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Opinion of the Court.
of the manufacture on a frame of a fabric consisting of a single thread, is the production of a textile fabric composed of a series of connecting loops which are alike in each case, yet the processes by which they are produced are dissimilar; that the result of the process of manufacturing upon frames and knitting by hand is the same, although the two processes are dissimilar; also, that there are no textile fabrics made on frames which are known in trade and commerce, except fabrics composed of cotton, wool or worsted, silk, linen, or a mixture of these materials. Both parties then rested.
The plaintiffs then moved the court to direct the jury to find a verdict in their favor, which motion was granted. To such ruling the defendant excepted. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs. The amount was, by agreement of the parties, adjusted at the custom house, and a judgment was entered for the plaintiffs, including costs, for $1897.96, to review which the defendant has brought a writ of error.
We think that it was error in the court to have directed a verdict for the plaintiffs. The act of 1867 is entitled “ An Act to provide increased Revenue from imported Wool, and for other Purposes." Section 1 of the act relates to duties on “unmanufactured wool, hair of the alpaca, goat, and other like animals, imported from foreign countries." Section 2 provides for the following duty : “On woollen cloths, woollen shawls, and all manufactures of wool of every description made wholly or in part of wool, not herein otherwise provided for, fifty cents per pound, and, in addition thereto, thirty-five per centum ad valorem.” This clause clearly covers stockings such as some of those in the present case, composed of wool and cotton, because they were made in part of wool.
The next question is, whether they were “herein otherwise provided for,” that is, otherwise provided for in that act of 1867. We have recently held, in the case of Arthur v. Butterfield, 125 U. S. 70, 76, that the words “not otherwise herein provided for," in an act providing for customs duties, mean, not otherwise provided for in the act of which they are a part. The words in the present case are “not herein otherwise provided for," which are identical in meaning. Section 2 of the
Opinion of the Court.
act of 1867 goes on to provide for duties on many manufactured articles made wholly or in part of wool, namely, “women's and children's dress goods and real or imitation Italian cloths, composed wholly or in part of wool ;” “clothing ready made, and wearing apparel of every description, and balmoral skirts and skirting, and goods of similar description or used for like purposes, composed wholly or in part of wool ;”
webbings, beltings,” etc., made of wool, or of which wool is a component material; and carpets of various kinds and carpetings of wool.
The clause of $ 2 of the act of 1867, above quoted, which covers “knit goods,” expressly excepts “such as are composed in part of wool:" and the clause relating to duties on “wearing apparel of every description composed wholly or in part of wool,” made up or manufactured wholly or in part by the manufacturer, expressly excepts “knit goods." It is stated in the bill of exceptions that the stockings in question were made on frames, and that all fabrics made on frames are knit goods.
According to the bill of exceptions, some of the goods in question here were properly assessed by the collector, under the act of 1867, at the rate of 50 cents a pound and 35 per cent ad valorem, less ten per cent, and it was improper to direct a verdict for the plaintiffs as to those goods. After the verdict was rendered, on the 10th of December, 1883, and before judgment, the defendant made a motion for a new trial, the decision on which is reported in 22 Blatchford, 39. The motion was denied, on the ground that the articles in question, as stockings made on frames, were specifically made dutiable by that name in the acts of 1861 and 1862, and had been dutiable eo nomine, by different enactments, since 1842; and that the general language of the act of 1867 did not affect the specific description in the acts of 1861 and 1862. Particular reference was made in the decision to the opinion of this court in Vietor v. Arthur, 104 U. S. 498. The goods in that case were imported after the enactment of the Revised Statutes, on the 22d of June, 1874, and were stockings, some of them wholly of worsted and others of cotton
Opinion of the Court.
