INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
LOCAL LAW (Alaska);
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 14.
INJUNCTION.
See ACTIONS, 4, 6;
JURISDICTION, C 4; F;
PARTIES, 1, 2, 3.
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY.
1. Error not prejudicial where jury not misled.
Where the case was tried throughout on the proper theory of the stat-
ute, the fact that the court in its charge may have used some
terms that were technically inappropriate held not to be ground for
reversal as the jury could not have been misled thereby. Phoenix
Ry. Co. v. Landis, 578.
2. Adequacy and fairness in suit on bond.
In Federal courts the judge and jury are assumed to be competent to
play their respective parts; and held that the charge to the jury in
this case as to the meaning of the phrase "net dimension blocks"
was adequate and fair. Graham v. United States, 474.
See PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 31.
1. Agent's knowledge; effect to estop principal.
Where the policy itself expressly provides that it cannot be varied by
anyone except an officer of the company issuing it, the company is
not estopped to contest the policy on the ground of misrepresenta-
tions or concealment in the application because its agent has knowl-
edge of actual conditions. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Moore, 560.
2. Agreements in policy; right of applicant to make.
Applicants for insurance are competent to make agreements in the
policy that no person other than the executive officers of the com-
pany can vary its terms, and such an agreement is binding when
made. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 543.
3. Law governing contracts of; Georgia law.
The character of the covenants of a contract for life insurance depends
upon the law of the State where made. The Code of Georgia ex-
pressly provides that the application must be made in good faith
and that the representations are covenanted by the applicant as
true, and any variations changing the character of the risk will void
the policy. Ib.
4. Representations; materiality and falsity; sufficiency of showing to void
policy.
In order for an insurance company, defending on the ground of false
statements in the application, to have a verdict directed, it must
establish that the representations were material to the risk and
were untrue. Ib.
5. Representation as to former rejection; falsity of.
A representation that the applicant for insurance has never been re-
jected by any company, association or agents is material to the risk
and is not true if he has withdrawn an application at the sugges-
tion of the medical adviser, and with the knowledge that the com-
pany to whom the application was made was about to reject it. Ib.
6. Representation as to former rejection; falsity of.
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Moore, ante, p. 543, followed to effect that it was
error not to charge the jury that a statement made by an applicant
for life insurance that he had never been rejected by any company,
association or agent after he had withdrawn an application on the
advice of the medical adviser with knowledge that the company
for whom the examination was made would reject him, is material
and untruthful. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Moore, 560.
7. Georgia law as to contracts of.
The law of Georgia as determined by its highest court, prior to the
adoption of the Code, was that insurer and insured may make their
own contract and determine what representations are material.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 543.
8. Georgia law as to contracts of; effect of immaterial matters as warranties.
The highest court of Georgia has decided that mere immaterial matters,
although declared to be warranties, do not void a policy even
though the policy declares them to be such, and that under the
Code the parties themselves could not contract to make immaterial
matter material. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 9, 10, 28.
1. Accounting by carriers; § 20 of Act to Regulate as amended.
In enacting the Hepburn Act amending § 20 of the Act to Regulate
Commerce, Congress recognized the essential distinctions between
property accounts and operating accounts, and between capital
and earnings, and that while prior to that time the practice of
different carriers varied, uniformity in regard to the keeping of
accounts was essential in the future for proper supervision and
regulation. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 423.
2. Accounts; classification adopted by Commission; abuse of power in.
The classification of accounts adopted by the Interstate Commerce
Commission in regard to additions and betterments and to prop-
erty and operating accounts are not so arbitrary or so entirely at
odds with fundamental principles of correct accounting as to
amount to an unconstitutional abuse of power. Ib.
3. Accounts; constitutional validity of Commission's system of accounting.
In this case the carrier was not deprived of any of its property without
due process of law because under the Commission's system of ac-
counting it was permitted to carry into its property account only
the excess of the full cost of improvements made off the line after
deducting the estimated replacement cost of the abandoned por-
tions of the track or because it was required to charge to operating
expenses the estimated cost of replacing the abandoned sections.
Ib.
4. Accounts; suit between carrier and Commission in regard to; rights
determinable.
