Opinion of the Court. a bank transaction. Applying, then, the plaintiff's own principle to the case, and the restriction as to the production of parol or extrinsic evidence could have been only applicable to himself. But it is enough for the purposes of the defendant to establish that there existed, on the face of the paper, circumstances from which it might reasonably be inferred that it was either one or the other. In that case, it became indispensable to resort to extrinsic evidence to remove the doubt." p. 336. The reasoning of the court in this last case leads irresistibly to the conclusion that, had the check under consideration been signed by Paton with the word "cashier" appended, there would have been no ambiguity in it, but it would have been clearly and unequivocally the check of the bank. And in this view the case seems to be not necessarily an authority in favor of the plaintiffs in error, but rather an authority against them, and in favor of the defendant in error. In Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 415, it is said: “If a note be payable to an individual, with the mere suffix of his official character, such suffix will be regarded as mere descrip tio persona, and the individual is the payee," citing Chadsey v. McCreery, Vater v. Lewis, supra, and Buffum v. Chadwick, 8 Mass. 103. Continuing, he says, "In New York a different doctrine prevails," citing Babcock v. Beman, 1 Kernan (11 N. Y.), 209. But in § 416 the rule laid down would seem to be in favor of the contention of the defendant in error; for it is there said: "Where a note is payable to a corporation by its corporate name, and is then indorsed by an authorized agent or official, with the suffix of his ministerial position, it will be regarded that he acts for his principal, who is disclosed on the paper as the payee, and who, therefore, is the only person who can transfer the legal title," citing Northampton Bank v. Pepoon, 11 Mass. 288, and Elwell v. Dodge, 33 Barb. 336. Many more authorities are cited and might be dwelt upon almost ad infinitum. A discussion of all of them would greatly protract this opinion, and would subserve no beneficial result. In all this vast conflict- we had almost said an Syllabus. archy of the authorities bearing on the question under consideration, it is not easy to lay down any general rule on the subject which would be in harmony with all of them. It seems to us, however, that the case of Hitchcock v. Buchanan, supra, controls the case at bar. Both involve the same principles, and the decision in this, to be consistent with that of the former, must sustain the contention of the defendant in error. Neither do we think that the case of Mechanics' Bank v. The Bank of Columbia, supra, when considered in the light of the facts upon which it is based, in anywise conflicts with this conclusion. We conclude, therefore, that the notes involved in this controversy, upon their face, are the notes of the corporation. In the language of the court below, they were "drawn by, payable to, and indorsed by, the corporation." There is no ambiguity in the indorsement, but, on the contrary, such indorsement is, in terms, that of the Peninsular Cigar Company. This being true, it follows that the court below was right in excluding from the jury the evidence offered to explain away and modify the terms of such indorsement. White v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 658; Martin v. Cole, 104 U. S. 30; Metcalf v. Williams, 104 U. S. 93. Entertaining these views, we find it unnecessary to consider any of the other questions presented and argued by counsel; as what we have said practically disposes of the case adversely to the plaintiffs in error. The judgment of the court below is accordingly Affirmed. ROBERTSON v. DOWNING. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE Under Rev. Stat. § 2907, and the act of June 22, 1874, c. 391, 18 Stat. 186, § 14, p. 189, as construed by the Treasury Department for many years without any attempt to change it or until now to question its correctness, Opinion of the Court. goods imported into the United States from one country which, in transportation to the port of shipment pass through another country, are not subject to have the transportation charges in passing through that other country added to their original cost in order to determine their dutiable value. When there has been a long acquiescence in a Department Regulation, and by it rights of parties for many years have been determined and adjusted, it is not to be disregarded without the most cogent and persuasive reasons. When after duties have been liquidated a reliquidation takes place, the date of the reliquidation is the final liquidation for the purpose of protest. Letters from the Secretary of the Treasury to a collector of customs, affirming an assessment of duty, and to an importer acknowledging the receipt of his appeal from the collector's assessment, are admissible in evidence to show that an appeal was taken. The Treasury Department not having objected that an appeal was too early, this court must assume that there was good reason for its action. THIS was an action to recover duties alleged to have been illegally assessed. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appealed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Solicitor General for plaintiff in error. No appearance for defendants in error. MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court. The plaintiffs below, the defendants in error here, in March, 1882, imported into the United States at the port of New York 5179 packages of steel rods from Mulheim, in Germany. They were shipped at the port of Antwerp, in Belgium, to which place they were brought by rail from Mulheim, where they were made. Antwerp is distant from the frontier of Germany between forty and fifty miles, and from Mulheim two hundred miles. The appraisers added to the invoice price of the articles at Mulheim eleven marks per ton to make the dutiable value of the articles, and four marks per ton for the charges incurred in their transportation to Antwerp. Upon their appraised value, including these charges, the defendant, who was at the time collector of the port of New York, on the 5th of May, 1882, ascertained and liquidated the duties. Subse quently, a reliquidation was made, by which two and one-half Opinion of the Court. per cent was deducted from the eleven marks. This reliquidation was completed on the 24th of May, 1882. Two days afterwards the plaintiffs made a formal protest against including in the dutiable value of the goods any sum for charges or otherwise in addition to the value stated in the invoice; but adding that they should pay the amount exacted, in order to get the goods, and then claim to have it refunded. On the trial the plaintiffs put in evidence letters from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, against the objection of the government, to show that an appeal was taken to the Secretary from the decision of the collector, and that it was affirmed. The counsel of the government excepted to their admission. The following are the letters: "TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, Washington, D. C., August 14th, 1882. "Collector of Customs, New York, "Sir: The department is in receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, submitting the appeal (1996, 2050 H) of Messrs. Downing, Sheldon & Co., from your assessment of duty on additions made by the appraiser to the invoice and entered value of certain steel wire rods imported by them per Hermann, March 9th, 1882. "The appraiser reports that an addition was made by him for charges under the Department's decision of July 20th, 1880, (S. S. H 4617,) for the reason that the invoice did not state that the price of the merchandise was 'free on board,' and that an addition for value was also made by him to make the usual market value of the merchandise. "Your assessment of duty thereon is hereby affirmed. "Very respectfully, H. F. FRENCH, Acting Secretary." VOL. CXXVII-39 Opinion of the Court. "TREASURY Department, OFFICE OF SECRETARY, Washington, D. C., August 12, 1882. "MESSRS. DOWNING, SHELDON & Co. (care of Kausche & Downing, P. O. box 3550, N. Y.): "Gentlemen: This department is in receipt of your appeal, (No. 2050 H,) dated May 25, 1882, from the decision of the collector of the port of New York, assessing duty on certain merchandise, imported per Hermann, March 9, 1882. "In reply, you are informed that the case has been disposed of by instructions this day addressed to the collector of customs at the port mentioned, to whom you are referred for particulars. "Respectfully, H. F. FRENCH, The decision of the Secretary was made August 12, 1882. The plaintiffs paid the amount of duties exacted, and in October following brought the present action. The jury found in their favor for $130.96. The court, by consent of parties, reduced this sum to $47.64, and judgment for that amount, besides costs, was entered. This reduction was made, as we infer from the record, so as to cover only the increased duties exacted by reason of the addition for charges on transportation to Antwerp. The question of importance presented is whether, under the statute, charges for transportation of goods imported from one country, which on their passage may pass through another country, should be added to the invoice value of the articles to make their dutiable value under § 2907 of the Revised Statutes, and § 14 of the act of June 22, 1874. Section 2907 provides that "in determining the dutiable value of merchandise, there shall be added to the cost, or to the actual wholesale price or general market value at the time of exportation in the principal markets of the country from whence the same has been imported into the United States, the cost of transportation, shipment, and transshipment, with all the expenses |