C. CAS. R.]

Tamar Crockett, wife of George Crockett, Tring: She asked what I wanted for plait. I said, "Ten pence halfpenny." She said, "Ten pence.' She took it." I said, "Where do you pay, good woman." She said, "At the Blooming Feathers." I said, "I don't know that." She said, "I'll pay at the Rose and Crown tap-room." She took it off my hand. It is a common rule for many plait buyers to take it. I believed I should find an honest woman in the tap-room to pay. I did not find her there. She offered ten pence, then took the plait. Then we spoke about the Rose and Crown.

I saw prisoner. She took plait, and asked what I wanted for it. I said, Eight pence." She said, "Seven pence." I asked her where she paid. She said, "At the Rose and Crown." I said, "Where are you paying, or where will you pay?" She said, "You'll be sure to find me." I believed she was an honest woman. I thought she took the room as well as others. I thought she had been there and taken a room to pay. That is the practice. We ask the buyers if we don't know them. I believed she had taken the room. They stop a penny out of the price, and we have beer; some do, and some do not, but pay the room themselves and stop nothing.

To me:

I parted with my plait because I thought she was an honest woman, and had put up there.

Sarah Kidd, barmaid at the Rose and Crown:

It is the practice of plait buyers to have so much beer. They come and ask for the room. The beer is for the use of the room. The sellers come to receive. They don't pay for the room. Two front rooms were taken this day. Each buyer had a separate table. The prisoner had not taken a room, nor anything to justify her in saying she was going to pay there.

I took prisoner at Leighton that afternoon. I searched every house in Tring first. Could not find her. Leighton is a mile from Tring. I said, "Are you a plait buyer." She said, "I buy a little sometimes for my neighbours." I said, "Have you bought any to-day ?" She says, "No." I said, "Tell the truth; a woman has been to Tring market and got a lot of plait without paying; have you been to Tring market? She said, "No." She turned to a person and said, "You know that." Upstairs in a back room I found plait. She afterwards said, "How much further have I to

go?" She said, "I have been to Tring market and bought plait, and paid for it, but not for first two bundles.”

Codd submitted there was no case.

The indictment was appropriate to the case proved.

I told the jury as follows: If it is the practice for buyers to engage a room, or table in a room at public-houses, of which the Rose and Crown is one, to pay sellers of plait; if that practice is well known; if what she, prisoner, said, naturally conveyed to sellers' minds that she had done so; if that was untrue; and if they, or any of them, parted with their goods in the belief she had done so, then they might find her guilty.

They found her guilty.

I have to request the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeal whether there was evidence of the matters left to the jury as to any of the cases. And whether the direction was correct in point of law.

If the direction was correct as to any of the cases. and there was evidence to support it, the conviction as to such case is to stand, otherwise to be quashed. The prisoner is on bail.

G. BRAMWELL.

[C. CAS. R. breach of contract. The false pretence laid in the indictment was that the prisoner alleged that she had taken a room, but the evidence does not support a conviction on that ground; all that the case shows is, that she said she would pay for the room.

No counsel appeared for the prosecution.

KELLY, C. B.-It is consistent with all that is stated in the case that the prisoner may have gone into the market, not knowing whether she would make any purchases or not, and having made some purchases, that she then promised to pay for them at the Rose and Crown public-house. At the time she made the promise she had not taken a dence that she knew there was a practice in the room at the Rose and Crown, and there is no evimarket to take a room for making such payments. It is quite consistent with the evidence that all she meant was that she would then take a room, and there pay for the purchases. That is not a false pretence, and the conviction must be quashed. The rest of the Court concurred.

Conviction quashed.

Saturday, May 1, 1869.

(Before KELLY, C. B., KEATING and LUSH, JJ., CLEASBY, B., and BRETT, J.)

REG. v. MEAKIN.

False pretences-Representation that goods were
unencumbered.

The prosecutor lent money to the prisoner at interest, on the security of a bill of sale on furniture, a promissory note of prisoner and another person, and a declaration made by prisoner that the furniture was unencumbered. The declaration was untrue at the time it was handed to the prosecutor, the prisoner having a few hours before given a bill of sale for the furniture to another person, but not to its full value: Held, that there was evidence to go to the jury in support of a charge of obtaining money by false pre

tences.

Case reserved for the opinion of this Court by Sir Thomas Tilson, Chairman.

