JUDGES' CH.] Re AN ELECTION PETITION. direct the prosecution to elect, and said "for convenience sake the prisoner's counsel might address himself to the stealing of the coal under the churchyard. The whole workings might be relied on to show the felonious intent, though they go into twenty different counties." In summing up, Erle, J., said, "The remarkable part of this case is the extent of the property taken; and it has been urged that the taking of each day was a separate felony, and that only one felony could be inquired into on this indictment. I should say as long as coal was gotten from one shaft it was one continuous taking, though the working was carried on by means of different levels and cuttings and into the lands of different people. As however complaint was made by counsel for the prisoner, I have thought it better that your attention should be confined to the charge of taking the coal of one owner. But in order to show that when the prisoner took the coal of Mr. Gunning in No. 10 drift he knew he was out of his boundary, I have permitted it to be proved that he has gone out of his boundary in many other instances and into the property of many other persons taking in 15,000 yards of coal." That case, therefore, is very like the present. If the taking of the coal in that case was one continuous act of larceny, looking at the present case in the most favourable light for the prisoner, it was a continuous act of stealing gas. Then there was the case of Reg. v. Shepherd, 11 Cox C. C. 119, decided in this court a short time ago, where the prisoner was convicted of cutting with intent to steal trees to an amount exceeding the sum of 51. The chairman of the court before whom the prisoner was tried directed the jury that in order to convict they must be satisfied that he cut down at one time, or so continuously as to form one transaction, such a number of the trees as would make the injury done amount to a sum exceeding 57., and that ruling was confirmed by this court. That is another instance in which there was one continuous act of larceny, though in one sense there were several takings. In the present case it was contended there was only a taking from time to time when the gas was turned on; but the fact was that there was a pipe to the main which was always open and contained gas, and there was no period when it was closed. It is impossible not to say as to that, that it was one continuous act. We are therefore of opinion, both on the authorities and on the facts, that this was one continuous act of stealing, and that the conviction was right. The object, motive, and intention of the prisoner may always be looked at, and there was nothing to prevent the case being presented to the jury in the way in which it was. The rest of the COURT concurred. Conviction affirmed. JUDGES' CHAMBERS. Reported by F. O. CRUMP, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Monday, Feb. 8, 1869. Election petition-Practice-Getting up briefs-Costs. If it appear to a judge at the trial of an election petition that the brief for the petitioner has not been got up as fully as it usually is at Nisi Prius the petitioner will lose his costs. BLACKBURN, J., before the commencement of the business to-day, referred to the careless way in which briefs were prepared in election-petition trials. He said: In the practice before the committees of the House of Commons, apparently there was Election THE STOCKPORT PETITIONS. Affidavits were made by petitioners and respondents that to the best of their information, knowledge, and belief, the withdrawal of a petition was not the result of any corrupt arrangement, or in consideration of the withdrawal of any other petition: Held, that the judge was bound to express his opinion in accordance with these affidavits, and allow the withdrawal of the petitions. Several hundred electors memorialised the judge against the withdrawal of the petitions, but did not appear or ask to be substituted for the petitioners: Held, that under such circumstances the memorial must be disregarded; and Held also, that the petitioners must pay the costs of the respondents, and that the judge had no discretion in the matter. in two cases; first Hallam and another (pets.) v. This was an application to withdraw the petitions Tipping (resp.); and the second, Walton and another (pets.) v. Smith (resp.) H. James appeared as counsel for the petitioners in the first case, and M'Intyre for Mr. Tipping. In the second M'Intyre was for the petitioners, and H. James for Mr. Smith. The matter first came before a judge at chambers on the 25th Jan., when he made the following order: "Upon hearing counsel for the petitioners, and upon reading the affidavits of Edward Reddish and John Slater, I do order that the application for leave to withdraw the petition herein be heard at the Judges' Chambers, Serjeants'-inn, London, on Saturday, 30th Jan. instant, at eleven o'clock, before a judge there. Notice of this order to be given to the respondent's agent and to the mayor of Stockport, and to be published by the mayor of the said borough and by the petitioners in some newspaper circulating in Stockport in the present week." The affidavits referred to proved the filing of the petition for leave to withdraw, and the service upon the respondent's agents. The parties appeared before the judge on the 30th Jan. H. James said the evidence had been laid before him in the early part of January, and Mr. Serjeant Ballantine had given a joint opinion with himself that the evidence was insufficient. The notice required by the statute had been given to the respondent's agent and the returning officer, and it had been duly published in a local newspaper. He handed to his Lordship the joint opinion and the affidavit stating the ground on which the application was made (31 & 32 Vict. c. 125, s. 35). BLACKBURN, J.