acceffion which his Majefty might have obtained, I could take upon myfelf to affore him, that his Majefty's ambition led him rather to preferve than to acquire. And that, with regard to the moft propitious moment for renewing hoftilities, his Majefty, whofe fincere defire it was to continue the blefings of peace to his fubjects, would always confider fuch a meafure as the greatest calamity; but that, if his Majetty was fo defirous of peace, it must not be imputed to the difficulty of obtaining allies; and the lefs fo, as thofe means which it might be neceffary to afford fuch allies, for perhaps inadequate fervices, would all be concentrated in England, and give a proportionate increafe of energy to our own exertions. At this part of the conversation he rofe from his chair, and told me, that he fhould give orders to General Andreoff to enter on the difcuffion of this bufinefs with your Lordfhip; but he wished that I should at the fame time be made acquainted with his motives, and be convinced of his fincerity, rather from himself than from his Minifters. He then, after a conversation of two hours, during the greateft part of which he talked inceffantly, converfed for a few moments on indifferent fubjects, in apparent good humour, and retired. Such was nearly, as I can recollect, the purport of this conference. It muft however be obferved, that he did not, as M. Talleyrand had done, affect to attribute Colonel Sebaftiani's miffion "to commercial motives only," but as one rendered neceflary, in a mi litary point of view, by the infraction by us of the treaty of Amiens. WHITWORTH. P. S. This converfation took place on Friday laft, and this morning I faw M. de Talleyrand. He had been with the Firth Conful after I left him, and be affured me that he had been very well fatisfied with the frankr: fs with which I had made my obferɣations on what fell from him. I told him, that with out entering into any farther detail, what I had faid to the First Conful amounted to an affurance, of what I trufted there could be no doubt, of the readiness of his Majefty's Minifters to remove all fubjects of difcuffion, where that could be done without violating the laws of the country; and to fulfil ftrictly the engagements which they had contracted, in as much as that could be reconciled with the fafety of the ftate. As this applied to Malta and Egypt, he gave me to understand, that a project was in contemplation, by which the integrity of the Turkith empire would be fo effectually fecured as to do away every cause of doubt or uneafinefs, either with regard to Egypt or any part of the Turkish dominions. He could not then, he said, explain himself farther. Under thefe circumstances, no one can expect that we should relinquith that affurance which we have in hand, till fomething equally fatisfactory is propofed and adopted. No. 39. Lord Haweksbury declares his Majesty's approbation of Lord Whitworth's conduct, and as inftructions for his future converfations obferves, that with regard to that article of the treaty which relates to Malta, the stipulations contained in it (owing to cir cumftances which it was not in the power of his Majefty to controul), have not been found capable of execution. The refufal of Ruffia to accede to the arrangement, except on condi tion that the Maltese Langue thould be abolithed; the filence of the Court of Berlin with refpect to the invitation that has been made to it, in consequence of the treaty, to become a guaranteeing power; the abolition of the Spanith in defiance of the treaty to priories, which the King of Spain was a party; -the declaration of the Portugucle Government of their intention to fequeftrate the property of the Portuguefe priory, as forming a part of the Spanish Langue, unless the property of the Spanith priories is rettored to them; -the non-election of a Grand Mater-The circumstances would have been fufficient, without any other special ground, to have warranted his Majetty in fufpending the evacuation of the illand, until fome new arrangement could be adjufled for its fecurity and indepedence. But that the valt increase of the French dominions fince the conclufion of the treaty, and in particular, their views with regard to the Turkish dominions, and the islands in the Adriatic, render more fecurities neceffary. No. 40. Lord Whitworth (Paris, March 5), urges to Talleyrand the contents of Lord Hawkesbury's letter. Both Both thefe reiterate the arguments about Malta, &c. No. 41. A note from M. Andreoffi, demanding the evacuation of Malta, in the fame manner as the French troops had already evacuated the Neapolitan and Papal States. No. XLII. Letter from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, March Lord Whitworth had just been apprifed of the King's meffage-his Lordhip fays. 12. "I found, however, on going to M. de Talleyrand, at two o'clock, that he was already informed of it. He was juft fetting out to communicate it to the First Conful, and appeared under confiderable agitation. He returned with me to his cabinet, and though he told me he was preffed for time, he fuffered me to relate the circumftances without interruption. I endeavoured to make him fenfible that this measure was merely precautionary, and not in the leaft degree intended as a menace I concluded my obfervations by repeating, that it was merely a measure of self-security, founded on the armaments which were carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, remarking at the fame time, that had not even thefe armaments been as notorious as they were, the very circumftance of the First Conful's determination to augment fo confiderably his army in time of peace, would have been a full and fufficient motive for fuch a measure of precaution. M. de Talleyrand now informed me he was already acquainted with the bufinefs that a meffenger had that morning arrived, who had brought him a copy of the meffage, which he communicated to me. I could draw from him no reply to my obfervations. He confined himself ftrictly to the aflurance which he has to repeatedly made, that there was no foundation whatever for the alarm which was felt by his Majefty's Ministers; that the Firit Conful was pacific; that he had no thoughts whatever of attacking his Majesty's dominions, unlefs forced to do fo by a commencement of hostilities on our part; that he fhould always confider the refufal to evacuate Malta as fuch a commencement of boftilities; and that, as we had hitherto he fitated to do to, he was juftified in adopting the meafures which might eventually be necefs fary. He difclaimed every idea of the armaments fitting out in the Dutch ports having any other deftination than to the colonies, and concluded that, for his part, he could not comprehend the motives which had neceffitated the refort to fuch a measure on the part of his Majesty's Government. "He then defred leave to go to the First Conful, promifing that he would let me know the refult when we met at dinner at the Pruffian Minifter's. He did not come there till near feven o'clock, and when we rofe from din ner, he took me afide, and informed me, that although the Firft Conful had been highly irritated at the unjust fnfpicion which his Majesty's Government entertained, yet he would not allow himself to be fo far mattered by his feelings, as to lofe fight of the calamities which the prefent difcuffion might entail upon humanity. He dwelt much on this topic, and explained the measures to which he fhould be obliged to refort; he faid that if England wifhed to difcufs fairly, he wished the fame; that if England prepared for war, he would do the fame; and that if England thould finally determine on hoftilities, he trufted to the fupport of the French nation in the war of honour and of justice. It was in vain that I repeated that England did not with for war; that peace was as neceffary to us as it could be to France; that all we defired, and all that we were contending for, was fecurity; that every thing proved to us that that fecurity was threatened by the Firft Conful's views on Egypt: and that confequently our retural to evacuate Malta, was become as much a neceffary meafure of precaution, as the defence of any part of his Majefty's dominion.. Note verbal referred to in No. 42. 1. If his Britannic Majetty, in bis meffage, means to speak of the expedition of Helvoctiluys, all the world knows that it was defined for America, and that it was on the point of failing for its deftination, but in confequence of his Majefty's meffage the embarkation and putting to fea are about to be countermanded. 2. if we do not receive fatisfactory explanation refpecting thefe armaments in England, and if they actually take 3 Y 2 place, place, It is natural that the First Conful fhould march 20,000 men into Holland, fince Holland is mentioned in the meffage. 3. Thefe troops being once in the country, it is natural that an encampment fhould be formed on the frontiers of Hanover; and, moreover, that additional bodies fhould join thofe troops which were already embarked for America, in order to form new embarkations, and to maintain an offenfive and defenfive pofition. 4. It is natural that the First Conful should order feveral camps to be formed at Calais, and on different points of the coafts. 3. It is likewife in the nature of things, that the Firft Conful, who was on the point of evacuating Switzerland, fhould be under the neceffity of continuing a French army in that country. 6. It is alfo the natural confequence of all this, that the Firft Conful fhould fend a fresh force into Italy, in order to occupy, in cafe of neceflity, the pofition of Tarentum. 7. England arming, and arming with fo much publicity, will compel France to put her armies on the war establishment; a step so important, as cannot fail to agitate all Europe. The refult of all thefe movements will be to irritate the two countries ftile more. France will have been compel led to take all these precautions, in confequence of the English armaments, and, nevertheless, every means will be taken to excite the English nation, by the affertion, that France meditates an invafion. The whole British population will be obliged to put themfelves under arms for their defence, and their export trade will, even before the war, be in a state of ftagnation throughout the whole extent of the countries occupied by the French arms. The experience of nations, and the courfe of events prove, that the diftance between fuch a ftate of things and a&ual hoftility, is unfortunately not remote. As to the differences, of which mention is made in his Britannic Majefty's meffage, we know not of any that we have with England; for it cannot be imagined, that a ferious intention can have existed in England of evading the execution of the treaty of Amiens, under the