Opinion of the Court. The court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas, and remanded the cases with instructions for such further proceedings as justice might require. Evidently, the purpose of this was to permit the Supreme Court of that State, if it could separate the taxes upon the two classes of telegrams, to do so, and to render judgment accordingly. In the recent case of The Western Union Telegraph Co. v. The Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530, decided at this term, a tax was levied upon that corporation, apportioned under the laws of Massachusetts upon the taxable value of its capital stock. The ratio which should have been allotted to that commonwealth may be supposed to have been properly apportioned to it, ascertaining that portion by means of the length of the lines of the company in relation to the entire mileage of its lines in the United States. The payment of the tax was resisted, however, partly upon the ground that it was levied upon interstate commerce, but mainly because it was asserted to be a violation of the rights conferred on the company by the act of July 24, 1866, now Title LXV., §§ 5263 to 5269 of the Revised Statutes. It was alleged that the defendant company, having accepted the provisions of that law, was entirely exempt from taxation by the State. This court, however, held that this exemption only extended under that law to so much of the lines of the telegraph company as were, in the language of § 5263, "through and over any portion of the public domain of the United States, over and along any of the military or post roads of the United States which have been or may hereafter be declared such by law, and over, under, or across the navigable streams or waters of the United States." It was shown in that case that, of the 2833.05 miles of the lines of the defendant corporation within the boundaries of Massachusetts, more than 2334.55 miles came within the terms of that section, being over or along post roads, made such by the United States, or over, under, or across its navigable streams or waters, leaving only 498.50 miles not within such description, on which the company offered to pay the proportion of the tax assessed against it according to mileage by the state authorities. Opinion of the Court. We refer to this now only for the purpose of showing how easily the subject of taxation which is forbidden by the Constitution may be separated from that which is permissible in this class of cases. The court held in that case that this tax, being in effect levied upon the capital stock or property of the company in the State of Massachusetts, which was ascertained upon the basis of the proportion which the length of its lines in that State bore to their entire length throughout the whole country, and not upon its messages or upon the receipts for such messages, was a valid tax. The question of interstate commerce, as affecting the tax in that action, was very little pressed by counsel for the company, but they relied upon the privilege granted by § 5263, already cited, to companies which accepted its provisions, and upon the fact that a large proportion of the lines of the defendant telegraph company were over or along post roads, or over, under, or across the navigable streams or waters of the United States. In the present case counsel for the telegraph company have argued that this statute secures the corporation from taxation. of any kind whatever, and especially as to receipts arising from messages sent over its lines; but that question does not arise in this action, because there is no allegation or averment, either in the bill itself or in the statement of facts, that any part of the lines of the telegraph company in the State of Ohio is built over or along a post road, or comes within the provisions of § 5263. The only reference to this subject is in the following allegation of the bill: "That prior to 1869 your orator accepted in writing the provisions of the act of Congress of July 4, 1866, 14 Stat. 221." Under this allegation the complainant can, of course, claim no benefit from the provisions of that section, for it does not appear that any part of the company's line comes within the description of this section. of the Revised Statutes. Under these views, we answer the question, in regard to which the judges of the Circuit Court divided in opinion, by saying that a single tax, assessed under the Revised Statutes of Ohio, upon the receipts of a telegraph company which were derived partly from interstate commerce and partly from com Syllabus. merce within the State, but which were returned and assessed in gross and without separation or apportionment, is not wholly invalid, but is invalid only in proportion to the extent that such receipts were derived from interstate commerce. Concurring, therefore, with the circuit judge in his action, enjoining the collection of the taxes on that portion of the receipts derived from interstate commerce, and permitting the treasurer to collect the other tax upon property of the company and upon receipts derived from commerce entirely within the limits of the State, this decree is Affirmed. UNITED STATES v. MCLAUGHLIN. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. No. 1027. Argued December 8, 9, 12, 1887. Decided May 14, 1888. - The boundaries of the Mexican grant, called the Moquelamos grant, considered, the same being described as "bounded on the east by the adjacent sierra:" held, as the result of the evidence adduced, that its eastern limit was at the point where the foot hills of the sierra begin to rise above the plain, near the range line between ranges 7 and 8. Mexican grants were of three kinds; 1, grants by specific boundaries, where the donee is entitled to the entire tract; 2, grants of quantity within a larger tract described by outside boundaries, where the donee is entitled to the quantity specified and no more; 3, grants of a certain place or rancho by name, where the donee is entitled to the whole place or rancho. The second kind, grants of quantity in a larger tract, are, properly, floats, and do not attach to any specific land until located by authority of the government. The Moquelamos grant was of this kind. In the case of floating grants, as above described, it was only the quantity actually granted which was reserved during the examination of the validity of the grant; the remainder was at the disposal of the government as part of the public domain. If within the boundaries of a landgrant made in aid of a railroad, such land-grant would take effect, except as to the quantity of land, or float, actually granted in the Mexican grant. If that quantity lying together was left to satisfy the grant, the railroad company would be entitled to patents for the odd sections of the remainder. Citations for Appellant. In the case of a floating Mexican grant the government retained the right of locating the quantity granted in such part of the larger tract described as it saw fit; and the government of the United States succeeded to the same right: hence, the government might dispose of any specific tracts within the exterior limits of the grant, leaving a sufficient quantity to satisfy the float. Patents issued to the Central Pacific Railroad Company under its land-grant, for any sections lying easterly of range 6 east within the outside boundaries of the Moquelamos grant, are valid, there being enough land lying west of range 7 to satisfy the floating grant of eleven square leagues. The bill in this case was filed by the Attorney General on behalf of the United States to vacate a patent granted to the Central Pacific Railroad Company for lands lying east of range 6 within the claimed limits of the Moquelamos grant — the ground of relief being, that all the lands within the exterior limits of that grant were reserved lands: held, that the lands in question were not reserved lands, and that the bill should be dismissed. BILL IN EQUITY to cancel a patent of public land issued to the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California. Decree dismissing the bill. Complainant appealed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Michael Mullany, with whom was Mr. Attorney General and Mr. D. M. Delmas on the brief, for appellant cited: United States v. Fossat, 1 Hoffman, 211, 376; S. C. 20 How. 413; 21 How. 445; Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44; Missouri &c. Railway Co. v. Kansas Pacific Railway, 97 U. S. 491; Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U. S. 360; Wright v. Rosberry, 121 U. S. 488; Railroad Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U. S. 426; Leavenworth &c. Railroad Co. v. United States, 92 U. S. 743; Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S. 761; United States v. Stone, 2 Wall. 525; Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Litchfield, 23 How. 66; Railroad Co. v. Fremont County, 9 Wall. 89; Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall. 160; Best v. Polk, 18 Wall. 112; Sherman v. Buick, 93 U. S. 209; Stoddard v. Chambers, 2 How. 284; Patterson v. Winn, 11 Wheat. 380; Barry v. Gamble, 3 How. 32; Mills v. Stoddard, 8 How. 345; Walden v. Knevals, 114 U. S. 373; Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v. Dunmeyer, 113 U. S. 629; Knevals v. Hyde, 5 Opinion of the Court. Dillon, 469; Grinnell v. Railroad Company, 103 U. S. 739; United States v. Burlington & Missouri Railroad Co., 4 Dillon, 297, 305; Morris and Essex Railroad Co. v. Blair, 9 N. J. Eq. 653; Carr v. Quigley, 57 Cal. 394; McLaughlin v. Powell, 50 Cal. 64, 67. Mr. A. L. Rhoads and Mr. L. W. Elliott for appellees cited: Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S. 761; Pico v. United States, 2 Wall. 279; United States v. Minor, 114 U. S. 233; United States v. White, 9 Sawyer, 131; The Siren, 7 Wall. 152; United States v. Flint, 4 Sawyer, 42, 58; Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87; Stearns v. Page, 7 How. 819; Sullivan v. Portland &c. Railroad, 94 U. S. 806; Twin Lick Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587; United States v. Tichenor, 8 Sawyer, 142; Manning v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 7 Sawyer, 418; Moffat v. United States, 112 U. S. 24; United States v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., 8 Sawyer, 81; Walden v. Knevals, 114 U. S. 373; Kansas Pacific Railway v. Dunmeyer, 113 U. S. 629; Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U. S. 360; Wood v. Rail road Co., 104 U. S. 329; Railroad Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U. S. 426; Barney v. Winona Railroad, 117 U. S. 228; United States v. Phelan, 4 Sawyer, 58; Pratt v. Cal. M. Co., 9 Sawyer, 354, 363; Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72; Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325; Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 447; Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636; Ehrhardt v. Hogaboom, 115 U. S. 67. MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. This is a bill in equity filed by the Attorney General on behalf of the United States against The Central Pacific Railroad Company, Kate D. McLaughlin, as executrix of Charles McLaughlin, deceased, and others, to cancel and annul a certain patent of the United States, issued on the 23d day of November, 1875, to the Central Pacific Railroad Company from the General Land Office, for certain sections and fractional sections of land in San Joaquin and Calaveras counties in California. The ground of relief stated in the bill is, that |