-The present case, being the first of its kind, will establish the practice under the new law. I have received some anonymous letters on the subject of the application, to which I, of course, JUDGES' CH.] ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. VISITORS OF THE COLNEY HATCH LUNATIC ASYLUM. [CHAN. can pay no attention. The best course will be to have affidavits, both from the petitioners and the respondents, setting forth that to the best of their knowledge, information, and belief they know of no corrupt inducement to withdraw the petitions. By the 36th section of the Parliamentary Elections Act, the judge has to report to the Speaker whether, in his opinion, the withdrawal of the petition is the result of any corrupt arrangement. The case, therefore, had better stand over for a week. In the mean time notice should be given in a local newspaper of this application, and it will then be seen whether any person wishes to appear in the place of the petitioners. I cannot expect the parties in their affidavits to go further than their knowledge, information, and belief; but documentary evidence should be supplied. I will appoint Monday, the 8th Feb., at 12 o'clock, for the further hearing, and if the evidence is sufficient, and no application is made to substitute other petitioners, I see no objection to the withdrawal. The following was the order made: Upon hearing counsel on both sides, I do order that the hearing of the application in this case be adjourned to Monday, 8th Feb., at twelve o'clock, at the Judges' Chambers, Serjeants'-inn, Chancerylane, for the production of affidavits by the petitioners and respondents in this case as to their knowledge, information, and belief as to the existence of the matters mentioned in the 36th section of the Parliamentary Elections Act 1868. That any person interested in the election may at the hearing apply on affidavit showing any matter bearing on the withdrawal of the said petition. That this order be sent to the returning officer, who shall make it public in the borough of Stockport, and that it be published by the petitioners in the Manchester Guardian." On Monday, 8th Feb., the parties again appeared before Blackburn, J. James produced affidavits, signed by the petitioners and respondents whom he represented, stating that, according to their knowledge, information, and belief, the withdrawal of the petitions was not the result of any corrupt arrangement. He also produced an affidavit of the agent, in which he set out the facts, making the opinion of counsel an exhibit, and further stated that the withdrawal of the petition was not the result of any corrupt arrangement. McIntyre produced affidavits of the parties whom he represented, but said he did not think it necessary that his agent should make one, nothing having been said about it in the order. of Commons, but now they would be too late, as the petition must be presented within fourteen days after the meeting of Parliament: (See sect. 56.) I think it might be worth the while of the Legislature to consider whether they might not say within fourteen days of the withdrawal of the petition. James applied as to the costs. There being two petitions he assumed that each respondent would get his costs. M'Intyre. Is it not in your Lordship's discretion? BLACKBURN.-If it requires that I should make liable. The section says the petitioner "shall be" an order I should say that the petitioners must be liable to pay the costs of the respondent. McIntyre. It is only a liability. You may exercise your discretion. BLACKBURN, J.-I do not think I have any discretion. It is the 46th section which gives the judge discretion, enacting that "all costs, charges, and expenses of, and incident to, the presentation of a petition under the Act, and to the proceedings consequent thereon, with the exception of such costs, charges and expenses as are otherwise provided for, shall be defrayed by the parties to the petition, in such manner and in such proportions as the court or judge may determine." The costs of a petition which is withdrawn are costs within the exception of such costs, charges, and expenses as are otherwise provided for." As it seems to me these costs are otherwise provided for-the petitioner "shall be" liable to pay the costs. And it seems reasonable that it should be so. The order will be that in each case the petitioners have leave to withdraw, the petitioners in each case to pay the respondent's costs. My belief is that the statute gives the costs imperatively. I shall, of course, report to the Speaker that in my opinion the withdrawal of the petition was not the result of any corrupt arrangement, &c. in,the terms of the 36th section. The following was the order made: "Upon hearing counsel on both sides, and upon reading the affidavits of E. Hallam and another, of J. W. Johnston, of William Tipping, of J. B. Smith, of C. E. Lake and two others, of J. H. Pace and two others, of C. E. Lake, and two others of the petitioners, and of James Walton and another, I do order that the petitioners have leave to withdraw the petition herein. The petitioners to pay the respondents' costs, to be taxed." Agents: E. Reddish; T. Hoskins. BLACKBURN, J.