With respect to the immigration of persons into the United States, the authority of the United States is exclusive as regards its commerce power, or its control of foreign relations. The States may not levy a tax on persons entering the United States, such a tax not being relieved from the constitutional objection that it is an interference with commerce by describing it in its title as in aid of an inspection law which authorizes immigrants to be inspected with reference to their being criminals, paupers, lunatics, or persons liable to become a public charge. Inspection laws, the Supreme Court has declared, have reference to property and not to persons.2 Suspension of habeas corpus The provision that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it, is considered in a later chapter dealing with Martial Law.3 Bills of attainder Clause 3 of § IX of Art. I provides that "No bill of attainder shall be passed." This clause has given rise to an inconsiderable number of judicial determinations. The principal case in definition of a bill of attainder is that of Cummings v. Missouri,1 in which the court held unconstitutional the test oath of loyalty imposed by the Constitution of Missouri as a condition precedent to holding any State office of trust or profit, or practicing the profession of the law or ministry. The court declared: "A bill of attainder is a legislative act, which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed a bill of 2 New York v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 59; 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 87; 27 L. ed. 383. 3 Chapter LII. 44 Wall. 277; 18 L. ed. 356. pains and penalties. Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties. In these cases the legislative body in addition to its legitimate functions, exercises the powers and office of a judge, it assumes, in the language of the text-books, judicial magistracy; it pronounces upon the guilt of the party, without any of the forms or safeguards of a trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced, whether conformable to the rules of evidence or otherwise; and it fixes the degree of punishment in accordance with its own notion of the enormity of the offense." The opinion then goes on to declare that the questioned clauses of the Missouri Constitution are also invalid as ex post facto legislation, being aimed at past rather than future acts. In Ex parte Garland,5 decided at the same time as the Cummings case, the court held void, as a bill of attainder, the act of Congress of January 24, 1865, prescribing as a qualification for admission as an attorney before the Federal courts an oath that the deponent had never voluntarily borne arms against the United States, given aid to its enemies, etc. A statute making the non-payment of taxes evidence of disloyalty during the Civil War and providing for the forfeiture of lands without a judicial hearing was held to be a bill of attainder, as was a law excluding from the United States Chinese who are citizens of the United States." Ex post facto legislation The same clause of the Constitution which prohibits bills of attainder declares that no ex post facto legislation shall be valid. 54 Wall. 333; 18 L. ed. 366. Martin v. Snowden, 18 Gratt. 100. 7 In re Yang Sing Hee, 13 Saw. 486. 8 In the early case of Calder v. Bull the prohibition was declared to relate only to criminal and not to civil proceedings, and, as thus limited, ex post facto laws were declared to be "every law that makes an action done before the passing of a law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and requires less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender." By later decisions this definition of ex post facto legislation has been broadened so as to include all laws which in any way operate to the detriment of one accused of a crime committed prior to the enactment of such laws.9 Appropriations It is provided that "no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." This restriction, it is apparent, operates rather upon the officials of the Treasury Department than upon Congress. The legislative body is left free to authorize such expenditures as it may see fit, and to direct the payment to be made by the Secretary of the Treasury. This direction having been given by law, no discretionary power is left with the Treasury Department to determine whether the payment is a proper one.10 8 3 Dall. 386; 1 L. ed. 648. 9 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620; 42 L. ed. 1061. In this case the earlier cases are carefully reviewed. 10 United States v. Price, 116 U. S. 43; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 235; 29 L. ed. 541. Congress may, as has been earlier pointed out, appropriate sums of money for private purposes; for the construction and maintenance of works which the United States could not constitutionally itself construct or operate; and recognize and pay claims of merely an equitable or moral nature.1 11 That money once covered into the United States Treasury may not, by a judicial process, be recovered therefrom without the sanction of an act of Congress, is further discussed under the title "Suability of the United States."'12 Jury trial By Art. III, § II, Clause 3, it is provided that "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury, and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed in any State, the trial shall be at such a place or places as the Congress may by law have directed." By the Sixth Amendment, this requirement of a trial by jury is repeated and the additional condition imposed that the trial of persons accused of crime shall be speedy and public, the jury an impartial one, selected from the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and that the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, be confronted with the witnesses against him, have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and have the assistance of counsel for his defense. The relation between this Amendment, and the third 11 United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1120; 41 L. ed. 215. 12 Chapter XLV. clause of § II of Art. III is, as stated in Callan v. Wilson, 13 that in the latter are enumerated, ex abundanti cautela, the rights to which, according to settled rules of common law, the accused is entitled. Offenses committed outside the jurisdiction of a State. are not local, but may be tried at such places as may be designated by Congress. In Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,14 "trial by jury" is declared to be "a trial by a jury of twelve men in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on the law and to advise them on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict, if, in his opinion, it is against the law or the evidence." Unanimity in the verdict is essential, as are twelve jurors.15 Courts and actions in which jury not required The right of trial by jury provided for in the Constitution applies only in the Federal courts, and in them it applies only to those cases in which, by common practice at the time the Constitution was adopted, it was employed in the colonies and in England. Thus it does not apply to equity causes, to cases in admiralty or to military courts, nor where the special prerogative rights of court are involved, as, for example, in proceedings for disbarment or for contempt.16 Furthermore, it has been generally recognized by courts, Federal as well as State, that the guarantee of the right to a trial by jury does not apply to the petty offenses, 13 127 U. S. 540; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1301; 32 L. ed. 223. See also Story, Commentaries, § 1791. 14 174 U. S. 1; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580; 43 L. ed. 873. 15 Springville v. Thomas, 166 U. S. 707; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 717; 41 L. ed. 1172. 16 In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900; 39 L. ed. 1092. |