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sive years, that the result of the vote should be conclusively settled on their behalf by the tribunal provided in the legislative act. That tribunal was the instrument chosen by the people, speaking through their representatives, to determine the result. It was a consent on the part of all these 69,642 electors, as well as all others in the state, to submit this question to the final arbitrament of that tribunal, presided over by the governor, whose judgment is entitled to the highest confidence and respect. The deliverance of that body was an irrevocable declaration by the people, acting through the political department of the government, upon a political question, that the amendment had been adopted by them. The courts have no more right to challenge or controvert that decision than they have to call in question the regularity of the proceedings of the legislature in passing a statute. It is the conceded law of this state that such power does not reside in the judiciary. Pangborn v. Young, 32 N. J. Law, 29. In the language of Chief Justice Taney and Mr. Justice Woodbury, the people, through the political department of the government, decide whether a law has been passed or a constitutional amendment adopted, and the judiciary must accept that decision. The power of the judiciary begins where that of the political department ends, and relates exclusively to the interpretation of constitutions and laws. The harmonious working of our complex system of government cannot be preserved unless each department is scrupulously careful to act within the true limits of its domain. For these reasons I feel constrained to differ with my associates, and refuse to assent to the granting of the writ applied for. The prosecutor has admittedly no private right to be protected by the writ. All he could accomplish by the successful prosecution of it would be to give the legislature the power to declare that to be lawful which is now a crime.

CARROLL v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 11, 1897.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Philadelphia county. Bill by Henry C. Carroll against the city of Philadelphia and others to enjoin said city and the mayor thereof from signing any contract with the Vulcanite Paving Company, or with the Pennsylvania Asphalt Paving Company, for paving certain streets under an award made by the director of public works, on the ground that the ordinance authorizing such paving was void, inasmuch as it sought to create a monopoly by prescribing a special kind of asphaltum to be used, thereby preventing competition in bidding for the contract. From a decree awarding a preliminary injunction, defendants appeal. Reversed. Edwin O. Michener, for appellant Pennsylvania Asphalt Pav. Co. M. Hampton Todd, for appellant Vulcanite Pav. Co. Dimner Beeber, Hampton L. Carson, J. Levering Jones, M. W. Van Auken, E. Cooper Shapley, and John G. Johnson, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. October 11, 1897, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the decree of the court below awarding the preliminary injunction from which this appeal is taken be, and the same is hereby, reversed and set aside. Record remitted for further proceedings.

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settlement made by the auditor general and state treasurer, defendant appeals. Affirmed. H. M. North, for appellant. J. P. Elkin, for the Commonwealth.

GREEN, J. For the reasons stated in the opinion just filed ir the case of Com. v. Fry (May Term, 1897) 38 Atl. 417, the judgment in this case is affirmed. Judgment affirmed, and appeal dismissed, at the costs of the appellant.

PENNSYLVANIA

COWAN et al. V. PLATE-GLASS CO. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 3, 1898.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Westmoreland county. Bill by George Cowan and others against the Pennsylvania Plate-Glass Company for the appointment of a receiver. A receiver was appointed, property sold, and an auditor appointed to make distribution. From a decree amending, and confirming as amended, the report of the auditor, George Cowan appeals. Reversed in part.

DEAN, J. We have disposed of all the assignments of error raised on this appeal in Appeal of Exchange Bank of Wheeling (No. 143, Oct. term, 1897; opinion handed down this day) 38 Atl. 1075. The decree, in part, is reversed, as therein stated; costs to be paid by William L. Kann, appellee.

In re FAIR HOPE NORTH SAVAGE FIRE-BRICK CO.'S ESTATE. Appeal of LIVERGOOD. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 25, 1897.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Somerset county. Exceptions by S. D. Livergood to the report of an auditor distributing a fund in the hands of Jacob D. Swank, assignee of the Fair Hope North Savage FireBrick Company, Limited. From a decree overruling the exceptions and confirming the report, said Livergood appeals. Affirmed. Kooser & Kooser and Coffroth & Ruppel, for appellant. W. H. Koontz, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. This case was argued with No. 4 of this term, same assigned estate, in which firmed. 38 Atl. 519. We think the questions the decree of the court below has just been afpresented in this appeal have also been sufficiently considered and correctly decided by the learned president of the common pleas, and on his opinion the decree is affirmed, and appeal dismissed, at appellant's costs.

McCOY v. BRUNOT. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 25, 1897.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Westmoreland county. Assumpsit by William McCoy against H. J. Brunot. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Geo. S. Rumbaugh and Atkinson & Peoples, for appellant. James S. Beacom and David L. Newill, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. This appeal is from the refusal of the court below to take off the judgment of nonsuit. Our consideration of the evidence on which the plaintiff relied has satisfied us that no error was committed in denying his motion. Neither a review of the testimony nor a discussion of the questions involved would serve any useful purpose. The assignment of error is dismissed, and the judgment affirmed.