At the general quarter session of the peace holden at Reigate in and for the county of Surrey on Tuesday, the 6th April 1869, William Meakin was tried and convicted on the following indictment:

Surrey. The jurors for our lady the Queen upon their oath present that William Meakin, on the 25th Nov. 1868, unlawfully and knowingly did falsely pretend unto Thomas John Williams that the goods of him the said William Meakin were unencumbered, and that a certain pretended bill of sale of the said goods, which pretended bill of sale the said William Meakin then delivered to the said Thomas John Williams, was a good and valid bill of sale of the said goods to the said Thomas John Williams. By means of which said false pretences the said William Meakin did then unlawfully obtain from the said Thomas John Williams 8l. 19s. 5d. in money, with intent to defraud, whereas, in truth and in fact, the said goods of him the said, William Meakin were not then unencumbered, nor was the said pretended bill of sale a good and valid bill of sale of the said goods to the said Thomas John Williams against the form of the statute in such case made and provided. The following was the evidence: Thomas John Williams, money lender, 68, Lorimore-road, Walworth:

In November last, some time prior to the 25th, I saw pri soner. On the 25th I saw him at the house of the gentleman who prepared the bill of sale. In the evening he had the money at nine p.m. He produced to me a declaration made and signed by himself, stating that the furniture was his, on the same day before a commissioner for taking affidavits, that he had not charged or encumbered it, and that he would not remove it, that he proposed to borrow 21. upon it, and that there were no judgments against him. [Tha declaration was put in and read.]

After that I let him have 81. 19s, 5d. The inducement to let him have it was believing there was value in his far

niture, and that it was his own. He then executed a bill of sale. [The bill of sale was put in and read.]

I saw it signed by him. I did not register it till some time afterwards. At the same time he gave me a promissory note, dated 25th Nov. 1868, for 121.

[C. CAS. R.

one of several matters which went to make up the transaction, and for which the prisoner, though civilly liable, was not amenable to the criminal law. In R. v. Codrington, 1 Car. & P. 661, where the defendant was charged with obtaining money by falsely pretending that he was entitled to a reversionary interest in a sum of money, when in

ing to his brother. I had not consented to their removal. Before I registered my bill of sale, I was not aware there was another bill of sale. I put a man in possession for three weeks, and after a notice I removed him. I have not been paid one shilling.

Cross-examined:

I have carried on my business ten or eleven years. The bill of sale and promissory note are for 12. I handed over to the prisoner 8. 19s. 5d. I deducted one month's interest, though the note is payable on demand. I took proceedings against Holton, the surety, in the Lord Mayor's Court, after prisoner left Hatcham Park-road. Mr. Noon, of Bucklersbury, is my attorney. The gentleman who prepared the bill of sale is an accountant. Prisoner drew the promissory note. I took no guarantee from Holton. In every case I take bills of sale and promissory notes. I saw the furniture before I lent the money. I have an inventory I made. The house at Hatcham contained two parlours, three bedrooms, and kitchen. The fair value of the furniture between man and man would be 251, to 301.

Re-examined:

I did not lend the money on the guarantee of Holton. I would not have lent the money on the bill of sale or promissory note if I had not had the assurance of the prisoner that the furniture was in his disposilion.

Patrick Wood, money lender, 2, Queensburychambers, London-wall:

About the 12th Nov. 1868, prisoner came to me to borrow 201. on his furniture in his house at Hatcham Park-road. I lent it him on the 25th Nov. 201. between two and three p.m.

He then executed to me a bill of sale [bill of sale put in and read]. He also gave me a promissory note. He never paid a penny. I went to Hatcham Park-road about three weeks afterwards, the goods were gone. I found them at the Herne Tavern. I took possession of them and sold them. The piano was gone. I never saw it.

Cross-examined:

The bill of sale recites a loan of 251. I gave prisoner 201. I believe prisoner was managing the tavern for his brother. It is a pretty large house. We removed the goods from the tavern. We got 61. for them, and had to pay expenses. I gave prisoner no notice, but believe his wife and friends were present at the sale.

At the close of the case for the prosecution, the counsel for the prisoner contended that there was no case to go to the jury, inasmuch as the case was precisely similar to R. v. Codrington, 1 C. & P. 661, and that on the authority of that case the jury @hould be directed to acquit the defendant.

