Opinion of the Court. their discretion as to the way in which they exercise the power, so that if a fund be applicable to the maintenance of children at the discretion of trustees, the court will not take upon itself, in the first instance, to regulate the maintenance, but will leave it to the trustees. But the court will interfere wherever the exercise of the discretion by the trustees is infected with fraud or misbehavior, or they decline to undertake the duty of exercising the discretion, or generally where the discretion is mischievously and erroneously exercised, as if a trustee be authorized to lay out money upon government, or real, or personal security, and the trust fund is outstanding upon any hazardous security. Lewin on Trusts, c. 20, § 2, 402, 403, 4th Eng. ed. In the case of Costabadie v. Costabadie, 6 Hare, 410, 414, Vice Chancellor Sir James Wigram said: "If the gift be subject to the discretion of another person, so long as that person exercises a sound and honest discretion, I am not aware of any principle or any authority upon which the court should deprive the party of that discretionary power. Where a proper and honest discretion is exercised, the legatee takes all that the testator gave or intended that he should have-that is, so much as in the honest and reasonable exercise of that discretion he is entitled to. That is the measure of the legacy." But it is always for the court eventually to say, when called upon, whether the discretion has been either exercised at all, or exercised honestly, and in good faith. In re Hodges, Davey v. Ward, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 754. Plainly, if the trustee refuses altogether to exercise the discretion with which he is invested, the trust must not on that account be defeated, unless by its terms it is made dependent upon the will of the trustee himself. On the whole, therefore, our conclusion is that each of the complainants in these bills is entitled to take a beneficial interest under the will of David D. Colton, to the extent, out of the estate given by him to his wife, of a permanent provision for them during their respective lives, suitable and sufficient for their care and protection, having regard to their condition and necessities, and the amount and value of the fund from VOL. CXXVII-21 Statement of the Case. which it must come. It will be the duty of the court to ascer tain after proper inquiry, and thereupon to determine and declare, what provision will be suitable and best under the circumstances, and all particulars and details for securing and paying it. The decrees of the Circuit Court are accordingly reversed, and the causes remanded with directions to overrule the demurrers to the several bills, and to take further proceedings therein not inconsistent with this opinion; and it is 80 ordered. CAMERON v. HODGES. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE. No. 208. Argued April 5, 1888. Decided April 30, 1888. A petition by defendant for removal of a cause from a state court, on the ground of citizenship, which alleges that he is a citizen of another named State of which none of the complainants are citizens, is insufficient unless the record discloses that they are citizens of other named States of which the defendant is not a citizen, or are aliens. This court of its own motion uniformly takes the objection of want of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court, especially as regards citizenship. A want of jurisdiction of a Circuit Court arising out of a defect in the allegations of citizenship in a cause removed from a state court, on the ground of citizenship, cannot be cured by affidavits here. THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee. The suit was originally brought in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, held in the city of Memphis in that State, in regard to a controversy which arose concerning the title to certain real estate situated in the State of Arkansas. The principal defendant, Asa Hodges, was a citizen of Arkansas, and upon that ground procured an order in the Chancery Court to remove the case into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee. The allega tions upon which this removal was made were as follows: Argument for Appellees. "In the Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee. "Anna E. Cameron et al. "To the Hon. W. W. McDowell, chancellor : "Your petitioner states that he is, and at the time of the institution of this suit was, a citizen of the State of Arkansas and not of the State of Tennessee, and that none of the complainants are or were at that time citizens of the State of Arkansas; that said suit is of a civil nature, and the matters in controversy exceed, exclusive of costs, in value the sum of five hundred dollars; that the controversy affects the ownership of real estate in said State of Arkansas, and can be wholly decided between complainants and this defendant. Wherefore he prays an order for the removal of said cause from this court to the United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Tennessee, at