belonging to the social condition. There is no act of Congress respecting any of the Territories which undertakes to enumerate the various objects of legislation, and then to confer jurisdiction over them. The whole power is conveyed, with the very few exceptions I have stated, and these are expressly withheld."

This effort was highly extolled. The Democratic members of the legislature of Tennessee complimented him with an address. Said they: "This oration will stand a perpetual monument in honor of your memory, and will hand your name down to the latest posterity as a scholar, learned and profound, as an orator, eloquent and powerful, as a statesman, sagacious and patriotic."

As if to break the power of this great speech among the freemen of the United States, the legislature of Michigan had, in advance, instructed General Cass to vote for the proviso. In the mutations of politics the legislature of that State, in 1850, was of a different political complexion from that of 1849; many Democrats in the fall of 1849 took little or no interest in the election of members of assembly-partly because there were no State questions to be brought before the legislature, but more from a feeling of dissatisfaction with the lukewarm support which their timehonored fellow-citizen had received from the Democratic politicians of the south and south-west in the late Presidential canvass. And this inaction, by meagre votes, resulted in the temporary ascendency of the Whigs. After General Cass' arrival at the seat of the general government, he was taunted with this legislative instruction on the floor of the Senate, and the newspapers were rife with speculation as to the influence which they would have upon the future course of this veteran patriot and statesman. Hence, when he gave notice that he purposed to speak on this question, the interest to see what he would say and do increased. We believe all doubt upon this head was removed in the minds of the most skeptical even, when he resumed his seat. For, to solve all mystery as to his official action when the vote of the Senate should be taken, he took occasion to say:

"I will endeavor to discharge my duty as an American senator, to the country, and to the whole country, agreeably to the convictions of my own duty and of the obligations of the Constitution; and when I can not do this, I shall cease to have any duty here to perform. My sentiments on the Wilmot proviso are now before the Senate, and will soon be before my constituents and the

country. I am precluded from voting in conformity with them. I have been instructed by the legislature of Michigan to vote in favor of this measure. I am a believer in the right of instruction, when fairly exercised and under proper circumstances. There are limitations upon this exercise; but I need not seek to ascertain their extent or application, for they do not concern my present position. I acknowledge the obligation of the instructions I have received, and can not act in opposition to them. Nor can I act in opposition to my own convictions of the true meaning of the Constitution. When the time comes, and I am required to vote upon this measure, as a practical one, in a bill providing for a territorial government, I shall know how to reconcile my duty to the legislature with my duty to myself, by surrendering a trust I can no longer fulfill."

Whether from the influence of this speech, or their own sense of constitutional right, or both, certain it is that a change came over the legislative mind of Michigan; and, in abundant season, rescinded the mandate to her senators, leaving them to act according to the dictates of their own wisdom and judgment.

This was wormwood to fanaticism. To parry the blow, she pointed to inconsistency, and insisted, most strenuously, that the disciple of Jefferson-the confidant of Jackson--the unflinching flag-bearer of the Democratic hosts in 1848-was her votary. As usual when attacked, either by open, manly foes, or by sinister, pretended friends, he faced the attacking party; and, on a subsequent day, at the first convenient opportunity, met the unfounded accusation in his place in the Senate. We give to the reader what he said:

"It was intimated by the senator from Mississippi, [Mr. Davis,] and by more than one gentleman, I believe, in the other wing of the capitol, that I had not been consistent in my course. The feelings of respect and kindness which I entertain for that senator are, I am sure, a guaranty to him that I do not allude to this subject in any spirit of complaint. My course, if worthy of notice, is open to public examination, and, I trust, will bear it. The charge is, sir, that, in my Nicholson letter, I laid down principles from which I departed in my late speech upon the Wilmot proviso. The allusion, as I understand it, is more particularly to the propo sition, that the people of the Territories, as well as of the States, have a right to manage their own internal concerns in their own

way, and that the condition of slavery may be regulated by them, as well as any other relation of life. In that letter, sir, which seems to have become historical far beyond its importance, I laid down four propositions, which I then deemed to be correct, and whose truth time and experience have but the more strongly confirmed. Till I change my convictions, I shall neither seek to conceal nor disavow them. If any one has misunderstood me before, I conceive the fault was his own; if any one misunderstands me hereafter, the fault shall be mine. I believe the Wilmot proviso to be unconstitutional; but, before I proceed to a full consideration of this branch of the subject, I beg leave to trouble the Senate with a brief review of my position, and of the circumstances connected with it. I have desired an opportunity of doing so for some time, as this has been made a matter of reproach-as, indeed, what is not, in times like these!