McCULLOUGH v. PITTSBURGH, A. & M. TRACTION CO.

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Nov. 8, 1897.)

STREET RAILWAYS-INJURY TO PERSON ON TRACK. Appeal from court of common pleas, Allegheny county.

Action by Charles S. McCullough, Jr., by his next friend and father, Charles S. McCullough,

against the Pittsburgh, Allegheny & Manchester Traction Company, to recover for personal injuries. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

A. M. Neeper, for appellant. Walter Lyon, Charles H. McKee, and H. W. Mitchell, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. We find no substantial error in this record. The case was carefully and correctly tried, and submitted to the jury with full and adequate instructions, of which the defendant company has no just reason to complain. There is nothing in either of the specifications of error that requires discussion. Neither of them is sustained. Judgment affirmed.

In re MITCHELL'S ESTATE. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 11, 1897.) Appeal from_court of common pleas, Huntingdon county. Exceptions by Elizabeth Mitchell to the report of an auditor appointed to distribute the proceeds of a sheriff's sale of the real estate of Thomas Mitchell. From a decree dismissing the exceptions and confirming the report, said Elizabeth Mitchell appeals. Affirmed. W. McK. Williamson, for appellant. Charles G. Brown, for appellee.

STERRETT, C. J. This case was argued with In re Mitchell's Estate (No. 505, Jan. term, 1896), in which an opinion has just been filed, affirming the decree of the orphans' court. 38 Atl. 489. The questions considered and decided in that case virtually dispose of the questions presented by the record in this case, and require that the decree of the court below be affirmed. There is nothing in either of the specifications of error that requires discussion. For reasons which sufficiently appear in the record of this case and in the opinion above referred to, the learned judge was clearly right in dismissing appellant's exception to the auditor's report, etc., and in discharging the rule to show cause. Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed, at appellant's cost.

STERRETT SCHOOL SUBDIST. v. CITY OF PITTSBURG. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Nov. 8, 1897.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Allegheny county. Action by the Sterrett school subdistrict against the city of Pittsburg in the nature of an appeal from the report of viewers appointed to ascertain the damages and assess the benefits caused by the grading, paving, and curbing of a street, on which plaintiff had abutting property. Judgment for

plaintiff, and new trial denied. Defendant appeals. Affirmed. Clarence Burleigh and T. D. Carnahan, for appellant. Lazear & Orr, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. This case in the court below depended on questions of fact which were properly submitted to and determined by the jury in favor of the plaintiff. The appeal from the judgment entered on the verdict practically resolved itself into a renewal of the motion for a new trial on the ground of an excessive verdict, etc. Those questions were disposed of by the court below, and, so far as appears, there is no good reason why they should be reconsidered here. We find no error in the record, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.

In re WRIGHT'S ESTATE et al. Appeal of CONVERSE et al. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. July 15, 1897.) Appeal from_court of common pleas, Philadelphia county. In the matter of the ssigned estate of Joseph S. Wright and Jacob A. Schmid, trading as Wright & Schmid. From a decree confirming the report of the auditor appointed to audit the account of William H. Schmid, the assignee, Converse, Stanton & Cullen, creditors, appeal. Reversed. John Sparhawk, Jr., W. A. Manderson, and George P. Rich, for appellants. Alex. Simpson, Jr., for appellee.

WILLIAMS, J. This case is identical in character with that of Appeal of Vietor, 38 Atl. 151, in which an opinion has just been filed. The decree is reversed for the reasons there given.

WRIGHT et al. v. WARRIOR RUN COAL CO. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 11, 1897.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Luzerne county. Bill by Annia A. Wright and others against the Warrior Run Coal Company for an account and an injunction. From a decree in favor of plaintiffs for only a part of the amount claimed, they appeal. Affirmed. Geo. R. Bedford and H. W. Palmer, for appellants. Alexander Farnham, for appellee.

DEAN, J. This is an appeal by plaintiffs from the same decree as in No. 146, January term, 1897, appeal by defendant, in which last case an opinion has been handed down this day. 38 Atl. 491. All the questions raised by the assignments of error on this appeal have been in effect overruled in the opinion in that case. Therefore the decree as modified in that case is affirmed, and this appeal is dismissed, at costs of appellants.

END OF CASES IN VOL. 38.

INDEX.

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Between husband and wife, see "Husband and Wife."

By and against executors, see "Executors and
Administrators."

By assignee of bond, see "Assignments."
By bailor, see "Bailment."

By minors, see "Infants."

Election of remedy, see "Election of Remedies." For breach of contract, see "Contracts."

of covenant, see "Covenants."

of promise of marriage, see "Breach of Marriage Promise."