and worsted, cotton being the material of chief value, and they were intended to be worn by men, women, and children, and were made on frames, and were also knit goods. The collector had exacted upon them a duty at the rate of 90 per cent of 50 cents a pound and 35 per cent ad valorem, as knit goods, under Schedule L of $ 2504 of the Revised Statutes. The importer claimed that they were dutiable as stockings made on frames, worn by men, women, or children, under Schedule M of the same section. Judgment having been entered for the defendant, this court reversed it, on the ground that, as between the descriptions in the two schedules in the same section of the Revised Statutes, the goods must be considered as having been provided for under the designation of stockings made on frames, worn by men, women, or children, in Schedule M, and as not being liable to the higher duty prescribed by Schedule L, because, although Schedule L was broad enough to comprehend them, yet, as Schedule M covered them by a specific designation, and they had been dutiable as stockings made on frames, eo nomine, since 1842, and by four different enactments, they fell within Schedule M. That decision does not apply to the present case, for here the only question is whether the stockings, so far as they have wool in them, being manufactures made in part of wool, and dutiable as such by the act of 1867, were otherwise provided for in that act. It is clear that they were not.
Inasmuch as the verdict directed covered the stockings which contained wool and cotton, and the judgment is a unit, and the direction of a verdict was wrong as to those goods, The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
Circuit Court with a direction to grant a new trial.
Opinion of the Court.
BROWN v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
No. 224. Submitted April 13, 1888. – Decided May 14, 1888.
A proposition to pave streets in a municipality, made in writing by a con
tractor to the head of a board consisting of several members which by law was charged with the care and paving of the streets, although considered and agreed to by the head of the board, and although by his directions the secretary of the board wrote under it that it was accepted by order of the board” and affixed his signature as secretary thereto, is not a “ contract in writing signed by the parties making the same,” if the action of the secretary was made without official acceptance of the
proposition by the board, and without authority from them to write it. On the facts in this case the court holds : (1) that the alleged contract
with the board of public works was not a valid contract; (2) that it was never ratified by the board; (3) that it was never ratified by Congress; (4) that the portion of the plaintiff's claim which was for work performed was rejected by the board of audit, and that the Court of Claims was therefore without jurisdiction to entertain it.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. C. C. Cole and Mr. Fillmore Beall for appellant.
Mr. Attorney General and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Howard for appellee.
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the petition of the appellant, Talmadge E. Brown, who sued in that court to recover a judgment against the District of Columbia, appellee, for $200,000, in satisfaction of his claim for damages for breach of an alleged contract, and for work and labor performed and materials furnished in the paving of certain streets in the cities of Washington and Georgetown.
The petition was filed November 16, 1880, and contains four counts, the first of which is in substance as follows: That
Opinion of the Court.
from 1869 to 1874, inclusive, petitioner, William W. Ballard. and Edward L. Marsh, all of whom were citizens of the United States, were in partnership under the name of the Ballard Pavement Company, their business consisting in grading, paring, etc., streets, sidewalks, etc.; that on or about December 10, 1872, said company made and completed a contract with the District of Columbia, whereby said company became bound to pave with wood pavement such streets, or parts of streets, in the cities of Washington and Georgetown, in the said District of Columbia, as the board of public works of said District should designate from time to time, to the amount of 75,000 square yards, said work to be assigned and completed during 1873, and at the price of $3.50 per square yard, and also to do such grading, hauling, filling, and setting of curbing on the streets paved by said company, and at the board prices, as the said board of public works should order or direct ; that by the terms of said contract the said work was to be paid for as the same progressed; that at the time the said board of public works of the said District of Columbia made and entered into said contract with said pavement company the said board had full power and authority to make the same in the manner and form the same was made; and that said contract was in the words and figures following, to wit:
“ The Ballard Pavement Company, Washington, D. C.:
“ Your proposition of this date, as follows:
“The Ballard Pavement Company hereby make proposals for the following work, with accompanying conditions:
“We will put down preserved wood pavement as follows: The Ballard block, the Perry block, or the wedge-shaped block, such as laid by Filbert & Taylor, in this city, as the contractors may elect, either to stand five inches high, for three dollars and fifty cents per square yard, and we hereby ask for seventy-five thousand square yards, contractors to have during the year 1873 within which to complete this work, the board not to stop the work without a gross violation of the contract on the part of the contractors, the streets to be designated by the board at such times as the company