"When the Wilmot proviso was first proposed, I have never concealed or denied that, had it been pushed to a vote, I should have voted for it. There is no need for any senator to resort to and retail conversations in railroad cars to prove this. I had never examined the constitutional power of Congress; and, when the subject was proposed, it did not excite that opposition from the South which we have since witnessed, nor led reflecting men to doubt whether such a provision could be enforced without danger to the Union. Southern men, I believe, had previously voted for a similar measure, and it had not become a grave sectional question, involving the most fearful consequences. At a subsequent session, convinced of its bearing, I spoke and voted against it; still, however, without touching the constitutional point. Afterwards, circumstances required me to examine the subject more narrowly. The public mind in the South became highly excited, and the indications were full of danger and difficulty. I felt then, as I do now, that the Union was the great object of every American, and that there are few sacrifices which ought not to be made to preserve it. I was prepared to go as far as any man ought to go to attain that object. In examining the Constitution, with reference to the whole matter, more narrowly than I had ever before done, I was startled by the conviction, that no authority was granted in that instrument to Congress to legislate over the Territories; and that, consequently, there was no power to pass the Wilmot proviso. Not satisfied with my own impressions, and

being unwilling to take such a ground without proper consideration, I determined immediately to converse with some person fully conversant with the history of the legislation and of the judicial decisions on the subject. In looking about for that purpose, it immediately occurred to me that an eminent judge of the Supreme Court, [Judge McLean, of Ohio,] from his position and associations, as well as from his residence in the west, could give me better information upon this subject than any other person. Anticipating that some discussion might soon arise, that would render this explanation proper, I applied to that gentleman some days since, and requested his permission thus publicly to refer to him, 'should I deem it necessary. This he cheerfully granted; and I now make use of his name with his own consent. I immediately repaired to him, and stated my doubts, as well as the circumstances which gave rise to them. I need not repeat the conversation here. It is enough to say that he confirmed my impressions, and informed me that, in an article published in the National Intelligencer a day or two previously, and which I had not seen, I should find his views fully set forth. That article has since been republished in other papers, and has attracted a good deal of attention, as it deserves, for it is powerfully written. I speak, sir, solely of the views which it presents of the power of Congress to legislate for the Territories. The question of slavery, which it discusses, I do not refer to. After reading this article, my doubts ripened into convictions, and I took the ground, to which I shall always adhere, that the Wilmot proviso is unconstitutional. And you have now, sir, the history of my course upon this subject."

That the reader may have the whole, we may as well add, that it had been, and continued to be, repeatedly charged upon General Cass that he designed his letter to Mr. Nicholson as a trap to catch the unwary-a subterranean pitfall, into which was to tumble the unsuspecting planters, whenever they reached the Territories with their slaves. This theme had been fruitful of harangues all through the south. For this reason, many in that section of the Union were opposed to the doctrines of the Nicholson letter. At the north, many were opposed to those doctrines, because, as they claimed, the slaveholder could remove to the Territories and retain his immunity over the slave for a season, at least. These were extreme opinions-dissimilar in fact-based upon antagonistical reasons, diametrically opposed to each in object, yet in harmonious action. Extremes met.

The objectors at the North desired positive action, to prevent the extension of slavery. They were unwilling to leave the matter to the inhabitants of the Territory. General Cass was willing, and he knew of no constitutional power to over-ride the right. The objectors at the south desired negative action relative to the extension of the area of slavery. They desired that the matter should be left with the territorial settlers. So General Cass desired: because that course of policy alone was the only one compatible with the terms of compromise upon which the Union of the States was formed. But these southern extremists-whether sincerely or not, they best know- stoutly insisted that the doctrine of the Nicholson letter did not recognize the territorial inhabitants as possessed of power to prohibit slavery, until they were admitted as a State into the Union. In other words, that it was to the people of a State, not to the inhabitants of a Territory, that the power belonged. That there might no longer be any apology for misconstruction of his views upon this point, in March, 1852, when examining, in his place in the Senate, a letter of Colonel Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, under date of December 27th, 1851, he remarked:

"If a newly-settled Territory is first occupied by a majority of emigrants from a slave State, they will be very apt to establish slavery in their new residence. If, on the contrary, they come from a non-slaveholding State, they will probably be equally strongly inclined to establish that exclusion to which they have been accustomed; and so with relation to all the objects of concern which are regulated by law. And where was there ever a community whose political and social system was not more or less influenced by the predominant opinions and characters which marked its early inhabitants? But this objection, sir, whatever weight it is entitled to in the scale of expediency, does not touch the question of right. That does not even depend on Congressional action, but upon the Constitution, which does not even look to this subject of early or of late legislation, nor the practical considerations to which it may give rise. The rightful power, therefore, is not affected by the mode in which it may be exercised, whether bearing upon one or another of the vast variety of objects of civilized life which fall within the scope of legislation. All, therefore, I claimed for the territorial governments was the right of legislation in all cases not in conflict with the Constitution; the