For infringement of trade-mark or trade-name, see "Trade-Marks and Trade-Names." For price of goods, see "Sales."

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Limitation by statutes, see "Limitation of Aetions."

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uors."

Particular actions and proceedings, see "AsOn notes, see "Bills and Notes." sumpsit, Action of"; "Attachment"; "Creditors' Suit"; "Death"; "Debt, Action of"; "Divorce"; "Ejectment"; "False Imprisonment": "Garnishment"; "Injunction"; "Interpleader"; "Libel and Slander"; "Malicious Prosecution". "Mandamus"; "Money Received"; "Partition": "Quieting Title"; "Quo Warranto": "Replevin"; "Specific Performance"; "Trespass" "Trover and Conversion"; "Work and Labor." Review of proceedings, see "Certiorari." Suits in equity, see "Equity."

To abate nuisance, see "Nuisance."

To foreclose lien, see "Mechanics' Liens." To set aside assignment for benefit of creditors, see "Assignments for Benefit of Creditors."

Where the members of a committee of a city council were put to expense in doing their work, held, that each might maintain his separate action for the recovery of his personal expenses.Rider v. City of Portsmouth (N. H.) 385.

of such a character as to induce the discharge of Where an employer is intimidated by threats an employé whom he would otherwise have retling the employé to recover from the person tained, it constitutes an actionable wrong, entimaking the threats.-Perkins v. Pendleton (Me.) 96.

An action may be maintained on a promise

Accounting by executor or administrator, see made to a third person for the benefit of plain"Executors and Administrators."

by trustee, see ""Trusts."

Partnership accounting, see "Partnership."

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

Of chattel mortgage, see "Chattel Mortgages."

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tiff, though the person for whose benefit the promise was made was uncertain when it was made.-Whitehead v. Burgess (N. J. Sup.) 802.

One having a reversionary interest in personalty can sue one not in possession for an injury thereto by him.-New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. New Jersey Electric Ry. Co. (N. J. Sup.) 828.

Under Pub. St. c. 204, § 22, an action will not lie to recover stolen money until criminal proceedings are begun.-Crowley v. Burke (R. L.) 895.

See "Statutes."

ACTS.

ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW.

See "Equity."

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ADJOINING LANDOWNERS.

See "Boundaries"; "Fences."

ADJUDICATION.

ALIENS.

Aliens may acquire personal property by bequest.-Crosgrove v. Crosgrove (Conn.) 219.

Where two of several joint devisees were aliens, held, that the estate vested in the others.-Cros

Operation and effect of former adjudication, see grove v. Crosgrove (Conn.) 219. "Judgment."

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ANSWER.

Where the owner, by his acts, had severed the mineral estate from the surface, and defendant had actual notice of the severance, he did not, In pleading, see "Pleading." on acquiring the surface by adverse possession, acquire also the mineral estate.-Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Hughes (Pa.) 568.

A right asserted by a railroad company to build a bridge over a highway held consistent with the right asserted by other persons to possess the land subject to public use, and to lay pipe beneath the surface of the highway.-Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Breckenridge (N. J. Err. & App.) 740.

A right to land held not enlarged beyond actual possession by a deed from one not shown to be the owner of the land, and in which the description was indefinite. — Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Breckenridge (N. J. Err. & App.) 740.

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AFFIDAVITS.

Of defense, see "Pleading."

AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE.

Estoppel to assert, see "Estoppel."

AGENCY.

See "Principal and Agent."

AGREEMENT.

See "Contracts."

AIDER BY VERDICT.

See "Pleading."

APPEAL AND ERROR.

See, also, "Certiorari."

Accounting by executor or administrator, see
"Executors and Administrators."
Appellate jurisdiction of particular courts, see
"Courts."
In criminal cases, see "Criminal Law."

common pleas, it should not present the same
Where the probate court certifies issues to the
question by different issues.-Keebler v. Shute
(Pa.) 586.

If plaintiff dies before errors assigned, the writ of error abates at common law.-Goldschmid v. Meline (Md.) 783.

The statute allowing an appeal to the court of appeals for reviewing judgments of inferior courts does not authorize an appeal to be taken or entertained in a case where a writ of error was not available at common law.-Goldschmid v. Meline (Md.) 783.

Decisions reviewable.

Under Code, art. 5, § 21, providing for an appeal from an order appointing a receiver, an order refusing to rescind the order of appointment, not being in the nature of a final decree, is not appealable.-R. Frank Williams Co. v. United States Baking Co. (Md.) 990.

Under Code, art. 5, § 21, providing that an appeal may be allowed from an order appointing a receiver, defenda it's answer first being filed, an appeal from such order will be dismissed if taken before answer filed.-R. Frank Williams Co. v. United States Baking Co. (Md.) 990.

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