protection of a military ar mament. Europe well knows that it is poffible to attempt the difmemberment of France, but not to intimidate her. No XLIII. Paris, March 14, 1803. "My Lord-The meffenger Mason went on Saturday with my dispatches of that date, and until yesterday, Sun. day, I faw no one likely to give me any further information, fuch as I could depend upon, as to the effect which his Majefty's meffage had produced on the Firft Conful. At the Court which was held at the Thuilt leries upon that day, he accofted me evidently under very confiderable agitation. He began by alking me if I had any news from Eugland. I told him I had received letters from your Lordship two days ago. He immediately faid, and fo you are determined to go to war. No! I replied, we are too fenfible of the advantages of peace. -Nous avons, faid he, déjà fait la guerre pendant quinze ans.-As he feemed to wait for an anfwer, I observ. ed only, 'C'en eft déjà trop.''Mais, faid he, vous voulez la faire encore quinze années, et vous m'y forcez.'-I told him that was very far from his Majefty's intentions.-He then proceeded to Count Marcow and the Chevalier Azara, who were ftanding at a little diftance from me, and faid to them, 'Les Anglois veulent la guerre, mais s'ils font les premieres à tirer l'efèe, je ferai le dernier à la remettre. Ils ne refpectant pas les traités. Il faut dorénavant les couvrir de crepe noir.' He then went his round. In a few minutes he came back to me, and refumed the converfation, if fuch it can be called, by fomething perfonally civil to me. He began again.- Pourquoi des armèmems? Contre qui des melures de precaution? Je n'ai pas un feul vaiku de ligne dans les ports de France; mais fi vous voulez armer, j'aimerai auffi; fi vous voulez vous battre, je me battrai aufli. Vous pourrez peut être tuer la France, mais ja mais l'intimider. On ne voudroit, faid I, ni l'un ni l'autre. On voudroit vivre en bonne intelligence avec elle.' Il faut done refpecter les traites, replied he; Malheur à ceux qui ne refpetent pas les traités; ils en feront refponfable à toute l'Europe.'-He was too much agitated to make it advifeable for me to prolong the converfation; I there I therefore made no anfwer, and he retired to his apartment, repeating the Jaft phrafe. "It is to be remarked that all this paffed loud enough to be overheard by two hundred people who were prefent, and I am perfuaded that there was not a fingle perfon, who did not feel the extreme impropriety of his conduct, and the total want of dignity, as well as of decency, on this occafion. "I propofe taking the fir opportunity of fpeaking to M. Talleyrand on this fubject. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) "WHITWORTH.” * Rt. Hon. Ld. Hawkesbury,” &c. No 44. is a letter from Lord Hawkefbury to Lord Whitworth, dated March 15, inclofing a note, No 45, in which he dwells upon Sebaftiani's miffion, and enforces the doctrine, that his Majefty should keep a compensation out of his conquefts for the important acquifition of territory made by France upon the Continent." No 46. is a letter from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, March 17, in which he fays, in anfwer to his complaint of the treatment which he had received the preceding Sunday at the Thuillieries: "M. de Talleyrand affured me, that it was very far from the First Conful's intention to diftrefs me; but he had felt himself perfonally infulted by the charges which were brought againft him by the English, Government; and that it was incumbent upon him to take the first opportunity of exculpating himself, in the prefence of the minifters of the different Powers of Eu10pc.' No 48. is a letter from Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, relative to the behaviour of the First Conful, on Sunday, at the Thuilleries, in which he says, "It will be impoffible for you to prefent yourself on any days of ceremony to the Firtt Conful, unlefs you receive an affurance that you will never be expofed to a repetition of the treatment which you experienced on that occafion." No 49. is a letter from the fame to the fame, inclofing a note of Gen. Andreoffi, as follows: The underligned General of Division, Amballador and Minifter Plenipoten tiary from the French Republic, has laid before his Government the note addreffed to him by his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury. He has received orders to make the following anfwer to the obfervations therein contained. The object of this note appears to be to explain his Britannic Majesty's meffage; and to give fome elucidations which had been demanded refpecting the execution of the treaty of Amiens The First Conful will not make any complaint relative to the extraordinary and unexpected affertions of this act iffued by his Britannic Majefty. Not one of them is founded. His Britannic Majefty believes that his kingdom is menaced by preparations made in the ports of Holland and France. He has been deceived: the Firft Conful has made no preparations. There were, at the time of the meffage, but two frigates in the roads of Holland, and but three corvettes in the road of Dunkirk. How can his Britannic Majesty's Minifters have been deceived on facts fo evident? His Britannic Majesty's Ambaffadors at Paris, and at the Hague, have feriously to reproach themfelves, if they have credited information fo evidently falfe, and if they did