Opinion of the Court.

tending from Minneapolis, in that State, to Fort Dodge, in Iowa. A law of Iowa, then in force, provides that "every corporation operating a railway shall be liable for all damages sustained by any person, including employés of such corporation, in consequence of the neglect of agents, or by any mismanagement of the engineers or other employés of the corporation, and in consequence of the wilful wrongs, whether of commission or omission, of such agents, engineers, or other employés, when such wrongs are in any manner connected with the use and operation of any railway on or about which they shall be employed, and no contract which restricts such liability shall be legal or binding."

On the 6th of December, 1881, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a brakeman on one of its cars, and on that day, in Webster, in Iowa, it became his duty to make a coupling of an engine and a freight car. The engine was in charge of one of its employés, an engineer, and whilst the plaintiff was making the coupling the engine was, by the negligence and mismanagement of the engineer, driven against the car, causing severe and permanent injuries to the plaintiff. To recover damages for the injuries thus sustained he brought this action in a District Court of Minnesota, relying upon the law of Iowa quoted above. The defendant in its answer alleged, and on the trial contended, that this law was abrogated by that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which declares that no State shall deprive any person of property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The District Court held the law to be in full force, and that under it the railroad company was responsible to the plaintiff for the injuries sustained by him through the negligence of the engineer. The plaintiff accordingly recovered a verdict for two thousand dollars, upon which judgment was entered. Upon appeal to the State Supreme Court the judgment was affirmed, and to review that judgment the case is brought here.

We have just decided the case of Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Mackey, ante, 205, where similar objections were raised

Opinion of the Court.

to a law of Kansas, which on the point here involved is not essentially different from the law of Iowa, namely, in imposing liabilities upon railroad companies for injuries to employés in its service, though caused by the negligence or incompetency of a fellow-servant, and we held that the law was not in conflict with the clauses referred to in the Fourteenth Amendment. On the authority of that case the judgment in the present one must be

Affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. BROADHEAD.

UNITED STATES v. BROADHEAD.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

Nos. 233, 234. Argued April 18, 1888.- Decided April 30, 1888.

On the authority of United States v. Hill, 123 U. S. 681, it is held, that an action against sureties to recover on a bail bond conditioned for the appearance of the principal to answer to an indictment for making and forging checks against an assistant treasurer is not a case for the enforcement of a revenue law, within the intent of Rev. Stat. § 699. No interest can be recovered in an action by the United States upon a bail bond conditioned for the appearance of a person to auswer to an indictment for forgery.

THESE were actions against sureties on bail bonds. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury for plaintiff in

error.

No

appearance for defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

These cases are suits brought upon two bonds given by John F. Broadhead and his sureties, conditioned for his appearance in the District Court of the United States for the

Syllabus.

District of California, to answer two separate indictments for making and forging checks on the Assistant Treasurer of the United States at San Francisco. The penalty of each of these bonds was $5000, and, according to well settled principles, no interest can be recovered in such a suit as this, nor can any recovery be had beyond the amount prescribed in these instruments, except for costs.

Section 3 of the "act to facilitate the disposition of cases in the Supreme Court of the United States, and for other purposes," approved February 16, 1875, 18 Stat. 315, c. 77, § 3, fixing the amount necessary to give jurisdiction to this court of writs of error from the Circuit Courts at a sum in excess of five thousand dollars, applies to the United States as well as to other parties, except in the cases enumerated in § 699 of the Revised Statutes. None of these exceptions apply to the present cases.

It was attempted in United States v. Hill, 123 U. S. 681, to establish the proposition that that case was for the enforcement of a revenue law, and, therefore, came within the exceptions specified. It was, however, overruled by this court, and the opinion in that case forbids the idea that these cases can be treated as an exception to the general rule.

As the act of 1875, above cited, requires that there shall be an amount in controversy, exclusive of costs, exceeding five thousand dollars, and as no such recovery can be had in the cases now under consideration,

The writs are dismissed.

JONES'S ADMINISTRATOR v. CRAIG.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA.

No. 235. Submitted April 18, 1888. Decided April 30, 1888.

A brought ejectment against B. B thereupon filed a bill in equity, (which was subsequently amended,) to remove a cloud from the title, setting up that the deed under which A claimed was a mortgage, with a written

Opinion of the Court.

contract of defeasance. A demurred. Upon hearing on the demurrer it was ordered that if B should, within fifteen days, bring into court the amount due on the mortgage, and interest, and all taxes paid by A, etc., A should be restrained from further prosecution of the ejectment suit; but that if he should fail to do so within that time, the bill should be dismissed and the defendant allowed to proceed with the suit. Held, (1) That this order, made upon hearing of a demurrer to a bill in chancery, was wholly irregular; but,

(2) That this court was without jurisdiction as the order was not a final decree.

IN EQUITY. The case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. G. E. Pritchett for appellants.

Mr. W. J. Connell for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellants here, Henry O. Jones and John Jort, brought their bill in chancery against Walter Craig, the defendant, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.

The object of the bill was to remove a cloud upon the title to certain lands. The defendant had brought an action of ejectment to recover the possession, and, having a prima facie title of record upon which he could recover, this bill was filed for the purpose of setting up an equitable defence. Thereupon a temporary injunction was allowed, restraining Craig from prosecuting his action of ejectment until the chancery suit was decided.

The allegation of the bill was, that a deed under which the plaintiff in the ejectment suit asserted title was executed as a mortgage, with a written contract of defeasance when the money loaned should be repaid. To this bill a demurrer was filed, upon which the court made an order in the following language:

"If the plaintiff will amend bill and bring into court proper amount of money to redeem and pay taxes, all of same to bear interest from time money was due, and interest on taxes from date of payment at present rate of interest, then perpetual

Opinion of the Court.

injunction can be allowed. Costs of both suits to abide further order."

Afterwards the plaintiffs did file an amended bill, to which likewise there was a general demurrer. Upon the hearing of that demurrer the court made the following order:

"This cause coming on to be heard upon the demurrer of the defendant to the amended bill of complaint filed herein, and the court being fully advised in the premises, it is ordered that if within fifteen days the plaintiff bring into court the amount of the note and mortgage set forth in the bill of complaint, with interest thereon from the time the note became due, with interest thereon at ten per cent per annum until November 1, 1879, and from November 1, 1879, to date of this order, at seven per cent per annum, together with all taxes paid by defendant upon the land described in said bill, with interest thereon at ten per cent per annum, then the defendant be restrained from the further prosecution of the cause in ejectment set forth in said bill of complaint, and entitled Walter Craig v. Henry O. Jones; but if the plaintiff shall fail so to do within the time mentioned, the said demurrer to said bill be sustained and the said bill of complaint be dismissed, and the defendant herein be allowed to proceed with the prosecution of his said action at law. To the ruling and decision of the court the plaintiffs except."

This order, made upon the hearing of the demurrer, to a bill in chancery, is wholly irregular.

This court, however, has no jurisdiction of the case as it stands, because the order just cited is not a final decree. Something yet remains to be done in order to make it such, and that action depends upon whether or not the complainants will comply with the order to bring in the sum due on the mortgage. If that order is complied with, then a decree should be made, upon the hypothesis on which the order was made, in favor of the complainants in the bill, and quieting their title. If, however, the money is not brought into court,