and assumed control of the waters of the inner harbor of Rio de Janeiro. The Government retained Fort Santa Cruz, which commands the entrance to the harbor, and held the shore line of the inner harbor, with artillery, infantry, and police forces. The army remained loyal, and the government was supported by the Congress."

representatives.

From time to time firing took place between the loyal forts and the squadron. On October 1, however, the commanders Action of foreign of the English, Italian, American, Portuguese, and French naval forces at Rio de Janeiro, acting upon the concurrent advice of their diplomatic representatives, notified Admiral de Mello, who had threatened to bombard the city, that they would if necessary use force to prevent it; and the ministers at the same time requested the Government to avoid doing anything to afford a pretext for hostile action against the city."

Mr. Thompson, United States minister at Rio de Janeiro, published a notice to American citizens that "lighters, launches, sloops, barges, and all other means of navigation used in embarking or disembarking passengers or in loading or unloading freight, should carry the flag of the United States of America at the prow in order that their traffic may be performed safely and under the protection of American war vessels." c

nition; refusal.

October 23 Admiral de Mello wrote Mr. Thompson, from on board the Aquidaban, that the insurgents had set up a proDemand for recog-visional government at Desterro, which is on the island of Santa Catharina and the capital of the State of that name, and asked that they be recognized as belligerents. Mr. Thompson was instructed that such recognition would be an unfriendly act toward Brazil, and a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion, the insurgents having not, apparently, up to date established and maintained a political organization which would justify such recognition on the part of the United States." He was instructed "to observe, until further advised, the attitude of an indifferent spectator." d Subsequently Mr. Thompson was instructed: "There having been no recognition by United States of the insurgents as belligerents, and there being no pretense that the port of Rio is blockaded, it is clear that if an American ship anchored in the harbor employs barges and lighters in transferring her cargo to the shore in the usual way and in so doing does not cross or otherwise interfere with Mello's line of fire and he seizes or attempts to seize the barges or lighters, he can and should be resisted. You

Limitation of insurgent operations.

a For. Rel. 1893, 45-46.

For. Rel. 1893, 51-52, 56, 66–68

e For. Rel. 1893, 53.

d Telegram, Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Thompson, Oct. 25, 1893, For. Rel. 1893, 63.

will deliver or send a copy of this instruction to the commander of the insurgents."

"a

“While our Government recognizes the existence of war between Brazil and

the insurgents, it does not accord to the latter belligerent rights. It is not claimed that the harbor at Rio is blockaded, and your right to transfer merchandise from an American or other neutral ship anchored there, to the shore, is clear, provided in doing so you do not cross the line of fire or otherwise interfere with the military operations of the insurgents. Barges and lighters thus employed will doubtless be protected by our naval forces there should Mello attempt to seize them." (Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Messrs. Lanman & Kemp, Nov. 2, 1893, 194 MS. Dom. Let. 174.) November 6, 1893, the commanders of the German, English, French, Portuguese, American, and Italian naval forces communicated to Admiral de Mello the following decision:

"1. They do not recognize the right of the insurgent forces to interfere in any way with commercial operations in the bay of Rio de Janeiro, operations which should be allowed to be accomplished everywhere except in the actual lines of fire of the batteries of the land fortifications.

"In consequence they have decided to protect merchandise, not only on board their countries' vessels or those that put themselves under their flag, but also on lighters, barges, and other means of maritime transport, whatever may be the nationality to which they belong, provided they be employed by these same ships in commercial operations.

"2. In order to avoid all disputes, these means of transportation or their tugs shall carry at their prow the flag of the country under whose protection they may be.

"3. The commanders of the foreign naval forces strongly hope that these measures will put an end to unfortunate incidents that they would find it necessary to repress."

December 1, 1893, de Mello left Rio de Janeiro on the Aquidaban,

and about the 12th of the same month the command of

Action of Admiral the remaining ships of the squadron was assumed by Benham. Admiral Saldanha da Gama, who, besides intimating an intention to bombard the city, announced that he would endeavor to prevent the passage of goods to the custom house or to the shore. Although the "decision" of the 6th of November was not withdrawn, it seems that for some time da Gama was permitted to interfere with the landing of merchandise. On the 29th of January, 1894, however, Admiral Benham, who had lately taken command of the United States naval forces, gave notice of his intention to protect all American ships proceeding to or discharging at the docks, and caused an insurgent.

a Telegram, Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Thompson, Nov. 1, 1893, For. Rel. 1893, 64.

For. Rel. 1893, 95-96.

e For. Rel. 1893, 121-122.

vessel, which had fired at the boat of an American ship, to abstain from further acts of molestation, by giving evidence of his purpose to return the fire and sink her, if she persisted." He acted within his instructions; and his action, which seems to have been approved by the other naval commanders, induced the insurgents to abstain from further interference with commerce."

66

Position of United
States.

"An actual condition of hostilities existing, this Government has no desire to intervene to restrict the operations of either party at the expense of its effective conduct of systematic measures against the other. Our principal and obvious duty, apart from neutrality, is to guard against needless or illegitimate interference, by either hostile party, with the innocent and legitimate neutral interests of our citizens. Interruption of their commerce can be respected as a matter of right only when it takes one of two shapes-either by so conducting offensive and defensive operations as to make it impossible to carry on commerce in the line of regular fire, or by resort to the expedient of an announced and effective blockade.

