these diseases-deranged sensibility either increased or diminished-the varying heatmuscular weakness with irregular muscular action-together with the depraved and approaching-to-putrefactive state of the secretions. -may be more clearly comprehended upon these views of physiology, than upon any rationale which has ever been proposed to account for them.

But to show the extensive connection with the phenomena of life, health, and disease, which these opinions have, would carry me too far, and lead into discussions which will be better detached; inasmuch, as after a close observation for a considerable period, I have met with no circumstances with which they do not accord. We may, therefore, consider this system to afford at least as rational an explanation of the phenomena of disease, and as useful a basis for practical medicine, upon which may be founded as scientific a method of cure, as any system heretofore advanced. And while it leads to a more mild and safe practice than that usually adopted, it tends also to a more energetic and more ardent course in cases of exhaustion, than the system of those physiologists who say that life may be

considered as made up of a given number of pulsations, and who teach the husbanding of

these to be the great secret of prolonging its duration.

CHAPTER IX.

Examination of the arguments in favour of Materialism-M. Bichat's argument concerning organic and animal Sensibility—is sophistical-A physical notion of life has insuperable physical objections— The reasoning of Materialists upon cause and effect —is not sound—Contrary to the assertions of the Materialists, the soul may be defined, is evidenced by the senses, and has palpable proof in its effects -The size of the brain- gives no support to Materialism-but is in direct opposition to it-The probable use of the brain-Conclusion-is in accordance with the possibility of a future life-and that as taught by the Christian Scriptures.

I COME now to resume the discussion of the question of Materialism; in doing which, I shall enter into a fair and impartial investigation of the most cogent arguments of its supporters; afterwards compare it with the opinions of life herein maintained, and then proceed to investigate the rationality of a future life.

The doctrine of Materialism supposes, that a certain arrangement of material atoms, combined with peculiar actions, give, as the result, all those phenomena which the varied animal, as well as the physical world present to our consideration. That the faculties of perceiving, retaining, discerning, comparing, compounding, and abstracting, ideas; the power of willing; and the capacity for passions and affections; are all results of this same arrangement of material atoms. The advocates of this doctrine have given their assent, and fully confided their belief in this opinion upon the circumstance of this material arrangement being essential to the demonstration of those powers or faculties. And, an argument of M. Bichat's, in which there is a palpable fallacy, has been thought to add much support to this opinion: I allude to his assertion, "that organic sensibility may, by disease, be heightened into animal sensibility:" and, as organic and vegetable sensibility are considered the same, here has been supposed a direct proof of animal life being nothing more than an exalted state of organic or vegetable vitality. The sophism here, is in supposing that the excess of any given property can constitute another property. Let the property of organic or vege

table sensibility be defined in any manner whatever, an excess of that property, according to the definition, cannot constitute the property of perceiving, any more than an excess of sweetness could constitute light, sound, or madness. Herein is seen the importance of attaching clear and definite ideas to the terms Perceptibility and Sensibility, in order to comprehend and render intelligible the circumstance of disease alluded to by M. Bichat. This phenomenon, to which he has so particularly directed the attention, and on which he has founded his doctrine, may be thus intelligibly understood. The perceptive power of the animal has a distinct existence; the sensibility of the animal is for the purpose of conveying impressions to that faculty, but it is. not designed that the organic operations should excite the act of perception; these actions must, however, necessarily approach very near to the accomplishment of that act, in order that any further impression coming upon the part, may readily excite perception; now, if these organic operations be by disease carried too far, they become themselves a cause of the act (not the power) of perception; and the beating of the artery, together with heat, are the objects perceived by the anima or soul.