PRACTICE.

1. After hearing counsel the court of its own motion dismisses a case for

want of jurisdiction. Plaintiff in error moves to reinstate it, support-
ing the motion by affidavits as to the value of the property in dispute.
The court orders service on the other party, and on return vacates the
judgment of dismissal. Glacier Mountain Silver Mining Co. v. Willis,

471.

2. There being nothing in the record to show that the Circuit Court had
jurisdiction of the case, this court of its own motion reverses the judg-
ment and remands the cause for further proceedings. Hegler v. Faulk-
ner, 482.

3. A cause under submission having been dismissed by the court of its
own motion for want of jurisdictional amount, the appellant moves to
reinstate and submits affidavits. The court orders the motion contin-
ued, with leave to each party to file further affidavits. Hunt v. Black-
burn, 774.

4. The court, for reasons stated in its opinion, denies a motion to vacate a
supersedeas or to make an order that the appeal bond filed in the case
does not operate as a supersedeas. Western Air Line Construction Co. v.
McGillis, 776.

See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 6;

EQUITY;

JUDGMENT, 1;

JURISDICTION, B, 4, 7.

PRECATORY TRUST.

See WILL, 3, 4, 5.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

A collector of customs is not personally liable for a tort committed by his
subordinates, in negligently keeping the trunk of an arriving passenger
on a pier, instead of sending it to the public store, so that it was de-
stroyed by fire; where there is no evidence to connect the collector
personally with the wrong, or that the subordinates were not compe-
tent, or were not properly selected for their positions. Robertson v.
Sichel, 507.

PROMISSORY NOTE.

1. A promissory note which reads: "Four months after date we promise
to pay to the order of George Moebs, Sec. & Treas., ten hundred sixty-
one & dollars, at Merchants' & Manufacturers' National Bank,
value received," signed: "Peninsular Cigar Co., Geo. Moebs, Sec. &
Treas.," and indorsed: "Geo. Moebs, Sec. & Treas.," is a note drawn
by, payable to, and indorsed by the corporation, and without ambi-

guity in the indorsement; and evidence is not admissible to show that
it was the intention of the indorser in making the indorsement to bind
himself personally. Falk v. Moebs, 597.

PUBLIC LAND.

1. The act of Congress of March 3, 1851, "to ascertain and settle the
private land claims in the State of California," 9 Stat. 631, c. 41,
created a board of commissioners to which all persons, claiming land
by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican
government, were required to present their claims for examination and
determination within two years from its date, with such documentary
evidence and testimony of witnesses as they relied upon to support
their claims, and provided, in substance, that if upon examination
they were found by the board, and by the courts of the United States,
to which an appeal could be taken, to be valid, the claims should be
confirmed and surveyed, and patents issued therefor to the claimants;
but that all lands, the claims to which were not presented to the board
within that period, should be considered as a part of the public domain
of the United States. Held, (1) That this provision requiring the
presentation of their claims was obligatory on claimants, and that
they were bound by the judgment of the board, if confirmed by the
courts of the United States on appeal, and by the survey and location
of the claim by the officers of the Land Department, following the
final decree of confirmation; (2) That the patent of the United
States, issued after the claim was surveyed and located, is conclusive,
both as to the validity of the title of the claimant and the extent and
boundaries of his claim, as against all parties not claiming by superior
title, such as would enable them to contest the action of the govern-
ment respecting the property. More v. Steinbach, 70.

2. In order that a perfect title to land might vest under a grant from the

Mexican government a delivery of possession by its officers was neces-
sary. The proceeding was termed a judicial delivery of possession. Ib.
3. The authority and jurisdiction of Mexican officials in California termi-
nated on the 7th of July, 1846. No alcalde appointed or elected
subsequent to that date was empowered to give judicial possession of
land granted by the previous government. Ib.

4. The doctrine that the laws of a conquered or ceded country, except so
far as affected by the political institutions of the new government,
remain in force after conquest or cession until changed by it, does not
apply to laws authorizing the alienation of any portions of the public
domain, or to officers charged under the former government with that
power. No proceedings affecting the rights of the new government
over public property could be taken, except in pursuance of its author-
ity on the subject. Ib.

5. The Attorney General has authority, under the Constitution, to file a
bill in equity in the name of the United States to set aside a patent

of public land alleged to have been obtained by fraud or mistake,
when the government has a direct interest in the tract patented, or is
under an obligation respecting the relief invoked by the bill. United
States v. Beebe, 338.

6. When the location of a mineral lode or vein, properly made, is perfected
under the law, the lode or vein becomes the property of the locators or
their assigns, and the government holds the title in trust for them.
Noyes v. Mantle, 348.

7. Where a location of a vein or lode of mineral or other deposits has been
made under the law, and its boundaries have been specifically marked
on the surface, so as to be readily traced, and notice of the location
has been recorded in the usual books of record within the district,
that vein or lode is "known to exist" within the meaning of that
phrase as used in Rev. Stat. § 2333, although personal knowledge of
the fact may not be possessed by the applicant for a patent for a placer
claim. Ib.

8. The boundaries of the Mexican grant, called the Moquelamos grant,
considered, the same being described as "bounded on the east by
the adjacent sierra:" held, as the result of the evidence adduced, that
its eastern limit was at the point where the foot hills of the sierra
begin to rise above the plain, near the range line between ranges 7
and 8. United States v. McLaughlin, 428.

9. Mexican grauts were of three kinds: 1, grants by specific boundaries,
where the donee is entitled to the entire tract; 2, grants of quantity
within a larger tract described by outside boundaries, where the donee
is entitled to the quantity specified and no more; 3, grants of a cer-
tain place or rancho by name, where the donee is entitled to the whole
place or rancho. The second kind, grants of quantity in a larger
tract, are, properly, floats, and do not attach to any specific land until
located by authority of the government. The Moquelamos grant was
of this kind.