The court, however, having referred to the cases of Reg. v. Burgon, 25 L. J. 105, M. C., and Reg. v. Crossley, 2 Moo. & R. 17, considered that the case should be left to the jury, and put it to the jury, that if the defendant made the representations charged in the indictment, and if they were false, and if they constituted an essential inducement to the prosecutor to part with his money the jury should find the defendant guilty, and they returned a verdict of guilty accordingly; but, on the application of the defendant's counsel, the court granted a case for the determination of the Court for consideration of Crown Cases Reserved, whether on the above facts, on the authority of R. v. Codrington, the jury should not have been directed to acquit the defendant.

Judgment was respited, and consent given to defendant being bailed, but as yet he has not found bail.

THO. TILSON, Chairman.

J. Thompson, for the prisoner.-It is submitted that there was no evidence to support the indictment. No doubt the declaration that the goods were unencumbered was untrue at the time it was handed to the prosecutor by the prisoner, but that was no more than a misrepresentation in respect of

said: "The doctrine contended for on the part of the prosecution, would make every breach of warranty or false assertion at the time of a bargain, a transportable offence. Here the party bought the property, and took as his security a covenant that the vendor had a good title. If he now finds that the vendor has not a good title, he must resort to the covenant. This is only a ground for a civil action." In Rex v. Crossley, 2 M. & R. 17, where the prisoner was indicted for obtaining a loan of money (300) by falsely pretending that he was prepared with funds to pay a large sum, all but 300%, it was proved that not only was the prisoner not in possession of such funds, but was at the time insolvent, and did not intend so to apply the 3007, Patteson, J. said: "The words of the Act are very large, and I do not think I can withdraw the case from the jury. If they are satisfied that the prisoner fraudulently obtained the 3007. by a deliberate falsehood, averring that he had all the funds to take up the bill except 3004, when, in fact, he knew that he had not, and meaning all the time to apply the 300l. to his own purposes, and not to take up the bill, the jury ought to convict the prisoner." [BRETT, J. read on: "In the case of did distinctly allege that he had a good title to the R. v. Codrington, it does not appear that the prisoner estate which he was selling." That passage gets rid of Codrington's case.] Scarcely, for the observation is hardly consistent with the facts stated in the report of it. In Reg. v. Burgon the facts were very strong, and showed that the whole device was a mere sham. So also in Reg. v. Watson, 27 L. J. 18, M. C., it was held that if a person is induced by false representations as to the nature and profits of a business to enter into and continue in partnership with another, and to give him money as part of the capital of the concern (the whole scheme not being a mere sham), the latter cannot be indicted for having obtained the money by false pretences. The test, it is submitted, is not whether any of the incidents to the contract were false, but whether the whole was a fraudulent affair and a mere sham. The representation in this case was no more than saying that the goods were not encumbered to their full value.

No counsel appeared for the prosecution.

KELLY, C. B.-The conviction must be affirmed. The prisoner falsely represented that his goods were unencumbered, but the truth was, at the time he made that statement, they were encumbered by a bill of sale, which he had executed only a few hours before, and he must therefore have known that the representation was false. The only question reserved for us is, whether on the facts the chairman ought to have withdrawn the case from the jury, and directed an acquittal. It is impossible to support such an argument.

The rest of the Court concurring,

Conviction affirmed.

Q. B.]

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Reported by T. W. SAUNDERS and J. SHORTT, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.

April 28 and May 10, 1869.
REG. v. EDWARD PELLEW PLENTY.

Municipal corporation-Voting papers-Initial letters for christian name-Misnomer.

By sect. 32 of the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76 (The Municipal Corporation Act), burgesses are to vote for councillors by voting papers, containing the christian names and surnames of the persons for whom they vote; and by sect. 142, it is enacted that no misnomer in any voting paper shall hinder the full operation of the Act. Certain voting papers were filled up with the initial letters only of the candidate's christian names : Held, that this was merely a misnomer, and that the voting papers were sufficient.

This was a special case upon a quo warranto information against Mr. Edward Pellew Plenty, for exercising the office of town councillor for the borough of Newbury. It appeared that at the annual election of town councillors, on the 1st Nov. 1867, there were four vacancies and five candidates, two of whom were Mr. Edward Pellew Plenty and Mr. William Penford. Upon the poll being taken, the three other candidates had unquestionable majorities; but, as regarded the two above-named gentlemen, Mr. Plenty had 272 votes, and Mr. Penford 271, whereupon the mayor declared Mr. Plenty to be duly elected. Upon a scrutiny of the votes, it appeared that for each of these two candidates a number of voting papers were given in at the poll in which the initials only of the christian names of such candidates were given, as "E. P. Plenty," and "W. Penford," and that if these voting papers were not rejected, there would remain a majority of good

votes for Mr. Penford.