Where, as in this case, all classes of stockholders of a carrier, whose
dividends are affected by the method of charging betterments and
repairs, are not before the court, their rights cannot be determined
in a suit between the carrier and the Commission in regard to such
methods of accounts. Ib.
5. Accounts of carriers; effect of requiring stockholders to forego dividends
for purpose of bettering conditions of property.
Semble, that requiring stockholders to forego dividends for a period
so that the amount not divided be spent in bettering the condition
of the property, thus giving them greater security for dividends in
the future, does not amount to an unlawful taking of property
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Ib.
6. Accounts of carriers; effect of order of Commission on carrier's right to
use funds.
The power given to the Commission by § 20 of the Act to Regulate
Commerce, as amended by the Hepburn Act, to require the carrier
to keep accounts as prescribed by the Commission, does not impose
obligations upon the carrier as to the use of the proceeds of bonds
but simply prevents such proceeds from being used in any manner
without the fact appearing in the accounts. Ib.
7. Accounts; abandonments; charging of.
Although the contention of the carrier that abandonments ought to
be charged to profit and loss rather than to operating expenses may
have weight, this court will not reverse the order of the Commis-
sion requiring them to be otherwise charged on the ground that
it was an abuse of power. Ib.
8. Character of business as; effect of magnitude.
The fact that there are great numbers of transactions therein does not
give to a business any other character than magnitude; it cannot
transform a business from one which is subject to state regulation
to one beyond that regulation as interstate. New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Deer Lodge Co., 495.
9. Character of insurance business as; effect of use of mails in.
The fact that the mails are used in consummating contracts for in-
surance between a corporation in one State and the insured in an-
other, does not give character to the negotiations or the contract
nor does it make the latter interstate commerce. Ib.
10. Character of insurance business as; effect of negotiability of policy.
The fact that after the insured receives his policy of insurance it be-
comes subject to sale and transfer, does not make the business of
issuing it commerce. Ib.
11. Common carriers; status as; application of commodity clause; quære
as to.
Quære, and not now discussed or decided, whether a shipper furnishing
lighterage service within lighterage limits for a part of the rate be-
comes a common carrier and debarred from transporting his own
goods under the commodity clause of the Act to Regulate Com-
merce. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 274.
12. Constitutional validity of § 20 of Act to Regulate.
The constitutional validity of the provisions in § 20 of the Act to
Regulate Commerce of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, as
amended by the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat.
584, giving the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to pre-
scribe the methods by which interstate carriers shall keep ac-
counts, has already been sustained by this court. (Interstate Com-
merce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194.) Kansas
City Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 423.
13. Disadvantage of shipper by reason of location.
A shipper may be under disadvantages in regard to his shipments by
a common carrier by reason of his disadvantageous location.
United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 274.
14. Discrimination between shippers; lease of terminal as.
The fact that the carrier leases a terminal from a shipper near that
shipper's establishments does not, in the absence of any fraudulent
intent, import a discrimination in favor of that shipper where the
station is actually used for the benefit alike of all shippers in that
neighborhood. Ib.
15. Discrimination between shippers; compensation of shipper for serv-
ices as.
A carrier may compensate a shipper for services rendered and instru-
mentalities furnished in connection with its own shipments; and if
the amount is reasonable it is not a prohibited rebate or discrimina-
tion, even if the carrier does not allow other shippers to render and
furnish similar services and instrumentalities and compensate
them therefor. Ib.
16. Federal assertion of power; scope of.
It cannot as yet be asserted that Congress has, to the exclusion of the
States, taken over the whole subject of carriers' terminals, switch-
ings and sidings; and quare where the accommodation between in-
trastate and interstate commerce shall be made. Grand Trunk
Ry. v. Michigan R. R. Comm., 457.
17. Power of Congress; effect of interference with private business of carrier.
In dealing with interstate carriers, the fact that some of them are also
engaged in private business does not compel Congress to legislate
concerning them as carriers in such manner as not to interfere with
such private business. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co. v. United
States, 363.
18. Hepburn Act; commodity clause; application of.
The commodity clause of the Hepburn Act applies not only to the
carrier's goods from point of production to the market but also to
goods from market to that point. Ib.
19. Hepburn Act; commodity clause; constitutional validity under Fifth
Amendment.
While the power to regulate interstate commerce is subject to the pro-
visions of the Fifth Amendment, an enactment, such as the com-
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