"Vexatious interference with foreign merchant shipping at a designated anchorage, or with the lighterage of neutral goods between such anchorage and a designated landing, by random firing not necessary to a regular plan of hostilities and having no other apparent object than the molestation of such commerce, is as illegitimate as it is intol erable. Hence we have a right to expect and insist that safe anchorage and time and place for loading and unloading be designated, if practicable, to be interrupted only by notice of actual intention to bombard, or by notification and effective enforcement of blockade.

"The insurgents have not been recognized as belligerents, and should they announce a blockade of the port of Rio the sole test of its validity will be their ability to make it effective."

Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Thompson, minister to Brazil, Jan. 11, 1893, For. Rel. 1893, 99.

*

*

*

* *

a "In no case have I interfered in the slightest way with the military operations of either side in the contest now going on, nor is it my intention to do so. * American vessels must not be interfered with in any way in their movements in going to the wharves or about the harbor, it being understood, however, that they must take the consequences of getting in the line of fire where legitimate hostilities are actually in progress. Until belligerent rights are accorded you, you have no right to exercise any authority whatever over American ships or property of any kind. You can not search neutral vessels or seize any portion of their cargoes, even though they be within the class which may be clearly defined as contraband of war, during hostilities between two independent governments. The forcible seizure of any such articles by those under your command would be, in your present status, an act of piracy." (Admiral Benham to Admiral da Gama, January 30, 1894, For. Rel. 1893, 122.)

For. Rel. 1893, 117, 118, 120.

Mr. Gresham, Feb. 5, 1894, cabled Mr. Thompson to inform Admiral da Gama, who had asked for the recognition of the insurgents as belligerents, that such recognition was "still considered by the President as not being justified by the situation." (For. Rel. 1893, 121.) On February 6 Mr. Thompson reported that the territorial claims of the insurgents, who professed to hold most of the States of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catharina and Parana, and a part of Sao Paulo, seemed to be exaggerated; that they held several towns, including the capital of Parana, in the south, but, so far as he was advised, had not absolute control of any State; and that, owing to dissensions among its members, their provisional government was not intact and was not improving either in organization or in effectiveness. (For. Rel. 1893, 126. See, also, pp. 275-278.) March 13, 1894, the insurgents at Rio unconditionally surrendered, with all their ships and munitions of war, da Gama and a number of his officers and men finding asylum on the Portuguese ships of war. (For. Rel. 1893, 141–142.)

13. SEMISOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS SUZERAIN.

§ 71..

The question of belligerency as between a semisovereign state and its suzerain was discussed in the case of Madagascar. Madagascar. When hostilities broke out in 1895, the relations between France and the island were regulated by the treaty between France and the Malagassy Government of Dec. 17, 1885, which was generally considered in Europe as constituting a French protectorate. The British Government treated the Malagassies not as belligerents, but as insurgents, and allowed English ships to transport materials of war for France."

Republic.

In the case of the Transvaal, however, Great Britain, though asserting rights of suzerainty, conceded to the Republic and The South African claimed for herself belligerent rights. The Republic, in its ultimatum of Oct. 9, 1899, declared that it would regard the failure of Great Britain immediately to comply with certain demands as a formal declaration of war." The British Government deemed these demands "impossible to discuss," and referred to the Transvaal's "declaration of war. The existence of a state of war was notified by Great Britain to foreign governments, and rights of belligerency, on sea as well as on land, were exercised and conceded.

66

a Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens, I. 79-93.

South African Republic, 1899, C.-9530, pp. 67–70.

Correspondence respecting the action of Her Majesty's naval authorities with regard to certain foreign vessels, Africa, No. 1 (1900); Correspondence in reference to the abuse of the white flag, April, 1900, Cd. 122.

tions.

V. ACTS FALLING SHORT OF RECOGNITION.

1. OF NEW STATES.

§ 72.

As there is no exclusive mode by which recognition is given, and as governments are sometimes obliged by necessity or Acts and implica- obvious convenience to hold intercourse with communities whose independence it would not be proper to acknowledge, the question whether recognition should be predicated of a particular act may depend upon intention. Holtzendorff mentions the surrender of criminals to a new community as an act of recognition, and it is quite conceivable that it might be so done as to create such an inference; but, as Hall justly observes,' it is not clear "why the surrender of an ordinary criminal to a de facto government, in the possession of regular courts, need more necessarily constitute recognition than does recognition of belligerency," both acts merely implying the acknowledgment, on grounds of political or social convenience, of a de facto exercise of jurisdiction. "It is, of course, direct recognition to publish an acknowledgment of the sovereignty and independence of a new power. It is direct recognition to receive its ambassadors, ministers, agents, or commissioners, officially." The "official reception of diplomatic agents accredited by the new state, the dispatch of a minister to it, or even the grant of an exequatur to its consul, affords recognition by necessary implication."a But neither the sending out to such state of consuls, agents of commerce, or persons to obtain information, nor the reception of its representatives, if these things be done unofficially, constitutes recognition. "In 1823 consuls were appointed by Great Britain to the South American Republics and the various governments were informed that the appointments had been made for the protection of British subjects, and for the acquisition of information which might lead to the establishment of friendly relations. The various consuls took up their appointments and acted, but were not gazetted. The earliest recognition [by Great Britain] took place in 1825." e

The diplomatic agents of the United States to France were permitted Unofficial inter- to reside at Paris and to hold informal intercourse with course; the the Government before the independence of the American Revo- United States was recognized. The case was the same in the Netherlands. Arthur Lee was stopped by the Spanish Government when on his way to Madrid in the spring of 1777, but afterwards Mr. Jay was allowed to reside at Madrid, it being

lution.

a Handbuch, I. § 8.

Int. Law, 4th ed. 93.

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, May 21, 1861, Dip. Cor. 1861, 73.