tain the issue of the bonds, after acquiring the rights of the railroad.
Smith v. Bourbon County, 105.

1. The statutes of Michigan require the attestation of two witnesses to the
grantor's signature. A deed of husband and wife was offered in evi-
dence, the attestation to which was: "Signed, sealed, and delivered in
presence of S. W. for" the husband; "W. H. R., G. H. for " the wife;
and there was a certificate that "the word "half' in the twelfth line
was interlined before signing. S. W., E. W." E. W. signing this cer-
tificate with S. W. was the justice of the peace who took the acknowl-
edgment, and his certificate of acknowledgment stated that he knew
the person who made the acknowledgment to be the person who exe-
cuted the instrument. Held, that the execution of the deed was
proved, and it was properly admitted in evidence. Culbertson v. The
H. Witbeck Co., 326.

2. A certificate by a master in chancery and notary public in New Jersey,
taking an acknowledgment there of a deed of land in Michigan that
he is "satisfied that the parties making the acknowledgment are the
grantors in the within deed of conveyance," is a sufficient certificate
that they were the same persons as those named as grantors in the
deed; but if defective in this respect, the defect is cured under the
laws of Michigan by a certificate from the proper official that the per-
son taking the acknowledgment was "a master in chancery and notary
public," and that "the annexed instrument is executed and the proof
of acknowledgment thereto taken in accordance with the laws of the
State of New Jersey." Ib.

3. An objection as to the sufficiency of a certificate of a register of deeds
to an instrument offered in evidence which was not made at the trial
cannot be taken here. Ib.

4. Letters from the Secretary of the Treasury to a collector of customs,
affirming an assessment of duty, and to an importer acknowledging
the receipt of his appeal from the collector's assessment, are admissible
in evidence to show that an appeal was taken. Robertson v. Downing,
607.

See LOCAL Law, 5.

EXECUTIVE.

See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNited States, 7;
SECRETARY OF STATE.

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 4.

EXTRADITION.

1. On the hearing of an appeal from a judgment of a Circuit Court, dis-
charging a writ of habeas corpus which had been issued on the petition
of a person arrested for a crime committed in a foreign country, and
held for extradition under treaty provisions, the jurisdiction of the
commissioner and the sufficiency of the legal ground for his action are
the main questions to be decided; and this court declines to consider
questions respecting the introduction of evidence, or the sufficiency of
the authentication of documentary proof. Benson v. McMahon, 457.
2. When a person is held for examination before a commissioner, to deter-
mine whether he shall be surrendered to the Mexican authorities, to
be extradited for a crime committed in Mexico, the question to be
determined is, whether the commission of the crime alleged is so
established as to justify the prisoner's apprehension and commitment
for trial if the offence had been committed in the United States; and
the proceeding resembles in its character preliminary examinations
before a magistrate for the purpose of determining whether a case is
made out to justify the holding of a person accused, to answer to an
indictment. Ib.

3. The crime of "forgery," as enumerated in article 3 of the Treaty of
Extradition with Mexico of June 20, 1862, is not confined to the
English common law offence of forgery; but it includes the making,
forging, uttering, and selling to the public, fraudulent printed tickets
of admission to an operatic performance, bearing on their face in print
the name of the manager of the operatic company, and also stamped
with his name and seal. It seems that such an offence is also included
in the crime of forgery as defined by the English common law. Ib.

FORGERY.

See EXTRADITION, 3.

GENEVA AWARD.

See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 2, 3.

HABEAS CORPUS.

The writ of habeas corpus, in case of a person held a prisoner by sentence
of court, can only release the prisoner when it is shown that the court

had no jurisdiction to try and punish him for the offence. The inquiry in such case is not whether there is in the indictment such specific allegation of the details of the charge as would make it good on demurrer, but whether the indictment describes a class of offences of which the court has jurisdiction, and alleges the defendant to be guilty. If the record of the case in which judgment of imprisonment is pronounced contains no charge of such offence, he should be discharged. In re Coy, 731.

See EXTRADITION, 1.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See DEED;

WRIT OF ERror, 2.

INDIAN-TRUST BONDS.

See SET-OFF.

INDICTMENT.

In an indictment in a court of the United States for a conspiracy to induce officers named in the opinion to omit their duty, in order that documents therein mentioned might come to the hands of improper persons who tampered with and falsified the returns, it is not necessary to allege or prove that it was the intention of these conspirators to affect the election of the member of Congress who was voted for at that place, the returns of which were in the same poll books, tally sheets, and certificates with those for state officers. In re Coy, 731. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW A. 25; JURISDICTION C

INSURANCE.

1. A provision in a policy of fire insurance, that if the interest of the assured in the property is " any other than the entire, unconditional and sole ownership for the use and benefit of the assured," or is "incumbered by any lien, whether by deed of trust, mortgage or otherwise," it must be so represented in the policy, does not, if it is stated that the property is incumbered, require a statement of the nature or amount of the incumbrances. Hosford v Germania Fire

Ins. Co., 399.