-I cannot conceive that there COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. could be any corrupt arrangement without coming to the knowledge of these parties; and therefore I must say, in accordance with sect. 36, it is my opinion that no such arrangement has brought about the withdrawal of the petitions. Reported by THOMAS BROOKSBANK and E. STEWART Dec. 21 and 22, 1868. (Before the LORD CHANCELLOR (Hatherley) and LORD JUSTICE SELWYN.) James said that both the sitting members were present prepared to undergo any personal exami- THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL V. THE COMMITTEE OF nation. BLACKBURN, J.-As no one has appeared to object to the withdrawal of the petition I cannot go into any personal examination of the respondents. I have this morning received a petition numerously signed by electors, and apparently genuine, in which they state their belief that many corrupt practices prevailed at the election, and claim an inquiry. [James.-We believe that, but cannot find them out.] Of course I cannot entertain this. They do not apply to be substituted as petitioners. They might present a petition to the Ilouse VISITORS OF THE COLNEY HATCH LUNATIC Nuisance-Injunction-Reference to an expert-Boards to CHAN.] ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. VISITORS OF THE COLNEY HATCH LUNATIC ASYLUM. this rule are only cases where there is a physical impossibility of restoring things to their previous condition, as where trees have been actually felled. When, therefore, a nuisance, by pouring sewage into a brook, was clearly established at the hearing, the Court of Appeal discharged an order of Malins, V. C. referring it to an expert to inquire whether the sewage could be purified or diverted, and at once declared the rights of the relators, and awarded them the injunction they sought, but suspended its operation for a short time, that the defendants might consider how they could best obey. In no case ought any such reference to be made when the report of such expert can have no bearing on what the court has to do, and where once a nuisance is established beyond doubt, the court can have no other duty than to order that it shall cease. It cannot be deduced from the fact that the Legislature The existing magistrates were liable to this jurisdiction Nor, although the relators (the Board of Health) were This was an appeal by the relators against the decree of Malins, V.C., made at the hearing of the cause. The information was filed at the relation of the Board of Health of the parish of Edmonton against the Committee of Management of the Colney Hatch Lunatic Asylum, who were magistrates of the county of Middlesex, to restrain a nuisance, detrimental to the public health, by the efflux of sewage from the asylum into a brook called Pymm's Brook, which flowed through the parish to its confluence with the river Lea. The nuisance was clearly established by the evidence, as the learned Vice-Chancellor himself thought; but at the hearing he directed a reference to Capt. Galton to ascertain whether it was necessary or proper, having regard to the health of the inhabitants of the district in which the asylum was situated, that any and what steps should be taken for purifying the drainage from the asylum as it then flowed into Pymm's Brook; or whether it was necessary or proper that the same should be diverted from the said stream, and if so, by what means such diversion could be made. The relators appealed from this decree, contending that, as the nuisance was clearly established, their rights ought to have been declared, and an injunction awarded, leaving it to the defendants to obey that injunction, and to find out the means by which they could dispose of the sewage without polluting the stream to their injury. Various other points, such as delay, the implied rights and obligations of public bodies, and the duty of the relators themselves in abating the nuisance, were discussed on the appeal; but the whole of these matters, and the arguments relating to them, fully appear in the judgments. The hearing before Malins, V.C., is reported in 19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 44. [CHAN. Cole, Q. C., and Macnaghten supported the appeal. Sir Roundell Palmer, Q. C., Schomberg, Q. C., and Kershaw for the respondents. The authorities cited were: The Attorney-General v. The Borough of Birming- The Attorney-General v. The Proprietors of the Goldsmid v. The Tunbridge Wells Improrement Spokes v. The Banbury Board of Health, L. Rep. The Nuisances Removal Act, 1855, ss. 12 and 22; The LORD CHANCELLOR (Hatherley).—We do not think we ought to call upon you, Mr. Cole, to reply in this case. No doubt these cases all show the difficulty in which persons who are desirous of getting rid of refuse sewage are constantly placed. That is a difficulty which must be met not by their taking any legal steps to escape from the exigencies of the condition in by some application to the Legislature; no other which they find themselves, but it must be met means are sufficient to relieve them from all the difficulties of the case. Now I believe that the court will always find that its simplest course, as far as regards the administration of justice, will be to ascertain the exact state of the law which regulates the relation of the parties who are brought before it, and having ascertained that exact state of the law, to proceed to act upon it without reference to the difficulties of the case on the part of those against whom they are obliged to decide; but leaving these parties to relieve themselves as they best can from the position in which they have placed themselves, and leaving these parties to do what is right and just; namely, if there be no other mode of escape, to cease to do the acts which occasion the wrong. Now I cannot but think that the learned ViceChancellor has a little mingled or confused two rules of the court in saying he will not make any order for that is