commencement of a state dates nevertheless from its recognition by other powers; that is to say, from the time at which they accredit ministers to it, or conclude treaties with it, or in some other way enter into such relations with it as exist between states alone. For though no state has a right to withhold recognition when it has been earned, states must be allowed to judge for themselves whether a community claiming to be recognized does really possess all the necessary marks, and especially whether it is likely to live. Thus although the right to be treated as a state is independent of recognition, recognition is the necessary evidence that the right has been acquired." Hall, Int. Law. 4th ed. 87. Hall maintains that, viewed as evidence of the right to be treated as independent, recognition by a parent state, though "more conclusive of independence than recognition by a third power,” does not essentially differ from the latter in legal effect. He admits, however, that there is an important practical difference in the value of the evidence in the two cases, since the parent state, by recognizing its revolted provinces, precludes itself from treating subsequent recognition by other states as premature. nal sovereignty. * * * "Sovereignty is the supreme power by which any state is governed. This supreme power may be exercised either internally Internal and exter- or externally. Internal sovereignty is that which is inherent in the people in any state, or vested in its ruler by its municipal constitution or fundamental laws. External sovereignty consists in the independence of one political society, in respect to all other political societies. The internal sovereignty of a state does not, in any degree, depend upon its recognition by other states. Thus the internal sovereignty of the United States of America was complete from the time they declared themselves free, sovereign, and independent States,' on the 4th of July, 1776. It was upon this principle that the Supreme Court determined, in 1808, that the several States composing the Union, so far as regards their municipal regulations, became entitled, from the time when they declared themselves independent, to all the rights and powers of sovereign states, and that they did not derive them from concessions made by the British King. The treaty of peace of 1782 contamed a recognition of their independence, not a grant of it. (McIlvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 4 Cranch, 212.) The external Sovereignty of any state, on the other hand, may require recognition by other states in order to render it perfect and complete." * Wheaton, Elements, Chap 11. § 20, 21, Dana's ed. 31-33. * The sovereignty of the state does not preclude the assumption of obligations, by treaty or otherwise, or the existence of a servitude upon the territory of one state for the benefit of another. Nor is it incompatible with the National obliga tions. payment of tribute, where such payment is made, as to the Barbary powers prior to 1830, not as a sign of dependence, but as the price of an advantage gained or peril avoided. Calvo, Le Droit Int., cinquième ed. I. 172, § 43; Rivier, Principes du Droit External influence. Calvo observes that the transitory obedience which a state pays to the directions of another government, or the exterior influence to which it may eventually have to submit, is not incompatible with the sovereignty of such state. Thus, for example, the city of Cracow was recognized by the congress of Vienna in 1815 as a free state, independent and neutral, under the protection of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Notwithstanding the powerful influence which those three powers were thus called upon to exercise over that state, Cracow did not cease to be considered as an independent nation in its international relations till 1846, when it was incorporated with the Empire of Austria, the incorporation giving rise to a protest on the part of England, France, and Sweden, based upon the violation of the treaties of 1815. Calvo, Le Droit Int., 5th ed. I. 172, § 42. External guarantees. Independence or sovereignty is sometimes guaranteed by one or more states, severally or jointly. The independence of Belgium has been guaranteed since 1831, and in virtue of Art. II. of their treaty with the Netherlands of April 19, 1839, by the five powers; the maintenance of its independence, as well as of its neutrality, was the object of new treaties concluded at London August 9 and 11, 1870, by Great Britain and Prussia, and Great Britain and France. The independence of Luxemburg was collectively guaranteed by Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, in the treaty of London of May 11, 1867, Art. II. Greek independence is guaranteed by France, Great Britain, and Russia. By Art. VII. of the treaty of Paris of 1856, the contracting parties agreed each on his own part to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This is not a guarantee. The independence of Switzerland is not guaranteed by the treaties of Vienna. There was no need of it, and Switzerland wished that the matter should not be brought into question. But the integrity and inviolability of Swiss territory have been guaranteed. Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens, I. 61–62. tic. From the point of view of their external relations, states may be classed as either simple or composite. The characterTheir characteris- istic of the simple state is that it has one supreme government, and exerts a single will, whether it be the individual will of a sovereign ruler, or the collective will of a popular body or of a representative assembly. If this characteristic be present, it matters not that the state may be divided for purposes of administration into provinces, departments, communes, or counties, or that it may hold colonies or dependencies, exercising to a greater or less extent powers of self-government in various parts of the world. In this sense the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with its widespread possessions, constitutes a simple state. Likewise Russia, with its extensive dominions in Europe and in