Memphis, and he tenders herewith the requisite bond, as required by law, for the removal thereof. "Asa Hodges, the petitioner, being sworn, says the matters set forth in the above petition are true as far as stated on his own knowledge; the rest he believes to be true. "Sworn to this October 2d, 1882. ASA HODGES. "J. M. BRADLEY, Deputy Clerk and M.” Mr. D. H. Poston, with whom was Mr. W. H. Poston on the brief, for appellants. Mr. W. G. Weatherford, with whom was Mr. T. B. Turley on the brief for appellees. Mr. Weatherford and Mr. J. B. Heiskell after the cause was argued and submitted, filed the following affidavit : Asa Hodges, being sworn, says that he is the defendant and appellee in this cause, and that the affidavit made by him for its removal from the state court in Tennessee to the United States court was inadvertently made less full than the facts warranted; that at the time of the institution of said suit he Opinion of the Court. was, and ever since has remained, a citizen of the State of Arkansas; and that at the same time Ann E. Cameron and J. D. Cameron were citizens of the State of Mississippi; Mary F. Thompson and J. A. Thompson, and J. E. Price, were citizens of the State of Texas; E. J. Morton, L. W. Morton, L. C. Cobb, and R. W. Cobb, were citizens of the State of Alabama; and Gasken Price, Wm. Price, Lawler Price, and Leila Price, were citizens of the State of Tennessee; and that the parties named were all the complainants in said cause. STATE OF TENNESSEE, County of Shelby. A. HODGES. Personally appeared [before] the undersigned, notary public for said county and State, Asa Hodges, who made oath that the statements in the foregoing affidavit are true. Subscribed and sworn to before [me] this 20th day of April, 1888. [SEAL.] J. E. DILLARD, With this affidavit they filed a brief in support of the jurisdiction of the court. MR. JUSTICE MILLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. While this petition sets forth the citizenship of Hodges to be in the State of Arkansas, both at the commencement of the suit and at the time of the application for removal, it does not state that of any of the complainants, but merely says "that none of the complainants are or were at that time citizens of said State of Arkansas," nor have we been able to find in the record any evidence, allegation or statement as to the citizenship of any of them. That the defendant, Hodges, was a citizen of Arkansas, in connection with the fact that none of the complainants were citizens of that State, is not sufficient to give jurisdiction in a Circuit Court of the United States. Brown v. Keene, 8 Pet. 112, 115. The adverse party must be a citizen of some other named Opinion of the Court. State than Arkansas, or an alien. All the complainants might be residents and citizens of the District of Columbia, or of any Territory, and they might not be citizens of the State of Tennessee where the suit was brought, or indeed, of any State in the Union. A citizen of a Territory, or of the District of Columbia, can neither bring nor sustain a suit on the ground of citizenship, in one of the Circuit Courts. Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280. This court has always been very particular in requiring a distinct statement of the citizenship of the parties, and of the particular State in which it is claimed, in order to sustain the jurisdiction of those courts; and inasmuch as the only citizenship specifically averred and set out in the case before us is that of the defendant, Hodges, at whose instance the cause was removed, and as that is the only ground upon which the removal was placed, it seems clear that the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction of it, and that the suit should have been dismissed or remanded for that reason. Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S. 646. The allegation which was made in that case, that Cease, who was the plaintiff, in the action in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Texas, "resides in the county of Mason and State of Illinois," was held not to be a sufficient averment of his citizenship in Illinois. See, also, Godfrey v. Terry, 97 U. S. 171. This court has uniformly acted upon the principle that in order to protect itself from collusive agreements between parties who wish to litigate their controversies in the federal courts, it would, on its own motion, take the objection of the want of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court, especially as regards citizenship. Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 165; Morgan's Executor v. Gay, 19 Wall. 81. We have considered the application of Hodges, the defendant in error, to supply the want of averments in regard to the citizenship of the complainants in this suit. The difficulty here, however, does not relate to the jurisdiction of this court, in regard to which evidence by affidavit has sometimes been received where the defect was as to the amount in controversy, and perhaps in relation to some other point. The juris |