what it comes to—in such a case as this, without being satisfied that the order of the court can in some mode or other be obeyed. Of course there are cases where the court would take care not to pronounce an idle and ineffective order; and the most common illustration of that is this, the court will not issue a mandatory injunction where it is impossible that that mandatory injunction can by any means be complied with. Take the simplest instance of all, that of cutting down timber. It is idle when the trees have been cut down to make an order not to allow the trees to remain prostrate, but to replace these trees which are irrevocably destroyed; and all that can be done in such a case is to leave the parties to their remedy in damages. So, again, there might be a bank to prevent the influx of the sea, and that bank might be most improperly destroyed. The court would restrain that destruction if it were in time to do so, but the act having been once done, and the sea once admitted, the court can of course only leave the parties to their remedy in damages, it being impossible to remove a grievance of that kind. But that has no application to a case where the consequence is simply as it is here; there is no difficulty where persons are, as in this case, committing a daily wrong, in enjoining them to cease from committing that wrong, though it may subject them, as I agree that it would in this case, to very considerable incon CHAN.] ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. VISITORS OF THE COLNEY HATCH LUNATIC ASYLUM. venience, because they themselves having for a very considerable time inflicted this wrong upon their neighbours, have a difficulty in at once ceasing to do so; and such a difficulty is one which is more properly met by the court affording them sufficient time to set themselves right, as has been done in numerous instances; but this considerable difficulty in setting themselves right is no reason whatever why they should be allowed to commit a wrong which in effect would amount to absolute permanent injury to the rights of their neighbours. Now I apply these observations to the subject before us. Here is a case in which I will assume for a moment that the defendants are persons who are committing the wrong. Now it is said-and here is the difficulty in which the Vice-Chancellor has thought himself placed-that unless the defendants are permitted to throw all this sewage into a place where they have no more right to throw it than into this court or into a gentleman's drawing-room; unless they are permitted to throw it on to their neighbours' lands, they cannot carry on the affairs of this asylum, and that therefore they must be permitted to throw the whole of the sewage on to the lands of their neighbours. Surely the mere statement of the proposition is enough to refute it. Nobody can suppose the law of England to be in that state. When difficulties of such a character as are alleged here exist, application is made to the Legislature, and if the Legislature thinks fit it removes the difficulties; but it is not because we are told, as I was told in the Birmingham case, that 300,000 people will be very much inconvenienced if you do not allow them to use their neighbours' property without paying for it, that they are to have the right so to use it; but the answer is, "You must ask the Legislature to let you take it, and you may be sure you will not be allowed to take it without paying for it; then when you have obtained permission you may exercise your rights to purchase the property, and all that is desirable can be done." I must say that it appears to me, with great deference to the view which the learned Vice-Chancellor has taken, that this court has nothing to do with the propriety or impropriety of creating new rights on the part of the Legislature. This court has merely to decide what is the law as it exists, to see that it it is duly administered, not to order anything which is simply impossible (as in the illustrations I have given) to be done; but to take care, subject to that modification, that all persons shall be restrained from exercising with a high hand powers which they have no right in law to exercise. Now try this case as I say by that simple proposition:-The Attorney-General comes here to complain, on the part of all this neighbourhood, that a vast quantity of sewage is poured down into a brook which at a certain time, some years ago, appears to have been pure, but which is now contaminated with other sewage to a great extent; but the sewage poured into it from this asylum, containing 2200 inmates, greatly aggravates the evil. The nuisance is what seems to me to be confessed. I find no contrary evidence; all shows that this is a great and threatening evil. That being so, it would seem to me, I confess, that there was nothing to do when the case came on for hearing, upon an undefended cause as to the fact of the nuisance, but to give to the informant on behalf of the public that remedy which is always accorded to those who have established their case-namely, a declaration of their right, and an injunction to restrain the wrong from being committed, unless there were that consideration which seems to have pressed so much upon the ViceChancellor, the apparent (and I think it apparent only) difficulty in enforcing the order of the court. I put aside for the moment the collateral points about the position of the magistrates, and the delay, [СНАХ. and I am taking it as if this information had been filed a few weeks after the nuisance began. Then surely, if that be so, it cannot be right or just that the informants should at the hearing, when everything has been said