to the amount of the duties paid; and an application was made to the German Government for relief from the exaction of the additional duty. The German Government refused to entertain the claim. The Government of the United States continued to press it, maintaining that it involved "a substantial hardship calling for that equitable treatment which the Foreign Office admits the case should receive." It was not deemed necessary, said the United States, to consider the question whether, by the payment of the duty, the goods themselves were invested with a right of free transportation into any part of what were then the Sultan's dominions. The duty was in fact paid on the goods for sale on the coast; by the entry of the goods at Zanzibar, they were in reality imported into the coast; but, the government of the coast having changed, a new entry was demanded and a second payment of duty exacted, simply because the government had changed. To the contention of the Foreign Office that notice should have been taken of the negotiations for the sale of the Sultan's dominions, it was answered that the importers could not reasonably be required to incur inconvenience and loss merely because negotiations were on foot of which they could not foresee either the result or the time of termination; that it seemed to be the more just and reasonable view that they had a right to continue to conduct their business according to methods which had all along been pursued and which had the sanction of law and treaty; and that the notice of Dec. 22, 1890, while it might be considered as an admission that they were entitled to be advised that they would be required to meet changes in the course of their business, was so short that it constituted rather a notification that they would be subjected to loss than an opportunity to avoid it. Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Phelps, Feb. 27, 1891, MS. Inst. Germany, XVIII. 417; Mr. Adee, Acting Sec. of State, to Mr. Phelps, May 20, 1891, id. 520. The German Government appears to have adhered to its position. 4. ON PRIVATE LAW. "All the laws which were in force in Florida while a province of Spain, those excepted which were political in their character, which concerned the relations between the people and their sovereign, remained in force until altered by the Government of the United States. Congress recognized this principle by using the words 'laws of the Territory now in force therein.' No laws could then have been in force but those enacted by the Spanish Government.” Marshall, C. J., American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 542. In the case of the Island of Grenada, reported under the title of Campbell v. Hall, 20 St. Tr. 239, 322; Cowp. 204, 208, it was declared by Lord Mansfield that “a country conquered by the British arms becomes a dominion of the King in right of his Crown, and therefore necessarily subject to the legislative power of the Parliament of Great Britain." It was also declared that the "laws of a conquered country continue until they are altered by the conqueror." The latter position was approved by Lord Ellenborough in Picton's case, 30 St. Tr. 944. (See Dana's Wheaton, note 169.) See, also, Craw. r. Ramsey, Vaughan 274; Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164; Airhart . Massieu, 98 U. S. 491; Magoon's Reports, 526. In cases of conquest, among civilized countries, having established laws of property, the rule is that laws, usages, and municipal regulations in force at the time of the conquest remain in force until changed by the new sovereign. United States v. Power's Heirs, 11 Howard, 570; United States v. Heirs of Rillieux, 14 id. 189; Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 id. 176, affirming Leitensdorfer. Webb, 1 N. M. 34. An adjudication as to title to certain lands in Louisiana, made by a Spanish tribunal in that territory after its cession to the United States, but before actual possession had been surrendered, the territory being de facto in the possession of Spain and subject to Spanish laws, was held valid as the adjudication of a competent tribunal having jurisdiction of the case. Keene v. McDonough, 8 Peters, 308. By the law of nations the rights and property of the inhabitants are protected, even in the case of a conquered country, and held sacred and inviolable when it is ceded by treaty, with or without any stipulation to such effect; and the laws, whether in writing or evidenced by the usage and customs of the conquered or ceded country, continue in force till altered by the new sovereign. Strother v. Lucas, 12 Peters, 410. Spanish laws prevailing in Louisiana before its cession, and affecting titles to lands there, must be judicially noticed by the court. Their existence is not matter of fact to be tried by a jury. United States v. Turner, 11 Howard, 663; S. P., United States v. Chaves (1895), 159 U. S. 452. The general principle that when political jurisdiction and legislative power over a territory are transferred from one sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the territory continue in force until abrogated by the new sovereign, is applicable as to territory owned by the United States, the exclusive jurisdiction of which is ceded to them by a State in a manner not provided for by the Constitution, to so much thereof as is not used by the United States for its forts, buildings, and other needful purposes. Chicago and Pac. Railway Co. e. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542, holding that a law of Kansas, requiring railways not enclosed by lawful fences to pay damages for animals killed or wounded by their engines or cars, without regard to the question of negligence, remained in force in the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation after the State had ceded exclusive jurisdiction over it. Article 44 of the alien law in force in Cuba, under which the consul of the country to which an intestate alien belonged had the right to administer upon his estate, continued in force after Spain's relinquishment of sovereignty over the island." Griggs, At.-Gen., April 26, 1900, 23 Op. 93; For. Rel. 1901, 226. A claim having been made by an English firm by reason of the refusal of the municipal authorities of Manila to carry out an alleged contract for supplying certain fire apparatus to the city, it was stated that implied provision had been made by the military government of the Philippines for the protection of the rights of the claimants under the alleged contract "by the continuance of the established laws under which the contract was made, if at all, and by the establishment of competent courts whose decree will be enforced by the executive department." Mr. Root, Sec. of War, to Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, Dec. 6, 1900, Magoon's 5. ON PUBLIC OBLIGATIONS. § 96. "No principle of international law can be more clearly established than this: That the rights and the obligations of a nation in regard to other States are independent of its internal revolutions of government. It extends even to the case of conquest. The conqueror who reduces a nation to his subjection receives it subject to all its engagements and duties toward others, the fulfillment of which then becomes his own duty. However frequent the instances of departure from this principle may be in point of fact, it can not with any color of reason be contested on the ground of right." Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Everett, chargé d'affaires to The Netherlands, "In the event of a state being divided into two or more independent sovereignties, the obligations which had accrued to the whole before the division are ratably binding on the different parts; for, as Story says, the division of an empire creates no forfeiture of previously vested rights of property.' And so, e contrario, where several separate states are incorporated into one sovereignty, the rights and obligations that belonged to each before the union are binding upon the new state; but, as General Halleck points out, of course the rule must be modified to suit the nature of the union formed and the character of the act of incorporation in each particular case." Abdy's Kent (1878), 96, citing Lawrence's Wheaton (1863), 52, note 20. The opinion of the United States heretofore has been that as the foreign obligations of Peru, incurred in good faith before the war, rested upon and were secured by the products of her guano deposits, Chile was under a moral obligation not to appropriate that security without recognizing the lien existing thereon. This opinion was frankly made known to Chile, and our belief was expressed that no arrangement would be made between the two countries by which the ability of Peru to meet her honest engagements toward foreigners would be impaired by the direct act of Chile. This Government went so far as to announce that it could not be a party as mediator or directly lend its sanction to any arrangement which should impair the power of Peru to pay those debts. "This attitude was taken, not because any appreciable portion of the bonded debt is known to be held by citizens of the United States, nor because of any purpose to officiously guarantee the eventual rights of alien bondholders, but from an intimate conviction that any settlement would be fraught with embarrassment or even peril to both Chile and Peru, which by its terms did not provide for the payment of the honest debt of Peru. "The same considerations which led this Government to refrain from taking an active initiative in compelling a peace, would lead it to refrain likewise from active opposition to an engagement already signed. 'Without knowing the text of the treaty provisions concerning the foreign debt of Peru, it is not easy to particularize an instruction to you. You will, however, abstain from any protest to the Chilean Minister at Lima against the pending ratification of the treaty by Chile. You will likewise abstain from any formulated protest to the provisional government of General Iglesias against such ratification. by the coming Assembly. That Assembly is convened for the purpose, as is believed, of permitting a free expression of the will of the Peruvian nation, and it would be contrary to the declared policy of this Government to seek to influence its action in the direction of any determinate solution. "At the same time, it would be the part of frankness not to withhold from such influential Peruvians as may converse with you on the state of their country the firm conviction that in order to render the treaty satisfactory and peace permanent, provision should be made for the payment of the honest indebtedness of Peru. If, as it is supposed, the treaty lately signed commits Chile to a partial recognition of the existing lien by a payment on account, it remains for Peru to make some equally distinct and efficacious provision for meeting the remainder." Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Phelps, min. to Peru, Dec. 29, 1883, See, also, Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Roustan, French min., so far as they impaired guarantees given by Peru to her foreign creditors. "The treaty," said Mr. Frelinghuysen, was eventually concluded in terms at variance with those which the United States had amicably counselled, and is now ratified by both Chile and Peru. I am not now called upon to express an opinion as to whether, in the relations of governments, a security for a debt is to be followed in rem through all its vicissitudes of ownership." (MS. Notes to French Leg. IX. 597.) In For. Rel. 1888, I. 182-186, there is a correspondence between the British minister in Chile and the Chilean minister of foreign relations touching the claims of Peruvian creditors on the revenues of the province of Tarapaca, and certain provisions of the Grace-Anibar contract for the settlement of the Peruvian debt. The Chilean Government contended that the Peruvian Government in attempting by the loan of 1872 to mortgage the guano beds of Tarapaca exceeded its legal powers, the acts under which the loan was issued not granting the necessary authority for the purpose; and that the only obligations of Chile in the premises, as successor in sovereignty of Peru in Tarapaca, were those which she voluntarily a sumed by the decree of February 9, 1882, giving to the creditors of Peru 50 per cent of the net proceeds of the sale of 1,000,000 tons of guano, and by the treaty of peace of Oct. 20, 1883, which confirmed (Art. IV.) the decree of 1882, and stipulated, besides, that, after the sale of the 1,000,000 tons, Chile would continue to pay to the Peruvian creditors 50 per cent of the net proceeds of guano till the debt should be extinguished or the deposits be exhausted. (For. Rel. 1883, 731.) Moreover, the Chilean Government, in the course of the correspondence, declared that it was "the right of the victor to become unconditional owner of a part of the enemy's territory" for war purposes and future security; that the object of the Peruvian loans was the building of railroads and other national works exclusively in territory which Peru preserved; and that Chile had not intended, in conceding something to the creditors of Peru, who held the latter's "mere promise of honor," to acknowledge any "pretended hypothecate rights." Chili, in taking possession, at the close of the war with Peru, of the guano deposits belonging to Peru, took them subject only to such liens as were binding under Peruvian law at the time of cession. Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Cowie, June 15, 1885, 156 MS. Dom. Let. 1. "The general doctrine of international law, founded upon obvious principles of justice, is, that in case of annexation of a state or cession of territory, the substituted sovereignty assumes the debts and obligations of the absorbed state or territory-it takes the burdens with the benefits. Mr. Adams, when Secretary of State, expressed the principle thus, extending it even to the case of acquisition by conquest: "The conqueror who reduces a nation to his subjection receives it subject to all its engagements and duties toward others, the fulfillment of which then becomes his own duty.' (1 Whart. Int. Law Dig., sec. 5.) "The subject is discussed by Mr. Hall (International Law, 4th ed., pp. 104, 105), and in Rivier (Principes du Droit des Gens, I., pp. 70-72, note, and authorities and instances cited). |