firm on March 11, 1910; that the points of difference as to accounting concern the valuation of an estate bought by the firm and of some unharvested and unsold crops. The firm credited the estate at cost, $20,584.67, but the courts below found that it was worth $80,000, charged the difference, $59,415.33, as profit, and credited the appellee with $5941.53. They likewise found that the profit on the crops was much greater than the appellee's estimate and therefore allowed him the $2000 claimed in his complaint.

It may be that we should adopt a different rule from that followed by the courts below if the question came here as a pure question of law. But it appears from the opinion of both courts that they found the appellants to have admitted the propriety of charging an increase in

the value of the estate as a profit, so that the question was narrowed to one of amount. The principle being settled in this way it was applied to the unsold crops. We do not go behind these well warranted findings of fact and really there is nothing else before us. The assignment of errors raised some other points, but these were the only matters that were pressed in the final argument or that could have been pressed with any hope of success. It is suggested that if otherwise right the judgment charged the appellants with some items twice over. We do not see it, but if there has been any oversight in this respect our affirmance of the judgment will be without prejudice to reopening the account for the single purpose of correcting errors of calculation if permitted upon application to the Supreme Court.

Judgment affirmed.

HOBBS v. HEAD AND DOWST COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.

No. 148. Argued December 18, 19, 1913.-Decided January 5, 1914.

Even though contractors may not be entitled to a mechanics' lien under the statute unless the contract be completed, they may be entitled thereto if absolute completion is waived, and in this case this court will not go behind the finding of the master followed by the court below that there was a waiver and the contractor was justified in stopping work.

Where the state trial court had upheld a mechanics' lien before the

petition and the trustee in bankruptcy seeks in the Federal court to prevent the enforcement of the lien, this court will not go behind the state judgment because exceptions thereto had not been passed upon owing to the action of those representing the estate.

In this case this court is satisfied that substantial justice has been

done in enforcing a lien for over $45,000 admittedly due to the contractor but contested because about $1,000 of work remained uncompleted on a contract of $187,000, the contractors having ceased work after the owner of the building had failed in its payments and was hopelessly insolvent.

175 Fed. Rep. 501, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the validity of a lien for labor and materials on property of a bankrupt, and the necessity for completion of the contract in order to maintain the lien, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Henry F. Hollis for appellant:

The alleged lien has no legal standing under the statute. See N. H. Pub. Stats., c. 141, §§ 10, 16, 17.

The lienors are not entitled to a mechanics' lien because: They deliberately, willfully, and without legal excuse, failed to complete their contract; nothing is due and payable under said contract; the contract is entire and no way is provided to apportion non-lienable items.

All the mechanics' lien cases which are reported in New Hampshire reports are as follows and sustain this contention: Jacobs v. Knapp, 50 N. H. 71; Bryant v. Warren, 51 N. H. 213; Cheshire Prov. Ins. v. Stone, 52 N. H. 365; Cole v. Colby, 57 N. H. 98; Freeto v. Houghton, 58 N. H. 100; Hill v. Callahan, 58 N. H. 497; Hale v. Brown, 59 N. H. 551; Eastman v. Newman, 59 N. H. 581; Marston v. Stickney, 60 N. H. 112; Foote v. Scott, 60 N. H. 469; Pike v. Scott, 60 N. H. 469; Hodgdon v. Darling, 61 N. H. 582; Pitman v. Thompson, 63 N. H. 73; Thompson Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 67 N. H. 409; Kendall v. Pickard, 67 N. H. 470; Quimby v. Williams, 67 N. H. 489; Lawson v. Kimball, 68 N. H. 549; Wason v. Martel, 68 N. H. 560; Lavoie v. Burke, 69 N. H. 144; Grafton Co. v. Company, 69 N. H. 177; Perrault v. Shaw, 69 N. H. 180; Cudworth v. Bostwick, 69 N. H. 536; Bixby v. Whitcomb, 69 N. H. 646; Russell v. Howell, 74 N. H. 551.