and proved that can be said and proved, have no statement or declaration of what their right is, or that the only order at the hearing of the cause should be a reference to Capt. Galton. That is surely nothing but referring to that gentleman facts which had been proved in the cause; because if a nuisance exists, if there has been that extent of evil which has been strongly deposed to, and if that is not denied or countervailed by the defendants, there can be nothing to inquire into. "Steps for purifying the sewage' must be taken before the sewage is poured out, or the pouring out of the sewage must be discontinued altogether. It must be so; it is not a question to be referred to an engineer, however eminent he may be. Then as to the second point referred to Capt. Galton-" Whether it is necessary that the sewage should be diverted from the said stream?"-I make the same observation. Of course it is necessary, if nothing else can be done to purify it. Further than that, I take it that no reference at any time ought to be made in a case where the answer to it can have no bearing on what the court has to do; because, suppose Capt. Galton had said, "I do not consider that any steps are necessary or proper," the court must still have looked at the evidence. In answer to a case in which all parties are agreed that there is a nuisance, and the only thing suggested is the difficulty of getting rid of it, if Capt. Galton had reported that it was not neces sary to take any steps at all, it would be the duty of the court to proceed just the same, and substantially to disregard any report that he might think fit to make. But there is another objection which goes more to the root of the inquiry, which is this: I entertain a very strong opinion that when the nuisance is once established all the court has to do is to say it must cease; and unless it should be plainly shown that it was such a case as I have already described, where the whole ocean had been admitted, and could not be carried back again to its place, or such damage had occurred as to show that the proper remedy must be by an action and not by an injunetion, the court is bound to grant the injunction, and it is no part of the duty of the informant, or of the court to find out how that injunction can be best obeyed, if the court be satisfied that it is not an order which it is impossible to obey. Now in this case the matter is really put in a much stronger point of view than it was in the Birmingham case, as to the possibility of compliance, because what is it that is the nuisance? It is that daily these 2200 persons are adding their quota to this continuing evil, and that is allowed day by day. The answer is, of course, that you must not allow this aggravation, day by day, of the evil that exists. Is it impossible to prevent it? Are there not ways and means? Did there not exist ways and means before drainage was ever heard or talked of? The common course in the country was to have drains leading to cesspools, which were from time to time emptied; but nobody in the country ever dreamed of turning all the filth of his own house into his neighbour's garden, simply because he hal not in his own garden a convenient place to deposit it in. Therefore, as to the extreme difficulty of the case, the defendants must meet it as best they can. I will not say one word more as to the supposed impossibility of dealing with the sewage. We have had the benefit of seeing Capt. Galton's report, an so far as I can see he says distinctly that it can bə done on the premises simply by using about thirty acres of land, whereas there are now seventy acres CHAN.] ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. VISITORS OF THE COLNEY HATCH LUNATIC ASYLUM. available for that purpose. Again, it might be met in the ways suggested by Selwyn, L. J., during the arguments, namely, by using the earth-closets, which are now considered by so many engineers a good mode of meeting such a difficulty. To my mind there is no physical impossibility of restoring things to the condition they were in before. It is only a question of expense, and this court invariably restrains evil and wrong being done, when it is clearly and manifestly established that there is wrong, without listening to any argument on the ground of expense on behalf of the wrongdoer, who says, "it is highly inconvenient and highly expensive to me, if I am put to the alternative of removing the evil, whereas it might be much better done by my neighbours, whom I am wronging." Now, I am taking this case as if it were between individuals; of course I have to deal with it as a case not of an individual committing a wrong against | another individual, but as one between two public bodies, and it is said that it would have been far better that neither of them should have taken a step of this description, but that both of them should have taken counsel together, to see how the difficulty could be best avoided. [CHAN. conceive how the fact of these defendants being visiting magistrates can justify them in acting thus. Another point was this. How can the present magistrates be made answerable now for that which was done by their predecessors fourteen or fifteen years ago; and how are they to redress the wrong that was then done? The simple answer is, that it is a continuing wrong, a daily wrong, and ail these unfortunate objects are persons having no control over their own motions and their own acts. They are all placed under the control of the magistrates, and the 40th section is quite enough to show that all the officers of the asylum are placed under that control, and the magistrates must be responsible for their servants and