By sect. 32 of the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76 (Municipal Corporation Act), it is enacted,

That every election of councillors within any borough according to the provisions of this Act shall be held before the mayor and assessors for the time being of such borough and the voting at any such election shall commence at 9 o'clock in the forenoou and shall be conducted in manner following, that is to say, every burgess entitled

to vote in the election of councillors may vote for any number of persons not exceeding the number of councillors then to be chosen, by delivering to the mayor and assessors, or other presiding officer as hereinafter mentioned, a voting paper containing the christian names and surnames of the persons for whom he votes, with their respective places of abode and description, such paper being previously signed with the name of the burgess voting, and with the name of the street, lane, or other place in which the property for which he appears to be rated on the burgess roll is situated. By sect. 142 (interpretation clause) it is enacted That no misnomer or inaccurate description of any person, body corporate, or place named in any schedule to this Act anuexed, or in any roll, list, notice, or voting paper required by this Act, shall hinder the full operation of this Act with respect to such person, body corporate, or place, provided that the description of such person, body corporate, or place be such as to be commonly understood.

[Q. B. schedule D contains the form and gives the christian name at full length. Erle, J.'s judgment in that case is very strong in my favour: "It is clear upon affidavit that A. W. Dobing was well understood in Hartlepool to mean Anthony Wilson Dobing, and that the claimant was the only person of that name there; and as there was before the mayor sufficient information in my judgment to that effect, I think that the mayor would have been fully justified in placing the name of the applicant on the roll." There was here no mistake as to the identity of the candidate, as there was no other person of the same name nominated, and there could be no mistake therefore as to who was meant. The interpretation clause, sect. 142, would cure this defect.

was

the court to disregard the statute by overruling the Gray, Q.C., contra.-The other side are asking express words of sect. 32. When the burgess signs his christian name he may sign by initials only, but this is otherwise with the christian name of the candidate. In Reg. v. Avery, 18 Q. B. 576; 21 L. J. 428, Q. B., Lord Campbell held that under sect. 32, it was sufficient according to the language of that clause, which speaks generally of the burgess singing his name, for the voter to sign with the initials of his christian names, but he adds, "In some cases the Legislature has required both the christian names and surnames to be signed at full length, and in those cases that must be done." I do not contend that the christian name must be written at full length with all its letters, an understood contraction will be sufficient. [LUSH, J.As "Geo." for "George."] Yes, or Willm." or "Wm." for "" "William." In Reg. v. Bradley, 3 Ell & Ell. 634; 3 L. T. Rep. N. S. 853, which arose upon the election of an alderman, and the question was whether a voting paper in which the party voted for designated "Wm. Bradley was good, in giving judgment, Wightman, J. says, "I am of opinion that the votes objected to on the ground that the voting papers contained abbreviations of the defendant's christian name, instead of the name at full length, are good. The statute requires each voting paper to contain the christian name and surname of the persons for whom the vote is given. Now, admitting that a mere initial could not be regarded as a christian name, I think that contractions of a chris. tian name, which like those in the present case are perfectly well known and in ordinary use, are sufficient to satisfy the statute." Crompton, J. also said "The statute which appears to have been decided to be imperative requires that the voting papers shall contain the christian name and surname of the persons for whom the votes are given, together with their respective places of abode and descriptions. I think that this requirement is satisfied as far as the christian name is concerned, if the voting paper contains something in writing which shows what christian name is intended. As to the present case, although the mere letter W. might have been open to the objection that it possibly represented some other name than William, the contractions "Wm." and "Willm.," though it is just possible that they might refer to some other name, would both be understood by any person reading them to mean "William." Hill, J. says, "Now I think that although an initial cannot be regarded as a christian name, a wellknown contraction of a name which cannot be misunderstood, may be so regarded, and is tantamount to the name in full." [Lush, J.

"Wr.," which stands for Walter, that would have been a misnomer, and might have been amended. What is the difference if he had omitted the "r" and had left only the "W."?] It would not have been a compliance with the statute. This is

Rogers was heard in reply.

Cur adv. vult.