Ib.

10. In the case of floating grants, as above described, it was only the quan-
tity actually granted which was reserved during the examination of
the validity of the grant; the remainder was at the disposal of the
government as part of the public domain. If within the boundaries
of a land-grant made in aid of a railroad, such land-grant would take
effect, except as to the quantity of land, or float, actually granted in
the Mexican grant. If that quantity lying together was left to satisfy
the grant, the railroad company would be entitled to patents for the
odd sections of the remainder. Ib.
11 In the case of a floating Mexican grant the government retained the
right of locating the quantity granted in such part of the larger tract
described as it saw fit; and the government of the United States suc-
ceeded to the same right: hence, the government might dispose of any
specific tracts within the exterior limits of the grant, leaving a suffi-
cient quantity to satisfy the float. Ib.

12. Patents issued to the Central Pacific Railroad Company under its land-
grant, for any sections lying easterly of range 6 east within the outside
boundaries of the Moquelamos grant, are valid, there being enough
land lying west of range 7 to satisfy the floating grant of eleven square
leagues. Ib.

---

13. The bill in this case was filed by the Attorney General on behalf of
the United States to vacate a patent granted to the Central Pacific
Railroad Company for lands lying east of range 6 within the claimed
limits of the Moquelamos grant - the ground of relief being, that all
the lands within the exterior limits of that grant were reserved lands:
held, that the lands in question were not reserved lands, and that the
bill should be dismissed. Ib.

14. Mineral locations on public lands, made prior to the passage of any
mineral law by Congress, are governed by local rules and customs then
in force; but their effect cannot be determined on the demurrer in
this action. Glacier Mountain Silver Mining Co. v. Willis, 471.

PUBLIC LAW.

See PUBLIC LAND, 4.

RAILROAD.

1. A railroad company, all whose stock was owned by four other com-
panies, whose roads connected, having obtained a lease of another
connecting railroad, and improved the terminal facilities, made a con-
tract with the four companies, by which they should have the use of
its tracks and terminal facilities for fifty years, each paying the same
fixed rent and certain terminal charges, and any other company with
the same terminus might, by entering into a similar contract, acquire
like privileges upon paying the same rent and similar charges; and
demanded the making of such a contract by the receiver of another
company, who previously had the use of the road now leased, and of
its terminal facilities, upon terms agreed on between him and the
company owning that road. The receiver objected that the terms
demanded were exorbitant and oppressive, and could not be assented
to by him without an order of the court which appointed him; and it
was thereupon agreed that his company should enjoy like privileges,
paying the like terminal charges as the four companies, and such rent
as the judge should award, and meantime should pay at the same rate
as before. The judge declining to act as an arbitrator, the receiver
was excluded from the use of the tracks. Held, that he had not
assented, and was not liable, to pay the same rent as the four compa-
nies, during the time that he used the tracks and terminal facilities
of the first company. Peoria &c. Railway v. Chicago &c. Railroad, 200.
2. The S. company, owning a railroad extending from S. to M., and
there connecting with the railroad of the H. company from M. to

H., sold a ticket, at a reduced rate of fare, for a passage from S.
to H. and return, containing a contract signed by the purchaser, by
which he agreed "with the several companies" upon the following
conditions: That "in selling this ticket the S. company acts only as
agent and is not responsible beyond its own line;" that the ticket
"is not good for return passage unless the holder identifies himself
as the original purchaser to the satisfaction of the authorized agent of
the H. railroad at H. within eighty-five days from date of sale, and,
when officially signed and dated in ink and duly stamped by said
agent," shall be good for five days from that time; that the original
purchaser shall sign his name and otherwise identify himself, when-
ever called upon to do so by any conductor or agent of either line;
and that no agent or employé of either line has any power to alter,
modify or waive any condition of the contract. The original pur-
chaser was carried from S. to H., and within eighty-five days, and a
reasonable time before the departure of a return train, presented him-
self with the ticket at the office of the agent of the H. railroad at H.,
for the purpose of identifying himself and of having the ticket
stamped, and, no agent being at that office, took the return train on
the H. railroad from H. to M. and a connecting train on the S. rail-
road for S., and, upon the conductor of the latter train demanding his
fare, presented the unstamped ticket, informed him of what he had
done at H., offered to sign his name and otherwise identify himself
to the conductor, and demanded to be carried to S. by virtue of the
ticket; but the conductor refused, and put him off the train. Held,
that he could not maintain an action against the S. company. Mosher
v. St. Louis Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Co., 390.
3. The receiver in a suit for the foreclosure of a railroad mortgage, being
directed by the court to settle and adjust outstanding claims prior to
the mortgage debt, and to purchase in outstanding adverse liens or
titles, agreed with the holder of a debt, which constituted a paramount
lien on a portion of the railroad, for the purchase of his lien and the
payment of his debt out of any money coming into the receiver's
hands from the part of the railroad covered by the lien, or from the
sale of the receiver's certificates, or from the earnings of that portion
of the road, or from the sale of it under the decree of the court; and
this agreement was carried out on the part of the vendor. When it
was made, a decree for a sale had already been made in the foreclos-
ure suit; and afterwards the road was sold as an entirety, with
nothing to show the price paid for the portion covered by the lien, and
payment was made in mortgage bonds without any money passing.
The vendor of the prior lien then intervened in the suit, asking the
court to enforce his agreement with the receiver. Subsequently the
court confirmed the sale, reserving to itself the power to make further
orders respecting claims, rights, or interests in or liens on the prop-
erty. At a subsequent term of court the court found that there was