not forefee that they thereby expofed their government to err in the most important deliberations. Was it not conformable to the usage practifed among nations, firft to demand explanations, and thus to take means for being convinced of the falfehood of the intelligence which the Minifters might have received? Muft not the leaft effects of the omiffion of this custom be, to bring on the ruin of families, and carry confufion, uncertainty, and diforder into all the commercial affairs of both nations? The Firt Conful knows, both from his own fentiments, and judging of other people by the French, that a great nation can never be terrified. He believes that good policy, and the feelings of true dignity, ever inipire the fentiment of efteem for a rival nation, and never the defign of menacing her. A great nation may be deftroyed, but not intimidated. The fecond part of his Majefty's me f fage confits of another affertion no better founded. His Britannic Majefty makes mention of difcuffions, the fuccefs of which is doubtful doubtful. What are thefe difcuffions? What official notes, what protocole prove the opening, the progrefs, the viciffitudes of a debate? Can a state of difficulties, which leads to an alternative of peace or war, fpring up unawares, without commencement, without progreffion, and lead without diftinction, to an appeal to arms, before all the means of conciliation have been exhaufted. In this cafe, the appeal has been publicly made, before it could be known that there was room for inifunderstanding. The termination of the difcuffions was announced before they had begun. The iffue of a difficult difcuffion has been declared before it arofe. What would Europe, what would both nations think, if they knew that thefe difcuffions, announced by his Britannic Majefty as fo difficult to terminate, were unknown to the French Government; and that the Firft Conful, on reading the meffage, could not comprehend the meaning of either of the declarations therein contained. He has alfo abitained from any oftenfible ftep; and whatever may have been the clamour, the activity, the provocations of war, which have taken place in England fince that meffage, he has given no orders, he has made no difpofitions, no preparations. He places his glory in an affair of this nature, wholly in being taken in an unprovided ftate. He will continue in this fyftem of honeft franknefs, until his Britannic Majefty has reflected fully on the part he propofes to take. In Lord Hawkesbury's note, an opinion is expreffed, that the French Republic has increafed in power fince the peace of Amiens. This is a decided error. Since that epoch, France has evacuated a confiderable territory. The French power has received no degree of augmentation. If his Britannic Majelly is determined to make war, he may allege all the pretexts he pleafes. He will find few lefs founded. As to the complaints made refpe&ing the publications which may have appeared in France, they are of an order too fecondary to be capable of influencing fuch a decifion. Are we then returned to the age of tournaments? Motives of this nature might have authorised, four ceturies ago, the combat of Thirties; but they cannot, in this age, be a reafon of war between the two countries. It might fuffice in this respect, to reply to his Excellency, that no repre fentation has been made by him on the fubject to the Government of the Republic; and that, if it was but juice to grant fatisfaction, the Firft Conful had a right to expect that, which was required by M. Otto, in his note of the 22d Thermidor laft, upon grounds more ferious and more juft. Is it poffible that the English Ministry can have been ignorant, that ever fince the conclufion of the treaty of Amiens, the English prefs has not ceafed to fpread, through Europe, the rage of war, the difcredit of peace, and fhame. lefs and boundlefs outrages againft every thing which is the object of the love and veneration of the French people? A few days after the ratification of peace, one of his Britannic Majesty's Minifters declared, that the peace estab. lishment must be confiderable; and the diftruft excited by this declaration, made in Parliament with as much bit ternefs as impropriety, furnished a commentary for the exaggeration and alarms which were circulated in despicable pamphlets, and in newspapers as contemptible as thofe libels. Since that time, thefe writers have found themfelves invariably fupported in their infolent obfervations by particular phrafes taken from the fpeeches of fome leading members of parliament. Thele fpeeches, fcarcely to be exceeded by the news-writers themfelves, have, for thefe eighteen months, tended to encourage infults against other Govern ments to that degree, that every European must be offended, and every reasonable Englishnan must be humiliated by fuch unheard of licentiousnels. What, if we connect with, these fallies, proceedings more offenfive and lericus; the indulgence granted to French chimmals, publiling daily outrages in the French language; the fill more inexcutable toleration extended to villaius, covered with crimes, and plotting affaffinations inceffantly, fuch as Georges, who ftill continues to refide at London, protected, and having a confiderable eftablishment; in a word, the little juftice which has been fhewn to all our reprefentations?-How are we to account for the publicity of the com |