May 10.-HANNEN, J. delivered the following judgment:-The question in this case is, whether William Penford was in Nov. 1867 duly elected a councillor for the borough of Newbury. It appears from the case that he was so elected if he was entitled to count as valid certain voting papers in which he was designated by the initial of his christian name (thus, W. Penford) instead of by his christian name and surname in full. By the 32nd section of the Municipal Corporation Act (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76) it is enacted that "every burgess entitled to vote . . . may vote. . . . by delivering a voting paper containing the christian names and surnames of the persons for whom he votes, with their respective places of abode and description. The interpretation clause (sect. 142) enacts that no "misnomer or inaccurate description of any person, body corporate, or place . . . in any voting paper required by this Act shall hinder the full operation of this Act. . . . Provided that the description of such person, body corporate, or place, be such as to be commonly understood." We are of opinion that the voting papers in question were valid, on the ground that the designation of the person voted for by the initial of his christian name is "a misnomer," and is, therefore, cured by the interpretation clause. It was contended for the defendant that where the initial is only used, there is a total omission of the name, which is not cured by the interpretation clause; and in support of this contention, the case of Reg. v. Bradley, 3 E. & E. 634, was referred to, where Hill, J. says that an initial cannot be regarded as a christian name. The question for consideration there, was whether the abbreviation “Willm.” for “William," vitiated the vote? and the court held that it did not. The dictum referred to was, therefore, not necessary for the decision of the case. The initial W. is certainly intended as an abbreviation of some name or other; its defect is, that it may be taken to be an abbreviation of any one of the other names beginning with it—such as Walter instead of the right one, William; but if any one, or

[Q. B.

even all of the wrong names which it might be mistaken for were written in full, this would certainly be cured. That being so, it is impossible to suppose that the Legislature did not intend to include under the term "misnomer' an abbreviation which could be, and in this case undoubtedly was, understood to indicate the correct name. We are of opinion that the word "misnomer," which means a naming amiss, is wide enough to cover the faulty indication of a christian name by means of the initial: (See Bac. Abr., title "Misnomer.") This construction has already been put_upon the word "misnomer" in another statute. By the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 11, it is enacted that no plea in abatement for a misnomer shall be allowed in a personal action, but that in all cases in which a misnomer would but for that Act have been by law pleadable in abatement, the defendant shall be at liberty to cause the declaration to be amended upon summons. In Rust v. Kennedy, 4 M. & W. 587, it was sought to set aside the writ and declaration for irregularity on the ground that the defen dant was described by his initial only, the action not being on a bill of exchange or other written instrument. It was there contended, as here, that it was not a mere case of misnomer, because the initials were no name at all. But Parke, B. pointed out that before the statute of 3 & 4 Will. 4, this was an objection which was pleadable in abatement as a misnomer, and that since that Act the only remedy was by summons and that this case was within the statute. Our judgment, therefore, will be for the relator.

Judgment for the Crown.

Attorneys: Southgate; Rickards and Walker.

Consecrated

Monday, May 3, 1869.

REG. V. TWISS.

ground-Faculty to desecrate-Ecclesiastical Court-Prohibition.

A piece of ground was formally consecrated in 1778 as a churchyard for the parish of S. In 1865, by an Order in Council, burials were ordered to be discontinued in the churchyard, none having taken place there for forty years previously. In the same year the guardians of the parish, in rebuilding their workhouse erected part of the buildings, including a chapel for the inmates of the workhouse, on a portion of the consecrated ground where no corpses had ever been buried, and then applied to the Consistory Court for a faculty to authorise this use of the portion of consecrated ground built on. On application by a stranger to the parish for a prohibition to restrain the judge of the Ecclesiastical Court from granting the faculty. Held, that although ground once consecrated cannot, without the authority of an Act of Parlament, be used for secular purposes, yet a prohibition should not be granted in this case, as the faculty applied for had reference partly to the erection of a chapel on the consecrated ground, which the Consistory Court might authorise, and this court would presume that the inferior court would not act beyond its jurisdiction; and (2) because the applicant for a prohibition was an entire stranger to the parish.

In this case a rule nisi had been obtained so far back as the 21st April 1865, calling on the worshipful Travers Twiss, judge of the Consistory Court of London, to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue, directed to him, to prohibit him from further proceeding in a certain suit instituted upon a petition of the board of guardians of the parish of St. Leonard's, Shoreditch, praying for a licence or faculty to desecrate and erect certain buildings, being part of a new workhouse, upon a