agents, and the unfortunate objects committed to their charge, and there is no doubt they were to deal with them as if they were dealing with persons reduced to the state of the brute creation, and they must be responsible for all the acts performed under their sanction and direction by the persons who thus create a nuisance. There would be no nuisance if these persons did not daily commit it; there would be no nuisance if these persons were removed from this place, or if the deposits were turned into a cesspool on the property; all would then be remedied, and their neighbours would have no cause of complaint. It is in the power of the magistrates to correct that which is an evil, and they are therefore wrongdoers if the evil is allowed to be continuous. Then something was said about delay; and in that respect the case stands thus: that this course of proceeding, if not actually commenced, was sufficiently indicated in 1851, and thereupon the clerk to the local board of health of Edmonton immediately called the attention of the magistrates to the evil, and from that time attempts were made by the magistrates to remove it; they have acted most properly in every way one would desire them to act, subject always to this one remark, that they were bound not to permit the nuisance at all. They tried a great variety of measures for removing it, and thus things went on between the board of health and the magistrates. This court would be very loth to say that a public body should rush at once into a Chancery suit in dealing with another public body; and I think that the observations which have been made upon the position of these two bodies are very applicable indeed. Each acts for a large section of ratepayers; neither of them ought to be anxious to increase the burdens of those who have to pay rates, by a useless litigation; therefore it is impossible for the court to say that such bodies are to be discouraged from entering into negotiations and consideration of the matter before suit, at the peril of being told—“If all that is attempted to be done should fail, that they are then too late in coming here, and that their case is without remedy." It appears to me that the delay here must count for nothing, and that when the informants filed this information in 1865 they were quite in time. On that last branch of the case I will not make a single observation. It is not the province of this court to say how far parties would or would not act better by trying to arrange and settle the disputes between themselves before they come into court. But when they have not so arranged and settled, all we have to do is to decide on the rights that exist between them. As regards the position of the defendants, it is true, as they said, that they act as a public body from public principle, wishing to discharge their duties in a proper manner: but that cannot give them any right whatever to throw this sewage on to their neighbours' property. That was a question which I put to Mr. Schomberg-Where is there in the Act anything that authorises them to do this? Mr. Schomberg cited several cases, which showed that where by Act of Parliament certain duties are confided to a public body, and that public body exercises the rights and privileges which Parliament has accorded to them, then, if they are doing only what Parliament has authorised them to do, and Parliament has not thought fit to say that those who may be injured by the necessary consequences of those acts shall be compensated, the persons against whom these rights have been fully created by the Legislature must not complain, and cannot be compensated. There was the case of trustees who had to fill up a gap between two hills (and there could hardly be a stronger one, perhaps) where it must have been some oversight of the Legislature. They did so, and placed a gentleman's lodge in such a position that it was impossible to drive up to it; there was a high embankment placed in front of it. All I can say, is that the owner had been forgotten, or had himself forgotten to assert his own interests; it was Independently of this I should have adhered to very unfortunate that it should be so, but whatever my decision in the Birmingham case, and held that the loss, the trustees could plead the authority of a lapse of thirteen or fourteen years would not per se Parliament for what they had done, and that gen. be sufficient to justify the continuance of a nuisance tleman had no right to compensation. I asked, which would amount to appropriating the property therefore, of course, what were the clauses which of others, which is the effect of this nuisance from conferred on these visiting magistrates, who have the way the parties have been dealt with in Edmonbuilt a house for the accommodation of lunatics, ton. A nuisance which would appropriate property the right to transfer this whole sewage and nuisance to the person committing it should not be perby these lunatics into their neighbours' grounds. mitted to have that effect, and to secure a title to I find nothing of the kind; nothing that leads one those who otherwise have none to the property so to suppose for a moment that Parliament could interfered with, though it would of course and have any such intention. Of course it is not to be, necessarily have had the effect of preventing an inand cannot be, deduced from the power given to junction being granted by way of interlocutory aperect a large building, that, as a necessary conse-plication. Therefore, as far as delay is concerned, I quence, all the refuse from the building is to be cannot deny the right of the informant to seck thrown on the adjacent lands. I cannot therefore relief. |