2. An application for fire insurance, expressly made a part of the policy and a warranty by the assured, contained these questions and answers: "Is there any incumbrance on the property? Yes. If mortgaged, state the amount. $3000." Held, that an omission to state that the property was incumbered otherwise than by mortgage was no breach of the warranty. Ib.

3. A warranty, in a contract of fire insurance, that "smoking is not allowed on the premises," is not, if smoking is then forbidden on the premises, broken by the assured or others afterwards smoking there. Ib.

4. An application for fire insurance, warranted to be "a just, full and true exposition of all the facts and circumstances in regard to the condition, situation, value, ownership, title, incumbrances of all kinds, insurance and hazard of the property to be insured," contained these questions: "Is there a mortgage, deed of trust, lien, or incumbrance of any kind on property? Amount, and in whose favor?" Held, that the questions related only to incumbrances created by the act or with the consent of the applicant, and that an omission to disclose an existing lien created by statute for unpaid taxes was no breach of the warranty. Hosford v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 404.

5. In an action upon a policy of insurance by which the insurer agreed to pay the sum insured to the beneficiary within ninety days after sufficient proof that the insured within the continuance of the policy had sustained bodily injuries, effected through external, violent and accidental means, and that such injuries alone occasioned death within ninety days from their happening, but that no claim should be made when the death or injury was the result of suicide (felonious or otherwise, sane or insane) the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, (subject to the limitation that it is not to be presumed as matter of law that the deceased took his own life or was murdered,) to show that the death was caused by external violence, and by accidental means; and no valid claim can be made under the policy if the insured, either intentionally, or when insane, inflicted upon himself the injuries which caused his death, or if his death was caused by intentional injuries inflicted upon him by some other person. Travellers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 661.

INTEREST.

1. No interest can be recovered in an action by the United States upon a bail bond conditioned for the appearance of a person to answer to an indictment for forgery. United States v. Broadhead, 212.

2. This case falls within the well-settled principle that interest is not allowed on claims against the United States, unless the government has stipulated to pay interest, or it is given by express statutory provision. Angarica v. Bayard, 251.

3. No claim for the allowance of interest can be predicated on the language of any notification, or circular or letter which issues from the Department of State, during the administration of a predecessor of the Secretary; no binding contract for the payment of interest is thereby created; and the existing Secretary is at liberty to act on his own judgment, irrespective of anything contained in any such notification, circular or letter. Ib.

INTERVENOR.

See RAILROAD, 3.

JUDGMENT.

1. Plaintiffs' complaint in ejectment sought to recover "all the north part
of lot 2, in section 36, township 38 N. of range 10 W. of the second
principal meridian, which lies west of the track of the Lake Shore and
Michigan Southern Railroad, and north of a line parallel with the north
line of said lot 2, and 753 feet south therefrom." Defendant denied
every allegation. The record showed that after the parties had sub-
mitted the cause to the court, "the court, having heard the evidence,
and being fully advised, finds for the plaintiffs, and orders and adjudges
that they are entitled to and shall have and recover of the defendant
the possession of so much of said lot 2 as lies south of the south line
of lot number 1, as indicated by a fence constructed and maintained by
the defendant as and on said south line ... which the plaintiffs
shall recover of the defendant." Held, (1) That though the order
embraced both a finding and a judgment, it was not for that reason a
nullity; (2) That it was not a general finding for the plaintiffs, but a
finding for them as to the part of the land described in the order, and
that the judgment for the possession of this part of the premises was
in accordance with the local law of the district in which the cause was
tried, Rev. Stat. Indiana, 1881, § 1060; (3) That this court is bound
to assume from the record that the tract described in the order was a
part of the premises described in the complaint. Morgan v. Eggers, 63.
2. If, after transfer by the plaintiff of the subject of controversy in a liti-
gation in Louisiana, the court, on being informed of the transfer,
refuses to permit the suit to be discontinued by the plaintiff, a judg-
ment does not make it res judicata as to the assignee. St. Romes v.
Levee Steam Cotton Press Co., 614.

3. Dismissal of a suit for want of parties does not make the subject of it
res judicata.

A.

Ib.

JURISDICTION.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME Court.

1. A brought ejectment against B. B thereupon filed a bill in equity,
(which was subsequently amended,) to remove a cloud from the title,
setting up that the deed under which A claimed was a mortgage, with
a written contract of defeasance. A demurred. Upon hearing on the
demurrer it was ordered that if B should, within fifteen days, bring
into court the amount due on the mortgage, and interest, and all taxes
paid by A., etc., A should be restrained from further persecution of
the ejectment suit; but if he should fail to do so within that time, the
bill should be dismissed and the defendant allowed to proceed with
the suit. Held, (1) That this order, made upon hearing of a de-