Asia. France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Denmark, Portugal, and Turkey are other examples of simple states. " (1) SINGLE STATES. The simple state may be either single, i. e., wholly separate and distinct from any other state, or it may be connected with another state by what is called a personal union. The examples given in the preceding section of simple states are also examples of single states. (2) PERSONAL UNION. "Personal union" is the phrase reserved to denote the condition that exists where states, which are wholly separate and distinct, have the same ruling prince. If, as the result of this identity of rulers, or in connection with it, the individuality of the states be permanently merged, or held for a time in suspense, the relation is no longer properly described as a personal union. The example most frequently given of a personal union is that of Great Britain and Hanover from 1714 to 1837. The two states, though they employed the same agent for a particular class of purposes,' remained independent, with separate nationality and separate rights and obligations. Other examples that have been cited of a personal union are those of Spain and the Empire during the reign of the Emperor Charles V., Saxony and Poland from 1697 to 1763, Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark from a Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens, I. 77. 1773 to 1863, Prussia and the principality of Neufchatel down to 1857, and the Netherlands and Luxemburg from 1815 to 1890. Leopold II., King of the Belgians, in assuming, in 1885, the post of sovereign of the Independent State of the Congo, declared that the tie between Belgium and the Congo was purely personal. By the treaty between Denmark, France, Great Britain, and Russia, signed at London July 13, 1863, for the accession of George I. to the throne of Greece, it is expressly declared (Art. IV.) that in no case shall the crowns of Greece and Denmark be united on the same head. A similar declaration was made in the Peace of the Pyrenees, of November 7, 1659, in regard to the crowns of France and Spain. See Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens, I. 93–97; Hall, Int. Law, 4th ed. 25-26; 2. COMPOSITE STATES. A composite state is one composed of two or more states. The character of the international person thus constituted depends upon the nature of the act by which the union was created and the extent to which the sovereignty of the component parts is impaired or taken away. For the purposes of international law, composite states are usually classed as real unions, confederacies, and federal unions. (1) REAL UNION. Where states are not only ruled by the same prince, but are also united for international purposes by an express agreement, there is said to exist a real union. Such a union is susceptible of great variation, and its character can be determined in each individual case only by the particular terms of the agreement. The examples most frequently cited of a real union are AustriaHungary and Sweden and Norway. The basis of the present AustroHungarian union is the agreement (Augsleich) of 1867. While the two great divisions of the monarchy have for many purposes separate laws and separate administrative organizations, they have a single minister for foreign affairs, a single minister of war, and a single minister of finance. In foreign affairs the monarchy speaks as one person. The kingdom of Sweden and Norway is sometimes classed as a personal union. Each division has a separate commercial flag and to some extent separate treaties. The United States has a separate extradition treaty with Sweden signed January 14, 1893, and one with Nor a Wheaton, Elements, Dana's ed. 61, § 40. way, signed June 7, 1893. In each case, however, the treaty was made by "The United States of America” and “His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway;" and all the other treaties between the two parties, including the convention of May 26, 1869, in relation to nationality, comprehend Sweden and Norway as one state. The union between the kingdoms rests on the international act of August 6, 1815, by which provision is made for the election, in a certain contingency, of one and the same person as successor to the throne. Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens, I. 97-99. (2) CONFEDERATION. § 10. Where states associate themselves, in a permanent manner, for the exercise in common of their rights of sovereignty for the general advantage, they constitute a confederation. A confederation differs from an ordinary alliance or league not only in the intention of perpetuity, but also in the possession of some common organization by means of which the will of the component states is ascertained and given effect. Those states, however, retain their internal and, to a greater or less extent, their external sovereignty. Their personality in international law is not destroyed. The act by which they are bound together is called a compact. The association is a band of states (Staatenbund), and not a banded state (Bundesstaat). The common organization, or central power, represents the states, and is controlled by them. It operates upon the states, and not directly upon their inhabitants. It may be enlarged or restrained by the states by means of new agreements. The confederation itself, in spite of the intention of perpetuity, may be denounced and dissolved by the states that compose it. Examples of confederations are: The Empire, after the Peace of Westphalia of 1648; the Germanic Confederation, from 1815 to 1866; the United Provinces of the Netherlands, from 1750 to 1795; the United States of America, from 1781 to 1789. Wheaton, Elements, Dana's ed. 65-77, §§ 44-51; Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens, I. 99-103. (3) FEDERAL UNION. Where states are united under a central government, which is supreme within its sphere and which possesses and exercises in external affairs the powers of national sovereignty, they are said to form a federal union. "The composite state, which results from this league, is alone a sovereign power." The act by which the union is effected |